Recently, the Supreme Court examined an important issue relating to the grant of anticipatory bail in cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The matter raised questions about the ambit of Section 18 of the Act, which expressly bars the application of Section 438, Cr. P.C. in cases involving allegations of caste-based atrocities. The case also highlighted the Court’s sensitivity towards the misuse of discretion by the High Court in granting pre-arrest bail despite clear statutory prohibition.
Brief Facts:
The case arose from an FIR lodged by a complainant belonging to the “Mang/Matang” Scheduled Caste community, who alleged that the accused, along with several others, assaulted him and his family for refusing to vote for a particular candidate. According to the complaint, the assailants hurled caste-based abuses, including remarks such as “Mangtyano, you have become very arrogant,” attacked him with an iron rod, pulled his mother’s saree, threatened to set their house on fire, and vandalised household property this incident occurred outside the complainant’s house in full public view. Based on these allegations, the Sessions Court rejected the anticipatory bail plea of the accused, finding sufficient material to invoke the provisions of the SC/ST Act. However, the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, took a contrary view and granted pre-arrest bail, citing inconsistencies in the prosecution’s version and attributing political overtures to the incident.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The appellant’s counsel argued that the High Court had misapplied its discretion and virtually conducted a mini trial at the bail stage, which is impermissible in law. It was submitted that once the FIR contained clear allegations of casteist abuse and assault, Section 18 of the SC/ST Act squarely applied, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a plea for anticipatory bail. Heavy reliance was placed on earlier precedents such as Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India , where the Court had reiterated that anticipatory bail could not be granted when the offence under the Act was prima facie made out.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The counsel for the respondent sought to defend the High Court’s order by contending that Section 18 does not impose an absolute bar, and that the FIR in the present case was politically motivated. Placing reliance on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, it was argued that the allegations were exaggerated and not sufficient to establish casteist intent. The State of Maharashtra, however, supported the appellant, stressing that the bar under Section 18 was attracted in view of the prima facie allegations.
Observations of the Court:
The Court emphasised that the SC/ST Act is a special legislation enacted to shield vulnerable communities from humiliation and atrocities. In this backdrop, the Bench categorically observed “In relation to any case involving arrest of a person who is facing the accusation about committing offence under this Act, protection of Section 438, Cr. P.C. would not be available. The Legislature has taken away the benefit of anticipatory bail in respect of the arrest for the offences alleged under the SC/ST Act. The bar in Section 18 of the SC/ST Act would operate.”
At the same time, the Court clarified that the only exception to this bar would arise where the FIR, on its very face, fails to disclose a prima facie offence under the Act. Even in such situations, however, the Court warned that its inquiry must remain limited to the allegations in the FIR itself and should not extend to an evidentiary analysis, stating “…it would not be permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary realm or to consider other materials, nor the Court could advert to conduct a mini trial.”
Applying these principles to the present case, the Bench found that the casteist abuse was not incidental but intentional and degrading. It noted that “The use of the word ‘Mangatyano’ was with a clear intention to humiliate the complainant because he belonged to the said Scheduled Caste community.”
The Court also confirmed that the requirement of the act being committed “within public view” stood satisfied, since the incident occurred outside the complainant’s house in a place visible to others “The incident as above took place outside the house of the appellant which could be viewed by anybody. It was indeed a place within public view.”
The Decision of the Court:
The Apex Court set aside the High Court’s order and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the accused. It held that once the FIR prima facie discloses offences under the Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, creates an absolute bar on anticipatory bail. The only exception is where no offence is made out on the face of the FIR, but courts cannot conduct a mini-trial at the bail stage.
Case Title: Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.
Citation: 2025 Latest Caselaw 858 SC
Case No.: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8169 of 2025)
Counsel for Appellant: Sr. Adv. Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Adv. Anant R. Devkatte, Adv. Damini Vishwakarma, Adv. Srishty Pandey, and Adv. B Dhananjay.
Counsel for Respondent: AOR Dilip Annasaheb Taur, AOR Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Adv. Amol Vishwasrao Deshmukh, Adv. Ira Mahajan, Adv.Siddharth Dharmadhikari, and Adv.Shrirang B. Varma.
Coram: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Read Judgment @LatestLaws.com
