Does Reproductive Health include Menstrual Leave?: HC questions State’s Power to Mandate It

On Thursday, the Karnataka High Court raised key constitutional questions while hearing challenges to a State notification mandating one day of paid menstrual leave per month for women employees in industrial establishments. The Court’s queries on whether reproductive health extends to such a right, and whether the State can enforce it through executive action, place the issue at the intersection of labour welfare, gender justice, and constitutional limits of power.

The petitions challenge a government notification requiring industrial establishments to grant one day of paid menstrual leave to women aged 18 to 52, including those employed in factories, shops, plantations, and transport sectors. The petitioners, representing industry bodies, have not opposed the idea of menstrual leave in principle but have questioned the legal route adopted, arguing that such a mandate cannot be imposed through executive instructions under Article 162 of the Constitution.

On the other hand, women’s groups and trade unions have defended the measure as a necessary step towards workplace equity, arguing that menstrual health is intrinsically linked to dignity and reproductive autonomy. They contend that such leave should be seen as part of labour welfare obligations, comparable to other statutory benefits, and necessary to address real health challenges faced by women in the workforce. The State, supporting the notification, has invoked constitutional principles and labour welfare mandates, asserting that progressive measures of this nature fall within its executive competence.

Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde engaged deeply with the constitutional dimensions of the issue, questioning whether reproductive health, as part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, can translate into a legally enforceable right to menstrual leave. The Court observed, “The question would also be if reproductive health is a fundamental right, would that translate into menstrual leave…”, while also noting that the challenge largely concerns the mode of implementation rather than the objective itself. It further indicated that if the notification is rooted in executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution, it must withstand constitutional scrutiny under Article 13. At the same time, the Court acknowledged concerns regarding classification, scope of application, and potential implications on employability.

With competing arguments on constitutional validity and policy necessity, the Court has deferred a final view and listed the matter for further hearing.

Disclaimer: This news/ article includes information received via a syndicated news feed. The original rights remain with the respective publisher.