In the judgment of the case- Union of India & Others v. Methu Meda, a Bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari at the Supreme Court, had occasion to deal with various shades of “acquittal” developed through the judicial pronouncements, as related expressions are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 while answering the question arising in this appeal.
The question was as to whether the decision of the Screening Committee rejecting the candidature of the respondent when there was no allegation of malice against the Screening Committee and the respondent- writ petitioner had been acquitted of serious charges, inter alia, of kidnapping for ransom as some prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, ought to have been interfered with.
While addressing the question, as argued the meaning of the expression ‘acquittal’ is required to be looked into. The expressions ‘honorable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, and ‘fully acquitted’ have been developed through judicial pronouncements. In the case of State of Assam & Another v. Raghava Rajagopalachari (1972) 7 SLR 44, the effect of the expression “honorably acquitted” has been considered in the context of Assam Fundamental Rules (FR) 54 (a) for entitlement of full pay and allowance, if the employee is not dismissed. The Court has referred to the judgment of Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 in the context of expression ‘honorably acquitted’.
In the case of R. P. Kapoor v. Union of India- AIR 1964 SC 787, Justice Wanchoo held that,
“Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honorable”.
If the acquittal is directed by the court on consideration of facts and material evidence on record with the finding of false implication or the finding that the guilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of the accused as just, it is treated as an honorable acquittal. In other words, if the prosecution could not prove the guilt for other reasons and the accused is not ‘honorably’ acquitted by the Court, it is treated other than ‘honorable’, and proceedings may follow. The expression ’ honorable acquittal’ has been clarified in the judgment of the case- Inspector General of Police & Another v. S. Samuthiram- (2013) 1 SCC 598. After considering the judgments in the cases- Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541, R.P. Kapur and Raghava Rajagopalachari; the SC has observed that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and inquiry conducted by way of a disciplinary proceeding is entirely different.
In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution until proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In case, the prosecution failed to take steps to examine crucial witnesses or the witnesses turned hostile, such acquittal would fall within the purview of giving the benefit of the doubt and the accused cannot be treated as honorably acquitted by the criminal court.
While in a case of departmental proceedings, the guilt may be proved on the basis of preponderance and probabilities, it is thus observed that acquittal giving the benefit of the doubt would not automatically lead to the reinstatement of a candidate unless the rules provide so. Recently, The SC has observed in the decision of the case- Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Others v. Pradeep Kumar & Another (2018) 1 SCC 797, relying upon the judgment of the Samuthiram’s case, that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates for the post concerned.
It is observed, acquittal or discharge of a person cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedent. The said issue has been considered further in the judgment of the case- Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Another v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 holding non-examination of key witnesses leading to acquittal is not an honorable acquittal. In fact, it is, by giving the benefit of the doubt. The Court has said the nature of acquittal is necessary for core consideration.
If acquittal is not honorable, the candidates are not suitable for government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors and the nature of offence, the extent of his involvement, the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in the future, are the relevant aspects for consideration by the Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all these issues. In the present case, the charges were framed against the respondent for the offences punishable under sections 347, 327, 323, 506(Part-II), and 364A IPC. He was acquitted after trial through the judgment on March 19, 2010, by the Sessions Judge, Jhabua, because the person kidnapped Nilesh, and also his wife did not support the case of the prosecution. As per the prosecution, the complainant was beaten by the respondent and the said fact found support from the evidence of the doctor.
Therefore, it appears that the Committee was of the view that acquittal of the respondent, in the facts of the present case, cannot be termed as 'honorable acquittal’ and the said acquittal may be treated by giving the benefit of the doubt. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the employer is having the right to consider the suitability of the candidate as per government orders/instructions/ rules at the time of taking the decision for induction of the candidate in employment. Acquittal on the technical ground in respect of the offences of heinous/ serious nature, which is not a clean acquittal, the employer may have a right to consider all relevant facts available as to the antecedents and may take an appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
Even in case, a ruthful declaration regarding concluded trial has been made by the employee, still, the employer has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. According to the official Circular of March 31, 2010, after seeking instruction from the headquarter, the Standing Committee had taken the decision on October 15, 2012, that because of acquittal with the benefit of the doubt, the respondent-writ petitioner was not considered eligible for appointment Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The SC has pointed out that the law is well settled in this regard. The employer has a right to consider the candidature of the employee in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee.
The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give an appointment to the candidate. Both the Single Bench and Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore did not consider the said legal position. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the High Court in writ petition and writ appeal are not sustainable in law, hence the Supreme Court has allowed the present appeal and set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court.
Case Details
Case Name: Union of India & Others v. Methu Meda
Date of Decision: October 6, 2021
Bench: Justices Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari
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