Telangana High Court
R. Mahender, vs The State Of Ap Rep By Its Spl Pp Hyd.,For ... on 18 September, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO
+ CRIMINAL APPEAL No.533 OF 2007
% Dated 18.09.2025
# R. Mahender S/o.Mallaiah
Aged: about 48 years,
Government servant,
R/o.H.No.11-29-237,
Bank Colony Deshaipet Road,
Warangal District.
....Appellant
VERSUS
$ State of A.P.
ACB, Rep. by its
Special Public Prosecutor
... Respondent
! Counsel for Appellant : Ms.P. Naga Deepika
^ Counsel for Respondent : Mr. T. Bala Mohan Reddy
< GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? CITATIONS:
1. AIR 1954 SC 15
2. SLP (Crl.) No.11212 of 2022
3. 2023 LawSuit (SC) 287
4. (2023) 4 SCC 731
5. (2020) 2 SCC 8
6. (2015) 3 SCC 220
7. (2021) 3 SCC 687
8. (2015) 10 SCC 152
2
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 533 of 2007
ORDER:
This criminal appeal has been filed under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
'the Cr.P.C.') by the appellant/Accused Officer aggrieved by
the judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed in C.C.No.7 of 2002
on the file of the Principal Special Judge for ACB Cases at
Hyderabad, whereby he was convicted for the offence under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for
short, 'the Act') and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in
default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple
imprisonment for one month and further sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine
of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall
undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section
13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act.
2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell :
2.1. The de facto complainant is native of Thattupally
Village, Korvi Mandal, Warangal District, was worked as the
Chairperson of the School Education Committee of the said
village. During the year 1998-99, under the District
Primary Education Programme (DPEP), he was entrusted
with the work of construction of a school building for a
sanctioned amount of Rs.1,70,000/-. PW.1 undertook the
construction and during its progress, he received part
payments i.e., Rs.85,000/- on 23.01.1999 and Rs.59,500/-
on 20.03.1999, aggregating to Rs.1,44,500/-. Though the
construction of the school building was completed by the
end of November 1999, the final bill for the balance amount
of Rs.25,500/- was not released. PW.4-Site Engineer of
Korvi Mandal inspected the work executed by PW.1 and
certified about completion of school building. When PW.1
approached PW.4 for the release of the pending amount,
PW.4 stated to have informed him that the appellant-
Accused Officer, who was a Government servant at the
relevant point of time, had demanded a sum of Rs.4,000/-
as illegal gratification for recommending and facilitating the
issue of the final cheque towards the balance payment. It
was also conveyed that unless the bribe was paid, the
measurement book would not be forwarded and the final
bill would not be processed. Basing upon the complaint of
PW.1, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) registered the case
and laid a trap. The trap was initially proposed to be
conducted at the residence of the appellant, but it was later
carried out at Mahabubabad at the insistence of PW.1 and
to prevent leakage of the operation. During the trap
proceedings, the appellant was allegedly found in
possession of Rs.4,000/- of tainted currency notes and
upon chemical test, gave positive result for
phenolphthalein. Post-trap proceedings were duly recorded.
The prosecution thereafter filed a charge-sheet before the
Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, against the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of
the Act and the same was taken cognizance and numbered
as C.C.No.7 of 2002.
2.2. During the course of trial, the complainant-PW.1,
mediator PW.2, Trap Laying Officer PW.8, and other official
witnesses were examined. The defence sought to rely on
certain documents, including Ex.P-25 representation of the
appellant and also examined DW.3 and DW.4 in support of
its version that the trap was falsely engineered. The trial
court, however, disbelieved the defence evidence, held that
the prosecution had proved demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt and invoked
the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act and
consequently, by judgment dated 09.04.2007, in C.C. No.7
of 2002, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section
7 of the Act and also pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, undergo simple imprisonment for one
month and also sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in
default of payment of fine, undergo simple imprisonment
for one month under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and ordered
that both substantive sentences shall run concurrently, by
its judgment dated 09.04.2017. Hence, this present
appeal.
3. Heard Mr. P. Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior Counsel,
representing Ms. P. Naga Deepika, learned counsel for the
appellant, and Mr. T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Special
Public Prosecutor for ACB appearing for the respondent
State.
4. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant:
4.1. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant
has not committed any offence, much less the offences
alleged against him. He further submitted that PW.1
lodged the complaint against the appellant that he
demanded an amount of Rs.4,000/- towards bribe for
release of final bill amount of Rs.25,500/- pertaining to
construction of school building at Thattupally Village. Even
according to PW.1, the appellant allegedly demanded the
amount on 20.12.1999 and he met the appellant on
01.01.2000. Subsequently, on 03.01.2000 trap was laid.
However, it was submitted that PW.1 in his evidence
specifically stated that he never met the appellant at any
point of time and he never demanded any amount, much
less the alleged amount of Rs.4,000/- from PW.1 and there
is no demand and acceptance. Hence, the essential
ingredients under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act does not
attract against the appellant.
4.2. He further submitted that on the alleged date of
demand, the appellant is not in the office and also he is not
having authority to issue or handover the cheque,
especially PW.1 was not eligible to receive the final bill
amount of Rs.25,500/- as per rules on the ground that he
has not completed the construction of school building as on
that date. Unless and until, PW.1 completes the
construction work and after issuance of requisite certificate
by the concerned officer, then only PW.1 is entitled to claim
the final bill amount. Even according to the prosecution,
PW.1 has not completed the work. The appellant filed
photographs dated 04.01.2000 by examining DW.1
photographer, proving the fact that the school building
work was not completed. The learned Special Judge failed
to consider the said evidence. Even according to the
evidence of PW.1, the appellant did not demand and accept
the bribe. The prosecution has not produced any other
evidence to prove that the appellant demanded and
accepted the bribe.
4.3. PW.2 in his cross-examination deposed that he acted
as a mediator in another case registered by ACB, Warangal.
It is also stated that unless the work is completed in all
aspects, there was no possibility to make final payment.
Despite this, learned Special Judge strongly relied upon the
evidence of PW.2, who has a stock witness.
4.4. He further submitted that PW.3 has not supported the
case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Even according
to the evidence of PW.4, an amount of Rs.4,000/- had been
paid by PW.1 towards supervisory charges. Hence, the
question of demand of bribe by the appellant and
acceptance of the same does not arise. PW.4, in his cross-
examination, stated that as on 29.12.1999, the doors,
shutters and window shutters were not fixed to the building
by PW.1, and plastering of the ceiling, fixing of shelves and
tower bolts to the shutters were not done. Since the work
was not completed, the final measurements were not
recorded by him by 03.01.2000 in Ex.P.12 measurement
book. He also stated that as per the norms, PW.1, School
Committee Chairman, was expected to pay Rs.4,900/- to
him towards supervisory charges in respect of the said
construction. PW.1 did not pay the said amount to him by
03.01.2000.
4.5. He further submitted that PW.5 has not supported the
case of the prosecution and turned hostile. PW.6, in his
cross-examination, stated that as on 22.01.2000, plastering
of the ceiling, fixing of racks in the shelves and re-white
washing were incomplete. Hence, the question of the
appellant demanding a bribe from PW.1 on 20.12.1999 and
01.01.2000 does not arise, especially since the school
building works were not completed as on 22.01.2000.
4.6. PW.7 has also not supported the case of prosecution
and turned hostile.
4.7. PW.8, in his cross-examination, specifically stated
that the appellant had no authority to issue or sign any
cheques and measurements of books executed by PW.1 was
to be recorded by PW.4. PW.8 simply denied the suggestion
that the appellant had brought to his notice that PW.1 had
not executed and completed the work, but on the other
hand was pressurizing him to get the final bill paid to him
and that since he did not listen to PW.1 in the said context,
PW.1 falsely implicated the appellant in this case. Even
according to the evidence of PW.8, the appellant is not
having any role to sign or issue the cheques. Hence, the
offences alleged against the appellant that he demanded
and accepted the bribe for release of final bill amount is not
true and correct and the impugned judgment dated
09.04.2007 passed by the learned Special Judge is liable to
be set aside.
4.8. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the
following judgments:
1. Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. 1;
2. Mini v. CBI/SPE Cochin 2; and
3. Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab 3;
AIR 1954 SC 15
2023 LawSuit (SC) 287
5. Submissions of learned Special Public Prosecutor
5.1. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the
appellant demanded and accepted the bribe from PW.1 for
illegal gratification. The prosecution proved the case
against the appellant by adducing oral and documentary
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted
that the learned Special Judge after evaluating the oral and
documentary evidence on record has given specific finding
that the appellant has committed the offences under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act and rightly convicted the
appellant.
5.2. He further submitted that PW.1 in his complaint
specifically mentioned the role of the appellant that he
demanded and accepted the bribe. Merely because PW.1
declared as a hostile witness in subsequent stage, the same
is not a fatal to the case of the prosecution. He also
submitted that PW.2 supported the version of prosecution
case. PWs.4 and 6 in their evidence specifically stated that
the role of the appellant.
5.3. He further submitted that PW.1 in his complaint and
in his chief-examination specifically stated that the
appellant has demanded and accepted the bribe and in
subsequent stages, he changed his version that he never
demanded bribe for processing final bill. The amount
which was given by PW.1 to the appellant towards
supervisory charges is an afterthought and PW.1 had
turned hostile. He further submitted that Ex.P.14 and
P.16-receipts issued by PW.4 support the version of the
prosecution. He also submitted that PW.6 in his cross-
examination specifically stated that the amount which was
received by the appellant is in respect of the bribe.
5.4. He further submitted that the prosecution discharged
the burden by proving entire case, however, the appellant
has not produced any evidence to substantiate his case.
The learned Special Judge after evaluating the oral and
documentary evidence rightly convicted the appellant and
there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Special Judge and the
same is liable to be dismissed.
5.5. In support of his contention, he relied upon the
following judgments:
1. Neeraj Dutta v. State 4;
2. Vinod Kumar Garg v. State 5; and
3. Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab 6.
6. Reply submission of learned counsel for the
appellant:
6.1. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that to draw the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act, demand and
acceptance are mandatory. The prosecution case should be
based on the complaint and the F.I.R. But, in the case on
hand, the complainant himself turned hostile. He further
submitted that PW.1, in his chief-examination, did not
state anything against the appellant, but in his cross-
examination specifically stated that money given by him to
the appellant was towards supervisory charges. He also
submitted that Exs.P.14 and P.16-receipts are subsequent
to the trap and there is no relevancy to the above said
documents.
6.2. He further submitted that PW.2 is not an eye witness
and he is not even a shadow witness, but acted as a
mediator and he was used as stock witness by the
prosecution and, hence, his evidence cannot be taken into
(2023) 4 SCC 731
(2020) 2 SCC 8
(2015) 3 SCC 220
consideration. He further submitted that unless the
prosecution discharges the initial burden by proving the
case in all probabilities, the burden does not shift upon the
appellant. In the case on hand, the prosecution has not
discharged its initial burden. The judgments which were
relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor are
not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the
respective parties and on perusal of the record, the
following points arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the impugned judgment passed by
the learned Special Judge convicting the
appellant for the offences under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d) of the Act is sustainable under
law?
(ii) Whether the appellant is entitled any relief in
the appeal?
(iii) To what relief?
Analysis :
Points (i) to (iii) :
8. It is not in dispute that basing upon the complaint
lodged by PW.1 dated 01.01.2000, Crime No.1 of 2000 was
registered. PW.8-Investigating Officer after conducting
investigation filed the charge sheet before the Principal
Special Judge for ACB Cases at Hyderabad, and the same
was taken cognizance and it was numbered as C.C.No.7 of
2002.
9. The record discloses that PW.1 was awarded the work
of construction of a school building worth of Rs.1,70,000/-
and he had received payment for two bills, but the final bill
was pending. After completion of work, when he requested
the appellant for release of the final bill amount of
Rs.25,500/-, the appellant demanded a sum of Rs.4,000/-
towards illegal gratification for processing the final bill and
issuing the cheque. At that state, PW.1 lodged complaint-
Ex.P.1. Pursuant to the same, crime was registered and
LWs.8 to 12 laid a trap against the appellant in the
presence of PW.2 and they recovered tainted currency notes
of Rs.4,000/- from the appellant after conducting a
chemical test.
10. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1, in his chief
examination, did not state that the appellant demanded an
amount of Rs.4,000/- towards illegal gratification for
issuing the final bill amount of Rs.25,500/-. On the other
hand, in his cross-examination, he stated that he kept
some amount in the right hand of the appellant stating to
him that the said amount pertains to supervisory charges
payable to site engineer and he specifically stated that the
appellant did not demand and accept any amount from
PW.1 as bribe for processing the final bill, either on
03.01.2000 or subsequent to the said date.
11. PW.2 in his evidence stated that he acted as a
mediator in another case registered by ACB, Warangal. He
also stated in his cross-examination that unless the work is
completed in all aspects, there was no possibility to make
final payment to PW.1. He also stated that he along with
the Investigating Officer and other staff went to the house
of the appellant in a jeep. However, they were informed
that the appellant went to Mahabubabad, where
construction work was going on. Thereafter, they reached
Mahabubabad, where D.R.C. building works are going on
and where the appellant was available.
12. PW.3, who is a private driver, did not state anything
against the appellant and he was declared as hostile.
13. PW.4, site engineer, in his cross-examination, stated
that PW.1 did not pay the amount towards supervisory
charges by 03.01.2000 and initially the contractor will pay
the supervisory charges and at the time of payment of final
bill, the Department will reimburse such supervisory
charges to the contractor (PW.1). He also stated that
Ex.P.16-receipt issued by him to the Additional Project
Coordinator to the effect that he had received Rs.4,000/-
from the appellant towards supervisory charges. This
admission directly contradicts the prosecution case that the
said sum represented illegal gratification demanded by the
appellant.
14. PW.5, who is executive engineer, did not state
anything against the appellant and he also turned hostile.
15. PW.6, in his chief-examination, stated that he received
a written requisition in Ex.P.19 from D.S.P., ACB,
Warangal, on 04.01.2000. Pursuant to the same, he
forwarded Exs.P.20-file and Ex.P.12-Measurement Book
along with cover letter under Ex.P.21 to the D.S.P. He
further stated that the final payment was made to PW.1 on
29.01.2000 on the basis of Ex.P.17-check report and
Ex.P.24-proceedings issued by him. In his cross-
examination, he specifically stated that as on 22.01.2000,
plastering of ceiling, fixing of racks in the shelves and re-
white washing works were incomplete. After receipt of
Ex.P.27-letter from MEO and recommendation of Executive
Engineer regarding check report, final payment was made
to PW.1.
16. PW.7 did not state anything against the appellant.
17. PW.8, who is a Trap Laying Officer, stated in his
evidence that he received a complaint from PW.1. He
enquired about the professional conduct of the appellant,
conducted the trap, seized the amount from the appellant
and filed the charge sheet through LW.13.
18. DW.1, in his evidence, stated that he had taken
photographs. Ex.D.3-(18) are the positive photographs and
corresponding negatives pertaining to the school building
were taken by him. According to the said photographs, the
school building works were incomplete. DW.1, in his cross-
examination, stated that no proceedings had been issued to
him by D.P.E.P. for taking the said photographs and he
subsequently denied the suggestion that entire work was
completed by the said date.
19. DW.3, in his evidence, stated that he, along with his
friend Srinivas Reddy and worker Chand, was present at
the site on 03.01.2000, where R.C.C. slab was being laid for
D.R.C. building at Mahabubabad and the appellant came to
the site at 09.00 a.m. in official jeep. At about 11.45 a.m.,
PW.1 came to the spot. At that time, he and Srinivas
Reddy saw the appellant and Chand coming down from the
slab and going towards the place where the mixers were
working through the said passage. Ten minutes thereafter,
they came towards front side of the building. At that time,
PW.1 went towards the appellant and Chand and gave
some amount to the appellant, who took it and kept it in
his pant pocket. Then the appellant again went to the slab
of D.R.C. building. PW.1 went behind him and Srinivas
Reddy. After some time, some persons came to the D.R.C.
building, went to the slab, and took the appellant to the
MPDO Office. DW.3 in his cross-examination denied the
suggestion made by the prosecution that DW.3 and Chand
were not present in the premises of D.R.C. building on the
date and at the hour of the trap.
20. DW.4 in his evidence stated that on 03.01.2000 at
D.R.C. building, the ACB officials went to the appellant and
took him to the M.P.D.O. office.
21. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant is that the appellant does not have any role or
authority to forward the final bill or to issue the cheque to
PW.1. The appellant did not demand any amount from
PW.1 on 20.12.1999 or 01.01.2000. The appellant was not
present when PW.1 visited the office on 20.12.1999 or his
residence on 01.01.2000. Even according to the
prosecution, the appellant was present at the construction
site during the trap operation on 03.01.2000. Hence, the
question of demanding any amount from PW.1 does not
arise.
22. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1, in his chief-
examination and cross-examination, did not state anything
against the appellant that he demanded Rs.4,000/- as
illegal gratification in order to process his final bill amount
of Rs.25,500/- and issue the cheque. But, he specifically
stated that the amount paid by PW.1 to the appeal is
towards supervisory charges that is payable to the site
engineer/PW.4 and the appellant did not demand and
accept any amount from him as bribe for processing his
final bill, either on 03.01.2000 or subsequent to the said
date.
23. It is also the case of the appellant is that PW.1 had
not completed the construction of school building as per
the terms and conditions of the contract, and therefore, the
question of payment of final bill amount to PW.1 does not
arise. Even according to the prosecution witness PW.6, the
appellant did not have authority to issue cheque and the
issuance of the final bill arises only after completion of
entire work and as on 22.01.2000, the school building
works, namely plastering of ceiling, fixing of racks in the
shelves and re-white washing were pending and the said
works were completed subsequently. The Mandal
Education Officer issued a letter through Ex.P.27, relying
on the completion of the works. Pursuant to the said letter-
Ex.P.27 only, the final payment was made to the
contractor. The above said document is subsequent to the
trap.
24. It is pertinent to mention that PW.4 also, in his
evidence, stated that PW.1 has not paid any amount
towards supervisory charges by 03.01.2000. Initially the
contractor will pay his supervisory charges and after final
amount, the Department reimburse such supervisory
charges to PW.1. He received Rs.4,000/- from the
appellant towards supervisory charges, which was given by
PW.1. Pursuant to the same, he had issued Ex.P.16-
receipt. The evidence of PWs.1 and 4 were taken into
consideration together, PW.1 paid an amount of Rs.4,000/-
to the appellant pertaining to the supervisory charges.
Even according to the prosecution, as on the date of trap,
PW.1 has not paid the supervisory charges to PW.4.
25. In Zwinglee Ariel supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reaffirmed the fundamental presumption of innocence and
the necessity of stringent evidentiary standards in criminal
trials. The Court, while scrutinising the prosecution case,
emphasised that lapses in procedure and lack of
corroboration fatally weaken the prosecution's version. It
was held that conviction cannot rest on doubtful,
circumstantial, or uncorroborated testimony; rather, proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established through
reliable and consistent evidence. This decision thus not
only protects the rights of the accused but also fortifies the
integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that
findings of guilt are anchored in unimpeachable proof.
26. In Mini supra, the appellant urged that the Courts
below erred in disregarding the defence explanation under
Section 313 CrPC. The accused had clarified that the
complainant, through an advocate, had sought his
assistance for obtaining a passport and, in that context,
tendered Rs.1,000/- as prescribed fee along with requisite
documents. The accused maintained that he accepted the
money believing it to be only the lawful fee, being unaware
that two Rs.100/- notes were concealed between two
Rs.500/- notes. Thus, his defence consistently was that
there was no conscious receipt of any bribe but only
acceptance of the legitimate statutory fee.
27. In Jagtar Singh supra, the Supreme Court observed
that with both the complainant and the shadow witness
having turned hostile, and no evidence of reiteration of
demand at the time of the alleged payment, the prosecution
had failed to establish the foundational requirement of
demand. The only evidence was that of PW-8, who merely
proved recovery from the appellant. The High Court, by
presuming demand solely from the fact of recovery,
committed a serious error. The Court held that in the
absence of either direct or circumstantial evidence proving
demand, conviction could not be sustained.
28. In the above said judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that convictions under anti-corruption laws must be
based on clear, credible, and corroborated evidence. Mere
recovery of money or procedural lapses cannot replace
proof of essential elements, particularly demand and
voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification. Courts must
carefully examine hostile witnesses, defence explanations,
and the possibility of innocent receipt, as presuming guilt
from recovery or circumstantial factors alone violates the
presumption of innocence. Therefore, each element of the
offences must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
29. In Vinod Kumar supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
clarified multiple important aspects of criminal trials.
Firstly, following S. Jeevanantham v. State, it was held that
the fact that the same officer lodged the FIR and conducted
the investigation does not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings
unless bias or prejudice is shown. Secondly, the Court
reiterated the well-settled principle from Bhagwan Singh v.
State of Haryana, and Khujji v. State of M.P., that the
testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in toto,
but remains admissible and can be relied upon to the
extent it is found credible and corroborated. It further
stressed that the Public Prosecutor, during re-examination,
has wide latitude to clarify or elicit explanations from such
witnesses, and both the prosecution and the defence are
entitled to rely upon parts of their testimony. Lastly,
approving M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., the Court
recognised that when witnesses turn hostile contrary to
their earlier statements recorded by the Magistrate under
Section 164 CrPC, and appear to have been won over, they
may rightly be prosecuted for perjury.
30. In Vinod Kumar Garg supra, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court dealt with discrepancies relating to the hand-wash
and pant-wash procedure in a trap case. It was noticed that
while one witness could not recall the details and another
stated that the pant-wash was not conducted, the evidence
clearly established that the tainted money was kept in a
polythene bag, which was duly washed and the wash
preserved in bottles. The Court held that such minor
inconsistencies or inability of witnesses to recollect precise
details regarding the washes did not undermine the
prosecution case or warrant acquittal, as the core fact of
recovery stood duly proved.
31. In Neeraj Dutta supra, the Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively summarised the
governing principles under the Prevention of Corruption
Act. It held that proof of both demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification is a sine qua non for conviction under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act. Such proof may be
established through direct oral or documentary evidence,
or, in its absence, by reliable circumstantial evidence. The
Court clarified the distinction between "acceptance" under
Section 7, which arises where a public servant merely
receives an unsolicited offer from a bribe-giver, and
"obtainment" under Section 13(1)(d), which requires a prior
demand emanating from the public servant. Mere recovery
of tainted money, without proof of demand, is insufficient to
establish guilt. Presumption of fact regarding demand and
acceptance may be drawn only when foundational facts are
proved, whereas Section 20 mandates a presumption of law
in respect of offences under Section 7, subject to rebuttal,
but does not extend to Section 13(1)(d). Importantly, even
where the complainant turns hostile, dies, or is otherwise
unavailable, the demand can still be proved through other
witnesses or circumstantial evidence, and the prosecution
case does not necessarily fail.
32. The above said judgments relied upon by the learned
Special Public Prosecutor are distinguishable and in those
cases, prosecution proved about involvement of accused
and foundatinal facts of demand, whereas, in the present
case, such facts are entirely absent and key witnesses have
turned hostile. Reliance on those judgments cannot sustain
conviction, since the burden of proof in corruption offences
rests entirely on the prosecution, and the statutory
presumption under Section 20 cannot apply in the absence
of proof of demand. Mere recovery of money does not
establish guilt without corroborative evidence of conscious
acceptance, and courts must not infer criminal liability
from assumptions or incomplete evidence.
33. It is very much relevant to pertinent to mention that
in N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N 7, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that in corruption cases, mere recovery of
tainted money is not enough to prove guilt. To secure
conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, the
prosecution must prove demand and voluntary acceptance
of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption under
Section 20 can arise only after such proof. If the
complainant does not support the case and there is no
independent evidence of demand, conviction cannot stand.
The Court also stressed that once a trial court acquits, the
(2021) 3 SCC 687
presumption of innocence becomes stronger, and unless its
view is perverse, appellate courts should not interfere.
Since demand and acceptance were not proved, the
acquittal by the trial court was a possible view, and the
High Court's conviction was set aside.
34. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. 8, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that in offences under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, proof of demand of illegal gratification is essential.
Mere recovery of tainted money, or even acceptance without
proof of demand, is insufficient to establish guilt. The
presumption under Section 20 also arises only after
demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, since the
complainant had died and PW1's testimony did not clearly
establish demand, the prosecution's case lacked decisive
proof. The Court held that convicting the accused would
amount to an impermissible inference, and emphasized
that failure to prove demand is fatal to the prosecution's
case.
35. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove the sine qua non of demand, which is the
(2015) 10 SCC 152
foundational requirement for establishing an offence under
the Prevention of Corruption Act. PW.1, the complainant,
along with PWs.3, 4, and 5 were not supported the
prosecution case. The Learned Special Judge, however,
relied upon the evidence of PW.2, who is a stock witnesses,
convicted the appellant. The evidence on record further
demonstrates that the money allegedly received by the
appellant was in fact paid towards supervisory charges to
PW.4 connected with the ongoing construction of a school
building. The records reveal that on the date of lodging the
complaint and laying the trap, the construction work was
admittedly incomplete, and PW.4, subsequently issued a
receipt and processed the final bill pursuant to Ex.P.27
dated 22.01.2000, conclusively showing that the payment
had a legitimate basis. In these circumstances, the
essential ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance
of illegal gratification are wholly absent.
36. The legal position consistently reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zwinglee Ariel, Mini, Jagtar
Singh, N. Vijayakumar, and P. Satyanarayana Murthy
supra is that mere recovery of money, without proof of
demand, cannot sustain conviction, as the statutory
presumption under Section 20 arises only when demand
and conscious acceptance are proved beyond reasonable
doubt. To hold otherwise would dilute the principle of
presumption of innocence and expose individuals to
criminal liability based on incomplete or unreliable
evidence. Since the prosecution failed to discharge the
burden of proof, the recovered amount cannot be held to be
illegal gratification.
CONCLUSION:
38. In view of foregoing reasons and precedent decisions,
this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution
failed to bring home the guilt of the appellant for the
charged offences beyond reasonable doubt and the
impugned judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed by the
learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside and the
appellant deserves the relief. Accordingly, point Nos.(i) and
(ii) are answered.
RESULT :
Point No.(iii)
39. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed in C.C.No.7 of 2002 on
the file of the Principal Special Judge for ACB Cases at
Hyderabad, is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted
under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act and his bail bonds
shall stand cancelled.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall
stand closed.
_______________________
J. SREENIVAS RAO, J
Date: 18.09.2025
L.R. Copy to be marked
mar
