In a case centred on the determination of juvenility in a murder prosecution, the Supreme Court examined whether an unverified school transfer certificate could prevail over statutory records, electoral rolls, and medical evidence. At the core was the question: how should courts assess conflicting proof when an accused seeks the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 in the context of serious charges? Read on to know how the Court approached this issue and the principles it applied.
Brief Facts:
The case arose from an incident when the Appellant alleged that his paternal uncle, Liliu Singh, and his son, Devi Singh, forcibly entered his house. The Appellant's wife, alone at the time, was manhandled when she resisted. Upon learning of the incident, the Appellant's brother, Rajesh Singh, confronted the accused. It is alleged that Liliu Singh and Devi Singh forcibly took Rajesh inside their house, where Liliu held him, and Devi Singh shot him with a country-made pistol, intending to kill. Rajesh sustained injuries and died en route to hospital. The Appellant lodged an FIR against both accused under Sections 452 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case proceeded in which Devi Singh claimed juvenility, asserting his date of birth as 18.04.1995, making him 16 years, 4 months, and 13 days old at the time of the incident. The Trial Court declared him a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, based on a school transfer certificate. The Appellant's revision petition challenging this was dismissed by the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The Appellant contended that the Trial Court and High Court erred in declaring Devi Singh a juvenile on the basis of a transfer certificate from the School, issued without supporting proof and based only on his father’s oral statement. It was argued that greater weight should have been given to statutory records, the Family Register under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, showing his birth year as 1991, and the 2012 Voters’ List indicating his age as 22 years. Citing Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Appellant submitted that such public records are admissible, and relied on Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit and Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan to argue that unverified school records lack evidentiary value and that medical evidence should be preferred in serious offences where documentary proof of age is doubtful.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The Respondent submitted that the Trial Court rightly found him to be a juvenile based on a transfer certificate from the School showing his date of birth as 18.04.1995. Relying on Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, he argued that, in the absence of a matriculation certificate, the birth certificate from the first attended school suffices, making other records like the Family Register or medical report irrelevant. He further stated that he had already served the maximum three-year sentence under the Juvenile Justice Act and been released by the Juvenile Justice Board, seeking dismissal of the appeal.
Observation of the Court:
The Court emphasized that while Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules prioritizes a sequential examination of documents, starting with matriculation certificates, followed by the date of birth certificate from the first school attended, then municipal or panchayat records, and finally medical opinion, the courts retain discretion to consider other relevant materials to ensure justice. The Court noted, “Though the issue of juvenility, indubitably and primarily has to be determined as per the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as applicable at the relevant time, yet under appropriate circumstances and with justifiable reasons, the Court examining the issue has the discretion to take other relevant materials and factors into account, for ultimately the cause of justice has to prevail.”
The Court scrutinized the school transfer certificate, relied upon by the lower courts, and found it unreliable due to the Headmaster’s testimony that the date of birth was recorded based solely on an oral representation by Devi Singh’s father, without supporting documents. The Court observed, “The deposition of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No 2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable.” Contrarily, the Family Register under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, recorded his birth year as 1991. The 2012 Voter's List indicated his age as approximately 21 years, and a Medical Board Report from 01.12.2012 estimated his age as about 22 years, suggesting he was 20–21 years old at the time of the incident. The Court held that private school records do not qualify as public documents under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, as “neither the Headmaster/Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively.”
Referring to the case Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, the Court emphasised that in serious offences like murder, a cavalier approach to juvenility claims is impermissible when documentary evidence raises doubts. The Bench reiterated, “When an accused commits a grave and heinous offence and therefore attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach while according as to whether an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are enjoined upon to perform their case as the object and protecting the confidence of common man to the institution entrusted with the administration of justice.”
The Court further noted, “Under such circumstance, the medical evidence based on scientific investigation will have to be given due weight and precedence over the evidence based on school administration records which give rise to hypothesis and speculation about the age of the accused.” The Court concluded that the school certificate could not override the Family Register, Voter's List, and Medical Report, which collectively indicated Devi Singh was not a juvenile.
The decision of the Court:
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, holding that the accused was a major at the time of the offence and must be tried as an adult in the concerned criminal case. The Trial Court was directed to expedite proceedings and conclude the trial by July 2026, with the accused required to appear within three weeks for bail consideration, failing which coercive steps may follow. The release granted under the Juvenile Justice Act was quashed, with directions for set-off of any sentence in case of conviction.
Case Title: Suresh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No.347 of 2018
Coram: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
Advocate for Appellant: Adv. Neema, AOR Rajesh
Advocate for Respondent: AORs Vishwa Pal Singh, Asha Gopalan Nair, Advs. Mukesh Kumar, Prateek Rai, Vikrant Rana, Prafulla, Anurag Pandey, Nivedita Nair, Shashikant Pralhad Chaudhari
