The Author, Juhi Senguttuvan is a Final Year Law Student at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Haryana.
       I. Facts

A Writ Petition was filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 by Lalita Kumari (minor) through her father. The main grievance stated in the Petition was that in 2008, the father submitted a written missing person report at the police station in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh after failed attempts of tracing his daughter. The police officer refused to register the FIR under Section 154 (“the Provision”) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“Code).[1] Thereafter, the father approached the Superintendent of Police, and on his directions, the FIR registered.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt of U.P. and Ors.,[2]acknowledged that the law surrounding compulsory registration of FIR was uncertain due to conflicting judgements passed by the Courts. This uncertainty led to a referral to the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court[3] in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh.[4]

  1. Issues

There has been a lot of discrepancy and uncertainty relating to whether the registration of the FIR is mandatory under the Provision or whether a discretion lies with the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry, prior to the registration of the FIR. From these discrepancies, four critical issues of interpretation arose for the Court to decide.

  1. Whether the Provision should be read purposively, in light of the purpose and circumstances behind the enactment of the Provision, while balancing the rights of the accused as well as the victims? 
  2. Whether the words of the Provision should be construed literally to mean the registration of an FIR is mandatory upon the disclosure of a cognizable offence?
  3. Whether the word ‘shall’ appearing in the Provision should be interpreted as mandatory or discretionary?
  4. Whether the use of the word ‘information’ within the Provision meant that the FIR could only be registered after the police officer is satisfied with the credibility or reasonableness of the information disclosing the cognizable offence?
  5. Rules

To resolve the above-mentioned issues, the Court relied on the following rules of interpretation:

  1. Literal Construction

Under the literal rule of construction, if the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous and, interpreting the words in their ordinary meaning does not create an absurdity or inconsistency; the Court is required to apply the literal rule construction to convey the intent of the Legislator.[5] In contrast to the literal rule, purposive interpretation considers various other factors such as the purpose for which the provision was enacted, thereby permitting the judges to go beyond the text of the statute.[6]

The Court further relies on statutory stare decisis as a principle rule of interpretation.[7] Under this, the Courts are free to rely on earlier decisions that establish the procedural rules, standards and the overall operation of a provision.[8] This application further raises a super-strong presumption that previous decisions relating to the Provision are correct and should not be overturned.[9]

In sum, the reliance on precedents results in creating overall stability and predictability in the way the Court applies its previous decisions, ensuring an overall consistency in the law and little to no deviation from what has been held previously.[10]

  1. Interpretation of the word ‘shall.’

The Court relies on subsidiary rules as guiding principles to interpret the word ‘shall’ appearing within the Provision. The use of the word ‘shall’ is not always indicative of the absence of discretion as supported by judicial precedents, nor can a definitive meaning be given to the word ‘shall’ which will then apply in all cases.[11] By placing reliance on how the Courts have previously interpreted the word ‘shall’, the use of precedents as external aid in statutory interpretation[12] leads to consistency and uniformity in the process of interpretation.

There is reliance placed on subsidiary rules of interpretation through the use of Harmonious Construction that enables the Court to harmoniously construe two provisions within the Code without having to change the meaning of the other or making one of them redundant.[13]

  1. Interpretation of the word ‘Information.’

To interpret ‘information’ appearing within the Provision, there is a presumption that the deliberate omission on the part of the Legislature is not a mistake and that the legislator intended to say what has been stated in the statute.[14] Further, there is an application of the principle of casus omissus. Under this, the Court is not competent to supply an omission for that will constituent as lawmaking. The primary focus of the Courts is jus dicere non facere that is to declare or decide the law.[15]

  1. Analysis

The Court places its reliance on the primary rule of interpretation – the literal rule of statutory construction to focus on the language of the Provision. The literal rule, in its purest form, is an inflexible rule which interprets the statute only through its wordings. The Indian Courts have been applying this rule of construction in instances where the words are clear, unambiguous and plain.[16] In the present context, when oral information is provided disclosing a cognizable offence, the police officer shall reduce the information into writing either by him or under his direction. The plain reading of the Provision does not lead to any absurdity or ambiguity, nor does it refer to any discretion of some sort; therefore, the rule of literal construction was adopted by the Courts.

The Court actively rejects other forms of interpretation such as purposive interpretation as this can only be resorted to if the outcome of reading the statute literally, produces absurd and unreasonable meanings which are incompatible with the statute in question.[17] The Court does not place sole reliance on this reasoning. While examining the outcome of purposive interpretation, the Court is satisfied that the consequences of granting discretion will be far-reaching and ultimately result in the violation of the victims’ rights. Hence, there exists no discretion.

Next, the Court derives legislative intent through the case of Bhajan Lal,[18] which categorically stated that the mandate of the Provision makes it clear that upon receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence, the police officer cannot embark upon an inquiry to test the veracity of the information provided or refuse the registration on the same grounds.[19] Hence, the only condition which is quintessential for the recording the FIR is the disclosure of a cognizable offence. The police officer has no option but to record the information when plain words of the Statute are given their literal meaning.[20]

Here, an evident nuance can be seen in the way the literal rule is applied in the present context. In its traditional application, the literal rule is to determine the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute.[21] However, the Court uses precedents as guiding principles to construe interpretations in line with what has been held previously, while affirming the presumption that the previous decisions were correct.[22] This is an application of the doctrine of stare decisis by the Court, which is used as a tool for statutory interpretation[23] which prioritizes coherence and stability in the process of decision making.[24] Dworkin characterizes this coherence with integrity in law and uses it as a metaphor to explain how each new interpretation of a statute is equal to a chapter in a chain novel.[25]

Although the Court is going a step further in the present case as compared to what was held in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the rationale remains the same. All that Lalita Kumari (supra) does, it adds another chapter to what has been held previously relating to the same Provision. Along with this, precedents act as judicial restraint on judges through which they substitute their own values in decision-making by relying on precedents as a statutory tool of interpretation—thereby deriving the purpose and intent from the statute itself.[26]

While settling the controversy relating to the context of ‘shall’, the Court relies on precedents as an external aid [27] to arrive at a conclusion which is consistent with the previous decisions. The Court does not go against the precedent [28] by declaring all provisions using ‘shall’ as mandatory. The Court examines the intent of the Legislature and the consequences that may flow from holding the word ‘shall’ as ‘may’ in the context of the Provision. The intent of the Legislature is a determining factor which decides the meaning of the words used and not merely the language in which the intent is clothed.[29] Prima facie, the word ‘shall’ is mandatory; however, the duty is on the Court to attend to the whole of scope of the Act to ascertain the real meaning.[30] In doing so, the Court affirms the application of the legal maxim Ex Visceribus Actus meaning, construction of the Provision should be within the four corners of the Act when the entire scheme of the Code is examined to interpret the Provision.[31] The Court also refers to Section 39 of the Code which casts a statutory duty upon persons to report certain cognizable offences to the police. The Court finds it absurd and illogical to say that every person has a statutory duty to report a cognizable offence; still, the police officer is under no obligation to register the report.[32]By construing the word ‘shall’ to mean mandatory, the Court harmoniously construes the word ‘shall’ appearing in both, Section 39 and Section 154 of the Code to avoid the absurdity of the word having two different meanings in the same Code, and in different Sections.

In terms of the interpretation of the word ‘information’, if the legislator wanted to add words like ‘credible’ or ‘reliable’ to the Provision, they would have done so. The fact that there is no such mention neither in the scheme of the Code nor the Provision is indicative of the legislators intent to specifically exclude such terms. Unless such reading results in any absurdity or anomaly, the Court must interpret the Provision under what has been stated above.[33] The Supreme Court relied on two principles of construction [34] as, under Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes,[35] namely omission of the Legislature cannot be readily inferred, and the statute needs to be read as a whole. In another case,[36] while placing reliance on Craies,[37] it was held that a casus omissus can in no situation be supplied by the Judiciary as this would be entering in the domain of the legislature.[38] Adding words like ‘credible’ or ‘reliable’ goes against the intent of the legislature as clearly, the intent was not to put a standard on the kind of information which is worthy of being registered as an FIR. To do so would be legislating and not constructing the interpretation of the Provision.[39] In the whole scheme of the Code, no such inference can be drawn and thus, ‘information’ within the Provision must mean any information disclosing the cognizable offence.

In the overall interpretation of by the Court, there is an underlying tone of textualism. The use of textualism enables the general population to read the statute and be aware of their rights, obligations and duties and limits the scope of judicial intervention.[40] By stressing on the words of the legislator over and above judicial interpretation, legislative supremacy is valued, and judicial restraint is exercised.[41] However problematic or outdated textualism may be, the Court balances the drawbacks by approaching textualism more liberally. The Court does not merely rely on the language of the Provision to decide the outcome but rather, also focuses on the legislative intent and purpose behind the Provision.[42] In this context, the Court was satisfied that the words were unambiguous, complete and reasonable. Moreover, the Court weighs polity considerations as well by examining the outcome of reading the Provision in various ways and choosing the one which produced the best result in consonance with the Legislator’s intent.[43] In doing so, the Court rejects the strict textualism theory, which fails to consider the meaning of text within the context in which it is to be interpreted.[44]

  1. Conclusion

The application of the various rules and aids of interpretation by the Court is a smart way of upholding the intent of the Legislature while giving the ordinary meaning to the words of the Provision. The Court is mindful of the fact that placing sole reliance on any form of interpretation produces problematic results. In a strategy to avoid these, external aids, primary rules of interpretation and presumptions are used for assistance, to harmoniously construe all factors that are essential to determine the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code. 

In doing so, the result, which is produced, is in line with the reason why the Provision exits; that is to immediately register the FIR, which can kickstart the investigation into the crime. If any of the rules were misplaces or misapplied, the result could have been catastrophic, violating the rights of the affected.

References:

 

[1] Act No. 2 of 1974

[2] Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2008) 14 SCC 337

[3] Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2012) 4 SCC 1 ¶ 97-100

[4] (2014) 2 SCC 1

[5]Dale McFadzean and Lynn Allardyce Irvine, 'INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION', Legal Method Essentials for Scots Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh University Press 2017) www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1pk86mp.9. accessed 2 June 2020.

[6] Aharon Barak, 'The Essence Of Purposive Interpretation', Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005) http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7pg5z.6. accessed 3 June 2020.

[7] Lawrence M. Solan, 'Precedent In Statutory Interpretation' (2016) 94 pp. 1225 North Carolina Law Review https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/2 accessed 3 June 2020.

[8] Ibid at 1231

[9]Anita S. Krishnakumar, 'Textualism And Statutory Stare Decisis' (2016) 104 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/44863678. accessed 2 June 2020.

[10] Lawrence M. Solan, 'Precedent In Statutory Interpretation' (2016) 94 pp. 1225 North Carolina Law Review https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/2 accessed 3 June 2020.

[11]Sharif-ud Din v Abdul Gani Lone AIR 1980 SC 303

[12] T. K. Viswanathan, 'Principles Of Interpretation Of Statutes', Legislative Drafting: Shaping the Law for the New Millennium (2nd edn, Indian Law Institute 2007) 204-262 http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/714/17/Principles%20of%20Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf accessed 3 June 2020.

[13] Ibid at 234-239

[14] Delhi Financial Corporation and Anr. V. Rajiv Anand and Ors.  (2004) 11 SCC 625 ¶ 17 & 21

[15] The Assistant Commissioner Assessment-II vs M/S. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. & Anr (2003) 11 SCC 405 ¶ 27

[16] T. K. Viswanathan, 'Principles Of Interpretation Of Statutes', Legislative Drafting: Shaping the Law for the New Millennium (2nd edn, Indian Law Institute 2007) http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/714/17/Principles%20of%20Interpretation%20of%20Statutes.pdf accessed 3 June 2020.

[17] See supra Note 16 & Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (p) Ud, (2003) 2 SCC 111 at 12

[18] State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335

[19] Ibid  ¶ 30

[20] Lalita Kumari (2012) 4 SCC 1 ¶ 39

[21] Richard H. Fallon J., 'Three Symmetries Between Textualist And Purposivist Theories Of Statutory Interpretation - And The Irreducible Roles Of Values And Judgment Within Both' (2014) 99 Cornell Law Review accessed 2 June 2020.

[22] See Supra Note 9

[23] Jordan Wilder Connors, 'Treating Like Sub decisions Alike: The Scope Of Stare Decisis As Applied To Judicial Methodology' (2008) 108 Columbia Law Review http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041775. accessed 2 June 2020.

[24] Lawrence M. Solan, 'Precedent In Statutory Interpretation' (2016) 94 pp. 1225 North Carolina Law Review https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/2 accessed 3 June 2020.

[25] Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). & Lawrence M. Solan, 'Precedent In Statutory Interpretation' (2016) 94 pp. 1225 North Carolina Law Review https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss4/2 accessed 3 June 2020.

[26] Ibid

[27]Dale McFadzean and Lynn Allardyce Irvine, 'INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION', Legal Method Essentials for Scots Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh University Press 2017) www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1pk86mp.9. accessed 2 June 2020.

[28] Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132

[29] Crawford on the Construction of Statutes (1940) at 516

[30] State of UP. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751.

[31] Mukund Sarda, 'Important General Rules Of Interpretation: A Study' [2016] SSRN Electronic Journal https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758062 accessed 2 June 2020.

[32] Khub Chand v. the State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074 ¶ 46

[33] Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India AIR 2002 SC 1351 at 1354.

[34] Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Taj Traders AIR 1980 SC 485 ¶ 10

[35] (12th Edition) at 33

[36] State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation (1980) 4 SCC 697

[37] William Feilden Craies and Samuel Gairdner Gibson Edgar, Craies On Statute Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 1971) at 71

[38] See Supra Note 37 ¶ 16

[39] G.P. Singh and A. K Patnaik, Principles Of Statutory Interpretation (12th edn, LexisNexis 2011).

[40] William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, 'Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning' (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d221/f6dc842d5824841ada8ac9f663c7006e28fc.pdf accessed 1 June 2020.

[41] William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, 'Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning' (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d221/f6dc842d5824841ada8ac9f663c7006e28fc.pdf accessed 1 June 2020.

[42] Ibid

[43] See Supra Note 41

[44] See Supra Note 41 & NLRB v. Federbush Co. 121 D.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)

 

 

 

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Juhi Senguttuvan