In a significant challenge arising from the Supreme Court’s recruitment for Junior Court Assistant posts, the Delhi High Court was called upon to determine whether introducing a benchmark in the Typing Test, absent from the original advertisement, amounted to an impermissible change of rules mid-way or a valid exercise of the shortlisting power reserved under Clause 18. The case raised fundamental questions on the scope of shortlisting, the doctrine of legitimate expectation, and the limits of administrative discretion in competitive examinations. Read on to see how the Court addressed these critical issues and clarified the boundaries of fairness in public recruitment.
Brief Facts:
The case stemmed from the Supreme Court advertising 241 vacancies for the post of Junior Court Assistant (JCA), with a recruitment scheme comprising an objective type question paper, objective type computer knowledge test, typing speed test (minimum 35 words per minute with mistakes up to 3% of total words), a descriptive test, and an interview. The petitioners, who were candidates, qualified in the first two stages and appeared for the typing speed test. By a notification, they were declared qualified in the typing test but excluded from the descriptive test as they scored below the benchmark of 43.18 marks out of 50 (equivalent to up to 3 mistakes), which was set to shortlist candidates in a 1:10 ratio against vacancies. Aggrieved by this exclusion, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court, contending that the benchmark altered the rules midway without basis in the advertisement. The respondent justified the shortlisting under Clause 18 of the advertisement, which reserved the right to shortlist in any appropriate manner with the approval of the Competent Authority (CJI), to ensure efficiency. The Court examined the respondent's records and affidavits, noting consistent shortlisting at prior stages and administrative reasons for the benchmark.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The petitioner contended that fixing a cut-off of 43.18 marks in the Typing Test, absent from the advertisement, amounted to changing the rules mid-way. The scheme prescribed only a minimum speed of 35 w.p.m. with a 3% error limit, and once satisfied, candidates were entitled to the Descriptive Test. Clause 18 could not introduce new qualifications, and shortlisting on vacancy multiples was confined to the Interview stage. Relying on Tej Prakash Pathak, it was urged that benchmarks must be set before, not after, the stage concerned. As the Typing and Descriptive Tests formed one stage, further filtering was impermissible, and the shortlisting, unsupported by reasons, was arbitrary. Administrative exigency was untenable since the candidate pool had already narrowed, and inclusion of 1,080 more was manageable. Foreseeable large participation could not justify deviation, nor could later affidavits or undisclosed “administrative reasons” validate the action.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The respondents submitted that Clause 18 of the advertisement expressly empowered the Competent Authority to shortlist candidates in any manner deemed appropriate, a power consistent with the rulings in Tej Prakash Pathak and Yogesh Yadav v. Union of India. The benchmark of 43.18 marks, fixed on the basis of a 1:10 vacancy ratio, was approved under Clause 18 and uniformly applied. It was further contended that the petitioners, having participated in the process with knowledge of Clause 18, cannot now challenge its operation, particularly as a similar shortlisting had earlier been undertaken after the Objective Test, reducing 61,561 qualified candidates to 10,993 for the Typing Test, including the petitioners. The decision, made in the interest of administrative exigency, was neither arbitrary nor contrary to statutory rules, being authorised under Rule 47, and was beyond interference within the limited scope of Article 226 jurisdiction.
Observation of the Court:
The Court upheld the Supreme Court's decision to impose a shortlisting benchmark in the typing speed test for Junior Court Assistant positions, emphasizing the balance between candidate's legitimate expectations and public interest in efficient administration. Relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court and Ors., the Court reiterated key principles, "Candidates participating in a recruitment process have legitimate expectation that the process of selection will be fair and non-arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is founded on the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness in government dealings with individuals."
It clarified that while eligibility criteria cannot change midway unless permitted by rules or advertisement, shortlisting benchmarks can be set post-commencement if empowered, subject to Article 14's non-arbitrariness test, stating, "The appointing authority/recruiting authority/competent authority, in absence of rules to the contrary, can devise a procedure for selection of a candidate suitable to the post and while doing so it may also set benchmarks for different stages of the recruitment process including written examination and interview. However, if any such benchmark is set, the same should be stipulated before the commencement of the recruitment process. But if the extant Rules or the advertisement inviting applications empower the competent authority to set benchmarks at different stages of the recruitment process, then such benchmarks may be set any time before that stage is reached so that neither the candidate nor the evaluator/examiner/interviewer is taken by surprise."
The Court distinguished qualification criteria (e.g., 35 wpm with 3% mistakes) from shortlisting benchmarks under Clause 18, which reserved the right to shortlist "in any manner as may be considered appropriate with the approval of Competent Authority," noting, "A distinction must be made between qualifying or eligibility criteria provided in the advertisement, and a shortlisting benchmark, which can be supplied later, if the rules and/or the advertisement so permit."
It held typing and descriptive tests as separate stages, allowing inter-stage shortlisting, and found no surprise as the marking scheme was pre-known. Addressing arbitrariness, the Court examined records showing the 1:10 ratio was contextually appropriate for 241 vacancies and descriptive evaluation burdens, aligning with public interest in merit-based selection without patronage.
The decision of the Court:
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the Court dismissed the writ petitions without costs, holding the shortlisting benchmark permissible under Clause 18 and non-arbitrary.
Case Title: Pramiti Basu Vs. Secretary General Supreme Court of India
Case No: W.P.(C) 11007/2025 & CM APPL. 45323/2025
Coram: Justice Prateek Jalan
