The author, Barkha Batra, is a third year student at Ashoka Universtiy, majoring in Political Science with a minor in International Relations.
On the Paradox of Tolerance
What are the limits of toleration? Should the intolerant truly be tolerated?
Toleration is one of the foremost virtues of liberal societies. It is often commended as a mechanism for the enforcement of pluralism - through which people can truly promote and pursue their life goals without unnecessary obstacles. The question of tolerance is one that is highly contested and particularly relevant in the contemporary political atmosphere. ‘Intolerance’ has become a buzzword for both the left and the right - for liberals and conservatives - with each accusing the other of being insular, dogmatic, and inflexible. The charge against liberals is particularly fascinating: they are said to exclude and shun conservatives and their ideologies. Liberals are seen as elitist and exclusionary, and are thus charged as being ‘intolerant’ towards opposing opinions or moral standards. Conservatives, are seen as closed-off and intolerant almost by definition to their liberal counterparts. The question then is: what are the limits of intolerance? Should the tolerant endure and tolerate the intolerant? What are the merits of tolerance as a political virtue?
This paper is inspired by John Rawls’ ideas in A Theory of Justice, wherein he claims that in a society where intolerant factions do emerge, the tolerant should, in most cases, tolerate these intolerants. This essay seeks to examine two fundamental questions: first - what are the limits of toleration? Second, it will enquire as to whether the intolerant should really be tolerated. In doing so, this paper will first establish the arguments used by Rawls in support of tolerating the intolerant. Further, it will examine opposing views on the same, analysing the nature and limits of tolerance serving as critiques to Rawls’ conception. It will then examine that Paradox of Tolerance. Finally, this paper will use the example of hate speech to illustrate the arguments made.
1. Tolerating the Intolerant : The Rawlsian Perspective
In his book, John Rawls lays out the ideal setting under which society will be ordered and justice will prevail. In doing so, he engages in a brief discussion on tolerance in a just society, and asks two fundamental questions: one, whether an intolerant faction has the right to complain when it is not tolerated, and two, the conditions under which the tolerant sects have a right to not tolerate those who are intolerant. Rawls begins by stating that it appears an intolerant sect has no right to complain when it is denied an equal liberty - since one cannot object to behaviour of others which is in accordance with the principles that she would herself use in a similar situation to justify her own behaviour towards another group. According to Rawls, a persons’ right to complain is limited to a violation of the principles she acknowledges herself. Further, Rawls establishes the principle of ‘good faith’ - wherein one party can complain to the other if they believe a principle has been violated. This complaint is made in good faith.
With this established, he moves on to assume that an intolerant person or group has no right to complain about intolerance towards them. Yet, Rawls does not believe that the tolerant factions have the right to suppress them - since here, an equal liberty is being denied without sufficient reason. Under this assumption, while the intolerant themselves are not liable to complain, others do have a right to do so - ie to disapprove when a principle of justice is violated.
Rawls then moves on to question whether intolerance itself is grounds enough to limit someone’s liberty. Here, he provides a contingency: the tolerant has the right not to tolerate the intolerant if they believe that their right to self-preservation is in danger - ie if this intolerance is mandatory for their very security. While justice does not allow baseless suppression, it also doesn’t mandate inaction when the basis for someone’s very survival is threatened. This argument is clear and watertight. However, are there any other, less dire situations in which the tolerant have the right to restrain the intolerant? Can the intolerant be restricted if they pose no imminent threat upon the equal liberties of others? According to Rawls, all citizens have the duty to uphold the just constitution that exists in a Rawlsian society. No citizen is let go of this duty by virtue of of a perceived risk to their own interests. Rawls functions under the principle that only when there is a legitimate and almost severe risk to liberty and equality themselves can the liberties of another be suppressed. Else, citizens must seek to preserve the principles espoused and enshrined within the constitution. “When the constitution is secure, there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant.”
Rawls also argues that intolerance can in fact be reconciled with by tolerant behaviour. For one, he has faith in the ‘inherent stability of institutions’ that will not permit intolerant behaviour to permeate into having actual repercussions - ie, the democratic institutions will not let intolerant behaviour interfere with people’s equality and liberty. Secondly, he has a firm belief in the power of liberty itself - the liberties that an intolerant person has may persuade her to believe in freedom has a general principle, and a right that everyone can enjoy. This works on a so-called psychological principle wherein those who are beneficiaries of a will eventually become faithful to it - and ultimately start abiding by, and even believing in the principles enshrined within it.
To summarise: an intolerant faction does not have the right to complain about intolerance. However, freedom of the intolerant can only be limited if the security of the tolerant, and the legitimacy of the institutions of liberty are threatened. Rawls also makes sure to assert that limiting the liberty of the intolerant does not comprise an unjust act - since even those belonging to intolerant factions would agree to such an act in the original position.
It is evident that Rawls’ conception of tolerance demands that toleration be exercised in most cases apart from the extreme - ie when someone else’s liberty or freedom is in danger. This seems to be in conjunction with Mills’ Harm Principle: only when intolerant activity causes harm - ie is injurious or sets back the equality and liberty of people 5- should it be interfered with. However, this is only a particular conception of tolerance - one with a rather broad scope. Rawls’ idea of tolerance leads to the question: are there any other limits of toleration? If so, what are these limits, and how far do they go?
2. The Limits of Toleration
As mentioned previously, John Rawls’ conception of toleration is rather broad, and deals only with extreme scenarios. This section seeks to explore other conceptions of toleration and establish the other limits that toleration must be subject to. In a sense, this section also serves as a critique to Rawls’ ideas.
2.1 Power dynamics
Fintan O’Toole defines toleration as a ‘fatalistic gesture - agreeing to put up with something we don’t like’ and questions whether it a sufficient foundation for a well functioning political society. Rather, he believes in more ‘positive ideals’ such as mutual respect and embracing diversity.
His first observation is that tolerance is not just a function of the State and the law, but also one of power. Tolerance is limited not just by moral or political norms, but also by the relative power in the relationship between the tolerant and the tolerated. The question, according to O’Toole, is not whether an individual’s liberties are being threatened, or whether any harm is being caused. Instead, the question asked is ‘what is the cost of intolerance, and is it worth the benefits?’ The example he uses clearly illustrates this - pollution is intolerable, dangerous, and even life-threatening, yet we put up with the companies and factories that create and exacerbate pollution, because the economic cost of being intolerant towards them outweighs the social benefit in a capitalist world. Thus, even in extreme situations, where Rawls permits intolerance - those who are relatively less powerful must remain tolerant, since their toleration is inversely proportional to their power and influence in society. Thus, toleration has almost no limit when it comes to multinational corporations, and extremely low when it comes to those who are helpless - such as immigrants and refugees.
This serves as a sort of utilitarian critique to Rawls - there is more than just the restriction of liberty that should be considered when imposing a limit to toleration. Other larger and more impactful considerations, such as the ones mentioned here, must also be made.
2.2 Principle of reciprocity
Two arguments outline the principle of reciprocity.The first, made by Yossi Nehushtan, argues against the claim that by virtue of being tolerant, one has a prima facie reason to be tolerant of the intolerant. The example used here is from the point of view of the state: if the state takes tolerance and the so-called ‘right to be tolerated’ seriously, then it will protect this right of a certain group by not tolerating those who infringe upon that right. Allowing a group not to be tolerant in the spirit of tolerance (on the state’s part) is incoherent and self defeating. Not tolerating the intolerant’s intolerance is logically the only way to be tolerant. One cannot act contrary to the demands of toleration and simultaneously claim to defend it. This argument was first made by Karl Popper - when he claimed that ‘the government should tolerate all who are prepared to reciprocate, ie who are tolerant.” Thus, the virtue of being tolerant de facto implies tolerance only to those who reciprocate the same virtue - unlike Rawls’ idea of tolerating the intolerant.
Such arguments are often grounded in a conception of democracy which bears the principle of the justification of justice. Here, Rainer Forst claims that the rights and privileges that citizens have though their democratic institutions must be ‘reciprocally justifiable’ and ‘generally legitimate.’ Here, reciprocal justifiability entails that groups do not lay claim on any rights that they deny others, and that they do not promote their own values and interests while making this claims. While Rawls does function under the assumption that the intolerant themselves have no right to complain about intolerance towards them, this argument is still not invalidated. Here, under the principle of justification of justice, any duties that citizens have to one another correlative to the rights that they have in this conception. Since, in this conception, the intolerant do not have a right to be treated in a tolerant fashion, particularly since they disregard the principle of reciprocity themselves - other citizens, and the state itself do not have a duty to be tolerant of these intolerant factions.
Another interesting feature of reciprocity appears when the intolerant gain enough power to threaten the just order (Rawls does account for this contingency). Here, intolerant behaviour cannot be reciprocated with intolerance, since dissent will be quashed and efforts will be ineffective. However, tolerating the intolerant in this situation can pose a grave threat to the liberal order. However, this will lead to the spreading of intolerance as a virtue across society, as those in power will espouse intolerant principles.
This contingency is not entirely unrealistic. While Rawls has a firm belief in democratic institutions in a just society being able to withstand the influence of intolerance, Karl Popper has a contrary point of view. To him, tolerating the intolerant as proposed by Rawls could lead to disastrous circumstances. He claimed: “if we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.” This was known as the paradox of tolerance, and is perhaps the strongest and most vastly cited contention to Rawls’ conception of tolerance.
3. The Paradox of Tolerance:
The Paradox of Tolerance as outlined by Karl Popper essentially states that tolerating the intolerant will eventually lead to a rise of intolerance where society’s capacity to be tolerant will erode. Power structures will be seized by the intolerant, and social relations, norms, and interactions will reflect the same intolerance. Thus, ‘in order to maintain a just society, the society must be intolerant of intolerance.’ This Paradox can be seen in all three arguments outlined in the previous section.
In the first argument, ie about power dynamics - those with power and capital can be classified as the intolerant while those with less power can be seen as the tolerant. Here, it is clear that decades of toleration towards those who are intolerant (towards their negative impact and harm on society) has led to the intolerant becoming even more powerful and governing all aspects of social, political, and economic life. Given the importance of the state in fostering social values, a State motivated and in deep correspondence with the intolerant will lead to the harbouring of intolerant sentiments within a society - leading to the erosion of tolerance as a political and social virtue.
The second argument is the essential principle that the paradox is based on: when the state does not interfere with intolerant behaviour and treats intolerance with toleration, this does not prohibit or inhibit intolerant behaviour in any way. Inaction towards intolerance could likely end up with the intolerant factions either seeing this as reaffirmation from the state, or as an indication of their ability and power to be openly bigoted and intolerant. This could lead to factions consolidating themselves, acquiring power, and spreading their influence across society. Liberal institutions, no matter how just, cannot withstand such a wave.
The fourth argument, then, is an embodiment of the paradox itself: when the intolerant have ultimately consolidated power, they espouse intolerant principles, leading to the nature of society itself becoming intolerant. Intolerance to this intolerance is also met with intolerance - wherein any form of healthy opposition, dissent, or protest is quashed and invalidated. Tolerance no longer exists in society.
Thus, it has been established that there is more to limiting tolerance than just an imminent threat to liberty. Further, it is clear that Rawls’ notion of tolerating the intolerant is by various accounts rather romantic and even proven as having a logical fallacy with regard to the nature of tolerance. The next section uses the example of hate speech to illustrate the interaction between tolerance and intolerance.
4. The Harm in Hate Speech
Hate speech is a particularly fascinating example of the interplay of tolerance and intolerance. While hate speech itself is manifestly intolerant in nature, many argue that it should not have legal prohibitions since it is essentially merely an expression of views. This argument stands in a Rawlsian court - it does not necessarily infringe upon liberty or equality as in Rawls’ conception of toleration. Thus, it provides the perfect Rawlisan example: while hate speech itself is intolerant, it should be tolerated in society since it poses no imminent danger or threat of infringement. However, this is easily refutable. Although hate speech may not directly infringe upon liberty in a very limited sense, that does not mean that there is no harm caused by the action.
For one, hate speech causes constitutive harm - ie it silences its targets and is a source of psychological stress, lowered self-esteem, prohibits the recipient from living a life of dignity, and reinforces power hierarchies in society. Hate speech also causes consequentialist harm, wherein those who listen to these speeches are often persuaded into believing negative stereotypes that may lead to harmful conduct. It could condition the environment so that expressing negative stereotypes and carrying out further discrimination become normalised, and it could also cause those who hear it to imitate behaviour, as well as act upon what is being said. These could lead to grave consequences.Cognisance of this harm has led to many arguing that reasonable legal rounds torestrict hate speech - ie, to be intolerant towards it - have been found.
One such argument has been made by Thomas Scanlon, known as his Common Assault Theory. Harm, according to Scanlon, can be tackled in the way that Common Assault is tackled: ie for causing an unpleasant state of mind. This psychological harm is one that the law has a duty to protects its citizens from, and justifies criminalising hate speech.
Another argument has been made by Jeremy Waldron, known as the Group Defamation Theory. This theory comprises of the consideration of dignity of the targets or victims - in their own eyes as well as that of society’s. These targets are particularly vulnerable, which makes compromising their dignity particularly damaging - amounting to a form of group defamation. The victim thus has a claim to protection from state against this group defamation, as state has duty to ensure all citizens are considered equally deserving of citizenship and stand as equal members of society.
While hate speech does not constitute threat or harm in the Rawlisan sense of toleration, it does in fact have consequences and effects that can be truly damaging. Treating such intolerance with tolerance will not curb either the practice, or the harmful effects that it has on self-esteem and dignity (amongst others). This is the perfect example of how toleration should have limits outside of just the restrictive Rawlsian conception - and how a society must not tolerate the intolerant. This example can be juxtaposed to all disputes between tolerance and intolerance - as has been outlined in this paper.
In conclusion, this paper has established that there is more to tolerance and the nature and limits of toleration than Rawls acknowledged. Circumstances that require a limit on toleration are not merely those that pose an imminent threat to liberty - they are also those controlled by people with great power in society, as well as by the constitutive and consequentialist harm they entail. Similarly, the second and third sections, through examinations of counterarguments and the paradox of toleration - demonstrated how tolerating the intolerant is counterproductive - in a liberal society, intolerance should be met with intolerance, else the intolerant faction and its views will spread and take over the liberal institutions and descend into an intolerant social and political space.
