On Monday, the Supreme Court redirected a long-pending challenge to the age-based restriction on pre-natal diagnostic testing, bringing renewed attention to how the PC-PNDT Act balances reproductive autonomy with statutory safeguards against sex-selective practices. The issue before the Bench centred on whether limiting access to diagnostic techniques for women under 35 years, save in specific circumstances, withstands scrutiny under Article 14, Article 15 and Article 21 of the Constitution.
The case stemmed from a writ petition filed in 2019 by Advocate Meera Kaura Patel questioning the validity of Section 4(3)(i) of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. The provision restricts access to pre-natal diagnostic techniques for women below the age of 35 unless particular medical indicators are met. The Petitioner contended that such a threshold deprives younger pregnant women of crucial genetic and congenital information during pregnancy, thereby affecting their right to health and informed reproductive decision-making. The challenge was brought against the backdrop of the Act’s legislative purpose, preventing sex selection while regulating access to diagnostic procedures.
The Petitioner argued that the age bar operates as an arbitrary barrier for women below 35, who also face risks of fetal abnormalities irrespective of age. She relied on empirical studies to contend that anomalies are not confined to older maternal age groups and submitted that treating pregnant women as a homogenous category makes discrimination based on age impermissible. She emphasised that “risk is always there,” asserting that the requirement of meeting additional criteria before accessing diagnostic facilities unreasonably curtails the Article 21 of the Constitution right to make informed reproductive choices. The Petitioner also maintained that Form F under the Rules offers indicators primarily linked to ultrasound examinations and does not justify the statutory limitation.
Opposing the petition, the Union, represented by the Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, submitted that women below 35 are not excluded from accessing diagnostic techniques, rather, access is subject to medically recognised conditions enumerated in Section 4(3) read with Form F. The ASG highlighted that Form F contains twenty-three independent indicators allowing diagnostic access and argued that “it’s not a restrictive provision that women below 35 are not allowed access to this.” The State maintained that the statutory scheme regulates access due to the risk of misuse of diagnostic procedures for sex determination, and the age of 35 functions only as one clinical marker among several.
The Bench engaged with the regulatory architecture of the PC-PNDT Act and the distinct constitutional dimensions of reproductive decision-making and diagnostic access. Noting the petitioner’s reliance on earlier jurisprudence involving reproductive autonomy, Justice Joymalya Bagchi observed that “right to reproductive autonomy is governed by the Termination of Pregnancy Act… Here is an interface between prevention of a crime, which is rampant… Therefore, your right to access to diagnostic facilities, which is a part of your Article 21 rights, is regulated to a certain extent.”
The Court clarified that while the petitioner may not have demonstrated discriminatory treatment under Article 14, Article 15 or Article 21 of the Constitution, the issues raised required expert assessment. The Bench explained that diagnostic indicators are applied by medical specialists and that misinterpretation of the forms, if any, could be addressed administratively. Justice Surya Kant also queried whether a revised Form F could avoid misconstruction, though the ASG reiterated that the forms are used by trained medical professionals.
Assessing the statutory scheme, the Court concluded that the questions involve technical considerations best examined by the Central Supervisory Board, a body equipped to evaluate medical, regulatory and policy implications arising from the petition. Consequently, the Bench directed that “the entire pleadings be treated as a comprehensive representation-cum-material for their expert consideration.”
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the Central Supervisory Board to consider the material placed before it and determine whether any modification, clarification or amendment to the Act or Rules is warranted. The Bench added that “if the petitioner has made out a case requiring any amendment/modification/clarification of existing rules/Act, the competent authority may consider to do so in public interest,” thereby closing the proceedings while placing the substantive issues before the expert body for further evaluation.
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