Thirunagari Govind vs The State Of Telagana
2026 Latest Caselaw 64 Tel

Telangana High Court

Thirunagari Govind vs The State Of Telagana on 26 March, 2026

Author: Juvvadi Sridevi

Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                AT HYDERABAD

  THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI

             CRIMINAL PETITION No.4031 OF 2024

                    DATED: 26th MARCH, 2026

Between:

Thirunagari Govind                                 ...Petitioner
                                AND

The State of Telangana represented by
Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor
for ACB Cases and two others              ...Respondents

O R D E R:

This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused

No.3 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crime

No.05/RCO/ACB-NZB/2020/ACB, Nizamabad, registered for

the offences under Sections 7(a)(c) and 12 of the Prevention

of Corruption Act (for short 'the Act') and Section 120B read

with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC').

02. Heard Sri Ch. Vidya Sagar Rao, learned counsel,

representing Sri N. Manohar, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri K. Rajashekar, learned counsel,

representing Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Standing

Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for the Anti-

Corruption Bureau for the respondents. Perused the record.

03(a). The brief facts of the case are as follows: One

Gaddam Satish Goud, shown as the respondent No.2,

became acquainted with Bathula Sudhakar, shown as the

respondent No.3. One Sujay was habitually engaged in

betting on IPL cricket matches, and the respondent No.3

used to act as a mediator in such betting activities. Sujay

used to pay money through the respondent No.3 in

connection with the said betting transactions. Subsequently,

the respondent No.3 decided to discontinue his involvement

in cricket betting and ceased to act as a mediator. However,

Sujay allegedly began coercing the respondent No.3 to

continue acting as a mediator. He is stated to have

threatened the respondent No.3 that, in the event of non-

compliance, he would lodge a complaint against him and

ensure that a betting case was registered, asserting that he

had influence over the officials of Kamareddy Police Station,

including the Inspector.

03(b). It is further averred that the respondent No.3

informed the respondent No.2 about the said threats, who in

turn apprised their common friend by name Ande Ramesh.

On 05.11.2020, the respondent No.3, accompanied by a

Police Constable by name Ravi, went to the residence of the

respondent No.2 and informed him that the said constable

was taking him to Kamareddy Police Station. The

respondent No.3 requested the respondent No.2 to

accompany him, and accordingly, he did so. However, the

respondent No.2 was not permitted to enter the Police

Station and waited outside. After some time, he was called

inside and met the respondent No.3. He advised the

respondent No.3 to disclose the truth as to whether he had

participated in betting activities. Shortly thereafter, the

respondent No.2 was directed to leave the premises by the

police officials. Subsequently, the respondent No.2

approached the accused No.1 and requested permission to

speak with him briefly. The accused No.1 declined and

directed him to speak with the accused No.2 instead. Upon

speaking with the accused No.2, the respondent No.2 was

informed that a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was required to secure

the release of the respondent No.3 from the proposed betting

case. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 came into the

verandah and informed the respondent No.3 that accused

No.1 was demanding Rs.5,00,000/- for his release, out of

which Rs.3,00,000/- was allegedly the share of the accused

No.1 and the remaining Rs.2,00,000/- would be shown as the

amount seized in the betting case to be registered against

him.

03(c). Thereafter, the Police Constable by name Ravi,

the accused No.2 and one Ramesh came out along with the

respondent No.3. Sujay informed the respondent No.2 that

the respondent No.3 was being taken to Banswada. The

respondent No.3 was taken in the car of the accused No.2,

and the respondent No.2 was unable to follow them.

Approximately, half an hour later, the respondent No.3

telephonically informed the respondent No.2 that they had

returned to the Police Station and requested him to come

there. The respondent No.2 accordingly went to the Police

Station but was not permitted to meet the respondent No.3

and therefore returned. On 06.11.2020, the respondent No.2

informed his friend Ramesh about the matter. On the same

day, Ramesh informed the respondent No.2 that the accused

No.1 was demanding Rs.5,00,000/- as illegal gratification.

Meanwhile, the respondent No.3 contacted Ramesh

telephonically, enquired about his location, and requested

him to arrange Rs.5,00,000/-. It was further informed that an

amount of Rs.1,50,000/- had already been collected.

Thereafter, the respondent No.3 again called Ramesh and

asked him to bring an additional amount of Rs.50,000/- or

Rs.1,00,000/-. He repeatedly enquired about Ramesh's

whereabouts and urged him to bring the money at the

earliest.

03(d). As the respondent No.2 was unwilling to pay the

bribe amount, he approached the officials of the Anti-

Corruption Bureau (ACB). On 06.11.2020 at about 7:45

p.m., Ramesh went to Kamareddy Town Police Station after

activating the electronic recording device provided by the

ACB officials. After some time, he returned and informed the

ACB officials that the accused No.2 had taken him aside in

the verandah of the Police Station and enquired as to the

amount brought by him. Upon being informed that he had

brought Rs.50,000/-, the accused No.2 directed him to hand

over the said amount and leave. When Ramesh enquired

whether the respondent No.3 would be released, the

accused No.2 informed him that the respondent No.3 would

remain inside. Ramesh further stated that when he

attempted to speak with the accused No.1, the respondent

No.3 prevented him from doing so.

03(e). At about 9:15 p.m., as per the instructions of the

ACB officials, the respondent No.2 went to the Police Station

with the electronic recording device activated. On seeing

him, the accused No.1 directed him to leave his cell phone

outside. The accused No.2 then entered the chamber of the

accused No.1. Inside the chamber, the accused No.2

enquired about the bribe amount. The respondent No.2

stated that since it was Friday, he was unable to mortgage

gold and would arrange the amount on the following day. The

accused No.1 stated that he had already given his word to

higher officials and was unable to retract it. He further

demanded Rs.1,50,000/- as advance. When the respondent

No.2 informed that Rs.50,000/- had already been paid

through Ramesh, the accused No.2 denied receipt of any

such amount. Thereafter, the accused No.1 directed them to

go outside and discuss the matter. The respondent No.2

subsequently handed over the recording device to the

Inspector of Police, ACB, Nizamabad Range.

03(f). On 07.11.2020, the respondent No.2 and

Ramesh met the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB,

Nizamabad Range, who instructed them to once again meet

the accused No.1 while carrying the electronic recording

device and record the conversation. Accordingly, they

proceeded to Kamareddy. At that time, the accused No.1

was coming out of the Police Station. He stopped his vehicle

and asked them to follow him to the office of the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Kamareddy. They complied and

waited outside as instructed. After some time, the accused

No.1 came out and directed them to come to the Police

Station.

03(g). At the Police Station, the accused No.1 informed

them that the respondent No.3 had been detained for a few

days and that a case would be registered against him, but

that he would grant station bail. He assured them that he

would manage the higher officials and ensure that the

respondent No.3 would not face future difficulties. He further

remarked that the respondent No.3 had accumulated

substantial wealth, including plots and a house, and enquired

whether they had brought the bribe amount. Ramesh, to

ascertain his intention, informed him that they had brought

Rs.4,00,000/- as per his instructions. However, the accused

No.1 asked them to come on the following day and pointed

out a person to whom the bribe amount was to be handed

over. Shortly thereafter, the said person approached them

and reiterated that they should come on the next day. The

entire conversation was recorded by Ramesh.

03(h). On 08.11.2020, the respondent No.2 submitted

a further complaint to the ACB authorities stating that he was

not willing to pay the bribe amount. Upon verification, it was

found that the accused No.1 did not enjoy a good reputation.

As there was prima facie material indicating demand and

acceptance of Rs.50,000/- as part of the bribe, efforts were

initiated to lay a trap. However, in the meantime, the

accused No.1 registered Crime No.404 of 2020 against the

respondent No.3 under Sections 3 and 4 of the A.P.Gaming

Act, notwithstanding the alleged receipt of Rs.50,000/- as

part of the illegal gratification. Consequently, the proposed

trap could not be executed.

03(i). On 13.11.2020, the ACB officials met the

respondent No.3, who submitted a typed complaint

reiterating the above facts. He further alleged that the

accused No.2 forcibly took his Canara Bank ATM card and

withdrew an amount of Rs.89,500/- from his account. He also

stated that, on the instructions of the accused No.1, the

petitioner-accused No.3 and his staff took him to a tin shed at

CSI Ground, Kamareddy, where photographs were taken

and a panchanama was purportedly conducted, and a false

case was registered against him. After registration of the

case, he was released. However, on 10.11.2020, he was

again summoned to the Police Station, compelled to sign

certain documents, and the petitioner-accused No.3 allegedly

demanded an additional bribe of Rs.20,000/-. Upon

verification, it was found that the petitioner-accused No.3

also did not enjoy a good reputation. Thus, accused Nos.1

and 3, being public servants, are alleged to have failed to

maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in the

discharge of their official functions and to have abused their

official position for illegal gratification.

04(a). Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused No.3

submits that the petitioner has no manner of involvement

whatsoever in the alleged offences. It is contended that as

per the complaints lodged by the respondent No.2 dated

06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020, the allegations were directed

only against the Inspector of Police (accused No.1) and the

private person i.e. accused No.2 and upon subsequent

complaint dated 13.11.2020 submitted by the respondent

No.3, the allegation against the present petitioner-accused

No.3 is that he allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- for

granting station bail and for accepting sureties in Crime

No.404 of 2020 registered against the respondent No.3. It is

further submitted that no case was registered by the ACB

authorities either on 06.11.2020, 08.11.2020, or 13.11.2020,

and that the present crime bearing No.05/RCO/ACB-

NZB/2020 was registered only on 19.11.2020, hence, as on

the date of the alleged complaint dated 13.11.2020, no case

had been registered against the petitioner-accused No.3.

04(b). Learned counsel further submits that the

petitioner-accused No.3 was working as Sub-Inspector of

Police at Kamareddy Police Station from September, 2018 to

November, 2020. During the said period, the accused No.1

was the Station House Officer of Kamareddy Police Station.

On 08.11.2020 at about 8:00 p.m., the accused No.1

instructed the petitioner-accused No.3 to proceed to a tin

shed situated at CSI Ground, Kamareddy Town, to verify

information regarding illegal online cricket betting allegedly

taking place there. Pursuant to such instructions, the

petitioner-accused No.3, along with police staff and two

mediators, proceeded to the said location and found the

respondent No.3 along with others present at the scene. The

police team surrounded the persons found there, informed

them of the purpose of their presence, and conducted

enquiries. As the respondent No.3 and others, namely

Jagan and Amarnath, failed to provide satisfactory

explanations for their presence, a search was conducted.

During the search, an amount of Rs.1,14,000/- and a Redmi

mobile phone were recovered from the possession of the

respondent No.3. From Jagan, an amount of Rs.16,000/-

and one OnePlus mobile phone were seized. Upon enquiry,

they allegedly disclosed that they were engaged in online

cricket betting using code "VIK" through phone number

7979028143 and were in contact with one R.K. (phone

number 7887005487), stated to be the main organiser,

through whom betting amounts were credited to participants'

accounts. It was further disclosed that the respondent No.3

used to receive commission through PhonePe and Google

Pay. The petitioner-accused No.3, in the presence of

mediators, recorded the proceedings, prepared a

panchanama, and seized the incriminating articles, namely

the cash of Rs.1,14,000/- and the mobile phones, under the

cover of the panchanama duly signed by the mediators.

Thereafter, the respondent No.3 and another person were

taken into custody and produced before the accused No.1,

the Station House Officer, who registered Crime No.404 of

2020 and entrusted the investigation to Mr. M. Ravi Kumar,

Sub-Inspector of Police. The Investigating Officer completed

the investigation and filed a report before the learned

Magistrate. Subsequently, the accused therein were

arrested, remanded to judicial custody, released on bail, and

ultimately the respondent No.3 pleaded guilty and was

sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.

04(c). It is further contended that the petitioner-

accused No.3 never demanded any illegal gratification from

any person while discharging his official duties. No official

favour was pending with the petitioner in respect of the

respondent No.3. The entire case was initially dealt with by

the accused No.1 and thereafter investigated by the said Mr.

M. Ravi Kumar, Sub-Inspector of Police. It is further

submitted that there is absolutely no material or evidence to

substantiate the allegation of any criminal conspiracy

between the petitioner-accused No.3 and the other accused.

The essential ingredients required to constitute offences

punishable under Section 120B of IPC and Section 7(a) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act are conspicuously absent,

and therefore the continuation of proceedings against the

petitioner-accused No.3 is wholly unsustainable in law. It is

also submitted that the proceedings against the accused

No.1 were already quashed by this Court vide Order dated

01.08.2022 passed in CRL.P.No.9027 of 2021.

04(d). With the above submissions, while praying to

quash the proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3,

he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court

in CBI v. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava 1 wherein it was held

at Paragraph Nos.15, 16, 24, 26, 31 that:

"15. A final report was filed in the Special Court, Patiala House in the FIR being No. RCAC 2012 A0001 dated 29-2-2012 alleging that on 28-12-2011, the respondent herein, who was at the relevant time posted as the Commissioner, Central Excise, Delhi-I Commissionerate, along with other persons of the Department and with one Hemant Gandhi (private person), planned a fake raid at the premises of Mr Dilip Aggarwal and Anand Aggarwal at Najafgarh

(2017) 15 SCC 560

Road, New Delhi in order to obtain illegal gratification by illegal and corrupt means through Hemant Gandhi.

16. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28-12-

2011, a team of officials of the Central Excise Department led by Lallan Ojha, Superintendent, conducted an illegal raid at the premises of Dilip Aggarwal and Anand Aggarwal at 71/7, A-4, First Floor, Najafgarh Road Industrial Area, New Delhi. Further, Lallan Ojha, in conspiracy with the respondent herein and Hemant Gandhi and others negotiated with the owners of the premises for illegal gratification in lieu of not taking any action against them and finalised the bribe amount of Rs 60 lakhs to be paid by them through the private person. The factum of the said raid was telephonically conveyed by Lallan Ojha to the respondent herein through Hemant Gandhi. Hemant Gandhi was in regular touch with the owners of the premises and received a huge amount of Rs 20 lakhs in cash along with a cheque signed by Anand Aggarwal for Rs 20 lakhs as security for the remaining amount of illegal gratification. Hemant Gandhi also spoke to Lallan Ojha and the respondent herein for some concession in the amount.

24. The statements under Section 164 of the Code also do not implicate the respondent herein in the present case as the witnesses have retracted from their statements. Further, on the contrary, the said witnesses have deposed that the aforesaid statements under Sections 161 and 164 were obtained under threat of arrest and false implication in the case and therefore are not voluntary. Admittedly, the statements of Lallan Ojha as well as the respondent herein are not on record. Even from the statement made by Ms Rekha Rani (PW 6) PS to the respondent herein, it can be easily seen that Hemant Gandhi was a frequent visitor to the office of the respondent herein. Several times, PW 6 connected his call to the respondent herein but in her deposition she clearly mentioned that earlier he used to call on

the landline number of the office but for the last 5-6 months he was meeting the respondent herein personally in his office. Though the said deposition proves the nearness of that particular private person with the respondent herein but it cannot be inferred that the private person was in constant touch with the respondent and was apprising him about every development before, during and after the alleged raid. The claim of his nearness to the respondent herein is baseless as he was working as the informer to the evasion wing and the alleged phone calls made by him to the respondent herein or meetings with the respondent herein cannot and will not be sufficient to implicate the respondent herein.

26. Similarly, the law on the issue emerges to the effect that conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The object behind the conspiracy is to achieve the ultimate aim of conspiracy. For a charge of conspiracy means knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or services in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do.

31. We have no doubt to hold that in Call No. 48, the respondent herein was not at all in the picture and even in Call No. 51 he was talking to Hemant Gandhi but it is not proved that they were talking about the same raid as they have used certain other cryptic codes as mentioned above which makes the call highly improbable for connecting the respondent

herein in commissioning of the offence. Even otherwise, in Call No. 51, the benefit of doubt must go to the respondent herein where the language of the call is dubious and no logical understanding of the actual conversation can be drawn. Further, in the absence of any details with regard to the amount of

categorically brings out that the respondent herein did not have any knowledge of the alleged criminal conspiracy and Call No. 51 is also unable to prove the complicity of the accused in the crime because of its out of the context conversation. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that Calls Nos. 48 and 51, heavily relied upon by the prosecution, lack object and purpose to prove the complicity of the respondent herein in the crime."

04(e). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in N.S.Gnaeswaran v.

Inspector of Police 2 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.8

and 9 that:

"8. Further, in identical proceedings filed by the CBI against the appellants in C.C. Nos. 13 of 2006 and 151 of 2010, the charge sheets were quashed by the High Court after taking note of the settlement reached in the recovery proceedings. The special leave petitions preferred by the State being SLP (Crl) No. 711 of 2021 and SLP (Crl) No. 825 of 2021 challenging the said quashing were dismissed by this Court, rendering the orders final. Since the facts and legal position are the same in the present matter, we see no reason why the appellants should not be given the same relief.

(2025) SCC Online SC 1257

9. In our view, allowing the present criminal proceedings to continue would serve no meaningful purpose, particularly when the dispute between the parties has already been resolved through a full and final settlement. The settlement between the parties having taken place after the alleged commission of the offence, and there being no continuing public interest we see no justification for allowing the matter to proceed further."

04(f). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in CBI v. Srinivas D. Sridhar3

wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.7, 12, 14, 18 and 21

that:

"7. An application for discharge made by the respondent (Accused 7) was rejected by the learned Special Judge of CBI Court. In a revision application filed by the respondent before the High Court, by the impugned judgment [Srinivas D. Sridhar v. CBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2900] , the High Court has discharged the respondent. The appellant CBI, being aggrieved by the said judgment, is before this Court.

12. We have perused the statements of the relevant witnesses and the documents on record in the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet. We may note here that there are no allegations against the respondent as regards the sanction of SBLC. There is no material placed in the charge- sheets to show that the respondent has played any role in sanction of SBLC.

14. At this stage, we may note that according to the prosecution, the usual procedure followed by the Bank at the relevant time was that credit proposals

(2025) 1 SCC 378

were processed by the Branch and submitted to the zonal office. After the recommendation of the zonal office, the proposals were examined by the Credit Department in the Head Office. The memorandum duly signed was used to be placed before the Loan Advisory Group of six General Managers. The loan proposals were thereafter presented before the Managing Committee, comprising the Chairman and Managing Director, whole-time Directors, RBI Nominee Director, and 3 other Directors, including at least 2 independent Directors, one of them being Chairman of the Audit Committee. The memorandum placed before the Managing Committee was prepared by the Bank's Credit Department and signed by the Deputy General Manager (Credit) and General Manager (Credit).

18. We find that the Loan Advisory Committee's favourable recommendations regarding the Company's proposal are also on record, apart from the memorandum submitted to the Managing Committee. We have also seen the executive brief prepared containing the proposal.

21. Therefore, we see no scope to interfere with the impugned order [Srinivas D. Sridhar v. CBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2900]. While we say so, we must observe here that we have examined only the role ascribed to the respondent in the process of sanctioning the facilities to the Company. We have examined the charge-sheet only for that limited purpose. Therefore, any observation made in the judgment will not affect the trial against the other accused persons as we have not recorded any findings about the material against them."

04(g). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Pandey v.

Shesha Ram Saini 4 wherein it was held at Paragraph

Nos.27, 32, 40 & 42 that:

"27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat7, this Court, in a very recent judgment held, that where the allegations pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office, such actions fall squarely within category of cognizable offences and therefore, they are to be inquired into, and holding of any preliminary inquiry before the registration of the FIR is not necessary. If the information provided to the police or the preliminary report discloses a commission of a cognizable offence, the police is duty bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register an FIR without any delay.

32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the police is not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of the said information. It has been so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari (Supra) that the genuineness or credibility of the information is not the condition precedent for registration of an FIR.

40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh11, and reiterated thereafter to the effect that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 Cr. P.C. if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry before FIR is permissible in such a situation; however, if the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates necessity of an inquiry being conducted, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain facts disclosing cognizable offence, if any. Thus, treating the inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI as a preliminary inquiry, we permit the same to be looked into, if necessary, by the I.O.

2025 Law Suit SC 1233

during the investigation by him, but not to treat it as conclusive. The I.O. would conduct the investigation strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any finding or observation made by the High Court in the impugned order(s) or by this Court hereinabove and shall conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months as the matter is quite old.

42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the above terms and the two appeals [D. No. 10495 of 2019 and D. No. 10508 of 2019] are partly allowed by modifying the judgment and orders of the High Court dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above."

04(h). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla and

another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 5 wherein it

was held at Paragraph Nos.19, 21 & 22 that:

19. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , it was observed notwithstanding the difference in language of Sections 227 and 239CrPC, the approach of the Court concerned is to be common under both provisions. The principles holding the field under Sections 227 and 228CrPC are well settled, courtesy, inter alia, State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] ; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] ; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [Stree Atyachar

(2023) 15 Supreme Court Cases 502

Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] ; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] ; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] ; Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 :

(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] ; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] ; Dinesh Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Dinesh Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2014) 13 SCC 137 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 614] ; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v.

State of Gujarat [Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361] and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Charan Bansal [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Charan Bansal, (2020) 2 SCC 290 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 594] . We need only refer to some, starting with Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , where, after considering Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , K.P. Raghavan v. M.H. Abbas [K.P. Raghavan v. M.H. Abbas, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 76 : AIR 1967 SC 740] and Almohan Das v. State of W.B. [Almohan Das v. State of W.B., 1968 SCC OnLine SC 85 : (1969) 2 SCR 520] , it was laid down as under : (Prafulla Kumar Samal case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , SCC p. 9, para 10) "10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out

whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." (emphasis supplied)

21. In a recent judgment viz. State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao [State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294] , this Court held : (SCC paras 7-10 & 12-13) "7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to

determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge- sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.

8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.

9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227CrPC is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the IO.

10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court

must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.

***

12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case"

used in Section 227CrPC is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.

13. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 :

1996 SCC (Cri) 820] and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." (emphasis supplied)

22. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits

expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged. It would be unjustified to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an FIR under Section 482CrPC albeit, this Court, while setting aside the judgment [Pushpendra Mishra v.

State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 7164] impugned therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that :

(Priyanka Mishra case [Priyanka Mishra v. State of M.P., (2023) 15 SCC 480] , SCC para 24) '24. ... the Appellants are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial.' [Priyanka Mishra v. State of M.P., (2023) 15 SCC 480] The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through quashing an FIR/complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts. The High Court should have intervened and discharged the appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive."

04(i). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid and another v.

State of Uttar Pradesh and others 6 wherein it was held at

Paragraph Nos.35, 38, 39, 45 and 46 that:

(2023) 20 Supreme Court Cases 219

35. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters are : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "102. ... (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." In our opinion, the present case falls within Parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7, respectively, referred to above.

38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

39. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :

(SCC pp. 526-27, paras 5-7)

"5. ... Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v.

State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death." (emphasis supplied)

45. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the continuation of the criminal case arising from FIR No. 224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police Station, Saharanpur will be nothing but abuse of the process of the law. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are inclined to accept the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.

46. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order [Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 967] passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19-9-2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed."

04(j). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in R. Ashoka v. State of

Karnataka and others 7 wherein it was held at Paragraph

Nos.12 and 21 that:

"12. Before proceeding to the merits, there are two aspects that this Court must remind itself of. One, that even though the parameters of the powers of quashing cases and proceedings under Section 482 CrPC are well-settled, the same must 2be re- appreciated, with reference to certain cases. Two, that the concept and Origins of the Lokayukta, its powers and scope of operation.

Principles of Quashing I. Bhajanlal (supra) "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

2025 Supreme (SC) 2057

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." II. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa10, a bench of three judges held:

"6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to

prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the

complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

III. Recently, this Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh11, reiterated the steps laid down by this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor12 to be taken by the High Court in exercising its quashing powers:

"20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:-- (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the 13 prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising

therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]" (emphasis supplied) Origins, Powers and Scope of Operation of Lokayukta The concept of Lokayukta has been adapted from the Scandinavian concept of Ombudsman, the origins of which can be traced back to the early 1800s. In India, it was recommended by the First Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966. The State of Maharashtra became the first State to establish the body in 1971. The State of Karnataka, with which, we are concerned, enacted this law in 1984. The scope is given in Sections 7 & 8 of KLA. Section 7 provides for the jurisdictional framework of the Lokayukta and Upalokayukta. It details who the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta can investigate, transfer complaints, bars legal challenges and provides for continuity in cases of vacancies. Section 8 is the counterpart to Section 7 and, as such details the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta and Upalokayuktas. This Court in Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C. Krishna13, had occasion to consider the act in extensive detail. We may quote some of the relevant paras:

"Functions of the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta -- Investigative in nature

32. The provisions discussed above clearly indicate that the functions to be discharged by the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta are investigative in nature and the report of Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta under sub- sections (1) and (3) of Section 12 and the special report submitted under sub-section (5) of Section 12 are only recommendatory. No civil consequence as such follows from the action of the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta, though they can initiate prosecution before a competent court. I have extensively referred to the object and purpose of the Act and explained the various provisions of the Act only to indicate the

nature and functions to be discharged by Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta under the Act.

33. The Act has, therefore, clearly delineated which are the matters to be investigated by the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta. They have no authority to investigate on a complaint involving a grievance in respect of any action specified in the Second Schedule of the Act, which are as follows: "(a) Action taken for the purpose of investigating crimes relating to the security of the State.

(b) Action taken in the exercise of powers in relation to determining whether a matter shall go to a court or not.

(c) Action taken in matters which arise out of the terms of a contract governing purely commercial relations of the administration with customers or suppliers, except where the complaint alleges harassment or gross delay in meeting contractual obligations.

(d) Action taken in respect of appointments, removals, pay, discipline, superannuation or other matters relating to conditions of service of public servants but not including action relating to claims for pension, gratuity, provident fund or to any claims which arise on retirement, removal or termination of service.

(e) Grant of honours and awards."

...

37. The Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta while exercising powers under the Act, of course, is acting as a quasi-judicial authority but his functions are investigative in nature. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398] held: (AIR p. 408, para 14) "14. ... Whether or not an administrative body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi-judicial capacity, must be determined in each case, on an examination of the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder."

...

40. The provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 11 clearly indicate that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are discharging quasi-judicial functions while conducting the investigation under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act also states that for the purpose of any such investigation, including the preliminary inquiry the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta shall have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in the matter of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. Further they have also the power for requiring the discovery and production of any document, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office, issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents, etc. Further, sub-section (3) of Section 11 stipulates that any proceedings before the Lokayukta and Upa- Lokayukta shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the Lokayukta and Upa- Lokayukta, while investigating the matters are discharging quasi-judicial functions, though the nature of functions is investigative."

21. Consequent to the above discussion, the FIR subject matter of the present case deserves to be quashed and set aside in view of Bhajanlal (supra). The appeal is allowed."

04(k). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in State of Telangana v.

Jerusalem Mathai 8 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.6

to 8 that:

2025 SCC Online SC 2086

"6. The FIR indicates that the information was received on 28.05.2015 at 15:00 hours but the general diary reference shows the entry made as on 31.05.2015 at 23 : 00 hours. The FIR is also dated 31.05.2015. As noted above, no FIR was registered on the written complaint made by the complainant, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The FIR further indicates that the police were present at a particular location, wherein the persons referred to in the second paragraph of the complaint along with another, having come to the residence of the friend of the complainant. There were arrangements made for audio and video recordings. It is also stated that the materials recorded disclosed reasons to suspect the crime and cognizable offence by the accused on which reasoning the crime was registered under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the offence of offering bribe on the eve of the MLC elections to the MLA for exercise of franchise in a particular manner.

7. Admittedly, the petitioner before the High Court, A4 was not present on the occasion when the transaction is alleged to have occurred. As we indicated earlier, the allegation made in the complaint against A4 is not in any way linked with the allegation of a higher offer having been made by another. The presence of A-4 is not reported when the alleged transaction occurred.

8. We would not speak on the incident that occurred on 31.05.2015 since the persons allegedly involved in the said transactions are not before us. However, we cannot but notice that there is nothing to connect A4 to the crime, but for a casual allegation raised on a call having been received by the complainant without any indication even of the time when such call was received. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court and dismiss the Special Leave Petitions."

04(l). Further, he relied upon a decision of the

Honourable Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Mathur v

State of Madhya Pradesh 9 wherein it was held at Paragraph

Nos.2, 4, 12 to 14 that:

2. The facts, as emanating from the record, are that:-

2.1 House No. D-90, Dindayal Nagar, Ratlam, was allotted on hire purchase basis to one Gopaldas s/o Narayandas, vide agreement between him and the Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board on 10th January, 1991. He sold the said property, and handed over possession thereof, to one Mangi Bai upon receipt of Rs. 12,500/- as consideration. It was agreed inter se these parties that upon being granted the registration of the house, Gopaldas would execute a sale deed in favour of Mangi Bai. An agreement to sell to such effect was drawn up on 11th January, 1991.

2.2 Mangi Bai, subsequently for a consideration of Rs.

19,000/- sold the said property to respondent No. 22 vide agreement to sell dated 17th December, 1994. 2.3 One Ashok Dayya, who has been made co- accused in the complaint, has allegedly, in connivance with other persons namely, Ramesh Sharma, Jitendra Sharma, Narendra @ Pappu Sharma and members of the Housing Board, forged the Power of Attorney of the original seller - Gopaldas in his favour and got the said property registered in his own name.

2.4 The appellant herein is an official of the Housing Board and it is said that the act perpetrated by Ashok was with his aid and assistance. It is against this transfer of property that the subject FIR was lodged, and after investigation a chargesheet filed under

2025 SCC OnLine SC 21

Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B r/w 34, Penal Code, 18603 against five persons, namely, Ashok (A-1), Ramesh Chand (A-2), Nanalal (A-3), Krishna Singh (A-4) and Dinesh Kumar D.K. (A-5).

4. Before proceeding further, it is important to note that the complainant filed a civil suit against five persons, namely, Gopaldas, Mangi Bai, Nirmlabai, Ashok Kumar and Manager Housing Board, Housing and Infrastructure Development Board Division, Ratlam, M.P. bearing No. 99A/2014 on 5th May, 2014 which was on the file of the learned Vth Civil Judge, Grade-2, Ratlam, contending inter alia as follows:-

"4. That after the execution of the agreement to sell by the defendant No. 2 and 3 in favour of the defendant No. 1 on 17.12.1994 in respect of the house No. 90, situated in the Deendayal Nagar on receipt of the amount of Rs. 19,000/- (Nineteen Thousand, the defendant No. 2 and 3, found that it was agreed that after the registration of the sale deed to be executed in favour of defendant No. 2 and 3, the defendant No. 1 executed a general power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff on 27.01.1995. According to it, by making the payment of the money which is due to the defendant No. 5, the defendant No. 1 informed the defendant No. 1 & 5 that the registry of the sale deed may be executed properly in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the House No. 90, Deendayal Nagar for which today the defendant No. 1, 2 and 3 have also indicated their consent in writing in the presence of the defendant No. 5."

It was prayed therein that the defendants, namely, Gopaldas, Mangi Bai and the Manager of the Housing Board among others should, in compliance with the agreement dated 17th December, 1994, get the sale deed registered in respect of the property, the subject matter of dispute in favour of the plaintiff, directly; and further that an injunction be issued against the defendants to not, either personally or through any other person, transfer the disputed property to a third party.

12. The ingredients of Section 420 IPC as described in Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B.11 are:

"34. Section 420 IPC is a serious form of cheating that includes inducement (to lead or move someone to happen) in terms of delivery of property as well as valuable securities. This section is also applicable to matters where the destruction of the property is caused by the way of cheating or inducement. Punishment for cheating is provided under this section which may extend to 7 years and also makes the person liable to fine.

35. To establish the offence of cheating in inducing the delivery of property, the following ingredients need to be proved:

(i) The representation made by the person was false.

(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he made was false.

(iii) The accused made false representation with dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to whom it was made.

(iv) The act where the accused induced the person to deliver the property or to perform or to abstain from any act which the person would have not done or had otherwise committed."

There is nothing on record to suggest, even prima facie, that any of the above-said ingredients are met in the case of the present appellant. No intent can be hinted to, where the appellant had willfully, with the intent to defraud, acted upon the allegedly forged Power of Attorney. Neither has anything been brought in the chargesheet upon completion of the investigation to show that the requirements of Section 120-B have been met. Nor that the appellant had any information or knowledge about the subject Power of Attorney being forged. For the ingredients of this section to be established, Bilal Hajar v. State12, records as follows:

"31. The expression "criminal conspiracy" was aptly explained by this Court in E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, (1962) 2

SCR 195 : AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828]. The learned Judge Subba Rao, J. (as his Lordship then was and later became CJI) speaking for the Bench in his distinctive style of writing said : (AIR p. 1778, para 31) "31. ... The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts."

32. Therefore, in order to constitute a conspiracy, meeting of minds of two or more persons to do an illegal act or an act by illegal means is a must. In other words, it is sine qua non for invoking the plea of conspiracy against the accused. However, it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy which is being hatched and nor is it necessary to prove their active part/role in such meeting."

Sections when put into a chargesheet, cannot be based on bald assertions of connivance, there must be a substance which is entirely lacking in the present case.

13. If the intent is on the face of it is absent qua one of the offences in the same transaction, it is absent in respect of the other offence as well, viz., Section 467,

468.

14. When examining a prayer for quashing, what is to be considered by this Court has been laid down most notably in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal13. The principle as applicable in this case is:

"102...

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code..."

As the discussion in the previous paragraphs would evidence, no intention whatsoever could be attributed to the present appellant, and in the absence of any intention attributable to him, no criminal offence can be made out. Further, the FIR and other materials are unable to disclose any cognizable offence, and therefore, would fall into the first and second criterion discussed in the landmark judgment."

05. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel-

cum-Special Public Prosecutor for the Anti-Corruption

Bureau appearing for the respondents filed counter

reiterating the prosecution case and contended that there are

triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the

learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the

proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3 at this

juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial

by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal

Petition.

06. Having heard the submissions made by learned

counsel on either side and upon perusal of the material

available on record, the sum and substance of the

allegations is that the accused No.1, the Inspector of Police,

Kamareddy, and the accused No.2 allegedly demanded

illegal gratification of Rs.5,00,000/- from the respondent No.2

for not implicating the respondent No.3 in a betting case. It is

stated that on 06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020, complaints were

lodged before the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) by the

respondent No.2, and certain electronic recordings were

allegedly made in relation to the said demand by the accused

Nos.1 and 2. Subsequently, on 13.11.2020, the respondent

No.3 submitted a complaint alleging that the present

petitioner, who is arrayed as the accused No.3, demanded a

sum of Rs.20,000/- for granting station bail and for accepting

sureties in Crime No.404 of 2020 registered under Sections 3

and 4 of the A.P. Gaming Act. Significantly, the name of the

petitioner-accused No.3 does not find place in the earlier

complaints dated 06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020. The

petitioner-accused No.3 implication surfaced for the first time

only in the complaint dated 13.11.2020.

07. In view of the above scenario of the issue, it is

apt to extract Sections 7 and 12 of the Act, which reads as

under:

"7. [ Offence relating to public servant being bribed. [Substituted by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.] Any public servant who, (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or

(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or

(c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation 1:- For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration:- A public servant, 'S' asks a person, 'P' to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2:- For the purpose of this section,-

(i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to

obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means;

(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party."

12. Punishment for abetment of offences [Substituted by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.] Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine."

08. It is not in dispute that no trap was laid against

the petitioner-accused No.3 and no recovery, either in whole

or in part, was effected from him. Crime No.404 of 2020 was

registered pursuant to a raid conducted at CSI Ground under

the instructions of the accused No.1. The said raid was

conducted in the presence of mediators and culminated in

registration of a case against the respondent No.3 and

others. Ultimately, the respondent No.3 pleaded guilty and

paid a fine of Rs.1,000/-, thereby lending prima facie

legitimacy to the gaming case.

09. It is also pertinent to note that the proceedings

against the accused No.1 were quashed by this Court in

Crl.P.No.9027 of 2021, by order dated 01.08.2022. Though

quashing of proceedings against one accused does not

absolve the other accused persons, the primary allegations

of demand of illegal gratification were directed against the

accused No.1, and the substratum of those allegations has

already been set aside.

10. For constituting an offence under Section 7(a) of

the Act, proof of demand of illegal gratification is sine qua

non. In the absence of proof of both demand and

acceptance, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of

the Act cannot be invoked. In the present case, there is no

material on record to demonstrate that the petitioner-accused

No.3 either demanded or accepted any illegal gratification

from the complainant. The allegation of demand of

Rs.20,000/- rests solely upon a solitary and uncorroborated

statement made in the subsequent complaint dated

13.11.2020. There is no independent material or supporting

evidence to substantiate the said allegation. Further, the

record reveals that no official favour or act was pending with

the petitioner-accused No.3 in relation to the respondent

No.3. On the contrary, the matter had already been

entrusted by the accused No.1 to Mr. Ravi Kumar, Sub-

Inspector of Police. In the absence of any pending official

act within the domain or authority of the petitioner-accused

No.3, the essential ingredients required to attract Section

7(a) read with clause (c) of the Act are conspicuously absent.

Insofar as the allegations under Sections 120-B and 34 of the

IPC are concerned, it is well settled that to sustain a charge

of criminal conspiracy or common intention, there must be

cogent material demonstrating an agreement or meeting of

minds to commit an illegal act. A careful scrutiny of the

record does not disclose any material indicating that the

petitioner-accused No.3 had entered into any agreement with

the other accused to demand or accept illegal gratification.

The prosecution has failed to establish any nexus or linkage

suggestive of either a criminal conspiracy or a common

intention.

11. In view of the above, the foundational

requirements necessary for invoking the presumption under

Section 20 of the Act, or for establishing the offences under

Section 7(a)(c) of the Act and Section 120-B read with 34 of

IPC, are conspicuously absent insofar as the petitioner-

accused No.3 is concerned. Continuation of the criminal

proceedings against him would therefore amount to an abuse

of process of law. Therefore, the proceedings against the

petitioner-accused No.3 are liable to be quashed.

12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and

the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3

in Crime No.05/RCO/ACB-NZB/2020/ACB of ACB,

Nizamabad Range, are hereby quashed.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if

any, shall stand closed.

__________________ JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J Dated: 26-MAR-2026 KHRM