The Chhattisgarh High Court was called upon in a petition to decide if the Special Courts constituted u/S 14 of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the SC/ ST Act) have the power and jurisdiction to invoke the provisions contained in Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C.) which provides for referring the complainant’s complaint to Police for registration of FIR and the consequent investigation in the matter.
The petition filed by Jaisingh Agrawal challenged the order of the Special Judge (SC/ ST Act). By virtue of this Order, the Special Judge invoked powers under section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. and directed lodging of FIR against the petitioner.
The petition was considered by a Bench consisting of Hon’ble Justice Sanjay K. Agarwal. The Court did close scrutiny of the provisions contained under Sections 156 and 193 of the Cr. P. C. and relevant provisions of the SC/ ST Act and made the following observations, with respect to the interplay of these two statutes:
“(...) the Special Court having established under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 by notification has power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under the provisions of the Act of 1989 directly without committal proceeding and the Magistrate is not a Special Court notified by the State Government within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act of 1989 read with Section 193 of the Code and therefore, Magistrate is not empowered to entertain a complaint under the Act of 1989.”
Having observed so, the Court referred to the cases of A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak (Supreme Court) and Anand Swaroop Tiwari v. Ram Ratan Jatav (full Bench Madhya Pradesh High Court) and stated that:
“(...) it is quite vivid that the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 is the criminal court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by Section 193 of the Code, and the Special Court can take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred to in Section 190 of the Code and is governed by Chapters XV & XVI of Code and such other provisions which are not inconsistent with the status and functions as Courts of original jurisdiction. Therefore, Special Courts constituted under under the Act of 1989 will also have the power and jurisdiction to invoke section 156 (3) of the Code to direct investigation in exercise of power conferred, to the Station House Officer.”
But such invocation of power u/s 156(3) of the Code to direct registration of an FIR was,
“subject to making two prior applications under section 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of the Code by the complainant,” the Court further held.
Thus, with respect to the question of law, the Court held that:
“As such, I do not find any merit in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the Special Judge under SC & ST Act has no power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code and to direct registration of FIR and investigation. Such a submission being merit- less and substance-less deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.”
With respect to the second issue which was: whether the Special Judge was justified in invoking powers u/s power and jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code, the Court held that the above-stated pre-requisites of making two prior applications u/s 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of the Code, were fulfilled.
Therefore, the High Court held that:
“The Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has clearly held that in order to file a duly competent application u/s 156(3) of the Code there has to be existence of prior applications u/s 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code.
(...) there is total non- compliance of the provisions contained in Section 154 of the Code and both the preconditions of making application under section 154(1) and 154(3) are absolutely missing, as the complainant has not sent the substance of information to the SHO (AJAK) under Section 154(1) of the Code. Thus, answering the question No.2, it is held that the impugned invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Code is totally without jurisdiction and without authority of law.
(...) the impugned order passed by the Special Judge, Korba in unregistered complaint case is hereby quashed and the consequential action of registration of FIR for offences under Sections 294, 506B, 323 & 120B of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(d) & 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 is also hereby quashed.”
Case Details
Case Name: Jaisingh Agarwal & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.
Bench: Hon’ble Justice Sanjay K. Agarwal
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