Recently, the Kerala High Court dismissed a criminal revision petition challenging the Special Court’s refusal to discharge an accused in a case involving allegations under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The Court upheld the Special Court’s observation that prima facie evidence of sexual assault as defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, was established. The High Court further emphasized the statutory presumption of culpable mental state under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act.
The case involved allegations against a teacher accused of sexually assaulting a first-grade student at St. Paul’s A.U.P. School, Thrikkaripur. As per the prosecution, the accused called the minor victim to the staff room on multiple occasions, instructed the child to lie on his body, and physically assaulted him when he resisted. The incidents, corroborated by the victim’s statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC, led to charges being framed under Sections 9(f), 9(m) and 10 of the POCSO Act, as well as Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. The accused filed a discharge petition under Section 227 of the CrPC, contending that the allegations did not establish the necessary ingredients of the alleged offences. The Special Court dismissed the petition, prompting the accused to file the present revision petition.
The counsel for the petitioner argued that the allegations lacked sufficient evidence to establish offences under the POCSO Act. It was submitted that the acts described in the victim's statements did not constitute “sexual assault” as defined under Section 7 of the Act. The petitioner further contended that the Special Court erroneously invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act to presume culpable mental state without adequate justification. Whereas, the Public Prosecutor opposed the petition asserting that the Special Court rightly concluded that the petitioner’s acts involved physical contact with sexual intent, falling squarely under the third category of “sexual assault” as per Section 7 of the POCSO Act. It was argued that the prosecution had established sufficient prima facie evidence warranting a trial on the charges framed.
The High Court extensively analyzed the allegations and the applicable legal framework under the POCSO Act. Referring to the prosecution’s case, the Court noted that the accused, a teacher, allegedly called the minor victim to the staff room multiple times and forced him to lie on his body. When the child resisted, the accused physically assaulted him, which led the victim to comply out of fear. The Court observed that such overt acts, as alleged, prima facie constituted physical contact with sexual intent, fulfilling the requirements of Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The Court referred to Section 7, which defines sexual assault as any act involving physical contact without penetration done with sexual intent. Quoting the provision, the Court remarked, “The third part [of Section 7] states that doing any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is also deemed as sexual assault. Here, the accused caused physical contact by lying the child upon his body, while also lying on a desk in the staff room”.
Further, the Court upheld the Special Court’s reliance on Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which provides for statutory presumptions in cases of sexual offences. Section 29 presumes the culpability of the accused, while Section 30 presumes the existence of a culpable mental state unless the accused proves otherwise. The Court, quoting the statute, noted “Section 30 mandates that in any prosecution under the POCSO Act, the Special Court shall presume the existence of culpable mental state. It is for the accused to rebut this presumption by proving that no such mental state existed at the time of the alleged act”. The Court concluded that the Special Court had rightly dismissed the discharge plea, observing that the prosecution had presented sufficient material to justify framing charges. It held, “This Court cannot hold, based on the records, that offences punishable under Sections 9(f), (m), and 10 of the POCSO Act are not made out, prima facie, to frame charge and proceed with trial. The Special Court’s order does not require any interference”.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition and vacated the interim order. It directed the Registry to forward a copy of the order to the Special Court within three days for information and further steps.
Case Title: Ajith Prasad Edacherry v. State of Kerala
Citation: CRL.Rev. Pet No. 884 of 2024
Coram: Justice M. Nirmal Kumar
Advocate for Appellant: Adv. Prajit Ratnakaran, Abdul Raoof Pallipath, Rajesh V. Nair, E. Mohammed Shafi
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Renjit George
Read Judgment@Latestlaws.com
Picture Source :
