Recently, the Karnataka High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against a man accused of storing child sexual abuse material on his mobile phone, holding that mere storage of such content can attract offences under Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, even without proof of actual transmission. The Court emphasised that “it is not transmission alone, but even storage of child pornographic content which has the capacity of being transmitted, which would become an offence.”
Brief Facts:
The case arose from a criminal investigation in which the mobile phone of an accused was seized and subjected to forensic examination. During the analysis, investigators allegedly discovered multiple images and videos depicting children in sexually explicit acts stored in the device. Based on this material, separate proceedings were initiated for offences punishable under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 15 of the POCSO Act, before the competent Sessions Court. Challenging the continuation of these proceedings, the accused approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the charge sheet and criminal case, contending that mere storage of such material, without evidence of transmission or dissemination, would not attract the alleged offences.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The Petitioner argued that the criminal proceedings were legally untenable since the material found on the petitioner’s phone had not been circulated or transmitted to anyone. According to the defence, the essential ingredients of Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the IT Act would be attracted only where there is dissemination or active sharing of such material. The Counsel contended that mere possession or storage of such images and videos, without any act of publication or transmission, cannot by itself constitute a criminal offence. The Petitioner therefore sought quashing of the proceedings, arguing that continuation of the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The State opposed the petition and submitted that the forensic examination of the petitioner’s mobile device revealed multiple images and videos depicting children in sexually explicit acts. The prosecution argued that the statutory framework under the POCSO Act and the IT Act criminalizes not only dissemination but also possession, browsing, downloading, or storage of such material. The State further relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2024), which clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act penalises the storage or possession of child pornographic material with the requisite intent and that actual transmission of such material is not a necessary ingredient of the offence.
Observation of the Court:
The Court rejected the Petitioner’s contention that storage alone cannot constitute an offence, after examining the statutory provisions and the Apex Court precedent. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 15 of the POCSO Act, which recognises the offence as an “inchoate crime”, that is, a preparatory offence aimed at preventing further exploitation of children. The Court observed that the provision penalises the storage or possession of child pornographic material when accompanied by the requisite intent, and that actual transmission is not required for criminal liability to arise.
The Court emphasised that the legislative intent behind the provision is to deter the circulation and exploitation of children through digital media at its earliest stage. It noted that the law punishes the intent and preparatory conduct associated with the possession of such material, recognising that such acts are often precursors to wider dissemination.
The Bench observed that “It is not transmission alone, but even storage of child pornographic content which has the capacity of being transmitted, which would become an offence under Section 15 of the POCSO Act.”
The Court further observed that the petitioner had admittedly stored sexually explicit pictures and videos involving children on his mobile phone, and therefore the ingredients of the alleged offences were prima facie satisfied. It clarified that the absence of evidence of transmission or sharing cannot absolve the accused, as the statutory provisions aim to curb the possession and storage of such material itself.
The Court concluded that the allegations disclosed a prima facie case and directed that the petitioner must face trial, thereby reaffirming the principle that possession or storage of child sexual abuse material constitutes a punishable inchoate offence designed to prevent further exploitation and dissemination of such content.
Consequently, the Court held that the issue of culpability must be determined during trial rather than at the stage of quashing.
The decision of the Court:
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court dismissed the criminal petition and refused to quash the proceedings, holding that the storage of child pornographic material on a digital device itself may attract liability under Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, even in the absence of proof of actual transmission.
Case Title: Sri Binoj P J Vs. State By Karnataka
Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 17142 Of 2025
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.Nagaprasanna
Advocate for the Petitioner: Adv. Deenabandhu Rai N.
Advocate for the Respondent: HCGP Vinay Mahadevaiah,
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