For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala.
02. Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh appearing on
Mr. R. Datta appearing on behalf of the State-respondent.
03. Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel drawn
registered as B.A. No.66 of 2025 and by order dated
11.08.2025 the bail application filed was rejected by this Court.
numbers of witnesses. Learned Counsel, Mr. Lodh further
application for releasing of the accused on bail. In this regard
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
Yadav & Anr. reported in (2005) 2 SCC 42, wherein in para
administration of justice and may lead to forum hunting. But
the Supreme Court in another case reported in Lt. Col. Prasad
Shrikant Purohit vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
this present bail application has been filed.
Learned Counsel, Mr. Lodh thereafter submitted that
2023. For the sake of convenience, let us reproduce herein
(4) It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before
whom such arrested person is produced, to satisfy
himself that the requirements of sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3) have been complied with in
respect of such arrested person."
Referring Section 47, Learned Counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that every police officer or other person
arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith
communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he
is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. But in the given
case, no such ground of arrest was communicated to the
accused-in-custody for which the arrest was illegal and the
accused is liable to be released henceforth. It was further
submitted that Section 48 also casts another responsibility
upon the arresting authority to inform such arrest to any of the
relatives, friends or such other persons as may be disclosed or
nominated by the arrested persons. But here in the case at
hand, the prosecution submitted before the Court that the wife
of the accused was informed and even, if, it is assumed that
the requirement of Section 48 has been complied with but
prosecution has failed to prove that the grounds of arrest have
been communicated in writing to the accused for which the
arrest has become illegal. In support of his contention, Learned
Counsel further relied upon another citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India reported in Ahmed Mansoor & Ors.
vs. State Rep. by, Assistant Commissioner of Police &
Anr. reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2650, wherein in
para Nos.3, 5, 6, 8 and 9, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as
under:
"3. The only issue for consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the appellants have
been furnished with the grounds of arrest
when they were apprehended and, if not,
whether an explanation given by the
jurisdictional Court at the time of remand,
followed by the remand order which indicates
that the grounds of arrest were explained,
would be in sufficient compliance of Section
43B of the UAPA.
5. The aforesaid position has been reiterated in
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573 as
stated under:
"45. We are of the firm opinion that once
this Court has interpreted the provisions
of the statute in context to the
constitutional scheme and has laid down
that the grounds of arrest have to be
conveyed to the accused in writing
expeditiously, the said ratio becomes the
law of the land binding on all the courts
in the country by virtue of Article 141 of
the Constitution of India.
46. Now, coming to the aspect as to
whether the grounds of arrest were
actually conveyed to the appellant in
writing before he was remanded to the
custody of the investigating officer.
47. We have perused the arrest memo
(Annexure P-7) and find that the same
nowhere conveys the grounds on which
the accused was being arrested. The
arrest memo is simply a proforma
indicating the formal "reasons" for which
the accused was being arrested.
48. It may be reiterated at the cost of
repetition that there is a significant
difference in the phrase "reasons for
arrest" and "grounds of arrest". The
"reasons for arrest" as indicated in the
arrest memo are purely formal
parameters viz. to prevent the accused
person from committing any further
offence; for proper investigation of the
offence; to prevent the accused person
from causing the evidence of the offence
to disappear or tampering with such
evidence in any manner; to prevent the
arrested person for making inducement,
threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so
as to dissuade him from disclosing such
facts to the court or to the investigating
officer. These reasons would commonly
apply to any person arrested on charge
of a crime whereas the "grounds of
arrest" would be required to contain all
such details in hand of the investigating
officer which necessitated the arrest of
the accused. Simultaneously, the
grounds of arrest informed in writing
must convey to the arrested accused all
basic facts on which he was being
arrested so as to provide him an
opportunity of defending himself against
custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus,
the "grounds of arrest" would invariably
be personal to the accused and cannot be
equated with the "reasons of arrest"
which are general in nature."
6. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, this
Court, in the supplementing judgment, was
pleased to observe as follows:
"3. The purpose of inserting Section 50A
of the CrPC, making it obligatory on the
person making arrest to inform about the
arrest to the friends, relatives or persons
nominated by the arrested person, is to
ensure that they would able to take
immediate and prompt actions to secure
the release of the arrested person as
permissible under the law. The arrested
person, because of his detention, may
not have immediate and easy access to
the legal process for securing his
release, which would otherwise be
available to the friends, relatives and
such nominated persons by way of
engaging lawyers, briefing them to
secure release of the detained person on
bail at the earliest. Therefore, the
purpose of communicating the grounds
of arrest to the detenue, and in addition
to his relatives as mentioned above is
not merely a formality but to enable the
detained person to know the reasons for
his arrest but also to provide the
necessary opportunity to him through his
relatives, friends or nominated persons
to secure his release at the earliest
possible opportunity for actualising the
fundamental right to liberty and life as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Hence, the requirement of
communicating the grounds of arrest in
writing is not only to the arrested
person, but also to the friends, relatives
or such other person as may be disclosed
or nominated by the arrested person, so
as to make the mandate of Article 22(1)
of the Constitution meaningful and
effective failing which, such arrest may
be rendered illegal."
8. In State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan (supra)
the facts governing are quite different. It was a
case dealing with the cancellation of bail where
the charge sheet had been filed and the
grounds of detention were served immediately.
This Court has, in fact, given its approval to the
decision in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana
(supra). Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy
v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), this Court
was pleased to hold in para 27 that the object
underlying the provision that the grounds of
arrest should be communicated has been
explained by this Court in Vihaan Kumar v.
State of Haryana (supra). Therefore, the law as
laid down in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana
(supra) has been approved and reiterated in
the abovesaid decisions.
9. In such view of the matter, we are inclined
to hold that the present appeal deserves to
succeed only on the ground that the mandate
of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time
of securing the appellants has not been
complied with. Therefore, we are not inclined
to go into the merits of the case. However,
while setting aside the order passed by the
High Court and consequently setting aside the
order of arrest and remand, we would only say
that liberty is granted to the respondents to
take recourse to law, to arrest, if a case is
made out."
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that
in view of the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the aforenoted case, the present petitioner requires to
be released henceforth.
Learned Counsel again submitted that at the time of
hearing, prosecution may rely upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme of India in State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan
Etc. reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702 dated
14.08.2025 but the same issue has been dealt with by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Ahmed Mansoor & Ors. case
(Supra). So, the same shall have no binding affect in the
present matter.
He also submitted another case of Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500,
discussed all the issues and in para Nos.47, 51, 55, 56, 62 &
68 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"47. Another aspect, which flows from the
above discussion and merits consideration is
the mode of informing grounds of arrest to the
arrested person to effectively serve the
intended purpose of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India. This Court, as observed
above, had held that it would not be ideal to
read out the grounds of arrest to a person who
is arrested, as he may not be in the frame of
mind to remember the contents of grounds that
are read out to him. The Court underscored
that if the authorities are permitted to read out
the grounds and claim compliance with the
constitutional and statutory mandate, the very
purpose of the constitutional protection would
be nugatory.
51. On perusal of the above two judgments, it
turns out that mere communication of the
grounds in a language not understood by the
person arrested does not fulfil the
constitutional mandate under Article 22 of the
Constitution of India. The failure to supply such
grounds in a language understood by the
arrestee renders the constitutional safeguards
illusory and infringes the personal liberty of the
person as guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22
of the Constitution of India. The objective of
the constitutional mandate is to place the
person in a position to comprehend the basis of
the allegations levelled against him and it can
only be realised when the grounds are
furnished in a language understood by the
person, thereby enabling him to exercise his
rights effectively.
55. This Court is of the opinion that to achieve
the intended objective of the constitutional
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India, the grounds of arrest must be informed
to the arrested person in each and every case
without exception and the mode of the
communication of such grounds must be in
writing in the language he understands.
56. It would not be out of context now to refer
to an obligation which has been imposed on a
person making arrest, as provided under
Section 50-A read in relation to Section 50CrPC
(now Sections 48 and 47 of BNSS 2023
respectively), to inform the arrestee of his
right to indicate his relative, friend or such
other person for the purpose of giving
information with regard to his arrest.
Simultaneously, a duty has also been cast on
the person making arrest to forthwith
thereafter inform of such arrest with reasons
and the place where the arrested person is
being held to the such indicated person. The
police officer/person making any arrest shall
make an entry of the fact as to who has been
informed of such an arrest in a book to be kept
in the police station. Further protection in this
regard is reflected when a duty has been cast
on the Magistrate to satisfy himself, when the
arrestee is produced before him, that the above
requirement stands complied with. This
requirement is in addition to the rights of an
arrestee to be made aware of the grounds of
arrest.
62. We thus hold, that, in cases where the
police are already in possession of
documentary material furnishing a cogent basis
for the arrest, the written grounds of arrest
must be furnished to the arrestee on his arrest.
However, in exceptional circumstances such as
offences against body or property committed in
flagrante delicto, where informing the grounds
of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered
impractical, it shall be sufficient for the police
officer or other person making the arrest to
orally convey the same to the person at the
time of arrest. Later, a written copy of grounds
of arrest must be supplied to the arrested
person within a reasonable time and in no
event later than two hours prior to production
of the arrestee before the Magistrate for
remand proceedings. The remand papers shall
contain the grounds of arrest and in case there
is delay in supply thereof, a note indicating a
cause for it be included for the information of
the Magistrate.
68. We are cognizant that there existed no
consistent or binding requirement mandating
written communication of the grounds of arrest
for all the offences. Holding as above, in our
view, would ensure implementation of the
constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as
engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution
of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on
obligation would avoid uncertainty in the
administration of criminal justice. The ends of
fairness and legal discipline therefore demand
that this procedure as affirmed above shall
govern arrests henceforth."
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that
although by the said judgment, prospective affect was given
but the principle laid down in the same case also may be
equally applied in this case.
Learned Counsel further submitted that in the
earlier order in connection with case No. B.A. No.66 of 2025
dated 11.08.2025 in para No.11 this Court observed as under:
"[11] I have gone through the aforesaid provisions
of law and also perused the relevant prosecution
papers. It appears to this Court that before arrest,
the IO conducted search where the signature of
the accused was taken. He was served notice
under Section 50 of NDPS Act and in presence of
gazetted officer, the proceeding was conducted
obtaining signature of the accused, he was
informed the grounds of his arrest to his family
members and copy of arrest memo was supplied.
Even in seizure list his signature was taken as
possessor of contraband items. Immediately, on
production before the Court, he was defended by
Learned Legal Aid Counsel who conducted the case
on his behalf. The case finally ended in filing of
charge sheet by IO involving the present accused
and another. It is the settled position of law that
every case will proceed according to its own merit.
Recently, Hon‟ble the Supreme Court of India in
Kasireddy Upender Reddy versus State of Andhra
Pradesh and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1228 decided on 23.07.2025 in para No.36
observed as under :
"36. If a person is arrested on a warrant, the
grounds for reasons for the arrest is the
warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to
him, that is sufficient compliance with the
requirement that he should be informed of the
grounds for his arrest. If he is arrested
without a warrant, he must be told why he
has been arrested. If he is arrested for
committing an offence, he must be told that
he has committed a certain offence for which
he would be placed on trial. In order to inform
him that he has committed a certain offence,
he must be told of the acts done by him which
amounts to the offence. He must be informed
of the precise acts done by him for which he
would be tried; informing him merely of the
law applicable to such acts would not be
enough."
I have also gone through the said citation.
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that
in pursuance of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8
SCC 254, Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025) 5
SCC 799 the grounds of arrest was not communicated in
writing in the language understand by the accused although
this Court came to the observation that before arrest the I.O.
conducted search where the signature of the accused was
taken, he was served notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act
and in presence of Gazetted Officer the proceeding was
conducted obtaining signature of the accused and the grounds
of arrest was informed to him and his family members and a
copy of arrest memo was supplied and even in seizure list his
signature was taken. But the observation does not curtails the
right of the accused to be released henceforth for non-
communication of grounds of arrest in writing in the language
understandable by the accused. As such the accused deserves
to be released henceforth or to be released on bail in any
condition.
It was again submitted by Learned Counsel that as
per prosecution in seven separate packets total 22 kg 625 gm
was alleged to be recovered from the possession of the
accused without any segregation, but as per rules the actual
contraband item seized was required to be measured which
prosecution has failed to do so in this case and if for any
reason after removal of the wrappers, if it is found that the
quantum of contraband items is lesser than 20 kgs, in that
case the same would come under the category of 'intermediate
quantity' and as such the accused shall have the right to be
released on bail.
It was further submitted that this present accused is
lodging in custody on and from 11.01.2025. So, considering
the period of detention of the accused-in-custody the accused
is required to be released on bail in any condition.
The submission of Learned Counsel for the accused-
in-custody has been refuted by Learned P.P. and submitted
that Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. Sri
Darshan Etc. reported in State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan
Etc., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, in para
No.20.1.7, observed as under:
"20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos
and remand records clearly reflect that the
respondents were aware of the reasons for
their arrest. They were legally represented
from the outset and applied for bail shortly
after arrest, evidencing an immediate and
informed understanding of the accusations. No
material has been placed on record to establish
that any prejudice was caused due to the
alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of
demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is,
at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself,
warrant release on bail. As reiterated above,
the High Court treated it as a determinative
factor while overlooking the gravity of the
charge under Section 302 IPC and the
existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on
Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is
misplaced, as those decisions turned on
materially different facts and statutory
contexts. The approach adopted here is
inconsistent with the settled principle that
procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of
arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to
bail."
Referring the same, Learned P.P. submitted that in
view of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court even
if it is found that the ground of arrest was not communicated in
writing to the accused at the time of arrest the same is a
curable defect and cannot by itself, warrant release on bail,
since the contraband items recovered was of commercial
quantity.
In this regard, Learned Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh
submitted that the observation of the aforesaid judgment has
been discussed in the Ahmed Mansoor & Ors(supra) and
this may not be applied in this case.
04. I have perused the judgment in Ahmed Mansoor &
Ors. In para No.8 Hon'ble the Apex Court came to the
observation that the facts governing are quite different. So, in
deciding the case, the observation of State of Karnataka vs.
Sri Darshan Etc.(supra) was not followed by the Hon'ble Apex
Court.
Learned P.P. thereafter submitted that no fresh
grounds have been projected by the accused in this case in
praying for bail and the judgment of Mihir Rajesh Shah vs.
State of Maharashtra & Anr.(supra) cannot be applied in
this case since the same has been given prospective effect. To
substantiate his contention, he also relied upon another
judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP
12201 of 2025 wherein in para Nos.3 and 7 the said High
Court observed that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of
Maharashtra & Anr.(supra) was prospective in nature.
Learned P.P. also relied upon another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in State of
Maharashtra vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao reported
in (1990) SCC (Cri) 126, wherein in para No.7, the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed as under:
"7. Liberty occupies a place of pride in our
socio-political order. And who knew the value
of liberty more than the founding fathers of our
Constitution whose liberty was curtailed time
and again under Draconian laws by the colonial
rulers. That is why they provided in Article 21
of the Constitution that no person shall be
deprived of his personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law. It
follows therefore that the personal liberty of an
individual can be curbed by procedure
established by law. The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law.
That law permits curtailment of liberty of anti-
social and anti-national elements. Article 22
casts certain obligations on the authorities in
the event of arrest of an individual accused of
the commission of a crime against society or
the Nation. In cases of undertrials charged
with the commission of an offence or offences
the court is generally called upon to decide
whether to release him on bail or to commit
him to jail. This decision has to be made,
mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to
the nature of the crime, the circumstances in
which it was committed, the background of the
accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the
impact that his release may make on the
prosecution witnesses, its impact on society
and the possibility of retribution, etc. In the
present case the successive bail applications
preferred by the respondent were rejected on
merits having regard to the gravity of the
offence alleged to have been committed. One
such Application No. 36 of 1989 was rejected
by Suresh, J. himself. Undeterred the
respondent went on preferring successive
applications for bail. All such pending bail
applications were rejected by Puranik, J. by a
common order on 6-6-1989. Unfortunately,
Puranik, J. was not aware of the pendency of
yet another bail application No. 995 of 1989
otherwise he would have disposed it of by the
very same common order. Before the ink was
dry on Puranik, J.'s order, it was upturned by
the impugned order. It is not as if the court
passing the impugned order was not aware of
the decision of Puranik, J.; in fact there is a
reference to the same in the impugned order.
Could this be done in the absence of new facts
and changed circumstances? What is important
to realise is that in Criminal Application No.
375 of 1989, the respondent had made an
identical request as is obvious from one of the
prayers (extracted earlier) made therein. Once
that application was rejected there was no
question of granting a similar prayer. That is
virtually overruling the earlier decision without
there being a change in the fact-situation. And,
when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one which has a direct impact on
the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic
changes which are of little or no consequence.
Between the two orders there was a gap of
only two days and it is nobody's case that
during these two days drastic changes had
taken place necessitating the release of the
respondent on bail. Judicial discipline,
propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed
reversing all earlier orders including the one
rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days
before, in the absence of any substantial
change in the fact-situation. In such cases it is
necessary to act with restraint and
circumspection so that the process of the court
is not abused by a litigant and an impression
does not gain ground that the litigant has
either successfully avoided one judge or
selected another to secure an order which had
hitherto eluded him. In such a situation the
proper course, we think, is to direct that the
matter be placed before the same learned
Judge who disposed of the earlier applications.
Such a practice or convention would prevent
abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it
will prevent an impression being created that a
litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to
secure an order to his liking. Such a practice
would also discourage the filing of successive
bail applications without change of
circumstances. Such a practice if adopted
would be conducive to judicial discipline and
would also save the court's time as a judge
familiar with the facts would be able to dispose
of the subsequent application with despatch. It
will also result in consistency. In their view
that we take we are fortified by the
observations of this Court in para 5 of the
judgment in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq
Hasan Khan [(1987) 2 SCC 684] . For the above
reasons we are of the view that there was no
justification for passing the impugned order in
the absence of a substantial change in the fact-
situation. That is what prompted Shetty, J. to
describe the impugned order as „a bit out of the
ordinary‟. Judicial restraint demands that we
say no more."
Referring the same, Learned P.P. further submitted
that the fact, situation has not been changed substantially for
which there remains no merit in this application and as such
the same is liable to be dismissed henceforth.
Further, at the time of hearing, Learned P.P. for the
State relied upon another judgment passed by a Division Bench
of this High Court in W.P.(Crl) No.06 of 2025 wherein in
para Nos.6, 7, 8, 15 & 16 this High Court observed as under:
"[6] For these reasons, the petitioner humbly
prays that this Court be pleased to allow the
present petition.
[7] On the contrary, Mr. Raju Datta, learned
PP appearing for the staterespondent has
contended before this court that in the instant
case, dry ganja was recovered and duly seized
from the house of the accused person. The
recovery was effected in the presence of
independent witnesses and seizure list was
prepared in due compliance with law. Once
such contraband substance is found in the
possession and control of the accused, his
connection with the commission of the
offence under the NDPS Act stands prima
facie established.
[8] In such circumstances, it is not required
under law that the police should separately or
formally inform the accused of the grounds of
arrest in a mechanical manner, because the
very recovery of the contraband from his
possession constitutes a clear and sufficient
ground. It is deemed understood that where
contraband articles like dry ganja are seized
from the conscious possession of an
individual, the police are empowered to arrest
him forthwith. Hence, the arrest of the
accused cannot be said to be illegal or
arbitrary and requirements of Article 22 (1) of
Constitution of India is followed and the
arrest is squarely justified by the recovery
itself and prayed to dismiss the petition.
[15] In this regard, in Kasireddy Upender
Reddy (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
reiterated that while the Constitution requires
communication of the grounds of arrest, it is
not necessary for the authorities to furnish
full details of the offence at the stage of
arrest. What is required is sufficient
information to enable the arrested person to
understand why he has been taken into
custody, akin in nature to a charge framed at
trial, though not containing the entire
evidentiary record.
[16] As regards the judgment relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioner,
wherein it was observed that once a violation
of Article 22(1) is alleged, the burden shifts
upon the State to show effective compliance,
this Court is of the view that the said
authority is not applicable to the facts of the
present case. That judgment dealt with a
situation where the very communication of
the grounds of arrest was in dispute. In the
present matter, however, the grounds of
arrest were sufficiently conveyed, and more
importantly, the recovery of contraband dry
ganja from the house of the accused in his
presence itself constituted a clear and
tangible ground for his arrest. Thus, the ratio
laid down in the said case does not advance
the cause of the petitioner and cannot be
relied upon by this Court."
Referring the same Learned P.P. submitted that this
present case is squarely covers by the aforementioned
judgment/order.
05. I have heard both the sides at length. It is
undisputed that on 11.08.2025 this Court in B.A. No.66 of
2025 dismissed the bail application filed by the accused. At the
time of deciding the bail application, detailed reasons were
given why the bail application was rejected. The same needs
no repetition herein.
In this case the prosecution case was in short is that
on 11.01.2025 ASI, Bimal Nama laid an FIR to O/C GRP
alleging inter alia that on that day at about 20:05 hours, he
received one information that a person carrying contraband
items through the train bearing No.15626 Up Deogarh Express
for Agartala Rly Station and accordingly, the same was reduced
into writing in the relevant book vide No.33 20:10 hours. The
matter was immediately informed to Inspector Tapas Das and
also to the IPF RPF/AGTL as well as OC/GRP/AGT for assistance
in course of conducting raid and search. After that the
informant along with staff left for AGTL Rly Station PF No.1 and
made ambush and in course of Naka at about 20:45 hours
when he noticed that one person was coming towards PF No.1
through the parcel gate of AGTL Railway Station in suspicious
manner with two number of bags in his possession. The person
was detained for verification, by this time, Inspector Tapas
Das, O/C Agartala GRP PS reached to the place of occurrence
and joined the proceeding as a gazetted officer. On
interrogation, the accused disclosed his name as Mantu Yadav
and started giving contradictory and unsatisfactory statements
regarding his presence in AGTL Rly Station PF No.1, near public
toilet. Finally, he admitted that he was carrying contraband
goods in the trolley and bag. Thereafter, following due process
he himself offered to be searched in presence of witnesses,
notice under Section 50 of NDPS Act was served upon him
after observing all formalities. After that search was conducted
on his sky colour trolley bag and blue colour bag and in course
of search seven numbers of dry ganza packets were recovered
from the possession of accused Mantu Yadav and after
checking, it was found that 22 kg 625 gm suspected dry ganza
was kept inside the bag. The seizure memo was prepared after
observing all formalities and the accused was taken into
custody and he was brought to RPF/POST/Agartala along with
the seized contraband items and accordingly, the FIR was laid.
This is the gist of the prosecution story.
The accused was produced before the Court and all
along he was represented by Legal Aid Counsel who conducted
the case on his behalf. The accused was informed about the
grounds of arrest and his wife also. The submission made by
Learned Counsel for the accused-in-custody was discussed
threadbare at the time of disposal of the B.A. No.66 of 2025 by
order dated 11.08.2025 and the said order still stands good.
Nothing new has been projected by the accused to consider his
bail application on any new grounds at this stage.
Furthermore, in this case, trial has been
commenced. Charge has been framed. The accused has not
challenged the order of charge on the ground of non-
application of Section 37 of NDPS Act in respect of commercial
quantity. So, at this stage, after hearing both the sides and
considering the materials on record and based upon the
judgments rendered by the petitioner accused-in-custody, I do
not find any scope to release the accused on bail at this stage.
06. Accordingly, the bail application filed by the
accused-in-custody deserves no consideration and the same is
rejected accordingly. The accused is to remain in J/C as before.
However, since the accused persons are lodging in jail, so, the
Learned Trial Court shall make all endeavour to dispose of the
case within a period of six(6) months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order.
07. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this order
to the Learned Trial Court.
Supply a copy of this order to Learned P.P. along
with the Case Diary.
With this observation, this present bail application
stands disposed of.
JUDGE
PURNITA DEB Digitally signed by PURNITA DEB
Date: 2026.02.03 16:01:51 +05'30'
Purnita
