Recently, while testing the boundaries of reformative justice and administrative discretion, the Delhi High Court turned its gaze on the functioning of the Sentence Review Board (SRB). At the heart of the matter lay a life convict’s plea for premature release, repeatedly denied despite over two decades of incarceration and a trail of reformative conduct. Could the SRB’s mechanical rejection withstand judicial scrutiny when pitted against constitutional ideals of fairness, rehabilitation, and reasoned decision-making? Read on to explore how the Court dissected these tensions and redefined the role of administrative bodies in upholding the spirit of justice.
Brief Facts:
The case stemmed from the petitioner's conviction in two criminal cases under Sections 302/120B/364A/384/186/353/307/419 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), including murder and abduction for ransom, and sentenced to life imprisonment, a verdict upheld by the Delhi High Court. Having served over 18 years without remission and 21 years with remission, he sought premature release under the Delhi Government’s 2004 policy. The Sentence Review Board (SRB) repeatedly rejected his applications, citing the gravity of the crime, his 2010 parole jump, and re-arrest in two 2015 cases, in which he was acquitted in 2018. In an earlier writ petition, the High Court directed reconsideration under the 2004 policy. After withdrawing a related SLP before the Supreme Court, the petitioner filed the present writ, seeking a mandamus for release.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The petitioner contended that the Sentence Review Board (SRB) failed to properly apply the 2004 policy, as mandated by the Delhi High Court in Bijender & Ors. vs State (2024) by ignoring his reformative progress. He argued that the SRB’s repeated, mechanical rejections, evident from “copy-paste” minutes, reflect a lack of genuine consideration. A single parole jump in 2010 and a 2015 re-arrest (followed by acquittal in 2018), he submitted, should not justify indefinite denial of release after over 15 years of incarceration. He cites commendation certificates for good conduct, including contributions during the Covid-19 pandemic, yoga training, and painting competitions, as evidence of sustained reformation. He further asserted that the SRB failed to consider key factors under the 2004 policy, such as his reduced risk of reoffending, potential for reintegration, and his family’s socio-economic condition.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The respondents justified the SRB’s rejection of the petitioner’s premature release on the grounds of the grave and heinous nature of his crimes, namely abduction for ransom and murder, coupled with his non-reformative conduct as evidenced by his parole jump in 2010 and subsequent re-arrest in two new criminal cases in 2015. They argued that while the petitioner’s commendation certificates may make him eligible for consideration, they do not entitle him to premature release as a matter of right. Additionally, the police have strongly opposed his release, citing concerns about the likelihood of his reoffending. It is further contended that the SRB, being a technical body, exercised its discretion appropriately, and judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution should be minimal in such matters. However, in the event the Court finds the SRB’s decision unsustainable, the appropriate course would be to remand the matter for reconsideration by the SRB in its forthcoming meeting.
Observation of the Court:
Justice Girish Kathpalia observed, “In the overall circumstances of this case, I have no doubt that the petitioner stands substantially reformed and can become a useful member of the society. Keeping the petitioner in jail for further period would not yield any fruitful result towards his reformation or to the society at large.”
The High Court, in a significant ruling rooted in the philosophy of reformative justice, held that the Sentence Review Board’s (SRB) rejection of the petitioner’s premature release suffered from “vices of non-application of mind and completely mechanical approach to such a sensitive issue”. The Court emphasized that the SRB’s repetitive, near-identical minutes across multiple rejections failed to demonstrate reasoned decision-making, undermining the principles of fairness and reformation central to premature release policies.
The Court began its analysis by critically examining the decision-making process of the SRB, observing that its orders lacked individualized reasoning. It emphasized that “Every instrumentality of the State, be it judicial or administrative, while deciding an issue must author the decision in such manner that deciphers what worked in the mind of the authority concerned. The court must have material before it to examine as to whether there was proper application of mind or not. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest proper application of mind by the SRB”.
Further, the Court identified structural deficiencies in the composition of the SRB, noting that key members, particularly high-ranking officials, frequently delegated their responsibilities to representatives. This practice, the Court observed, undermined the board’s capacity to meaningfully assess cases that require a nuanced understanding of human behavior and reformative progress. Emphasizing the need for a more substantive approach, the Court remarked, “The approach of the SRB ought to be reformation oriented and not a routine disposal/statistics dominated exercise.”
Examining the grounds for rejecting the petitioner’s release, the Court systematically dismantled the SRB’s rationale. On the gravity of the crime, it noted, “Not that due to passage of time, the inherent perversity of the crime per se diminishes in any manner. But for the purposes of reformative sentencing, such long incarceration, as already suffered by the petitioner, the perversity must be visualised as faded. The wound suffered by the kith and kin of the deceased, which was fresh in the year 2001, would have by now reduced to scab. Time heals all wounds”.
Regarding the petitioner’s parole violation in 2010 and re-arrest in 2015, the Court emphasized that “some point of time has to be there, when aftereffects of such misconduct must taper down,” especially since the petitioner was acquitted in the subsequent cases and showed no further misconduct. The Court also rejected the SRB’s speculative concern about the petitioner’s propensity to reoffend, finding it unsupported by evidence and contradicted by his commendation certificates, which included recognition for his contributions during the Covid pandemic and participation in rehabilitative programs. The Court observed, “These certificates, coupled with the fact that across a period of time, the petitioner was released on parole and furlough more than once show a substantial reformative growth of the petitioner, which is a vital indicator of reduced propensity to commit crime again”.
Addressing the police’s objections and the SRB’s reliance on precedents, the Court stated, “As regards the ‘strong objection’ by police to allow the petitioner premature release, no reasonable grounds of objection have been spelt out. However, in this regard, the police also has to shift their paradigm from oppressive punitive approach to reformatory approach. Not everything propounded for an accused or a convict has to be opposed by police as a matter of routine”.
While relying on Gurvinder Singh vs State (Govt. of NCT) of Delhi and Anr., the Court reiterated, “However, in the impugned order, there is no discussion on the aspects viz., (i) whether the convict has lost his potential for committing crime considering his overall conduct in jail during the 14 year incarceration, (ii) the possibility of reclaiming the convict as a useful member of the society, and (iii) the socio-economic condition of the convict's family. It is settled law that if the administrative power has been exercised without considering, or without application of mind to, the relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded manifestly erroneous”.
The decision of the Court:
In the light of the foregoing discussion, while allowing the petition, the Court directed the respondent to consider afresh the petitioner’s case for premature under Sections 302/120B/364A/384/186/353/307/419 of the IPC, in accordance with the 2004 policy and the parameters discussed in the judgment, within four weeks. The Court further added that if the SRB denies premature release, its decision must clearly reflect the reasoning applied. The competent authority is also expected to deliberate on reconstituting the SRB and refining the 2004 policy as suggested.
Case Title: Vikram Yadav Vs. State Govt. Of Nct of Delhi
Case No.: W.P.(CRL) 3429/2024
Coram: Justice Girish Kathpalia
Advocate for Appellant/Petitioner: Sr. Advocate Arundhati Katju, Advocates Ali Chaudhary, Shristi Borthakur and Abuzar Ali
Advocate for Respondent: ASC Sanjeev Bhandari, Advocates Sushant Bali, Avita Bhandari, Arjit Sharma and Nikunj Bindal, with Inspector Shrichand and SI Anil, PS Seemapuri
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