Recently, the Supreme Court revisited a decades-old murder case arising from a village land dispute, where multiple individuals were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The case, involving allegations of group violence and conflicting eyewitness accounts, prompted the Court to re-examine the principles governing common object and constructive liability in unlawful assembly offences.
Brief Facts:
The case originates from a judgment delivered by the High Court, which affirmed the conviction of several accused individuals for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The incident took place in November 1988, when two villagers went to inspect their agricultural land. They were confronted by a large group of people armed with weapons, and violence ensued, in which two people were killed while several others suffered injuries. One injured eyewitness was hospitalised, and his statement formed the basis of the FIR, naming numerous accused. The prosecution’s case largely relied on the testimony of several eyewitnesses who had themselves been injured during the incident. The trial court convicted 21 out of 24 accused, and the High Court upheld these convictions based on a reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The counsel for Appellant challenged the convictions by pointing out that the oral testimony of prosecution witnesses was contradictory and not corroborated by medical evidence, resulting in inconsistencies that undermined the prosecution’s version. It was argued that broad and vague allegations were made against a large number of accused with no clearly attributed overt acts, rendering the application of Section 149 IPC unsafe in the absence of specific evidence. The Appellants further submitted that the FIR was not the true “first information,” as prior intimation had reached the police before the recording of the eyewitness’s statement, which should thus be treated only as a police statement under Section 161 CrPC. Several prosecution witnesses were alleged to have improved or embellished their statements during the trial, leading to doubts regarding the identification and participation of many accused. The counsel for Appellants also asserted that the investigation was tainted and that reliance on such police evidence should not form the basis for a conviction.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The counsel for Respondent, however, argued that the conviction was rightly based on the consistent accounts of injured eyewitnesses, whose presence at the scene was further confirmed by the nature and extent of their injuries, thus warranting greater evidentiary weight. Minor discrepancies in details regarding weapons or the sequence of events were contended to be natural and did not detract from the credibility of the witnesses, where medical evidence broadly supported their accounts. It was asserted that the prosecution had established the existence of a common object among the assembly and attributed specific acts to several accused, thus satisfying the requirements of Section 149 IPC. The counsel also relied on established jurisprudence regarding constructive liability under Section 149 IPC and the special evidentiary value accorded to injured eyewitnesses. It was emphasised that proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty, but rather must be based on the overall probabilities and corroborative material presented in the case.
Observations of the Court:
The Court observed that while the appreciation of evidence primarily lies with the trial and appellate courts, it must intervene when lower courts overlook material evidence, causing a miscarriage of justice. As held, “This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 is duty-bound to intervene and look into the matter closely.”
Reiterating the settled principles under Section 149 IPC, the Bench stated that “Mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC.”
The Apex Court cautioned that innocent spectators should not be convicted merely for being present, though proof of an overt act is not essential where a common object is proved. It further clarified that “The expression ‘in prosecution of the common object’ means that the offence committed must be directly connected with the common object of the assembly.”
In State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu & Ors, the Court observed that “once it is found that the investigating officer deliberately failed to record the first information report on receipt of the information of a cognizable offence, and had prepared the FIR after deliberations, consultations and discussions, the FIR would fail to inspire confidence”.
In Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, the Court explained the meaning of “reasonable doubt. “It means doubts that are free from abstract speculation, not a result of an emotional response, which are actual and substantial doubts on the guilt of the accused person, and not vague apprehensions. It cannot be an imaginary, trivial or a possible doubt, but a doubt based upon reason and common sense.”
The Bench also noted that the PW statement could not be treated as the FIR, since prior information had already reached the police that “The statement of PW-20 becomes a police statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.”
Upon reviewing the record, the Court found material contradictions between the oral and medical evidence, weakening the prosecution’s case. It held that “The oral testimonies of the witnesses neither corroborate each other nor align with the medical records. The various contradictions in the form of material omissions go to the root of the matter, and in such circumstances, it cannot be held that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof.”
Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, observing that “The prosecution version does not appear to stem from a truthful narration of facts.”
The decision of the Court:
The Court allowed the appeals, holding that the prosecution failed to prove a common object among the accused under Section 149 IPC. The Bench noted inconsistencies in witness testimonies, lack of medical corroboration, and a tainted investigation. It ruled that mere presence at the scene did not establish guilt. Accordingly, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted with their bail bonds discharged.
Case Title: Zainul versus the State Of Bihar
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 1187 Of 2014
Citation: 2025 Latest Caselaw 943 SC
Coram: Hon’ble Mr Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R. Mahadevan
Counsel for the Appellant: Sr. Adv. Ashwani Kumar Singh, Adv. Ashish Anshuman, Adv. Chandan Malav, AOR Prerna Singh, Sr. Adv. Rauf Rahim, Adv. Ambar Qamaruddin, Adv. Tejasvi Kumar, AOR M. Qamaruddin.
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv. Divyansh Mishra, Adv. Yoshit Jain, AOR Manish Kumar, Adv. Himani Choudhary, AOR Samir Ali Khan, Adv. Pranjal Sharma, Adv. Anil Kumar Verma
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