WPMS/1730/2012
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                                 WPMS No.1730 of 2012
                                 Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, A.C.J.

                                       Mr. Virendra Kaparwan, Advocate
                                 for the petitioner.
                                       Mr. Nikhil Singhal, Advocate for
                                 legal heirs of the respondent.

2. Petitioner filed a suit for eviction of respondent from a shop situate in Shravan Nath Nagar, Haridwar before Small Cause Court, which was registered as S.C.C. Case No.14 of 2003. In the suit, he claimed to be the owner of shop no.4, which was part of Baijnath Giri Dharamshala and alleged that defendant (respondent herein) was its tenant @ Rs.100/- per month. It was further alleged that the respondent has not paid any rent since 01.07.1981 and, despite notice dated 11.09.2003, the rent for the period 01.07.1981 to 31.07.2003 has not been paid. Respondent filed written statement contending that plaintiff is neither owner nor landlord of the shop in question; the shop is part of Baijnath Dharamshala, which belongs to Baijnath Giri Public Trust Society and rent was paid by him to the Treasurer of the said society. Learned Small Cause Court dismissed the suit filed by petitioner vide judgment dated 05.07.2010, by holding that petitioner could not prove that he is owner or landlord of the shop in question. Petitioner challenged the judgment passed by learned Small Cause Court by filing Revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. His Revision Petition was dismissed by learned Additional District Judge/First Fast Track Court, Haridwar vide judgment dated 16.05.2012.

Feeling aggrieved by the judgment rendered by both the Courts below, petitioner has approached this Court.

3. Learned trial Court had framed 5 points for determination, namely, (i) Whether defendant is tenant of plaintiff in respect of shop in question at the monthly rent of Rs. 100/-? (ii) Whether plaintiff is entitled for recovery of Rs.2600/- as rent and Rs.360/- as water tax from the defendant? (iii) Whether Small Cause Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit?

(iv) Whether the notice issued by plaintiff to the defendant dated 11.09.2003 is not valid? (v) Whether plaintiff is entitled to any relief?

4. Learned trial Court decided the first and second point of determination together and returned a finding that the deposition made by plaintiff as witness is contrary to his stand as taken in the plaint and decided both the issues against the plaintiff. Learned Revisional Court affirmed the finding returned by the trial Court.

5. Since the burden to prove that he was the owner/landlord of the shop in question was upon the plaintiff and learned trial Court, for valid reasons, has held that plaintiff could not prove that he was the owner/landlord of the shop in question, therefore, learned trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit. Learned trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the shop belonged to Baijnath Giri Public Trust Society and plaintiff could not produce any evidence to show that he was authorized by the said trust to collect rent, therefore, the finding of fact recorded by learned trial Court, cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse. The Revisional Court was, therefore, justified in dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner.

6. It is settled position in law that this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, does not act as a Court of Appeal. The scope for interference with finding of fact recorded by learned Courts/Tribunals in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is very limited, as explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jasbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 294. Paragraph nos.11 to 14 of the said judgment are extracted below:

"11. This view expressed was later followed by this Court in Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide [(1977) 2 SCC 437 : AIR 1977 SC 1222] by Justice Jaswant Singh at AIR p. 1225: (SCC p. 441, para 3) "It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept in or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution."

12. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim [(1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38] this Court held: (SCC p. 570, para 7) "7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited 'to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority', and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. ... In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."

13. This Court also made almost similar observations in State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545] .

14. So, even while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial functions. It is the members of the subordinate judiciary who directly interact with the parties in the course of proceedings of the case and therefore, it is no less important that their independence should be protected effectively to the satisfaction of the litigants. The independence of the judiciary has been considered as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and such independence is postulated not only from the executive, but also from all other sources of pressure. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87] speaking on the independence of the judiciary, a Bench of seven Judges observed as under at p. 223: (SCC para 27) "The concept of independence of the judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. ... But it is necessary to remind ourselves that the concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence from executive pressure or influence but it is a much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the judges belong."

7. Thus, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the finding recorded by learned Judge, Small Cause Court, as affirmed by the Revisional Court.

8. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.

(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, A.C.J.) 06.11.2023 Arpan