Telangana High Court
Nalla Balu Durgam Shashidhar Goud vs The State Of Telangana on 10 September, 2025
Author: N. Tukaramji
Bench: N. Tukaramji
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA,
HYDERABAD
***
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos. 4905, 4903 & 8416 OF 2025
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 4905 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. G.Satish
Respondents
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 4903 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. MA Wasim Akram
Respondents
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 8416 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
2 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. Koutam Sathish
Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 10.09.2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
________________
N. TUKARAMJI, J
3 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI
+ CRIMINAL PETITION Nos. 4905, 4903 AND 8416 OF 2025
% 10.09.2025
# Between:
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 4905 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. G.Satish
Respondents
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 4903 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. MA Wasim Akram
Respondents
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 8416 OF 2025
Between:
Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud
Petitioner/Accused
VERSUS
4 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
1. The State of Telangana, represented by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana.
2. Koutam Sathish
Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner : Mr. T.V. Ramana Rao
^Counsel for the respondent(s) : Mr. Palle Nageshwar Rao,
learned Public Prosecutor,
representing respondent No.1-
State.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)
2. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978),
3. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989)
4. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221
5. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1
6. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) SCR Supl. (2)
769
7. Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1
8. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273
9. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
5 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI
CRIMINAL PETITION NOs.4905, 4903 & 8416 of 2025
COMMON ORDER
I have heard Mr. T.V.Ramana Rao, learned counsel for
petitioners and Mr.Palle Nageshwar Rao, learned Public
Prosecutor, representing the respondent No.1-State.
2. As the crimes are arising out of similar factual matrix and
the petitioner/accused is alleged to have committed the offences
within the scope of self same sections of prosecution, these
matters were heard together and are being adjudicated in this
common order.
3. Criminal Petition No. 4905 of 2025 has been filed under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for
short 'the BNSS') seeking quashment of the proceedings in FIR
No. 8 of 2025 registered at Police Station, CCPS Ramagundam,
Telangana Cyber Security Bureau ("TSCSB") against the
petitioner/accused.
Pursuant to a report lodged by Respondent No. 2, the said
police station registered a case alleging commission of offences
under Sections 192, 353(1)(b), 352, and 356 read with Section
6 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ("BNS") and Section
67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008 ("ITA, 2008").
The allegation is that the petitioner, using the Twitter handle
@Nallabalu, posted a tweet criticising the Congress Party in the
following terms:
"Congress is the scourge of the state! If the field is affected
by the pest, the people will be disturbed."
4. Criminal Petition No. 4903 of 2025 is likewise filed under
Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 seeking quashment of the
proceedings in FIR No. 13 of 2025 registered at Police Station,
CCPS Karimnagar, TSCSB, against the petitioner/accused.
On the basis of a report by Respondent No. 2, the police
registered a case for offences punishable under Sections 192,
353(1)(b), 352, and 356 read with Section 61(2) of BNS, along
with Section 67 of ITA, 2008. It is alleged that the petitioner
posted on Twitter a photograph of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of
Telangana with the caption:
"No Vision, No Mission, Only 20% Commission! This is how
the 15-month rule of the Revanth Reddy led Congress
Government is in Telangana."
7 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
The complainant, a police constable, alleges that this post
was intended to provoke public unrest, defame the Chief Minister,
and disturb public tranquility.
5. Criminal Petition No. 8416 of 2025 has also been filed
under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, seeking quashment of
proceedings in FIR No. 146 of 2025 registered at Police Station,
GDK-I Town, Ramagundam, against the petitioner (arrayed as
Accused No.2).
On 18.03.2025, Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint
alleging that, on 04.03.2025 and 11.03.2025, while browsing the
social media platform "X" (formerly Twitter), he encountered
allegedly vulgar and abusive messages posted by two individuals,
including the petitioner, targeting the Hon'ble Chief Minister of
Telangana. The case has been registered for offences
punishable under Sections 352 and 356(2) read with Section 3(5)
of BNS.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
impugned tweets constitute an exercise of the petitioner's
fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, made on
social media purely as expressions of political opinion, without
any intent to incite violence or disturb public peace.
8 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
Consequently, the essential ingredients of the offences under
Sections 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for
short 'the BNS') are absent.
It is further argued that there is no element of false
evidence involved, and thus, Section 192 of the BNS, pertaining
to the offence of giving or fabricating false evidence has no
application, as neither the offence of rioting nor false evidence is
even alleged in the complaint. The attribution of these provisions
to the petitioner is, therefore, without basis.
With respect to Section 356 of BNS (defamation), counsel
submits that the provision mandates that the complaint must be
made by the 'aggrieved person' and not by any unrelated third
party. Similarly, Section 67 of the Information Technology Act,
2008 ('the IT Act'), which penalises the publication or
transmission of obscene material, is inapplicable, as even
accepting the impugned statements at face value, they amount, at
best, to political criticism and not obscenity.
Furthermore, the allegation is limited to the petitioner
having posted the tweet in question on social media. In the
absence of any averment suggesting the involvement of other
individuals, the provisions relating to criminal conspiracy under
9 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
Section 61(2) of BNS or common intention under Section 3(5) of
BNS cannot be invoked.
Counsel emphasizes that all the complaints are devoid of
specific particulars regarding the allegedly obscene content, the
precise dates of posting, or any actual impact on public order.
The police reports were filed belatedly, rendering the proceedings
arbitrary and unsustainable. On these grounds, it is prayed that
the records be called for and the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner be quashed.
7. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submits that,
despite the issuance of multiple notices under Section 35(3) of
the BNSS, the petitioner willfully failed to appear and produce the
requisite electronic devices and documents, thereby
demonstrating deliberate non-compliance.
It is further contended that the petitioner is implicated in
multiple criminal cases across the State of Telangana, indicative
of a continuing pattern of similar conduct. The prosecution asserts
that the tweet in question was intentionally posted with the
objective of defaming and provoking unrest against a
democratically elected government. This, it is argued, squarely
10 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
attracts the provisions of Section 67 of the IT Act, which is
independently punishable irrespective of any claim of defamation.
With particular reference to FIR No. 146 of 2025, it is
alleged that the petitioner/accused, along with another individual,
is associated with the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) party and,
on 04.03.2025 and 11.03.2025, posted defamatory and abusive
content on the social media platform "X" (formerly Twitter)
targeting the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Telangana. These posts,
according to the prosecution, provoked public outrage and
caused social unrest.
The prosecution further submits that the investigation is at
a nascent stage and the witness statements have been recorded,
and relevant digital evidence has been collected. In light of the
pendency of the investigation, it is prayed that the present
petitions be dismissed.
8. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned
counsel and perused the materials on record.
9. The social media posts attributed to the petitioner, which
contain the alleged statements, are prima facie evident from the
record. At the outset, it is a settled proposition of law that content
posted on social media platforms may, in appropriate
11 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
circumstances, amount to criminal offences such as defamation,
hate speech, incitement to violence, public mischief, and other
cognizable wrongs. In such cases, prosecution is maintainable
under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 (BNS), the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) (where
applicable), and the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).
10. However, to proceed with prosecution on such imputations,
the investigating agency must prima facie find admissible material
both the requisite intent (mens rea) and the actual or probable
harmful effect (actus reus) of the alleged act. Mere publication of
offensive or critical content, without making out a case of an
intention to cause the prohibited consequences, is insufficient to
proceed with the criminal proceedings. Authentication of the
content, proper collection of evidence and positive identification of
the person responsible for the posting are essential prerequisites.
Courts, in this regard, are duty-bound to adopt a balanced
approach safeguarding the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) while ensuring that
such freedom does not extend to speech that causes tangible
harm, such as misinformation, targeted harassment, or incitement
12 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
to disorder. Preserving this balance is critical to both democratic
discourse and maintenance of public order.
11. In the present case, the allegations broadly encompass
charges of provocation to commit rioting, fabrication of false
evidence, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace,
circulation of statements conducing to public mischief, and
defamation. The maintainability of prosecution for these offences
necessarily depends upon the specific factual context in which the
impugned acts occurred.
12. Acts that amount to intentional insult likely to provoke
breach of peace, online mischief calculated to promote enmity or
violence, and defamatory imputations, if duly established would
justify continuation of prosecution. Conversely, where the
statutory ingredients of the offence are absent, mere political
criticism, however harsh, cannot attract criminal sanction.
13. The police report in FIR No. 8 of 2025 alleges that the
petitioner's tweet was defamatory, provocative, and politically
motivated. In FIR No. 13 of 2025, the complaint alleges that the
statements were false, politically motivated, and devoid of legal
merit. FIR No. 146 of 2025 alleges that the petitioner's remarks
13 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
sought to damage the reputation of the Hon'ble Chief Minister,
thereby disturbing social peace and creating a likelihood of
conflict between rival political groups.
14. The relevant statutory provisions are summarised below:
a. Section 192 BNS - Wanton provocation with intent to
cause riot: Attracts liability where a person, with ill intent,
provokes others with knowledge or intention that such
provocation may cause rioting. Mere offensive language without
such intent is insufficient.
b. Section 191 BNS - Rioting: Requires an unlawful assembly of
five or more persons using force or violence towards a common
illegal object. A social media post alone does not complete this
offence unless it incites and results in unlawful assembly and
violence.
c. Section 352 BNS - Intentional insult to provoke breach of
peace: Necessitates proof of grave and sudden provocation,
typically involving direct and abusive remarks calculated to incite
retaliation.
14 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
d. Section 353 BNS - Statements conducing to public
mischief: Penalises circulation of false or incendiary statements
designed to cause public alarm, enmity, or hatred.
e. Section 356(2) BNS - Defamation: Applies to publication of
false imputations intended or known to cause harm to reputation.
Essential elements include falsity, intent, knowledge of probable
harm, and resulting reputational injury.
f. Section 61(2) BNS - Criminal conspiracy: Requires proof of
agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence.
g. Section 3(5) BNS - Common intention: Extends liability to
acts done jointly in furtherance of a common unlawful object.
h. Section 67 IT Act - Obscene material in electronic form:
Limited to sexually explicit or lascivious content capable of
corrupting or depraving viewers.
15. In light of the above provisions, the allegations against the
petitioner must be scrutinised to determine whether they establish
a prima facie case.
15 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
16. The substratum of the complaints is that the petitioner (i)
engaged in political criticism of the ruling party and government,
and (ii) used allegedly vulgar or abusive remarks against the
Hon'ble Chief Minister.
17. Upon review of the impugned social media posts, the legal
position is as follows;
The first post, which describes the Congress party as a
"scourge" and likens it to a "pest," is harsh and metaphorical but
constitutes political criticism. It does not attract Section 192 of the
BNS on promotion of enmity, since it targets a political party and
not a protected group. Nor does it fall within Section 352 BNS on
intentional insult or Section 353(1)(b) BNS on public mischief, as
there is no imminent threat of public disorder. At most, it could
amount to defamation under Section 356 read with Section 61(2)
BNS; however, statutory exceptions such as truth for public good
and fair comment provide strong defences.
18. The second post, which alleges "20% commission" in the
rule of the Chief Minister and the ruling Congress party in
Telangana, is closer to the domain of defamation as it names
both the Chief Minister and the party. A government cannot sue
for defamation, as held in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu
16 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
(1994), but individual ministers and political parties as
associations may do so. Even here, statutory defences of truth
and fair comment in the public interest remain available. Sections
192, 352, and 353(1)(b) BNS are inapplicable, as the criticism is
political, not communal or provocative.
19. The third post, involving vulgar and abusive remarks
against the Chief Minister, may at best be construed as
defamation. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008,
which penalizes obscene material in electronic form, is not
applicable, as the remarks, though abusive, are not obscene.
20. Constitutionally, all three posts fall within the protection of
Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees freedom of speech and
expression. Restrictions under Article 19(2) apply only in narrow
circumstances such as defamation, incitement to violence, or
imminent threat to public order. The Supreme Court in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram
(1989), and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) has
consistently affirmed the high level of protection granted to
political expression in a democracy.
17 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
21. As for procedure, under the BNSS, criminal defamation is
punishable by up to two years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
Cognizance can only be taken on a complaint filed by the
aggrieved person, or in limited cases by a public prosecutor with
prior sanction. The complaint is filed before a Magistrate of the
First Class, who records statements and issues summons if a
prima facie case exists. The trial then proceeds as a summons
case, where the accused may rely on the ten statutory
exceptions, including truth, fair comment, and privileged
communication.
22. In conclusion, the impugned posts do not attract the
application of Sections 192, 352, or 353(1)(b) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, nor Section 67 of the Information
Technology Act, 2008. At best, they may fall within the limited
ambit of defamation under Section 356 read with Section 61(2)
BNS. Even in that context, however, the availability of statutory
exceptions, such as truth for the public good and fair comment, as
well as the robust constitutional safeguards for political
expression, provide a strong shield to the petitioner.
Consequently, any attempt to prosecute the petitioner under
provisions other than defamation would be legally unsustainable.
18 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
More importantly, the present criminal proceedings were initiated
on the basis of police reports filed by third parties, and not
through a complaint by the aggrieved person, as mandatorily
required under the BNSS framework for prosecuting defamation.
In the absence of locus standi of the complainant, the
continuation of these proceedings would be not only improper but
also untenable in law.
23. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of
speech and expression, subject to reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2), which permits limitations only in the interests of
sovereignty, integrity, security of State, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court,
defamation, and incitement to offence.
24. The penal provisions alleged require specific prima facie
material: defamation requires false imputations harming
reputation; insult requires grave and sudden provocation; public
mischief requires circulation of false or inflammatory material; and
Section 67 IT Act applies only to obscene sexual content.
Notably, criminal defamation is a non-cognizable offence under
CrPC, investigation of which requires a magistrate's order under
Section 155.
19 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently clarified the
limits of criminal liability for speech:
i. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 held that
mere annoyance or offensive remarks are not criminal; only
incitement to violence or disorder justifies restriction.
ii. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) SCR Supl. (2)
769 upheld the constitutionality of sedition law but limited
its application to speech inciting violence or disorder.
iii. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221
upheld criminal defamation but stressed the requirement of
false factual imputations and actual reputational injury,
distinguishing it from political criticism.
iv. Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 mandated
FIR registration only for cognizable offences; for non-
cognizable offences such as defamation, preliminary
enquiry or judicial sanction is required.
v. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273
cautioned against mechanical arrests and stressed
proportionality in criminal process.
26. Applying these principles, the impugned tweets, such as
"Congress is the scourge..." and "No Vision, No Mission...", are
20 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
plainly political criticism and satire, which do not amount to
defamation or public mischief and are fully protected by Article
19(1)(a). The third tweet, though allegedly vulgar or abusive
towards the Chief Minister, cannot be equated with defamation
absent false factual imputations. Since defamation is
non-cognizable, the registration of FIRs without compliance with
Section 174 BNSS and without a Magistrate's order is
procedurally unsustainable. None of the tweets contain obscenity
under Section 67 IT Act, nor do they disclose elements of public
mischief (Section 353 BNS) or provocation to riot (Sections
191/192 BNS). Additionally, the mechanical registration of FIRs in
this case, without preliminary enquiry, is in violation of the binding
dicta in Lalita Kumari (supra).
27. When the factual matrix of the present case is examined in
light of the seven illustrative categories laid down in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, it is evident that
the proceedings squarely fall within multiple categories warranting
quashment. First, under Categories (1) and (2), the allegations in
the FIRs, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not disclose the commission of any cognizable
offence, save for a tenuous allegation of defamation. Secondly,
21 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
under Category (3), the uncontroverted allegations on record fail
to satisfy the statutory ingredients of the offences invoked, such
as provocation to riot, intentional insult, or public mischief. Finally,
under Category (5), there exists a clear legal bar to prosecution,
inasmuch as the law mandates that criminal defamation
proceedings can only be initiated by way of a private complaint by
the aggrieved person. In the present case, the FIRs have been
registered on the basis of police reports or third-party complaints,
which render them procedurally incompetent and legally
unsustainable.
28. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the impugned tweets, though critical, fall squarely within
the ambit of legitimate political expression. In the absence of
statutory ingredients of the alleged offences, the registration of
FIRs without requisite enquiry or judicial approval is
unsustainable in law, and continuation of proceedings would
amount to an abuse of process. Accordingly, the criminal petitions
are liable to be allowed.
29. Before parting with this judgment, this Court considers it
necessary to make certain observations. Having regard to the
factual and legal position discussed herein, and with a view to
22 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
safeguarding fundamental rights as well as preventing the
criminal process from being invoked mechanically or arbitrarily, it
is appropriate to prescribe a set of operational guidelines for
police authorities and Judicial Magistrates when dealing with
proceedings initiated on the basis of social media posts. These
directions are particularly relevant in cases where the registration
of First Information Reports (FIRs) is sought in connection with
such posts. Accordingly, the police authorities are directed to
adhere to the following guidelines:
i. Verification of locus standi: Before registering any FIR for
alleged defamation or similar offences, the police must verify
whether the complainant qualifies as the "person aggrieved" in
terms of law. Complaints by unrelated third parties lacking
standing are not maintainable, except where the report concerns
a cognizable offence.
ii. Preliminary inquiry in cognizable offences: Where a
representation/complaint discloses a cognizable offence, the
police shall, prior to registration of crime, conduct a preliminary
inquiry to ascertain whether the statutory ingredients of the
alleged offence are, prima facie, made out.
23 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
iii. High threshold for media post/speech-related offences: No
case alleging promotion of enmity, intentional insult, public
mischief, threat to public order, or sedition shall be registered
unless there exists prima facie material disclosing incitement to
violence, hatred, or public disorder. This threshold must be
applied in line with the principles laid down in Kedar Nath Singh v.
State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769, and Shreya Singhal v.
Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
iv. Protection of political speech/post: The police shall not
mechanically register cases concerning harsh, offensive, or
critical political speech. Only when the speech amounts to
incitement to violence or poses an imminent threat to public order
may criminal law be invoked. Constitutional protections for free
political criticism under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution must be
scrupulously enforced.
v. Defamation as a non-cognizable offence: Since defamation
is classified as a non-cognizable offence, the police cannot
directly register an FIR or crime in such matters. The
complainant must be directed to approach the jurisdictional
Magistrate. Police action may follow only upon a specific order of
the Magistrate under Section 174(2) of the BNSS.
24 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
vi. Compliance with arrest guidelines: In all cases, the police
shall strictly comply with the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar
v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273. Automatic or mechanical
arrests are impermissible, and the principle of proportionality in
the exercise of criminal process must be observed.
vii. Prior legal scrutiny in sensitive cases: In matters involving
political speech/post or other sensitive forms of expression, the
police shall obtain prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor
before registering an FIR, to ensure that the proposed action is
legally sustainable.
viii. Frivolous or motivated complaints: Where a complaint is
found to be frivolous, vexatious, or politically motivated, the police
shall close the matter under Section 176(1) of the BNSS, citing
absence of sufficient grounds for investigation.
30. In light of the above directions, Criminal Petition Nos.
4905, 4903, and 8416 of 2025 are allowed. Consequently, the
proceedings against the petitioner in (i) FIR No. 08 of 2025
registered at Police Station, CCPS Ramagundam, Telangana
Cyber Security Bureau (TSCSB); (ii) FIR No. 13 of 2025
registered at Police Station, CCPS Karimnagar, TSCSB; and (iii)
25 NTR,J
CRLPs_4905, 4903 & 8416_2025
FIR No. 146 of 2025 registered at Police Station, GDK-I Town,
Ramagundam, are hereby quashed.
_______________
N.TUKARAMJI, J
Date: 10.09.2025
Note : Registry is directed to serve a copy to the DGP, Telangana State
Police, for appropriate action and to the Judicial First Class Magistrates
of the State of Telangana, for reference.
B/o.
CCM/SVL.
