In a recent pronouncement strengthening procedural discipline in the initiation of criminal investigations, the Supreme Court has ruled that a Magistrate cannot direct the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) unless the complainant has first exhausted the remedies prescribed under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC. The ruling came in the case of Ranjit Singh Bath & Anr. v. Union Territory Chandigarh & Anr., where a Judicial Magistrate’s order directing FIR registration was quashed for non-compliance with these procedural prerequisites.
A Bench comprising Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan delivered this verdict while quashing an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate on June 14, 2017, which had directed the registration of an FIR under Sections 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property) and 120-B (Criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Bench emphasized that adherence to the procedural mandate under Section 154 of the CrPC is a sine qua non for invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
Under Section 154(1) of the CrPC, an informant must first report the commission of a cognizable offence to the officer in charge of the police station, who is obligated to record it in writing and furnish a copy to the informant. If the police fail to register the complaint, the complainant must escalate the matter under Section 154(3) by submitting a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police, who, if satisfied that the information discloses a cognizable offence, may investigate the matter or direct a subordinate officer to do so.
The Court reiterated that only after these statutory avenues are exhausted can a complainant invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC to seek an investigative direction. The Court observed:
"Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CRPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CRPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CRPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. However, in this case, the second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we find that both the learned Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava.”
The Court relied on its earlier judgments in Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) and Babu Venkatesh & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2022), which underscored the necessity of prior compliance with Section 154 before invoking Section 156(3). The judgment in Priyanka Srivastava had particularly expressed concern over the misuse of Section 156(3) and mandated that applications under this provision must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit to ensure accountability.
Referring to the procedural discipline required under law, the Bench noted that the complainant in the present case had not demonstrated compliance with Section 154(1) or 154(3). The absence of specific averments regarding compliance with these statutory preconditions was a decisive factor in quashing the Magistrate’s order.
The Supreme Court set aside all further steps taken pursuant to the Magistrate’s order and allowed the appeal filed by the accused against the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had refused to quash the impugned order. However, the Court clarified that it had not adjudicated upon the merits of the allegations and granted liberty to the complainant to pursue remedies under Section 154 of the CrPC in accordance with law.
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