In a significant ruling involving public employment and service jurisprudence, the Calcutta High Court delved into the legal limits of judicial review in matters of age determination for government employees. At the heart of the dispute was whether a belated request for correction of date of birth, based on a subsequently attested school certificate, could override an earlier medical board assessment accepted into official service records. The case raised vital questions about the scope of permissible rectification, the binding nature of expert assessments, and the procedural sanctity under statutory service regulations. Read on to explore how the Court interpreted overlapping documentary and medical evidence while maintaining institutional discipline in service matters.
Brief facts:
The case arose from a dispute concerning the rectification of the petitioner’s date of birth in the service records of the Damodar Valley Corporation (D.V.C.). The petitioner, appointed on compassionate grounds, had submitted a school Transfer Certificate reflecting his date of birth as December 10, 1968. However, the certificate lacked the requisite attestation. Consequently, a medical board assessed his age to be approximately 30 years, and his date of birth was recorded as June 13, 1965, in the Service Book. After obtaining the necessary attestation in 1998, the petitioner applied for correction. Although an identity card issued by D.V.C. in 2019 reflected the corrected date, his rectification request made in 2001 was allegedly rejected without proper communication. Subsequent applications in 2023 and 2025 were also denied, and a retirement notice was issued on the basis of the 1965 entry. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the present Court seeking appropriate relief.
Contentions of Petitioner:
The petitioner submitted that his Transfer Certificate, showing December 10, 1968, as his date of birth, was valid but initially lacked attestation due to an inadvertent error. After obtaining attestation in 1998, he applied for rectification in 1999, within five years of appointment, relying on the Government of India. He argued that Clause 2 of the interview letter gave primacy to the Transfer Certificate over the medical board’s assessment. He also relied on the 2019 D.V.C. identity card reflecting the corrected date. The 2001 rejection, he claimed, was never communicated, and his 1999 application remained pending until its flawed dismissal in 2025. He maintained there was no delay in his claim, having followed D.V.C.'s procedures, and relied on Supreme Court rulings in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority and Ors. Vs. Manju Jain and Ors., Gendalal Vs. Union of India & Ors., and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Chhota Birsa Uranw to support his right to rectification.
Contentions of Respondent:
The respondent contended that under the D.V.C Act, 1948, and its Service Regulations, particularly Regulation 21, correction of date of birth is allowed only for clerical errors, which was not the case here. It was submitted that the petitioner’s unattested Transfer Certificate necessitated a medical board assessment under Clause 2 of the interview letter and the 1985 Circular, leading to the valid entry of June 13, 1965. The 1999 application was termed belated, the attestation irrelevant, and the 2019 identity card reflecting 1968 a clerical error. Relying on Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Ltd. Vs. T. P. Nataraja & Ors. and South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Ors. vs. Avinash Kumar Tiwari, the respondent argued the claim was time-barred. It was further submitted that the 2001 rejection was communicated and the petitioner had accepted the 1965 entry in a 1999 promotion application.
Observations of the Court:
A Single Judge Bench Justice Aniruddha Roy observed, "On a harmonious reading of the above, this Court is of the firm view that, there are two independent provisions, as referred to above. If the first provision fails then the second provision applies. Thus, there is no conflict between the two."
The Court noted that Clause 2 of the interview letter and the D.V.C. Circular provided two independent methods for determining age: either through a duly attested Transfer Certificate or, where such a certificate was inadequate, through a medical board assessment. Since the petitioner’s Transfer Certificate submitted in 1995 lacked the required attestation, the medical board’s assessment was validly applied. Accordingly, the Court held that “there was no bona fide mistake or clerical error in recording the date of birth in the Service Book of the petitioner.”
It further observed that Regulation 21 of the D.V.C. Service Regulations permits alteration of the date of birth only in cases of clerical error, which was not applicable in this case, as the entry was based on a valid and recognized method under D.V.C. rules. The Court concluded, “In view of the said provision laid down under Regulation 21 only in case of a bona fide clerical mistake, if committed in recording the date of birth in the Service Book, then only it is permitted to be altered at a later stage. On a meaningful and harmonious reading of the said provisions, this Court is of the considered view that, as discussed above already, no such bona fide clerical mistake has been committed in recording the date of birth in the Service Book”
The Court stressed, "The law is well settled that, Court cannot sit in appeal on a decision and opinion of experts neither the Court can substitute an expert’s opinion," affirming the medical board's unchallenged assessment. It further noted, “When on a close scrutiny of records it reveals that the procedure of law/statutory regulation has been followed and the decision has been arrived at, procedural infirmity or illegality or error in application of law or mis-construction of law may be there on the face of the decision making process and/or on the decision, but the same cannot be termed as genuine bona fide or clerical mistake on the decision”.
The Court declined to address the petitioner's arguments on delay or communication of the 2001 rejection, deeming them irrelevant given the absence of a clerical error.
The decision of the Court:
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred, delayed, and unsupported by any bona fide clerical error. It upheld the statutory autonomy of D.V.C. under the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948, and its Service Regulations, particularly Regulation 21, which permits correction of the date of birth only in cases of clerical mistake. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed without any order as to costs, and the petitioner’s date of retirement, scheduled for June 30, 2025, based on the Service Book entry of June 13, 1965, remains unaltered.
Case Title: Gangadhar Mondal Vs. Union of India & Ors.
Case No.: W.P.A. 11453 of 2025
Coram: Justice Aniruddha Roy
Advocate for Petitioner: Advocates Uttiya Ray and Anima Maiti
Advocate for Respondent: Advocates Sabita Roy and Pratik Majumder
Read Judgment @ Lateslaws.com
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