Recently, the Allahabad High Court examined the legality of suspending members of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The case brought into focus the scope of disciplinary action against officials discharging quasi-judicial functions under the statute.
Brief Facts:
The Petitioners were appointed as members of an Internal Complaints Committee following a complaint of sexual harassment. The committee conducted an inquiry within a compressed timeline and submitted its report, concluding that the allegations were not proved. Subsequently, while the delinquent officer was suspended, the petitioners themselves were also suspended on allegations of improperly conducting the inquiry and shielding the accused. Aggrieved, they approached the High Court challenging their suspension.
Contentions of the Petitioners :
The counsel for the Petitioners argued that the ICC report under Section 13 is recommendatory and there was no finding that they acted with mala fide intent. The counsel contended that mere disagreement with the committee’s conclusion cannot justify suspension, especially when they were performing quasi-judicial functions.
Contentions of the Respondents:
The State contended that the Petitioners deliberately ignored material evidence and acted in a biased manner to exonerate the accused. Relying on additional material, including witness testimony and an audio recording, it was argued that their conduct amounted to misconduct, justifying suspension and disciplinary proceedings.
Observation of the Court :
The Court drew a clear distinction between the correctness of a decision and the conduct of officials exercising quasi-judicial powers. The Court emphasized that members of an Internal Complaints Committee act in a quasi-judicial capacity and must be allowed to function independently, without fear of disciplinary action merely because their conclusions are not agreeable to the authorities.
In a significant observation, the Court held that “The correctness or legality of the decision cannot be a ground to proceed departmentally… it is only the conduct in discharge of duties which can form the basis.”
The Court further highlighted that before initiating disciplinary action against such authorities, there must be a clear prima facie satisfaction of misconduct beyond mere error of judgment. It cautioned that “Such a prima facie satisfaction is imperative… to ensure that such a quasi-judicial authority does not have the Sword of Damocles hanging over them.”
On the issue of suspension, the Court found that the impugned orders were passed mechanically, without recording any satisfaction that the allegations were गंभीर enough to warrant a major penalty. It noted that “The impugned orders have been passed in a very cursory manner without forming any prima facie satisfaction…” The Court also highlighted procedural concerns, particularly the undue haste in directing the committee to conclude the inquiry within an unrealistic timeframe, which was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
The decision of the Court :
The Court held that the suspension orders were legally unsustainable. It quashed the impugned orders, observing that they suffered from non-application of mind and failed to meet the requirements of service rules. However, the Court granted liberty to the authorities to pass fresh orders, if necessary, in accordance with law and after properly recording reasons and satisfaction as required. Accordingly, the writ petitions were allowed.
Case Title: Km. Sunita Devi v. State of U.P. & Others
Case No.: Writ - A No. 9112 of 2025 (along with Writ - A No. 9114 of 2025)
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manish Mathur
Advocate for the Petitioner: Mr. Sharad Pathak, Senior Advocate (assisted by Ms. Priya Singh)
Advocate for the Respondent: Mr. S.M. Singh Royekwar, Additional Advocate General (assisted by Mr. Akash Sinha
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