The Delhi High Court Bench comprising Justice Asha Menon in the Case of Sneha Ahuja v. Satish Chander Ahuja and Another held that Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act cannot be used to override section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act dealing with women’s right of Shared Household.
Background of the Case
This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India had been filed by the petitioner seeking the setting aside of the order dated 19th April 2021 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (ADJ), South-East District Saket, New Delhi.
In the present case, the petitioner is the daughter in law of the respondent. Respondent filed an Eviction Suit against the Petitioner to evict her from their residentials house. In this an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 filed by respondent No.1 resulted in the order dated 8th April 2019 whereby the suit was decreed. Against this decree, a Regular First Appeal (RFA) was filed by the petitioner. This RFA was disposed of along with several other matters by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 18th December 2019 whereby the decree dated 8th April 2019 was also set aside and the matter was remanded back to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication.
Submissions of the Counsel
Mr J.P. Sengh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, had submitted that the learned Trial Court had completely misdirected itself in its understanding of the directions of the High Court as well as the Supreme Court. According to the learned senior counsel, the Supreme Court had underlined the need for determining the question, whether the premises constituted “shared household”, and was of the view that evidence was required to determine this question. Thus, the learned Trial Court could not have, in this summary manner, directed the eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises, where she had been residing for about twenty years.
The Petitioner submitted that the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were married in the year 1995, and she had come into and had started living on the first floor of the suit premises since then. However, in the year 2004, respondent No.2 shifted to the ground floor with his parents, though an attempt was made to pretend that he had shifted elsewhere. Further, it was submitted that respondent No. 2 filed a divorce petition in 2014. Thereafter, an effort had been made to somehow throw the petitioner out of her matrimonial home.
It was submitted that the petitioner had pleaded in her written statement that the suit premises had been purchased with funds from the joint family business and therefore, was not the self-acquired property of the respondents. This question had to be decided only after evidence had been brought on record. However, even if the suit premises belonged to the respondent, nevertheless, since it was a shared household, the petitioner could not be evicted without proper adjudication of facts.
The learned senior counsel further argued that an application under Section 19 of the DV Act could be filed only by the “aggrieved person”, to seek an alternate residence and it was in that context that the High Court had observed that the learned Trial Court would be empowered to consider the question for grant of an alternate residence to the petitioner. It was not as if the High Court had issued directions to the respondents to move such an application and made it binding on the learned Trial Court to pass eviction orders subject to provision of alternate accommodation. Such an understanding of the directions by the learned Trial Court was erroneous.
It was further submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the learned Trial Court ought to have abided by the caution of the High Court that the orders granting alternate accommodation could not be rendered “meaningless”. However, without considering the fact that the respondent No.2/husband had not paid the maintenance which was in arrears and for which execution had to be filed and that the respondent No.2/ husband had also applied to the court to modify the order as he claimed he was unable to pay the electricity charges, it accepted the offer of the respondents to pay the rent for alternate accommodation. Moreover, in the time of Covid-19, the learned Trial Court had directed the petitioner to herself search out an alternate accommodation and vacate the suit premises. Such an order was against the spirit of the directions of the High Court. Therefore, the impugned order was liable to be set aside.
Order of the Court
The court in its order stated that,
"Significantly, it is for the learned Trial Court to determine the nature of the relationship between the parties and to permit eviction if the relationship was acrimonious. The learned Trial Court was also to ascertain, whether the daughter-in-law was residing in a joint family. This was to be during the subsistence of matrimonial life. But the learned Trial Court has not dealt with these aspects at all as it felt bound to call for the application from the respondents and issue an eviction order forthwith. Important facts have been overlooked."
The Court relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in S Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District [Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020] that needs to be taken into account by the Courts while balancing the rights of the daughter-in-law and the senior citizens.
Observing so, the Court said:
"Therefore, in the event of a composite dispute where the suit premises is a site of contestation between the two groups protected by the law, appropriately moulded reliefs qua both the sides ought to be granted. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law particularly that of a women's "right to a shared household" under Section 17 of the DV Act."
"In other words, the factual situation had to be assessed at least on a prima facie evaluation before directing the eviction of the daughter-in-law from what she describes as her 'shared household'. It bears repetition that the Supreme Court has held that what constitutes a shared household is a matter of evidence."
Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the Court noted that the Trial Court had not come to a cogent conclusion that the relationship between the parties was acrimonious and that it had also overlooked the interim injunction which was still in force against the petitioner which she had clearly not violated.
Court highlighted the facts that Trial Court had not given thought to this question of shared household even perfunctorily, the Court said that there is an obligation on the Trial Court to weigh all circumstances before directing eviction of the daughter-in-law being an onerous one has not been duly discharged.
The Court said that,
"It cannot be overlooked that the impugned order was passed on 19th April 2021 when Delhi was at the peak of the second wave of Covid-19. The hospitals were overflowing with patients and no family had remained untouched by the mayhem caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, it left the petitioner to search for herself and take some premises on rent. The Court also said that while jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised as if the Court is an Appellate Court, it was observed that in cases where the Trial Court overlooks significant facts and considers irrelevant facts, the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction would interfere with a decision of a Trial Court, especially in the event the orders appear to be perverse and unreasonable.”
At last, it was concluded that,
"Senior Citizens, Act, 2007 and PWDV Act, 2005 are to be read simultaneously and a wife cannot be ousted from her matrimonial home on the basis of the summary proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007."
The directions issued to the petitioner to shift out to a rented accommodation were most unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned order.
Case Details
Title: Senha Ahuja v. Satish Chander Ahuja and Anr.
Bench: Justice Asha Menon
Read Order@LatestLaws.com
Picture Source :
