M/S Pennar Industries Limited vs State Of Telangana
2025 Latest Caselaw 6331 Tel

Telangana High Court

M/S Pennar Industries Limited vs State Of Telangana on 7 November, 2025

Author: P.Sam Koshy

Bench: P.Sam Koshy

     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
                     AND
           THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE
            SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO

                       W.P.No.33664 OF 2025

ORDER:

(per Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)

Heard Mr. Kumar Harshavardhan, learned counsel

representing Mr. A.V.A.Siva Kartikeya, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government

Pleader for the State Tax for the respondents. Perused the record.

2. The present is second round of writ petition preferred by the

petitioner. The earlier was W.P.No.16467 of 2025, decided on

23.06.2025. The petitioner at that point of time had challenged the

order of the Revisional Authority dated 11.06.2025 on the

ground that the petitioner's rectification application and repeated

representation are all pending consideration. In the meanwhile, the

order dated 11.06.2025 was passed considering the total factual

matrix of the case. The Division Bench of this High Court disposed

of the writ petition by making the following observations:

3. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties reached to a consensus. It is agreed that since the petitioner's representations dated 01.11.2022, 02.11.2022 and

04.11.2022 are pending consideration before the 2nd respondent/competent authority, the impugned order, dated 11.06.2025, may be set aside and the said respondent may be directed to take a decision on the said representations within fifteen days from the date of communication of this order.

4. In view of consensus arrived at, the impugned order dated 11.06.2025 is set aside. The 2nd respondent/competent authority shall decide the representations, in accordance with law, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

5. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is disposed of, without expressing any opinion on the merits. At this stage, the petitioner undertakes to appear before the 2nd respondent/competent authority on 09.07.2025 at 11.30 AM and for this purpose, no notice will be required to be issued.

No costs.

3. Pursuant to the disposal of the said writ petition, the

respondents took up the representation that the petitioner had filed

and after hearing the parties, has now passed a fresh order on

28.07.2025 with its consequential order being passed on

20.09.2025, which has now been challenged through the present

writ petition before this Court.

4. The substantive contention of the petitioner was that in the

representation which was referred to before the writ Court in the

earlier round of writ petition, the petitioner has raised the issue in

respect of three points, particularly pertaining to transit sale, high

sea sale and SEZ sale. According to the petitioner, so far as the

transit sale, SEZ sale are concerned, the Revisional Authority after

due consideration of the representation have decided the issue in

favour of the assesses and has reduced the additional tax liability

from Rs.5,40,42,969/- to Rs.2,13,96,646/-.

5. The contention of the petitioner is that as regards the issue of

high sea sales, the Revisioanl Authority has not dealt with the same

and have thus violated the earlier order of this Court in the earlier

writ petition and had prayed for setting aside of the impugned order

and the matter be remanded back to the authority concerned for a

fresh consideration on the aspect of high sea sales.

6. The learned Special Government Pleader, on the other hand,

opposing the contentions of the petitioner submits that at the outset

the writ petition cannot be maintainable as the order is one which is

appealable, secondly the ground that the petitioner has raised

again is not correct, as the point of high sea sales also has been

duly considered, but has not gone in favour of the asessee. Thus, it

cannot be said that the authority has not considered the aspect, as

the impugned order itself would go to reflect the consideration of

the objection as regards the high sea sales are concerned.

Therefore, the learned Special Government Pleader was of the

contention that there was no violation of any principles of natural

justice as has been contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioner.

7. Having duly considered the submissions put forth on either

side and on perusal of the record, particularly on the aspect of the

question of high sea sales are concerned, the impugned order

specifically reflects of the authority having taken up that issue but

after refusing to interfere with the same on the ground that the said

aspect already stood concluded earlier and, therefore, was beyond

the purview of the revisional authority. Moreover, what is also

apparently evident from the bare perusal of the proceedings is that

pursuant to the earlier order this High court in W.P.No.16467 of

2025, decided on 23.06.2025, the respondent authorities did take

up the matter of the petitioner and have duly scrutinized the same

and the petitioners have in fact been provided with substantial

relief of reducing the tax liability that was earlier assessed of

Rs.5,40,42,969/- and have reduced it to Rs.2,13,96,646/-.

Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent authorities have decided

the matter with a closed mind or with a pre-determined approach.

In view of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the

matter is not one which needs to be taken up invoking the writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, rather

since there is already a statutory remedy of appeal available, it

would be open for the petitioner to, if he so wants, assail the

impugned order by way of statutory appeal. The view of this Court

stands fortified from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

vs. COMMERCIAL ENGINEERS AND BODY BUILDING

COMPANY LIMITED 1, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court

referring to a series of judgments in paragraph 5, 6 and 7 has held

as under:

"5. While entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the Assessment Order denying the Input rebate, the High Court has observed that there are no disputed question of facts arise and it is a question to be decided on admitted facts for which no dispute or enquiry into factual aspects of the matter is called for. The aforesaid can hardly be a good/valid ground to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the

2922 SCC OnLine SC 1425

Constitution of India challenging the Assessment Order denying the Input rebate against which a statutory remedy of appeal was available.

6. At this stage, a recent decision of this Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra v. Greatship (India) Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4956 of 2022, decided on 20.09.2022) is required to be referred to. After taking into consideration the earlier decision of this Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, it is observed and held that in a tax matter when a statutory remedy of appeal is available, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Assessment Order by-passing the statutory remedy of appeal. While holding so, this Court considered the observations made by this Court in paragraphs 49 to 53 in Satyawati Tondon (supra), which read as under:

"49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3)

"3. ... Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are

available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged."

50. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (2001) 6 SCC 569 this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: (SCC p. 570, paras 5-6)

"5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act'). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.

6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the

jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act."

51. In CCT v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 688] the Court reversed an order passed by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court quashing the show-cause notice issued to the respondent under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by observing that the High Court had completely ignored the parameters laid down by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy.

52. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [(2009) 1 SCC 168] the Court highlighted the parameters which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paras 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under: (SCC pp. 175-76)

"29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex

parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) the petition reveals all material facts;

(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.

The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self- defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any

relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law."

53. In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2010) 4 SCC 772] the Court was dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed: (SCC p. 781, paras 31-32)

"31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum."

7. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Assessment Order denying the benefit of Input rebate is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and

set aside and the original writ petitioner is to be relegated to prefer an appeal against the Assessment Order dated 28.02.2015 passed by the Divisional Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Jabalpur, which may be available under Section 46(1) of the MP VAT Act, 2002".

The said view has also been followed by this High Court in a very

recent decision in the case of M/s A.S.MET CORP PRIVATE

LIMITED vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (ST) AND

OTHERS 2, wherein in paragraphs 14 and 15 it has been held as

under:

14. Having taken note of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the adjudicating officer has, without granting adequate opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and without supplying the relevant relied upon documents, passed the impugned order-in-original. Needless to say that the writ proceedings are entertainable on grounds of error of jurisdiction or violation of principles of natural justice or if there is a violation of fundamental rights. In such financial matters, it is the consistent view of the Apex Court, as also held in Civil Appeal No.7170 of 2022, dated 14.10.2022 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Commercial Engineers and Body Building Company Limited), relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader for State Tax that when the taxing statute provides for an alternative remedy for resolution of dispute, the writ court would be

W.P.No.29376 OF 2025 decided on 06.10.2025.

loath to enter into such disputed questions of fact which can adequately be raised before the appellate authority. In such circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the matter.

15. The petitioner is at liberty to approach the appellate authority with statutory pre-deposit as per the provisions of Section 107(1) read with sub-section (4) of the TGST Act.

8. In view of the aforesaid, we are not inclined to entertain the

writ petition at this juncture, reserving the right of the petitioner to

prefer an appeal, if he so wants.

9. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be

no order as to costs.

Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall

stand closed.

_____________________ P.SAM KOSHY, J

_________________________________ SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO, J 07.11.2025 Lrkm/Aks