______________________________________________________
For Applicant(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Hare Krishna Bhowmik, Adv.
Mr. Rishiraj Nath, Adv.
Mr. Chinfru Mog Samung, Adv.
Mr. Jilu Rahaman, Adv.
Mr. Santtipriya Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. Pujan Biswas, Adv.
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
15/09/2025
This application under Section 483(3) of BNSS read
reference to East Agartala P.S. Case No.61/25 under Sections 61/
[02] Heard Learned P.P., Mr. R. Datta appearing on behalf of
counsel, Mr. P.K. Biswas assisted by Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, Learned
respondent accused persons. As ordered earlier, today Learned
P.P. has produced the case diary and by this time, we have also
received the record from the Learned Trial Court below.
[03] Taking part in the hearing, Learned P.P. first of all
registered. He further submitted that the respondent accused
[04] Learned P.P. further drawn the attention of the Court
allegation against the accused persons was serious in nature.
persons. For the sake of bravity, the relevant part of the order of
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge is narrated herein below :
[05] Learned P.P. further submitted that the allegation of
warrant scope for granting bail yet the Learned Addl. Sessions
interference of the Court is required. He also drawn the attention
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge at the time of consideration of the
fresh incident reported against the accused. So, he granted bail to
of mind of the Learned Court below. In support of his contention,
Learned P.P. also drawn the attention of the Court referring one
Karnataka versus Sri Darshan Etc. reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1702 wherein in para Nos. 18.1, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5,
"(A) Annulment of bail orders
18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power
to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified,
or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It is
concerned with defects existing at the time the bail
was granted, without reference to subsequent
conduct.
18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338, it was
held that a bail order can be set aside even in the
absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be
unjustified, illegal, or perverse.
18.4. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 6 Scale 415, a three-Judge Bench held
that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the
bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside.
18.5. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee
(2010) 14 SCC 496, this Court held that where the
High Court grants bail mechanically and without
application of mind to material factors such as the
gravity of the offence or antecedents of the accused,
such an order must be set aside.
18.11. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (supra), this
Court delineated broad, though not exhaustive,
grounds justifying cancellation of bail, including:
• Interference or attempt to interfere with the due
course of justice;
• Evasion of justice;
• Abuse of the concession of bail;
• Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice.
18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), Justice
D.Y. Chandrachud explained:
"An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail
order if it is found to be based on a misapplication of
legal principles or where relevant considerations
have been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of
bail typically arises from post-bail conduct or
supervening circumstances."
20.5.1. The fact that the accused were in custody for
more than 140 days, or exhibited good conduct post-
release, does not ipso facto render the order of bail
sustainable, if it suffers from non-consideration of
material factors at the stage of grant.
20.5.2. In State through CBI v. Amaramani Tripathi,
2005 (8) SCC 21, this Court reaffirmed that "...the
mere fact that the accused has undergone certain
period of incarceration... by itself would not entitle
the accused to being enlarged on bail... when the
gravity of the offence alleged is severe..."
20.5.4. In Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla
Bahu, (2012) 9 SCC 446, the Court reiterated that the
period of custody, while relevant, must be weighted
against the totality of circumstances, including the
nature of the crime and criminal antecedents. It was
held that:
"31. Be it noted, a stage has come that in certain
States abduction and kidnapping have been regarded
as heroism. A particular crime changes its colour with
efflux of time. The concept of crime in the contextual
sense of kidnapping has really undergone a sea
change and has really shattered the spine of the
orderly society. It is almost nauseating to read
almost every day about the criminal activities relating
to kidnapping and particularly by people who call
themselves experts in the said nature of crime.
32. We may usefully state that when the citizens are
scared to lead a peaceful life and this kind of offences
usher in an impediment in establishment of orderly
society, the duty of the court becomes more
pronounced and the burden is heavy. There should
have been proper analysis of the criminal
antecedents. Needless to say, imposition of
conditions is subsequent to the order admitting an
accused to bail. The question should be posed
whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail
or not and only thereafter issue of imposing
conditions would arise. We do not deny for a moment
that period of custody is a relevant factor but
simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the
criminal antecedents are also to be weighed. They are
to be weighed in the scale of collective cry and
desire. The societal concern has to be kept in view in
juxtaposition of individual liberty. Regard being had
to the said parameter we are inclined to think that
the social concern in the case at hand deserves to be
given priority over lifting the restriction of liberty of
the accused.
33. In the present context the period of custody of
seven months, in our considered opinion, melts into
insignificance. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
granting of bail is a matter of discretion for the High
Court and this Court is slow to interfere with such
orders. But regard being had to the antecedents of
the accused which is also a factor to be taken into
consideration as per the pronouncements of this
Court and the nature of the crime committed and the
confinement of the victim for eight days, we are
disposed to interfere with the order impugned.
34. We may note with profit that it is not an appeal
for cancellation of bail as cancellation is not sought
because of supervening circumstances. The present
one is basically an appeal challenging grant of bail
where the High Court has failed to take into
consideration the relevant material factors which
make the order perverse."
Accordingly, the bail order was set aside and the
accused was directed to surrender.
20.5.6. In conclusion, while post-bail good conduct or
the period of incarceration may be relevant
considerations at the stage of continuing bail, they
cannot cure the fundamental defects in an order
granting bail which is otherwise perverse, legally
untenable, or passed without due consideration of
material factors such as the gravity of the offence,
prima facie involvement, and the likelihood of
influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence. An
unsustainable bail order does not become valid with
the mere passage of time or the subsequent
behaviour of the accused. Judicial scrutiny must focus
on whether the discretion to grant bail was exercised
judiciously, and in accordance with established
principles, at the time of the grant, and not
mechanically or on technicalities. Therefore, the
order of the High Court granting bail to the
respondents/accused, deserves to be set aside.
22.2.1. In Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338, this
Court categorically held that "Cancellation of bail is
permissible where the order granting bail was
perverse, or if the accused tampers with evidence or
attempts to influence witnesses."
22.4. An order that overlooks material evidence or
proceeds on an erroneous premise is perverse, and
such perversity forms a valid ground for cancellation
or setting aside of bail.
22.4.1. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), this
Court laid down that "where the order granting bail is
founded on irrelevant considerations, or non-
consideration of material facts, the same is rendered
perverse and is liable to be set aside." Similarly, in
State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra) the Court
held that "bail orders must be founded on a careful
and judicious application of mind to the facts of the
case and the seriousness of the offence. Non-
consideration of relevant material renders the order
vulnerable to challenge."
22.4.3. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra), this
Court reversed the grant of bail observing that
"Where the High Court ignores vital circumstances
and material facts, the order becomes indefensible".
22.4.5. In offences punishable with life imprisonment
or death, the bail court must be especially cautious.
In Ash Mohammed v. Shiv Raj Singh (supra), this
Court emphasized that in serious offences, "the
gravity of the offence and its impact on society must
weigh heavily with the court, and such cases must be
considered with greater care and circumspection".
However, in the present case, the High Court's order
fails to reflect any such higher scrutiny or cautious
approach, despite the seriousness of the charge and
the wider societal impact of the case.
23.1. In State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram
Bhurle, (2009) 11 SCC 541, it was observed that
"grant of bail in serious offences involving public
confidence must be handled with great caution,
especially where the accused enjoys influence".
Referring the aforesaid case, Learned P.P. drawn the
attention of the Court that by the said order Hon‟ble the Apex
Court cancelled the bail granted to the respondent accused
persons.
Here in the case at hand from the initial order passed
by Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class and thereafter the
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge it appears that both the Courts
came to the observation that there were serious allegations
against the respondent accused persons but only considering the
period of detention of the accused persons in custody without
considering the incriminating evidence revealed against the
respondent accused persons mechanically granted bail to them. As
such, the interference of the Court is required. So, Learned P.P.
ultimately prayed for cancellation of the order dated 11.07.2025
delivered by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Agartala,
West Tripura in the aforenoted case.
He further relied upon another citation of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India in Shabeen Ahmad vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2025) 4 SCC 172 wherein in para
Nos.27 and 28 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under :
"18. *** *** ***
27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted,
ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner.
However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
always open to interference by the superior court. If
there are serious allegations against the accused,
even if he has not misused the bail granted to him,
such an order can be cancelled by the same Court
that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by
a superior court if it transpires that the courts below
have ignored the relevant material available on
record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or
the impact on the society resulting in such an order.
In P. v. State of M.P. [P. v. State of M.P., (2022) 15
SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has
spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the
Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an
accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following
words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)
„24. As can be discerned from the above
decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the
court must consider whether any supervening
circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the
accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is
no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to
retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it
differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court
would be loathe to interfere with an order passed
by the court below granting bail but if such an
order is found to be illegal or perverse or
premised on material that is irrelevant, then such
an order is susceptible to scrutiny and
interference by the appellate court.‟
Considerations for setting aside bail orders
28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate
court for setting aside the bail order on an application
being moved by the aggrieved party include any
supervening circumstances that may have occurred
after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of
the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of
the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the
trial, any instance of threats being extended to the
witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of
the accused to tamper with the evidence in any
manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative
and not exhaustive. However, the court must be
cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a
prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed
reasons relating to the merits of the case that may
cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided.
Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal
the factors that have been considered by the Court
for granting relief to the accused."
Referring the same, he submitted that although it is the
settled position of law that bail once granted ought not to be
cancelled in a mechanical manner but if the order is unreasoned or
perverse, which is always open for interference by the superior
Court or unjustified.
Here in the given case, according to Learned P.P. the
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the order opined that the
allegation was serious in nature but on the other hand simply on
the ground of incarceration of the respondent accused persons in
custody granted bail to the accused persons without considering
the materials on record as well as the injury report of the victim
for which the interference of the Court is required.
He then referred another citation of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India in Sumitha Pradeep vs. Arun Kumar
C.K. & Anr., reported in (2022) 17 SCC 391, wherein in para
No.12, Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"12. We are dealing with a matter wherein the
original complainant (appellant herein) has come
before this Court praying that the anticipatory bail
granted by the High Court to the accused should be
cancelled. To put it in other words, the complainant
says that the High Court wrongly exercised its
discretion while granting anticipatory bail to the
accused in a very serious crime like Pocso and,
therefore, the order passed by the High Court
granting anticipatory bail to the accused should be
quashed and set aside. In many anticipatory bail
matters, we have noticed one common argument
being canvassed that no custodial interrogation is
required and, therefore, anticipatory bail may be
granted. There appears to be a serious misconception
of law that if no case for custodial interrogation is
made out by the prosecution, then that alone would
be a good ground to grant anticipatory bail. Custodial
interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be
considered along with other grounds while deciding
an application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be
many cases in which the custodial interrogation of
the accused may not be required, but that does not
mean that the prima facie case against the accused
should be ignored or overlooked and he should be
granted anticipatory bail. The first and foremost thing
that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application
should consider is the prima facie case put up against
the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence
should be looked into along with the severity of the
punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the
grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if
custodial interrogation is not required or
necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant
anticipatory bail."
Referring the same, he has drawn the attention of the
Court that even if custodial interrogation is also not required in
that case also there is no scope to grant bail to the accused where
there was incriminating materials on record against the
respondent accused persons.
Learned P.P. thereafter referred another citation of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Jage Ram & Ors. vs. State of
Haryana reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366, wherein in para
No.12, Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307
IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention
to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the
accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the
accused had attempted to commit the murder of the
prosecution witness. Whether the accused person
intended to commit murder of another person would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it
is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing
death should have been caused. Although the nature
of injury actually caused may be of assistance in
coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused,
such intention may also be adduced from other
circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be
gathered from the circumstances like the nature of
the weapon used, words used by the accused at the
time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of
the body where the injury was caused and the nature
of injury and severity of the blows given, etc."
Referring the same, he submitted that in consideration
of bail application in a case of erstwhile Section 307 of IPC now
Section 109 of BNS the intention is to be gathered from
circumstances like the nature of weapon used, words used by the
accused at the time of incident, motive of the accused, parts of
the body where the injury was caused are to be taken into
consideration.
Here in the case at hand on the bottom of the FIR the
respondent accused at the time of alleged commission of offence
loudly uttered "sobdire maira la jabai kar" which indicates the
intention of the accused persons to commit the offence but the
Learned Court below did not consider the same and urged for
taking note of the said observation of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
this regard.
Further reference was made by Learned P.P. in another
case of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India In Ajwar vs.
Waseem & Anr. along with other connected matters reported in
(2024) 10 SCC 768, wherein in para Nos.26 and 27, Hon‟ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
"Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like
the nature of the accusations made against the
accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to
have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the
offence, if the accused are released on bail, the
likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the
event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing
the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and
the overall desirability of releasing the accused on
bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal
v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974] ; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
[Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] ; Masroor v. State of
U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v.
Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
765] ; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v.
State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] ; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC
129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted,
ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner.
However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
always open to interference by the superior court. If
there are serious allegations against the accused,
even if he has not misused the bail granted to him,
such an order can be cancelled by the same Court
that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by
a superior court if it transpires that the courts below
have ignored the relevant material available on
record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or
the impact on the society resulting in such an order.
In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15
SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has
spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the
Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an
accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following
words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)
"24. As can be discerned from the above
decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the
court must consider whether any supervening
circumstances have arisen or the conduct of
the accused post grant of bail demonstrates
that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to
permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying
the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram
v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in
ordinary circumstances, this Court would be
loathe to interfere with an order passed by
the court below granting bail but if such an
order is found to be illegal or perverse or
premised on material that is irrelevant, then
such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and
interference by the appellate court."
Referring the same, Learned P.P. further submitted that
although it is the settled position of law that bail once granted
ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner but if it is found
that such order is found to be illegal or perverse, in that case,
such order is susceptible in scrutiny and interference by the
appellate Court. He further submitted that since on bare perusal of
the order of the Learned Addl. Sessions Judge it appears that
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge at the time of consideration of the
bail application although admitted that the allegation was serious
in nature but without appreciating the materials collected by IO
during investigation against the accused persons granted bail
which was perverse and for that the interference of the Court is
required.
He also referred another citation of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya Pradesh vs.
Harjeet Singh & Anr., reported in (2019) 20 SCC 524, wherein
in para Nos.5.6.1, 5.6.3 and 5.6.4, Hon‟ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"5.6.1. If a person causes hurt with the intention or
knowledge that he may cause death, it would attract
Section 307.
5.6.3. If the assailant acts with the intention or
knowledge that such action might cause death, and
hurt is caused, then the provisions of Section 307 IPC
would be applicable. There is no requirement for the
injury to be on a "vital part" of the body, merely
causing "hurt" is sufficient to attract Section 307 IPC.
[State of M.P. v. Mohan, (2013) 14 SCC 116 : (2014)
4 SCC (Cri) 119]
5.6.4. This Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana
[Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 :
(2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425] held that: (SCC p. 370, para
12)
"12. For the purpose of conviction under
Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish
(i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii)
the act done by the accused. The burden is on
the prosecution that the accused had
attempted to commit the murder of the
prosecution witness. Whether the accused
person intended to commit murder of another
person would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. To justify a
conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not
essential that fatal injury capable of causing
death should have been caused. Although the
nature of injury actually caused may be of
assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused, such intention may
also be adduced from other circumstances.
The intention of the accused is to be gathered
from the circumstances like the nature of the
weapon used, words used by the accused at
the time of the incident, motive of the
accused, parts of the body where the injury
was caused and the nature of injury and
severity of the blows given, etc."
(emphasis supplied)
Referring the same he submitted that since in this case
there are sufficient materials showing implication of the
respondent accused persons with the alleged offence punishable
under Section erstwhile Section 307 of IPC now Section 109 of
BNS and here in the case at hand there was sufficient materials
for involvement of the respondent accused persons with the
offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS but the Learned
Addl. Sessions Judge without considering the materials on record
granted bail to them and in view of the principle of law laid down
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforenoted case and the conduct
of the accused, it is a fit case for cancellation of bail granted to the
respondent accused persons.
[06] Finally, Learned P.P. submitted that although in the
order some citations were referred by the State prosecution but
those principles of law laid down were not discussed by the
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge at the time of passing of order, even
according to the said principles of law sometimes detention period
is also not required to be considered in granting bail but here in
the case at hand the Learned Addl. Sessions Judge without
application of proper mind and without considering the principles
of law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court simply on the ground
of detention of the accused persons in custody for a period of
more than thirty days granted bail to them for which the
interference of the Court is required and he urged for setting aside
the order passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge. He further
drawn the attention of the Court referring the GD No.28 dated
13.07.2025 of East Agartala P.S. and statement of one of the
witness and submitted that after release on bail, the accused
persons threatened the witnesses of the prosecution and also
threatened to kill them if they give any statement against them
and accordingly, those witnesses reported the matter to O/C of
the concerned P.S. and the same was entered in G.D.E. which
needs to be taken into consideration by this Court at the time of
passing order.
[07] On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. K.
Biswas assisted by Mr. H. K. Bhowmik, Learned Counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent-accused persons strongly countered
the submission made by Learned P.P. representing the prosecution
and submitted that the citations referred by Learned P.P.
appearing on behalf of the State-respondent are misleading which
cannot be applied in this case because the facts and circumstances
of those cases are totally different from the facts of the present
case and in this case Learned Addl. Sessions Judge after perusal
of the case diary and the materials on record and also after
considering the case and the counter-case with reasoned order
granted bail to the respondent-accused persons which cannot be
interfered by this Court at this stage. He further drawn the
attention of the Court referring the contents of the FIR that in the
first page of the FIR the informant who had written the FIR only
indicated the name of one Sahajahan Islam and 10/12 other
persons but in the second page he implicated the name of the
respondent-accused persons with a malafide intention and
furthermore he was not the inhabitant of that locality where the
respondent-accused used to reside. He further drawn the attention
of the Court that this is purely a political case and on the alleged
date and time the informant party and others hand ransacked the
house of the respondent-accused persons even they did not spare
the ladies who were present to the residence and that time two
political persons of the Congress Party appeared therein to whom
police rescued and after that, the respondent-accused persons
were brought to police station by the police personnel when they
were illegally detained by the police. Even on that day, their
counter FIR was not accepted by the Police which was laid by one
Rabiya Begam and furthermore Learned Senior Counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that in the FIR it was mentioned that based
on a facebook news the incident took place but now-a-days once
the facebook news is uploaded it becomes viral within a very short
span of time and even if it was presumed that the same was
uploaded by one of the respondent-accused there was no scope on
his part to delete the same from the system but the informant
party not only caused hurt to the respondent accused persons and
they also manhandled the women members of the family and
furthermore till today, there was no any adverse report from the
side of the police regarding violation of the conditions of bail
granted to the respondent accused-persons and the prosecution
could not establish any supervening circumstances to cancel the
bail granted to the respondent-accused persons. It was further
submitted that if there was any evidence of any violation of order
of bail in that case without registering any specific case simply on
the basis of GD entry beyond the knowledge of the respondent-
accused there was no scope to take any adverse inference against
the respondent-accused persons.
[08] Learned Senior Counsel further drawn the attention of
the Court to strengthen the case under Section-192 and 196 of
BNS were added by the Police just to harass the accused persons
in absence of any such evidence on record. Learned Senior
Counsel thereafter drawn the attention of the Court referring the
relevant part of the order dated 11.07.2025 delivered by Learned
Addl. Sessions Judge wherein it was clearly observed by the
Learned Trial Court that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
and the continued detention of the accused persons were not
required and the Learned Court of Addl. Sessions Judge
considering the case diary and the statement of witnesses, injury
report of the victim came to the observation that continued
detention of the respondent accused persons were not required as
no fresh incident reported against the accused persons since the
date of alleged offence. So, there was no illegality and perversity
in the order passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge and urged
for dismissal of the bail application.
[09] In support of his contention, Learned senior counsel
referred one citation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in
Deepak Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in
(2022) 8 SCC 559, wherein in para Nos.32 and 33, Hon‟ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
32. This Court has reiterated in several
instances that bail once granted, should not
be cancelled in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused
to retain his freedom by enjoying the
concession of bail during trial. Having said
that, in case of cancellation of bail, very
cogent and overwhelming circumstances are
necessary for an order directing cancellation
of bail (which was already granted). A two-
Judge Bench of this Court in Dolat Ram And
Others Vs. State of Haryana : (1995) 1 SCC
349 laid down the grounds for cancellation of
bail which are :-
(i) interference or attempt to interfere with
the due course of administration of Justice
(ii) evasion or attempt to evade the due
course of justice
(iii) abuse of the concession granted to the
accused in any manner
(iv) Possibility of accused absconding
(v) Likelihood of/actual misuse of bail
(vi) Likelihood of the accused tampering with
the evidence or threatening witnesses.
33. It is no doubt true that cancellation of bail
cannot be limited to the occurrence of
supervening circumstances. This Court
certainly has the inherent powers and
discretion to cancel the bail of an accused
even in the absence of supervening
circumstances. Following are the illustrative
circumstances where the bail can be
cancelled:
33.1. Where the court granting bail takes
into account irrelevant material of
substantial nature and not trivial nature
while ignoring relevant material on
record.
33.2. Where the court granting bail
overlooks the influential position of the
accused in comparison to the victim of
abuse or the witnesses especially when
there is prima facie misuse of position
and power over the victim.
33.3. Where the past criminal record and
conduct of the accused is completely
ignored while granting bail.
33.4. Where bail has been granted on
untenable grounds.
33.5. Where serious discrepancies are
found in the order granting bail thereby
causing prejudice to justice.
33.6. Where the grant of bail was not
appropriate in the first place given the
very serious nature of the charges
against the accused which disentitles
him for bail and thus cannot be justified.
33.7. When the order granting bail is
apparently whimsical, capricious and
perverse in the facts of the given case."
Referring the same Learned senior counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that bail once granted should not be
cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering any
supervening circumstances. But here in the case at hand
prosecution till today could not prove any supervening
circumstances for interference to cancel the order of bail granted
to the accused.
In Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation & Anr., reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51, wherein
in para Nos.12, and 13, Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and
jail is the exception has been well
recognised through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again
is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. This Court in
Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India
[Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of
India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC
(Cri) 302] , held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 &
27, paras 19 & 24)
"19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.
State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2
SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] ,
the purpose of granting bail is set
out with great felicity as follows :
(SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30)
"27. It is not necessary to refer to
decisions which deal with the right to
ordinary bail because that right does not
furnish an exact parallel to the right to
anticipatory bail. It is, however,
interesting that as long back as in 1924
it was held by the High Court of Calcutta
in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re
[Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923
SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] ,
AIR pp. 479-80 that the object of bail is
to secure the attendance of the accused
at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question
whether bail should be granted or
refused is whether it is probable that the
party will appear to take his trial and
that it is indisputable that bail is not to
be withheld as a punishment. In two
other cases which, significantly, are the
"Meerut Conspiracy cases" observations
are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In
K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar
v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR
1931 All 504] it was observed, while
dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439
of the Code, that it conferred upon the
Sessions Judge or the High Court wide
powers to grant bail which were not
handicapped by the restrictions in the
preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437.
It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no
inflexible principle governing the
exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle
which was established was that the
discretion should be exercised
judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L.
Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson,
1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All
356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was
very unwise to make an attempt to lay
down any particular rules which will bind
the High Court, having regard to the fact
that the legislature itself left the
discretion of the court unfettered.
According to the High Court, the variety
of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify
the cases and to say that in particular
classes a bail may be granted but not in
other classes. It was observed that the
principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code
was that grant of bail is the rule and
refusal is the exception. An accused
person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and
to properly defend himself than if he
were in custody. As a presumably
innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look
after his own case. A presumably
innocent person must have his freedom
to enable him to establish his innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was
observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor
[Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC
(Cri) 115] that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
"1. ... the issue [of bail] is one of
liberty, justice, public safety and
burden of the public treasury, all of
which insist that a developed
jurisprudence of bail is integral to a
socially sensitised judicial process. ...
After all, personal liberty of an
accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms
of "procedure established by law".
The last four words of Article 21 are
the life of that human right."
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC
(Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J.,
who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
129, para 29)
"29. ... There cannot be an inexorable
formula in the matter of granting
bail. The facts and circumstances of
each case will govern the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail."
30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn.,
Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
"Where the granting of bail lies
within the discretion of the court, the
granting or denial is regulated, to a
large extent, by the facts and
circumstances of each particular
case. Since the object of the
detention or imprisonment of the
accused is to secure his appearance
and submission to the jurisdiction
and the judgment of the court, the
primary inquiry is whether a
recognizance or bond would effect
that end."
It is thus clear that the question
whether to grant bail or not depends
for its answer upon a variety of
circumstances, the cumulative effect
of which must enter into the judicial
verdict. Any one single circumstance
cannot be treated as of universal
validity or as necessarily justifying the
grant or refusal of bail.‟
*** *** ***
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the
Covenant so far as the Fundamental
Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
concerned. It deals with nothing less
sacrosanct than the rights of life and
personal liberty of the citizens of India
and other persons. It is the only
article in the Fundamental Rights
Chapter (along with Article 20) that
cannot be suspended even in an
emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is
the repository of a vast number of
substantive and procedural rights post
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
[Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
(1978) 1 SCC 248] ."
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra
v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1
SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2
SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that :
(SCC p. 52, paras 21-23)
"21. In bail applications, generally,
it has been laid down from the
earliest times that the object of bail
is to secure the appearance of the
accused person at his trial by
reasonable amount of bail. The
object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventative. Deprivation of liberty
must be considered a punishment,
unless it is required to ensure that
an accused person will stand his
trial when called upon. The courts
owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins
after conviction, and that every man
is deemed to be innocent until duly
tried and duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was
appreciated that detention in
custody pending completion of trial
could be a cause of great hardship.
From time to time, necessity
demands that some unconvicted
persons should be held in custody
pending trial to secure their
attendance at the trial but in such
cases, "necessity" is the operative
test. In this country, it would be
quite contrary to the concept of
personal liberty enshrined in the
Constitution that any person should
be punished in respect of any
matter, upon which, he has not
been convicted or that in any
circumstances, he should be
deprived of his liberty upon only the
belief that he will tamper with the
witnesses if left at liberty, save in
the most extraordinary
circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of
prevention being the object of
refusal of bail, one must not lose
sight of the fact that any
imprisonment before conviction has
a substantial punitive content and it
would be improper for any court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval
of former conduct whether the
accused has been convicted for it or
not or to refuse bail to an
unconvicted person for the purpose
of giving him a taste of
imprisonment as a lesson."
Referring the same, Learned senior counsel drawn the
attention of the Court that here in the case at hand the matter is
pending before the Court for cancellation of bail not by granting of
fresh bail and in a case of cancellation of bail certain factors are to
be taken into consideration but here in the case at hand the
prosecution could not establish any ground or supervening
circumstances to reject the privilege of bail granted to the accused
persons and urged for dismissal of the bail application filed by the
prosecution.
Learned senior counsel for the accused referred
another citation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in
Bhagirathsinh s/o Mahipat Singh Judeja vs. State of
Gujarat, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284, wherein in para Nos.3
and 5 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"3. It is alleged that the appellant gave blows
with a knife to one Popatlal Sorathia, who had
come to visit an indoor patient Navalsinh Bhatti
on August 17, 1983 around 9.45 a.m. Appellant
was accosted by the policemen on duty. An
offence under Section 307 IPC was registered
against him and the appellant was taken into
custody and was subsequently remanded to
judicial custody. An application for releasing him
on bail was made on August 22, 1983 to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot. The Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Rajkot was pleased to dismiss the
same by his order dated August 29, 1983.
5. It appears that the State of Gujarat filed
Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 1724 of
1983 in the High Court of Gujarat seeking
cancellation of the order granting bail to the
appellant. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court held that once a prima facie case is
established, the learned Sessions Judge ought to
have taken into consideration the nature and
gravity of the circumstances in which the offence
is committed. The charge against the appellant is
that he has committed an offence punishable
under Section 307, IPC and Section 135 of the
Bombay Police Act and even on the date of
hearing of this appeal before us on November 18,
1983, the Court was informed that the victim is
alive and at present there is no danger to his life.
Nearly 3 months have rolled by from the date of
the offence. We fail to understand what the
learned Judge of the High Court desires to convey
when he says that once a prima facie case is
established, it is necessary for the court to
examine the nature and gravity of the
circumstances in which the offence was
committed. If there is no prima facie case there is
no question of considering other circumstances.
But even where a prima facie case is established,
the approach of the court in the matter of bail is
not that the accused should be detained by way of
punishment but whether the presence of the
accused would be readily available for trial or that
he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his
favour by tampering with evidence. We would
have certainly overlooked this aspect of the
matter if the approach of the learned Judge was
otherwise one which would commend to us. It
however appears that the learned Judge was
impressed by some of the most irrelevant
considerations which prima facie emerge from the
following observations of the learned Judge
which permeates his whole order running into
about 13 pages.
6. Says the learned Judge:
"The learned Judge ought to have seen the fact
that the helpless victim had gone to the hospital
for pre-operation check-up. He was a leading
social and political worker. He was an active
worker and Secretary of Gundagiri Nivaran Samiti
which had raised a campaign against the
atrocities allegedly having been committed by the
Rajputs of Girasiya community. Admittedly the
respondent is Girasiya and the complainant who
was an active worker and Secretary of Gundagiri
Nivaran Samiti had become a victim at the hands
of the respondent. The learned Judge ought to
have taken into consideration the material fact
that the incident had taken place in the premises
of the hospital which may terrorise a number of
sick persons who might be getting treatment in
the hospital."
At another place, the learned Judge has observed
that the learned Sessions Judge has ignored the
fact that a social and political worker was
attacked in the hospital premises with a knife
having 9″ blade and as many as 11 injuries were
caused to a helpless victim."
Referring the same he submitted that in view of the
principle of law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the
aforenoted case here in the case at hand there is no materials on
record before the Court from the side of the prosecution to cancel
the bail granted to the accused-persons.
Learned Senior Counsel again referred another citation
of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Ms. X vs. State of
Telangana & Anr., reported in (2018) 16 SCC 511, wherein in
para No.17 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"17. The accused had the benefit of an order
granting him anticipatory bail. The grant of
anticipatory bail was cancelled principally on the
ground that he had not disclosed the pendency of
a prosecution against him in the 2G Spectrum
case. The Court has been informed during the
course of the hearing that the said prosecution
has ended in an acquittal. Regular bail was
granted by the High Court on 17-11-2017 [Karim
Morani v. State of Telangana, 2017 SCC OnLine
Hyd 533] in the present case. The second FIR
which was lodged on 22-11-2017 is not, in our
view, a supervening circumstance of such a
nature as would warrant the cancellation of the
bail which was granted by the High Court. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused has submitted that the lodging of the
second FIR, four days after the order of bail is
merely an attempt to bolster a case based on a
supervening event and that it suffers from
vagueness and a complete absence of details. We
are not inclined to make any further observations
and leave the matter there. Above all, the Court
must bear in mind that it is a settled principle of
law that bail once granted should not be cancelled
unless a cogent case, based on a supervening
event has been made out. We find that to be
absent in the present case."
Referring the same he submitted that once the bail is
granted there is no scope to cancel it and here in the case at hand
Learned Additional Sessions Judge considering the materials on
record allowed bail to the accused which is not suffering from any
sort of infirmity and in view of the present circumstances at this
stage there is no scope to cancel the bail granted to the
respondent accused-persons.
Finally, Learned senior counsel referred another citation
In Kashmira Singh vs. Duman Singh, reported in (1996) 4
SCC 693, wherein in para No.10 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
"10. Indisputably, there was a fight between two
groups. Which party had launched the attack
would be a matter of evidence but for the purpose
of this appeal, we assume that the accused's side
was the aggressor. The fact, however, remains
that there was casualty on both sides since both
sides were armed. Whether a cross-complaint
was filed or not does not alter this factual reality.
The possibility of the respondent's side being the
aggressor, or there being a free fight cannot be
overlooked altogether. Non-filing of a cross-
complaint may be a relevant factor, but that there
were injuries on both sides has to be accepted.
This fact was known to the court when it granted
bail. Therefore, in our view, this ground is not
strong enough for cancellation of bail."
Referring the same he submitted that since there is
case and counter case amongst the rival parties and considering
the materials on record Learned Additional Sessions Judge granted
bail to the accused persons. So, at this stage considering the
materials on record there is no scope to interfere with the order
delivered by Learned Additional Sessions Judge on 11.07.2025
and finally Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since the
citations referred by Learned P.P. representing the prosecution
does not covers the present case of the prosecution and as such,
he urged for dismissal of the application for cancellation of bail
filed by the prosecution.
[10] To counter the reply Learned P.P. further submitted
that on bare perusal of the FIR nowhere it will be found that the
complainant was/is a political person and as submitted by Learned
Senior Counsel that the alleged counter case was filed after a
considerable period so the submission of Learned Senior Counsel
cannot be considered.
[11] I have heard detailed submission of both the sides at
length and perused the order dated 11.07.2025 passed by
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala
in connection with BA No.104/2025. Also, I have also gone
through the citations referred by Learned Counsel of the rival
parties.
[12] In the case at hand, the prosecution was set into
motion on the basis of an FIR laid by one Nagadhiraj Datta of
Shibnagar to O/C, East Agartala Police Station alleging inter alia
that on 08.06.2025 one Md. Sahajahan Islam posted a video on
his facebook profile vide URL
No.http://www/facebook.com/share/V/150dzZjN4T/. He saw the
said video on his facebook profile and in the said video, the said
accused made derogatory statements against the Chief Minister of
the State and questioned the Government of India as to why
Manik Saha was appointed as the Chief Minister of the State and
for the said reason the accused declared war against State
Government and Central Government and tried to instigate
religious and communal dispute and made provocative speech.
After that in the evening at about 08.00 p.m. he along with 4/5
persons found accused Sahajahan Islam infront of his house and
on finding him he requested him to delete the said post that time
the accused along with his father and brother and other
miscreants conjointly attacked them with dao and lathi with
intention to kill them resulting which Raktim Sarkar, Kuljit
Debnath and Subhradeep Gupta sustained bleeding injuries and
they have immediately taken to IGM Hospital for treatment from
where they were referred to GBP Hospital. It was further
mentioned in the FIR that the accused persons and his associates
in order to kill them uttered loudly „sobdire mariya la, jabai kor‟
(kill everyone slaughter them). Hence he laid the FIR.
[13] On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the present case was
registered and in course of investigation, the accused respondent
persons were arrested and they were taken into custody and they
were produced before the Court under arrest. Initially, they were
produced before the Court of Learned J.M. First Class Court No.4,
Agartala, West Tripura and the Learned J.M. First Class by order
dated 09.06.2025 was pleased to reject their bail application. I
have also perused the said order as mentioned above delivered by
Learned J.M. First Class. Thereafter, the respondent-accused
persons moved one bail application under Section 483 of BNSS,
2023 before the Court of Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court
No.2, West Tripura, Agartala and the Learned Addl. Sessions
Judge by order dated 11.07.2025 was pleased to grant bail to the
respondent-accused persons which is challenged before this Court
by the prosecution.
[14] In course of hearing both the rival parties have placed
their arguments and counter-arguments to substantiate their
cases. The prosecution to substantiate the case also produced the
Case Diary before this Court. This present case has been
registered under Section 61/109/148/118(2)/3(5) of BNS with
added Section 192/196 of BNS, 2023. For the sake of convenience
I would like to refer herein below all the relevant provisions of the
BNS on the basis of which this case has been registered.
"Section-61 deals with criminal conspiracy. Section-109 of
BNS deals with attempt to murder. Section-148 relates to
conspiracy to commit offences punishable by Section-147.
Section-118(2) relates to punishment for grievous hurt.
Section-3(5) of BNS relates to criminal intention. Section-192
relates to wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause
riot-if rioting be committed; if not committed and Section-196
deals with promoting enmity between different groups on
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony."
[15] The investigation of the case is in progress. The I.O. by
this time has collected the injury report of the victim and also
recorded the statement of some of the material witnesses of the
prosecution who are/were conversant with the facts and
circumstances of the case including the alleged victims of this case
who sustained injury due to causing of hurt by the alleged accused
persons.
[16] I have also seen the medical injury report of one of the
victim Subhradeep Gupta who sustained grievous injury which
attracts the provision of Section 116(g) of BNS, 2023. Apart from
the statement of the victims I have also seen the statement of
other witnesses recorded by I/O in course of investigation. The I/O
in course of investigation seized one knife made of iron and also
one iron made stick and iron rod, the alleged weapon of offence
which were used at the time of commission of offence by the
respondent accused-persons and others.
From the injury report of the victims as well as the
statements of witnesses so far recorded by I/O upto this stage of
investigation, it appears that there are/were sufficient materials
against the respondent accused and others showing their
implication with the alleged offence.
[17] I have also gone through the statement of witnesses
who were threatened by the accused persons after their release
on bail as per order of the Court, on the basis of which GD Entry
was made by O/C of the concerned PS. From the statements of
witnesses so far recorded by I/O up to this stage of investigation
apart from evidences punishable under Section
69/109/148/118(2) of BNS there are also evidences against the
accused-persons including the principle accused showing his
implication with the offence punishable under Section 192/196 of
BNS. Since the investigation of the case is in progress so at this
stage, there is no scope to give any observation regarding
innocence or regarding guilt of any of the accused persons.
[18] From the order dated 11.07.2025 passed by Learned
Additional Sessions Judge, it appears that at the time of granting
bail Learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala
also considered the materials on record which were collected by
I/O in course of investigation of the case and accordingly in page-
4 of the order, Learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the
observation that the allegation was serious in nature. But only
considering the period of incarceration of the accused persons in
custody, Learned Additional Sessions Judge granted bail to the
respondent accused persons without considering/ignoring the
materials on record and also the gravity of the offence which
appears to be non application of proper mind.
[19] I have also perused the citations referred by both the
sides. It is the settled position of law that bail once granted cannot
be cancelled in a mechanical manner. But at the same time it is
also the settled position of law that if the order impugned appears
to be perverse, unjustified not supported by cogent materials on
record that can be interfered by the upper forum. Here in the case
at hand, injury of one of the victim was grievous in nature for
which under Section 118(2) of BNS there is scope for imposing
punishment upto 10 years and also under Section 109 of BNS,
more grievous punishment is provided.
[20] Learned Court below at the time of granting bail came
to the observation that since the statement of primary witnesses
have been recorded and injury report is collected, so there was no
scope for indefinite detention of the accused persons in custody.
But once the Court forms an opinion that the allegation is serious
in nature, in that case, how the Learned Additional Sessions Judge
came to the observation that further detention was not required.
Even it appears that the citations referred by the parties were not
discussed by Learned Court below at the time of passing of order
which in the considered opinion of this Court was not proper
because once the citations are referred by the Learned Counsels
then it casts a duty upon the Court either to accept or to differ
with the same but some opinion is required to be reflected in the
order sheet so that the concerned Learned Counsels can
understand that their citations have been taken care of by the
concerned Court at the time of delivery of judgment/order. Here if
the charges of the prosecution are proved then there is scope for
imposing punishment upto life also. Prosecution before this Court
has challenged the legality and impropriety of the order delivered
by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. To
substantiate the allegation, Learned Counsel of both the rival
parties have placed their elaborate arguments.
[21] I have also gone through the citations referred by
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused persons. As
already stated, it is settled position of law that bail is rule jail is
exception and mechanically there is no scope to cancel the bail
granted to a person but at the same time it is also true that if
there is any perversity in the order of the Court below whose
order has been challenged, in that case, the Learned Appellate
Court or the upper forum cannot keep their eyes closed and
moreover at this stage beyond the Case Diary there is very least
scope to consider the other imputes as referred by Learned senior
counsel.
However, if it is found that the accused persons have
good prima facie case and they have got sufficient materials in
support of their defence that can only be considered in course of
trial by any Court. Even the accused may substantiate their
defence by adducing defence witness during trial not during the
stage of investigation.
It is also the settled position of law that the prosecution
is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but that
reasonableness can only be considered after conclusion of trial of
a case. Here we are concerned with the bail only. Learned Addl.
Sessions Judge, West Tripura only considering the period of
detention in custody granted bail. But at the time of passing order
of bail Learned Addl. Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the
materials on record and the evidence so far collected by I/O upto
this stage of investigation including the injury report of the victim.
Because as already stated, Learned Court below initially came to
the observation that the allegation was serious but later on,
simply on the ground of detention/incarceration granted bail which
shows non-application of proper mind by the Learned Court below.
[22] Learned P.P. in course of his argument referred few
citations in support of the case of the prosecution. I have
meticulously perused the citations referred by the prosecution. It
is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically
but at the same time, as already stated, if the order is perverse
and suffers from infirmity that can be intervened by the Superior
forum.
[23] Here in this case after perusal of the entire Case Diary
and the materials on record it appears that all the victims of this
case have sustained more or less injury to their persons due to
causing of attack by the respondent-accused and others. The
injury of one of the victim was grievous in nature so the prima
facie involvement of the respondent-accused persons punishable
under Section 109/118(2) cannot be ruled out. The IO also has
seized the alleged weapon of offence by this time which was used
at the time of alleged occurrence of offence. It is also on record
that after release on bail, the accused persons threatened the
witnesses of the prosecution not to depose against them before
the Court failing which their life would be in danger and their
families would suffer bad consequences.
[24] So, after hearing both the sides and also after going
through the citations referred by both the parties and the order
dated 11.07.2025 delivered by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in connection with B.A. No.104
of 2025 and considering the materials in CD, it appears that the
said order suffers from perversity for non-application of proper
mind for which the interference of the Court is required and
accordingly, the order dated 11.07.2025 delivered by Learned
Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in
connection with B.A. No.104 of 2025 is hereby stands cancelled
and set aside.
The accused persons are to surrender before the Court
of Learned Jurisdictional Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala on or
before 24.09.2025.
Send down the record of Learned Court below along
with a copy of this order. Also, send a copy of this order to the
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala.
Return back the Case Diary to IO through Learned P.P.
along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
MOUMIT Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
A DATTA Date: 2025.09.17
02:25:53 +05'30'
Sabyasachi B/Amrita
