Telangana High Court

Sri. B. Ravindher Reddy, vs Sri. Pallepati Anjaiah, on 5 March, 2025

      HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

            CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1010 OF 2023

ORDER:

This Civil Revision Petition is filed assailing the order dated

10.01.2023 in I.A.No.401 of 2022 in O.S.No.68 of 2015 passed by the

Principal District and Sessions Judge, Yadadri-Bhongir.

2. Heard Ms. Harshitha, learned counsel represnting M/s.

Chandrasen Law Offices and Sri K. Jagadishwar Reddy, learned counsel

for respondent.

3. The petitioner herein is the defendants and respondent herein is

the plaintiff before the trial Court. For convenience, the parties

hereinafter are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court.

4. Brief facts relevant for adjudication of the present Civil Revision

Petition are that petitioner herein filed O.S.No.68 of 2015 for specific

performance, on the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge,

Nalgonda, to execute and register sale deed on receiving balance

amount as per agreement or refund of amount with damages. The said

suit was dismissed for default on 02.06.2017.

5. The plaintiff filed I.A.No.401 of 2022, under Order IX Rule 9 r/w

151 of C.P.C., to restore the O.S.No.68 of 2015 along with an application,

I.A.No.91 of 2020 under Section 5 of Limitation Act, to condone the LNA,J,

delay of 954 days in filing the application for restoration. The trial court

vide order dated 10.01.2023 dismissed I.A.No.91 of 2020, with an

observation that the reasons stated for the said delay are not

satisfactory. Aggrieved by the same, the present Civil Revision Petition

is filed.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner

was not in Hyderabad on 02.06.2017, and was in Karnataka for

construction of factory building, therefore, he could not appear before

the court on 02.06.2017. Along with the said application, petitioner also

filed medical certificate dated 22.04.2016 and as per the said medical

certificate, he was admitted in the hospital on 10.04.2016 and discharged

on 22.04.2016. Thereafter, he was in continuous medication and

therefore, he could not take steps for restoration of suit. Therefore,

prayed this court to set aside the impugned order dated 10.01.2023 and

allow IA.No.91 of 2020 and I.A.No.401 of 2022.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent contended that the trial

court on due consideration of pleadings in the application as well as

medical certificate placed on record, rightly dismissed the application as

the petitioner failed to explain the inordinate delay of 954 days in filing

the application for restoration. Learned counsel further contended that

admittedly, even as per medical certificate produced, petitioner LNA,J,

discharged from the hospital on 22.04.2016, whereas, the suit was

dismissed on 02.06.2017 and application for restoration was filed on

10.02.2020, which was about more than three years of his discharge

from the hospital. Therefore, the trial court has rightly dismissed the

application and he finally contended that there are no merits in the

revision petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

8. To substantiate his contention, learned counsel for respondent

placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental

Aroma Chemical Indistries Limited Vs Gujarat Industrial Development

Corporation and Another 1, Wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held as

follows

15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate..."

9. It is also apt to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR

(SLP (Civil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024), wherein the Hon'ble

(2010) 5 SCC 459 LNA,J,

Apex Court by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha

Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy &

Others [(2013) 12 SCC 649], held that "delay should not be excused as a

matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to

the opposite party".

10. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer 2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

xxx

2013 (14) SCC 81 LNA,J,

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

11. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India

Limited and another 3, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena

of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs.

Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 4,

wherein it was held that,

"17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights".

and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:-

(2012) 3 SCC 563

(2008) 17 SC 448 LNA,J,

"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

12. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources

Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers

Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 5, Hon'ble Supreme

Court held as under:

"63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period

(2021) 6 SCC 460 LNA,J,

can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

13. Perusal of the record would disclose that the suit for specific

performance was dismissed for default on 02.06.2017 and petitioner also

failed to file the application in time and filed a restoration petition along

with condone delay petition with a delay of 954 days. The trial court has

rightly observed that no material was placed on record explaining the

inordinate delay of 954 days. It is relevant to note that as per medical

certificate dated 22.04.2016 filed by the petitioner, the petitioner was

admitted in the hospital on 10.04.2016 and was discharged on

22.04.2016, whereas the suit was dismissed on 02.06.2017, which is

much after discharge of the petitioner and whereas application for

restoration was filed on 10.02.2020. Except stating that he was on

continuous medication after discharge, the petitioner failed to place any