Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 87 Tel
Judgement Date : 26 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4564 of 2025
DATE: 26.03.2026
Between:
UBR's Housing and Infra Developers LLP
and 2 others.
...Petitioners
AND
Vanga Sudheer Reddy (alias Sudheer)
and 15 others
...Respondents
ORDER:
Heard Mr. A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of Mr. Rusheek Reddy K.V., learned counsel for the petitioners;
Mr. R.Sushanth Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for CBIC appearing on
behalf of respondent Nos.1 & 2, Mr. K.Vivek Reddy, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of P. Vidhyadhar Goud, learned counsel for
respondent No.3, and Mr. Vivek Jain, learned counsel for respondent
No.5.
2. The instant Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners aggrieved of the
order dated 10.11.2025, in I.A.No.1297 of 2025 in O.S.No.442 of 2025,
passed by the XXV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at
Hyderabad.
3. Vide the impugned order, the Trial Court rejected the I.A.No.1297
of 2025 filed by the petitioners under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC')
seeking for an attachment before judgment.
4. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs and respondents herein are
the defendants before the Trial Court. For convenience, the parties are
being addressed in respect of their status before the Trial Court.
5. The plaintiffs by filing the aforesaid I.A. have sought for a
direction from the Court to direct the defendants to furnish a security to
the tune of Rs.24,07,21,377/- to be deposited in the Court, failing which
an order of attachment before judgment insofar as the defendants are
concerned would be passed.
6. The facts in brief relevant for adjudication of the instant Civil
Revision Petition are that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for recovery of
money against the defendants. The plaintiffs entered into an agreement
of sale in respect of certain agricultural land in Maheshwaram Village,
Ranga Reddy District and registration of which was to be done after the
money was transferred against the said agreement of sale. Meanwhile,
certain Memorandum of Understandings (for short 'MoUs') were
entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 and 2. The two
MoUs entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 and 2 was
to be treated as composite transaction and it is contended that the money
was also transferred treating the two agreements as composite one. The
defendant No.1, meanwhile, demanded more money as he was
developing another venture in respect of the land standing in the name of
his son Mr. Vanga Siddharth Reddy (defendant No.3). Certain money
further was also paid by the plaintiffs to defendant Nos.3 and 4.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs were waiting for registration of the land to be
done. When it did not happen for a considerable period of time, the
plaintiffs filed the suit.
7. The defendant No.1, in fact, had also given an undertaking that the
whole amount along with interest at the rate of 36% per annum shall be
paid, which too did not happen. Neither was any land given in lieu in
terms of the agreement agreed upon. Meanwhile, certain criminal cases
were also filed before the CCS, Hyderabad, which was registered as
CRLP.No.231/2014. Though the said FIR is put to quashment vide
CRLP.No.14885 of 2024 before the High Court, the same is still
pending.
8. Meanwhile, however, the plaintiffs have filed the suit O.S.No.442
of 2025 against the defendants seeking for recovery of money along with
damages. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs have also filed an I.A.
seeking for issuance of an appropriate direction to the defendants to
furnish a security to the tune of Rs.24,07,21,377/- by way of deposit as a
security in the event of the plaintiffs succeeding in the suit and getting
the said order executed. Accordingly, purely as a security measure the
plaintiffs have sought for grant of an order of attachment before
judgment.
9. It is this application which was refused by the Trial Court leading
to filing of the instant Civil Revision Petition.
10. According to the plaintiffs, in terms of the agreement of sale the
defendants were to pay Rs.29 crores and 160 plots. Out of the said
agreement of sale, the defendants only paid Rs.55 lakhs and thereafter
there was a default in making the balance of payment. According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants had in a fraudulent manner induced them in
paying crores of rupees and when it came for refund of the said money or
plots in lieu of the said money, they adopted an evasive stand and
defaulted in repayment of the amount payable to the plaintiffs. It was in
this context that the plaintiffs have filed the suit along an I.A. under
Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC seeking for attachment before judgment.
11. According to the plaintiffs, they have met all the ingredients which
are required to establish a case under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC and
therefore they were quite hopeful of the Trial Court considering their
request for attachment before judgment. According to the plaintiffs, they
have also showcased before the Trial Court all the relevant ingredients to
meet the prayer for attachment before judgment like, prima facie the
matter being in their favour, the plaintiffs' apprehension of the
defendants alienating the property and non-marking of the relevant
documents by the Trial Court filed by the plaintiffs themselves.
12. The plaintiffs contended that from the averments made by the
defendants there does not seem to be any specific denial by the
defendants to the pleadings and averments so far as the relief sought for
under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC is concerned and meeting the
grounds required under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC.
13. It was also contended by the plaintiffs that the Trial Court has
wrongly appreciated the aspect of delay on the part of the plaintiffs in
getting the suit itself registered, which itself had consumed substantial
period of time so as to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiffs.
Likewise, it was also the contention of the plaintiffs that the Trial Court
has wrongly appreciated the filing of criminal complaint and using of
police mechanism to settle the dispute and subsequently having thought
of filing of a suit as also granting of the order of attachment before
judgment.
14. On the other hand, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 contended that in
fact a plain reading of the impugned order passed by the Trial Court
itself makes it clear that the same is self-explanatory and does not
warrant any interference. According to the defendant Nos.1 and 2, the
Trial Court has taken note of the fact that the plaintiffs have not met all
the ingredients envisaged under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC and,
therefore, the findings given by the Trial Court cannot be said to be
either illegal or contrary. Nor can it be said to be a perverse finding of
fact.
15. According to defendant Nos.1 and 2 there was no material
available on record to demonstrate the alleged intent of the defendants to
alienate the subject property, that too, with an intention of defeating any
decree that is likely to be passed. It was contended that the entire claim
petition filed by the plaintiffs itself is baseless as at no point of time
defendant No.1 has given any undertaking so far as repayment of the
alleged dues to the plaintiffs along with interest at the rate of 36% per
annum.
16. According to the defendant Nos.1 and 2, of the 39 petition
schedule properties against which attachment is sought for, only F-1 and
F-2 properties are owned by defendant No.1 and defendant No.5 i.e. the
wife of defendant No.1 and both these properties are combined
properties and is a permanent residence of defendant Nos.1 and 5. No
material has also been brought on record to show the intention of
defendant Nos.1 and 5 in alienating the said property. According to the
defendant Nos.1 and 2, all the contentions put forth by the parties have
been duly considered by the Trial Court in the course of passing of the
impugned order and as such, the Trial Court has rightly dismissed the
application on merits itself and the same does not warrant any
interference.
17. Referring to the MoU dated 24.06.2019, 19.09.2019, 10.11.2021,
and sub-MoU dated 10.11.2021, it was contended by defendant Nos.1
and 2 that these are all separate independent agreements entered into
between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 and 4 and those agreements
are pertaining to separate and distinct piece of land and clubbing all the
agreements as a composite transaction and including the agreement for
sale dated 04.10.2019 is frivolous, baseless and false.
18. Lastly, it was contended by defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the
plaintiffs have miserably failed to adduce any third party affidavit or
material with which it could be established that defendant Nos.1 and 2 or
for that matter the defendants are intending in any matter to alienate the
subject property.
19. Similar were the arguments advanced on behalf of defendant No.3.
It was contended by defendant No.3 that since the instant is a Civil
Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, limited scope of
interference is permissible. Exercise of the powers under Article 227 is
permissible only in the event of there is an order passed in excess of
jurisdiction or by somebody who is otherwise incompetent to have
passed the said order. The other occasion which could permit the
interference under Article 227 is in the event of there being any
perversity in the finding of fact given by the Trial Court. According to
defendant No.3 neither is there any ground of jurisdictional error
committed by the Trial Court, nor is there any ground of any perversity
in the finding of fact by the Trial Court. In the absence of any these
grounds, the scope of interference to a well-reasoned order of the Trial
Court becomes impermissible.
20. It was also the contention of defendant No.3 that in the course of
deciding the application filed by the plaintiffs the Trial Court has
exercised its discretionary powers. The power of discretion cannot be
questioned in excess of the powers under Article 227 vested upon the
High Court. It was also emphasized by defendant No.3 insofar the
plaintiffs having failed to produce cogent material in order to establish
the ingredients required to meet the conditions envisaged under Order
XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC, and as such, there is no culpable error
committed by the Trial Court while passing the impugned order.
21. According to defendant No.3, the plaintiffs themselves have not
disputed the fact that the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC
has to be rarely exercised and should not be invoked as a matter of
routine, and all these facts have been rightly considered by the Trial
Court while passing the impugned order.
22. It was lastly contended by defendant No.3 that it is a case where
the suit itself was filed in 2019 and the I.A. seeking attachment before
judgment is being sought for after 6 years of its filing i.e. in the year
2025, that too, without any prima facie proof of establishing the
intention of defendants alienating the subject property. So far as the
contention of the plaintiffs that the documents have not been marked
again is erroneous and the plaintiffs themselves did not seek to exhibit
any documents and those documents that were available with the Trial
Court have been duly considered.
23. Having gone through the contentions put forth on either side and
on perusal of records, it would be pertinent at this juncture to take note
of the findings given by the Trial Court in the course of passing of the
impugned order, more particularly the findings given in paragraph
Nos.13 and 14. For ready reference, paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the
impugned order is reproduced hereunder, viz.,
"13. The contention of the respondents noted as above, on a perusal of the material on record, it appears that the contention raised by the respondents is believed to be true. On the contrary, there is no explanation from the end of the petitioners on the said aspect. The said attitude of the petitioners itself is sufficient to hold that the petitioners failed to satisfy the essentials of Order 38 Rule 5 of CPC in the light of their contention referred as above at para 47 and 49 of petition supporting affidavit. Referring to document No.18, complaint, Dated 16- 11-2024 and Document No.19, FIR in Cr.No.231 of 2024, Dated 17-11- 2024 on one hand and getting registered the suit on 23-9-2025 on the other hand, an adverse inference can be drawn on the case of the petitioners and can be held that on failure to settle the matter through police mechanism. the petitioners finally got registered the suit. In the afore facts and circumstances, the preposition in the judgment of the erstwhile Hon'ble High Court of AP in Bommana Saree Mandir Vs M/s. Manisha Sarees, 2001 (2) APLJ 173 (HC) relied upon by the petitioners on conduct of parties does not applicable to this case.
14. Be that as it may except self serving statement, admittedly, the petitioners have not filed any third party affidavits as to show that with an intention to defraud the petitioners and delaying the execution of decree, the respondents are attempting to remove or dispose of their assets. As a matter of fact, after filing the counters, on 06-11-2025 at the time of submitting arguments, the petitioners tried to file third party affidavit of one Rudra Vaikuntam along with certain documents as to show that the respondent No.4 through the respondents No.3 and 5 are
attempting to sell the property. The learned counsel for the respondents strenuously raised objection to receive the said third party affidavit. In the facts and circumstances of the case noted as above, the third party affidavit along with the documents can not be considered. Once the third party affidavit has been omitted from consideration there is no other material on record except the vague and general allegations in the affidavit of the petitioner No.2 that the rèspondents are attempting to dispose of the property or remove it beyond the jurisdiction of the court, unsupported by particulars, would not be sufficient compliance with the rule and that apart, the petitioners failed to state the grounds on which they entertain the belief or apprehension that the respondents would dispose of or remove the property or, to give the source of their information and belief in the matter through an affidavit. In these circumstances, referring to preposition in Raman Tech & Engg's case noted as above, it can be said that merely on the ground that the petitioners have a just and valid claim or a prima facie case, the same by itself will not entitle the petitioners as they failed to establish that the respondents are attempting to remove or dispose of their assets with an intention of defeating the decree that may be passed. Accordingly, this court answered the point against the petitioners."
There were other grounds also which have been duly considered
by the Trial Court and it is only thereafter the Trial Court had found the
application filed by the plaintiffs not having sufficient force.
24. Upon hearing the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, this
Court is also of the firm view that firstly, the Trial Court has not
committed any error of law or on facts in the course of passing of the
impugned order. Secondly, even before this Court the plaintiffs have not
been able to produce any cogent proof of meeting the ingredients
required under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC or at least to the extent of
producing some material to show that the defendants have conspired
together against the plaintiffs and intend to alienate the subject property
with an intention of defeating the claim of the plaintiffs in the event of
the decree being passed in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, there does not
seem to be any perversity convincingly established by the learned Senior
Counsel for the plaintiffs.
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raman Tech. and
Process Engg. Co. and Ors. vs. Solanki Traders 1, held at paragraph
Nos.4 to 6, as under:
"4. The object of supplemental proceedings (applications for arrest or attachment before judgment, grant of temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers) is to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. The object of Order 38 Rule 5 CPC in particular, is to prevent any defendant from defeating the realisation of the decree that may ultimately be passed in favour of the plaintiff, either by attempting to
(2008) 2 SCC 302
dispose of, or remove from the jurisdiction of the court, his movables.
The scheme of Order 38 and the use of the words "to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him" in Rule 5 make it clear that before exercising the power under the said Rule, the court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable chance of a decree being passed in the suit against the defendant. This would mean that the court should be satisfied that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. If the averments in the plaint and the documents produced in support of it, do not satisfy the court about the existence of a prima facie case, the court will not go to the next stage of examining whether the interest of the plaintiff should be protected by exercising power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. It is well settled that merely having a just or valid claim or a prima facie case, will not entitle the plaintiff to an order of attachment before judgment, unless he also establishes that the defendant is attempting to remove or dispose of his assets with the intention of defeating the decree that may be passed. Equally well settled is the position that even where the defendant is removing or disposing his assets, an attachment before judgment will not be issued, if the plaintiff is not able to satisfy that he has a prima facie case.
5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is a drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilise the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of attachment
before judgment and forcing the defendants for out-of-court settlements under threat of attachment.
6. A defendant is not debarred from dealing with his property merely because a suit is filed or about to be filed against him. Shifting of business from one premises to another premises or removal of machinery to another premises by itself is not a ground for granting attachment before judgment. A plaintiff should show, prima facie, that his claim is bona fide and valid and also satisfy the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of the whole or part of his property, with the intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, before power is exercised under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. Courts should also keep in view the principles relating to grant of attachment before judgment. (See Premraj Mundra v. Md. Manech Gazi [AIR 1951 Cal 156] for a clear summary of the principles.)"
26. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is also of the firm view
that the instant Civil Revision Petition being devoid of merit, deserves to
be and is accordingly dismissed.
27. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
________________ P.SAM KOSHY, J Date: 26.03.2026 GSD
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