Tripura High Court
Sri Rajesh Das @ Sanku @ Kutan vs The State Of Tripura on 27 August, 2024
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. A(J) No.31 of 2023
Sri Rajesh Das @ Sanku @ Kutan,
S/O Sri Ratish Das, of Paschim Mashauli, P.S. Fatikray, Dist. Unakoti,
Tripura.
......... Appellant(s)
-Versus-
The State of Tripura
........Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, Advocate.
Mr. R. Das, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Ghosh, Addl. P.P.
Date of hearing : 10th July, 2024.
Date of delivery of : 27th August, 2024.
Judgment & order
YES NO
Whether fit for reporting : √
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
The appeal arises out of the judgment dated 24.05.2023
passed by learned Special Judge (POCSO), Unakoti, Kailashahar in case
No. Special (POCSO) 14 of 2019.
[2] The appellant has been convicted by the impugned judgment
under Section 341 and Section 354 of Indian Penal Code (for short-IPC)
and under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and has been sentenced to suffer
simple imprisonment for 1 (one) month under Section 341 of IPC, and to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 (five) years and to pay fine of
Rs.5,000/- under Section 354 IPC. Similar sentence like Section 354, IPC
has also been passed under Section 8 of POCSO Act and all the
sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
[3] The prosecution case is that the victim, a minor girl aged
about 10 years on 16.06.2019 at about 11 am went to the house of her
grandfather in the same village for playing there and while returning to
her home at about 2/2.30 pm by riding a bicycle, the appellant forcefully
pulled her to the western side bushes of Noagaon school and raped her.
[4] The father of the victim lodged the FIR on the same day at
about 1630 hours and names of two witnesses viz Sri Sadhu Malakar and
Smt. Khela Malakar were also stated in the FIR to have witnessed the
incident and rescued the victim. The police authority registered the FIR
under Sections 341,376 AB and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and on
completion of investigation laid the charge-sheet under above said
provisions of law, but in place of Sri Sadhu Malakar and Smti Khela
Malakar, the investigating officer cited therein one Sri Parendra Malakar
and his sister Smti Kunturi Malakar as eye witnesses of the incident.
[5] Charges were also framed under by Ld. Special Judge under
Sections 341/376AB, IPC and also under Section 6 of POCSO Act to
which the appellant claimed trial pleading his innocence. Prosecution
examined total 18 witnesses in the trial but the defence did not examine
any one as defence witness.
[6] Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the appellant during
hearing gave much stress on his argument that withholding said FIR
named witnesses namely Sri Sadhu Malakar and Smti Khela Malakar, two
new eye witnesses namely, Parendra Malakar [PW-6] and Kunturi
Malakar [PW-9] were produced to design a case for false implication of
the appellant and as such both said PW-6 and PW-9 were not at all
reliable witnesses.
[7] Mr. Bhowmik also raised the question of competency of the
victim to testify in the case on the ground that the learned trial Court
before examining her failed to test her maturity of understanding as
required by law. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel further tried to show
some dis-corroborations amongst the evidences of the victim, PW-6 and
PW-9 to show them untrustworthy.
[8] According to prosecution version, another girl namely,
Anushri was also present in said Noagaon school just before the said
alleged incident, but said girl, Mr. Bhowmik argued, was withheld.
Referring to the medical evidence, learned counsel also contended that
as per victim, after the incident blood seeped out from her genital
whereas, as per medical evidence, there no injury was found in the
private part and therefore, according to Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel,
the victim herself was an untrustworthy witness as she was not giving
the true version of the alleged incident. In this regard, Mr. Bhowmik,
learned counsel also referred one decision of this Court in the case of Sri
Krishnadhan Sarkar vs. The State of Tripura [Crl. A(J) No.30 of
2023].
[9] Next point as raised by Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel was
that places of occurrence was also shifted in this case raising further
doubt about the veracity of the case, for, as per the FIR, place of
occurrence was in a jungle in the western side of said school whereas the
victim stated the same to be in the playground of the school and again
investigating officer showed it in the urinal point located behind the said
school.
[10] Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P., on the other hand,
contended that there was no scope of any exaggeration in the
prosecution case as within two hours of the incident, the FIR was lodged.
He also argued that though said Khela Malakar was not examined but
Sadhu Malakar was examined who was actually said Parendra Malakar
[PW-6] and same was evident from the testimonies of victim as well as
her father and mother.
[11] Ld. Addl. P.P. also argued that medical evidence never
contradicted with the evidence of the victim regarding denuding her and
also regarding penetration on her private part rather, in her cross-
examination, it was further confirmed by the defence that blood also
came out from her vagina due to such sexual assault committed by the
appellant. According to Mr. Ghosh, some weightage could be given for
the same in favour of defence, if she would divulged said fact in her
examination-in-chief but the fact which was taken out during cross-
examination would further bolster her evidence stated in examination in
chief.
[12] Learned Addl. P.P. also submitted that the medical officer had
found redness in the vulva of the victim and even her wearing apparel
which she wore during the incident, had mud stain and these
circumstances were the strong indicators of ravishing the victim sexually.
Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. also argued that both the victim and the
eye witnesses namely, PW-6 and PW-9 corroborated with each other in
all material aspects and were very reliable witnesses and therefore,
learned trial Court was completely justified in convicting the appellant.
[13] Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. to gain support to his
submissions referred one decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar alias Sunny,
(2017) 2 SCC 51 regarding the appreciation of evidence of child victim
in sexual offences. The relevant paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 of the said
decision are extracted below:
"30. By no means, it is suggested that whenever such charge
of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has to be
treated as a gospel truth and the accused person has to be
convicted. We have already discussed above the manner in
which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and
analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure
that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time,
after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it
is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the
case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such
cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the realities
of life as well. Various studies show that in more than 80%
cases of such abuses, perpetrators have acquaintance with the
victims who are not strangers. The danger is more within than
outside. Most of the time, acquaintance rapes, when the
culprit is a family member, are not even reported for various
reasons, not difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is
the fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor
which many times prevents such victims or their families to
lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of criminal
justice system extremely intimidating coupled with absence of
victim protection mechanism. Therefore, time is ripe to bring
about significant reforms in the criminal justice system as
well. Equally, there is also a dire need to have a survivor-
centric approach towards victims of sexual violence,
particularly, the children, keeping in view the traumatic long-
lasting effects on such victims.
31. After thorough analysis of all relevant and attendant
factors, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds, on
which the High Court has cleared the respondent, has any
merit. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim
in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate looking for
corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no
difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual
assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony
has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a
statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such
cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The
deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a
whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an
accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without
corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured
witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her
version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which
lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration,
except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a
victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and
thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury
to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed
unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case
of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the
girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual
molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with
lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea
about lack of corroboration has no substance (See Bhupinder
Sharma v. State of H.P.). Notwithstanding this legal position,
in the instant case, we even find enough corroborative
material as well, which is discussed hereinabove."
[14] Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. also relied on another decision
of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of B.C. Deva alias Dyava vs. State
of Karnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 122 wherein at Para 18 it was observed
by the Apex Court that the plea that no marks of injuries were found
either on the person of the accused or the person of the prosecutrix,
does not lead to any inference that the accused has not committed
forcible sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix and even in absence of any
corroboration of medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix,
which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy has to
be accepted.
[15] As it appears, the victim [PW-2] in this case stated that on
the date of the incident while she was returning to her home from the
house of her grandfather after playing with kid there, the appellant
obstructed her way expressing his willingness to train her on bicycle
riding but she refused as she already knew how to ride the same.
Thereafter, the appellant took her bicycle and started training another
girl namely, Anushri but after a while, when Anushri was called by her
mother, she left the place. Thereafter, the appellant asked the victim to
go behind the Noagaon school premise and also caught hold of her hand.
As the victim was then holding a pillar of the school, he removed her
hands therefrom and took her in the backside of the school by pressing
her mouth and thrust her on the ground. Thereafter, he opened her
panty and his own clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. She
then started crying and at that moment, one Sadhu and another Kunturi
came to spot and seeing them, he ran away. According to the victim,
said Sadhu tried to catch hold of the appellant but failed as Sanku gave a
push to Sadhu. Thereafter, with Sadhu, she went to her home but she
did not enter there out of fear of her mother‟s scolding. Sadhu then
informed her mother and her mother thereafter called her inside but due
to stomach pain, she was unable to move and therefore, her one „Pishu‟
(Bengali slang of husband of father‟s sister) carried her to her house and
she then narrated the incident to her. In her cross-examination, she
stated that when the appellant penetrated his private part, blood came
out from her vagina. She also confirmed that the investigating officer
seized her wearing apparels which she was wearing at the time of said
incident. She also confirmed that the bicycle which was taken by the
appellant was of her elder sister.
[16] The medical officer namely Dr. Saheli Debnath [PW-11]
examined the victim on the same day of incident at about 5.10 pm and
she did not find any injury in the vagina except redness of vulva and
there was mud stain found on the back side of her wearing apparel. Her
hymen was found intact. PW-11 stated that findings of the examination
were inconclusive in respect of commission of rape and forensic report
was awaited.
[17] Contradicting with the medical officer, the Scientific officer,
Dr. Shubankar Nath [PW-16] stated that he did not find any mud stain in
Ext.F and F-1 which were the seized short pant and T-shirt of the victim.
He also did not find any seminal stain or spermatozoa of human origin in
the vaginal swab, urethral swab, anal swab of the victim and also in the
wearing apparels of both the victim and the appellant.
[18] In view of above, it appears that the victim cannot be termed
as wholly reliable witness, for, her evidence is stained with some sort of
exaggeration. The court is therefore required to circumspect and to look
for further corroboration in material particulars by other reliable
testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon her testimony.
[Ref.- Lallu Manjhi and another vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2003
SC 854].
[19] As further noticed, before recording evidence of the victim,
her maturity of understanding was not tested by the learned trial Court,
atleast there is no such indication in the record. In this regard, learned
counsel, Mr. Bhowmik also relied on a decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 777 and
the relevant paragraphs are excerpted hereinbelow:
"7. We have carefully considered the submissions. The fate of
the case depends on the testimony of the minor witness Ajay
(PW-1). Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for
short, "the Evidence Act"), a child witness is competent to
depose unless the Court considers that he is prevented from
understanding the questions put to him, or from giving
rational answers by the reason of his tender age. As regards
the administration of oath to a child witness, Section 4 of the
Oaths Act, 1969 (for short "Oaths Act") is relevant. Section 4
reads thus:
"4. Oaths or affirmations to be made by
witnesses, interpreters and jurors.-(1) Oaths or
affirmations shall be made by the following persons,
namely:-
(a) all witnesses, that is to say, all persons who may
lawfully be examined, or give, or be required to give,
evidence by or before any court or person having by law
or consent of parties authority to examine such persons or
to receive evidence;
(b) interpreters of questions put to, and evidence given
by, witnesses; and
(c) jurors:
Provided that where the witness is a child under twelve
years of age, and the court or person having authority to
examine such witness is of opinion that, though the
witness understands the duty of speaking the truth, he
does not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation,
the foregoing provisions of this section and the provisions
of Section 5 shall not apply to such witness; but in any
such case the absence of an oath or affirmation shall not
render inadmissible any evidence given by such witness
nor affect the obligation of the witness to state the truth.
(2) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. "
8. Under the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 4, it is laid
down that in case of a child witness under 12 years of age,
unless satisfaction as required by the said proviso is recorded,
an oath cannot be administered to the child witness. In this
case, in the deposition of PW-1 Ajay, it is mentioned that his
age was 12 years at the time of the recording of evidence.
Therefore, the proviso to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not
apply in this case. However, in view of the requirement of
Section 118 of the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was
under a duty to record his opinion that the child is able to
understand the questions put to him and that he is able to
give rational answers to the questions put to him. The Trial
Judge must also record his opinion that the child witness
understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is
of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking
the truth.
9. It is well-settled principle that corroboration of the
testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of
caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is easily
susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is no ground to
reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court must make
careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness. The Court
must apply its mind to the question whether there is a
possibility of the child witness being tutored. Therefore,
scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be
made by the Court with care and caution.
10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a
Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view
to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions
put to him and is in a position to give rational answers. The
Judge must be satisfied that the minor is able to understand
the questions and respond to them and understands the
importance of speaking the truth. Therefore, the role of the
Judge who records the evidence is very crucial. He has to
make a proper preliminary examination of the minor by
putting appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor
is capable of understanding the questions put to him and is
able to give rational answers. It is advisable to record the
preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court
can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court."
[20] In the case in hand, neither the trial court has put any
preliminary question to the witness as to whether she was in a position
to understand the question put to her and was capable of giving rational
answers. Even, oath was also administered to her though her age was
stated to be about 10 years in the Court without verifying whether she
understood the nature of the oath or not. There is also no indication in
the record that learned Special Judge complied with the provision of sub-
section (2) of Section 33 of the POCSO Act, 2012 by not permitting the
special public prosecutor or the learned defence counsel to put any direct
question to the victim rather, the manner in which the evidence was
recorded creates an impression that both the prosecution and defence
put the questions to the witness directly. Learned Special Judge,
therefore, did not act with all sensitivity as was required. Though for
these reasons, the evidence of victim cannot be rejected in lemini but
non-compliance of these provisions may cause harassment to the victim
and simultaneously superior Court loses the scope to appreciate the
maturity of understanding of a child witness and also to verify the
capacity of the child witness to understand her duty of speaking the truth
before the Court. Therefore, trial Judges should be more sensible and
pragmatic while examining a child witness and should strictly adhere to
the relevant provisions of law in this regard.
[21] Now, another major controversy as arisen in this case is that
in the FIR, name of one Sadhu Malakar and another Khela Malakar were
mentioned to be eye witness whereas during investigation and also in
trial, other two persons namely Parendra Malakar [PW-6] and Smti
Kunturi Malakar [PW-9] were examined as eye witnesses of the
occurrence. In this regard, law is fairly settled that FIR is not a
substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the
statement of the maker of the same under Section 157 of the Evidence
Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Act. Reference in this
regard may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Bandlamuddi Atchuta Ramaiah and others vs. State of A.P.,
(1996) 11 SCC 133 and the relevant paragraph no. 14 is excerpted
below:
"14. It is necessary to point out that the statement
attributed to the first accused (Atchuta Ramaiah) in Ext.
P-24 was completely disowned by him when he was
questioned by the learned Sessions Judge under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even assuming
that this was truly recorded by the police, its utility in
evidence is very much restricted by law. A statement in
an FIR can normally be used only to contradict its
maker as provided in Section 145 of the Evidence Act,
1872 or to corroborate his evidence as envisaged in
Section 157 of the Act. Neither is possible in a criminal
trial as long as its maker is an accused in the case,
unless he offers himself to be examined as a witness
(vide Nisar Ali v. State of U.P.) Kapoor J. Speaking for
the three-Judge Bench in that decision has observed:
"A first information report is not a
substantive piece of evidence and can only be
used to corroborate the statement of the maker
under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict
it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used
as evidence against the maker at the trial if he
himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate
or contradict other witnesses. In this case,
therefore, it is not evidence."
Earlier thereto, in the cases of Dharma Rama Bhagare vs.
the State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 537 and Pandurang
Chandrakant Mhatre and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009)
10 SCC 773, similar ration was laid down by the Apex Court and it was
categorically held that FIR cannot be used with regard to the testimony
of other witnesses who deposed in respect of the incident. Even in
Dharma Rama (supra), it was further observed that the FIR can by no
means be utilised for contradicting or discrediting the other witnesses
who obviously could not have any desire to spare the real culprit and to
falsely implicate the accused.
[22] In the FIR of the present case in hand, it was alleged that
Sadhu Malakar and Khela Malakar rescued the victim from the grip of the
appellant and in the evidence, the informant [PW-1] stated that Sadhu
Malakar and Kunturi Malakar witnessed the occurrence. But, such
departure by the informant from the contents of FIR was not confronted
to him by the defence and therefore, the appellant cannot be allowed to
take benefit of the same. On similar ground, evidence of PW-6 and PW-9
also cannot be discarded at the threshold, unless there are other reasons
to discard their evidences.
[23] The victim as well as her parents in their evidences
categorically stated that both said Sadhu Malakar and Kunturi Malakar
had witnessed the occurrence. They did not name Parendra Malakar as
one of the eye witness of the same. Ld. Addl. P.P tried to convince the
Court that as father‟s name and address of both Parendra and Sadhu are
same, therefore, they are same person, but the Court is unable to accept
such analogy, especially when the investigating officer has categorically
deposed that he did not examine Sadhu Malakar and also did not cite
him as witness in the case. Moreover, just on the ground that father‟s
name and address of both the said persons are similar, the court cannot
come to a definite conclusion that both are same and single person.
However, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Kunturi
Malakar just on the ground that her name was not reflected in the FIR as
witness of the occurrence.
[24] Said Kunturi Malakar [PW-9] categorically stated that she
found the appellant to take the victim behind the school building and
when she was not coming out, she along with her brother Parendra
Malakar went there and found the appellant was sitting over the victim
and her panty was opened and seeing them the appellant ran away from
the spot. This witness could not be shaken in her cross-examination and
she corroborated with the victim on material points. In her cross-
examination, she stated that her house and the house of Parendra was
on the western side of said School. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel argued
that the houses of PW-6 and PW-9 were not shown in the hand sketch
map, but for such defect made by the investigating officer, the evidence
of Kunturi Malakar cannot be disregarded when the same is found
consistent and reliable. The defence also tried to show by giving
suggestions that due to previous enmity between the father of the
appellant and said Parendra, she was deposing falsely, but same is also
not convincing. The defence could not show any probable reason for false
implication of the appellant by said PW-9.
[25] Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel pointed out that according to
the parents of the victim, at the time of occurrence or just thereafter, the
informant was not present in the house, whereas PW-9 in her cross-
examination stated that she had found father of the victim in the house
when she went there with the victim. But such minor discrepancy in her
evidence is not sufficient to render her entire evidence unreliable.
[26] As discussed earlier, the Medical Officer [PW-11]
categorically stated and also confirmed in her cross-examination that she
found redness in the vulva of the victim, but the defence did not try to
elucidate further from the said witness about the cause of such redness
to create doubt on the prosecution version by showing that such redness
could be caused for other reasons.
[27] Regarding the point of shifting of place of occurrence as
argued by Mr. Bhowmik, it is noticed that the investigating officer
showed the place of occurrence in a urinal point situated behind a school
building and the victim as well as PW-9 also stated that the place of
occurrence was behind the school building. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel
also tried to show that in the FIR, the incident was stated to have
occurred in a jungle in the back side of the school, but the informant was
not an eye witness of the occurrence and moreso, such assertions made
in the FIR was also not confronted to him.
[28] While summarizing the aforesaid discussions, what culminates is
that though the evidence of the victim is tainted with some sort of
exaggeration but she is not completely unreliable witness to brush aside her
entire evidence. She has well been corroborated by PW-9 on material
particulars. Unexplained redness found in the genital of victim adds further
chain link to the prosecution version. In Gul Singh @ Guliya and others
vs. State of M.P. and another, 2014 SCC Online SC 719, it has been
observed by the Apex Court that that evidence of child witness cannot be
rejected unless the same is tutored or unless the same is unreliable.
[29] In kit and boodle, the prosecution has proved the required
foundational facts triggering applicability of Section 29 of the POCSO Act
raising statutory presumption against the appellant but the appellant in turn
could not show inherent infirmities, improbabilities or any patent absurdity
in prosecution case or his false implication therein. Ld. Special Judge was
therefore justified in convicting the appellant.
[30] Mr. Bhowmik, Ld. Counsel relied on a decision of Division Bench
of this Court rendered in Krishnadhan Sarkar (supra), but said case was
based on a complete different sets of facts. Allegations therein were that
the accused first inserted his fingers inside the vagina of a 07 years old girl
followed by penetration of his penis therein but the Medical officer did not
find any injury or swelling in her private part. There were also major
discrepancies amongst the material witnesses and other infirmities in the
prosecution evidences which created serious doubt about the veracity of the
case and therefore the accused therein was acquitted. The appellant in this
case cannot take any benefit of said decision which was based on complete
different sets of facts and evidence.
[31] However, as it appears, learned trial Court has imposed
maximum prescribed punishment both under Section 8 of POCSO Act and
also under Section 354 of IPC, but no reason has been assigned for
inflicting such a harsh punishment. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel
submitted that in the relevant letter of investigating officer giving
requisition for medical examination of the appellant after his arrest, his
age was reflected as 28 years. It is also submitted that his academic
qualification is 8th pass and he is the sole bread earner in his family by
doing a small business of decorator. Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel also
submitted that he was a first time offender. In view of above, this Court
does not find any aggravated factor justifying imposition of such highest
form of punishment under above said both the provisions and
accordingly, sentence is required to be modified.
[32] In view of above, it is directed that the appellant shall
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 (three) years and shall pay fine of
Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) under Section 354 of IPC and in
default of payment of fine, he shall suffer further simple imprisonment
for 1 (one) month. Similar punishment is also imposed upon the
appellant under Section 8 of POCSO Act, 2012 to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for 3 (three) years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees
five thousand) and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further simple
imprisonment of 1 (one) month. No interference is made regarding the
punishment imposed under Section 341 of IPC. The fine money, if
realized, be handed over to the victim through her guardian.
All the substantive sentence of imprisonment shall run
concurrently.
The appeal is, therefore, partly-allowed and is disposed of
accordingly with the above said modification in the sentence.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
Registry is to re-consign the LCRs with copy of this
judgment. Learned trial Court will issue necessary modified conviction
warrant.
Registry will also send a copy of this judgment to Jail
Authority.
JUDGE
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally signed by SUJAY GHOSH
Date: 2024.08.27 17:05:28 +05'30'
Rudradeep
