Mirza Mahmood Baig vs Shatrughan Agarwal
2025 Latest Caselaw 2214 Tel

Telangana High Court

Mirza Mahmood Baig vs Shatrughan Agarwal on 17 February, 2025

      HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

                       I.A.NO.2 OF 2024
                            IN/AND
                 SECOND APPEAL NO.364 OF 2024

COMMON JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal is filed aggrieved by the judgment and

decree dated 29.01.2021 in A.S.No.243 of 2009 passed by learned

single XXV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad,

confirming the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1969 in O.S.No.84 of

1967 on the file of VI Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at

Hyderabad. As there is delay of 1196 days in preferring the Appeal,

the appellant filed I.A.No.2 of 2024 to condone the delay.

2. Heard Ms. Sneha Bhogle, learned counsel for appellant, Sri

Shyam S.Agrawal, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri

M.V.Pratap Kumar, learned counsel for respondent no.23.

3. Without referring to the merits of the appeal, it is appropriate to

first consider the I.A.No.2 of 2024 filed for condonation of delay of

1196 days in preferring the appeal.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant contended that

he is the Agreement of Sale-cum-GPA holder of respondent Nos.3 to

10 herein, who subsequently obtained final decree proceedings on

05.11.2007 in O.S.No.84 of 1967 and thereafter, they executed sale

deed in his favour on 16.11.2007. It is further averred that respondent

Nos.1 and 2 herein challenged the final decree dated 16.11.2007 by

filing A.S.No.243 of 2009 and the first Appellate Court, vide judgment

and decree, dated 29.01.2021 allowed the Appeal Suit. Challenging

the judgment and decree dated 29.01.2021, the appellant herein filed

the present Second Appeal and along with I.A.No.2 of 2024 to condone

the delay of 1196 days in preferring Second Appeal.

5. The learned counsel for petitioner/appellant further contended

that the first Appellate Court passed the judgment and decree on

29.01.2021, by the time the country was affected by Covid pandemic

and a nationwide lockdown was announced by the Government of

India from 25.03.2020; that petitioner was severely affected by the

second wave of Covid during February, 2021 and that he got to know

about passing of judgment and decree dated 29.01.2021 in Appeal

Suit, only in May, 2024 and he was suffering with prolonged illness

and thus, there was a delay of 1196 days in filing the present Second

Appeal, which was neither deliberate nor wanted. Learned counsel

further contended that the petitioner has a good case in Second

Appeal and if he is not allowed to contest the same, he would be put

to irreparable loss and damage and therefore prayed to condone the

delay of 1196 days in preferring Second Appeal.

6. Per contra, according to learned counsel for respondent Nos.1

and 2, there is inordinate delay of 1196 days in preferring the appeal

and the petitioner/appellant failed to offer valid, cogent reasons for

condonation of inordinate delay of 1196 days, except saying that he

was severely affected by the second wave of Covid during February,

2021 and that he was suffering with prolonged illness and

complications and after knowing about passing of impugned judgment

in May, 2024, he filed the present appeal. He further contended that

the medical certificate produced by the petitioner/appellant is created

and fabricated for the purpose of the present case. It is finally

contended that the application for condonation of delay is devoid of

any merit and thus, the same is liable to be dismissed.

7. Perusal of the record would disclose that Appeal Suit was

decreed on 29.01.2009 and whereas, the Second Appeal was filed on

08.08.2024 with a delay of 1196 days in preferring the present appeal.

The reasons for the inordinate delay of 1196 days, as mentioned in

the affidavit, are that petitioner/appellant was severely affected by the

second wave of Covid during February, 2021 and was suffering with

prolonged illness and he came to know about the passing of judgment

and decree dated 29.01.2009 in A.S.No.243 of 2009 and he

immediately filed the present Appeal. To substantiate the contention,

petitioner has filed Medical Certificate dated 15.05.2024 issued by

Dr.Vinod Chavan.

8. Perusal of the medical record discloses that petitioner was

suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and chronic

arthritis since last five years and he was on oxygen support for a

period of two years and six months and was under constant

supervision of a physician for the last three years. Except mentioning

that he was suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and

chronic arthritis for the last five years and that he was on oxygen

support for a period of two years six months, details of medical report

and treatment given to the petitioner and also the dates were not

mentioned in the said certificate. In considered opinion of this Court,

medical certificate is vague and is bereft of details as to when the

petitioner was admitted in the hospital and treatment given to him

and also the medical certificate is not supported by any discharge

summary or any other details. It is pertinent to mention that except

medical certificate, no other reports are filed. Therefore, learned

counsel for the respondents has specifically contended that medical

report dated 15.05.2024 is a fabricated and created only for the

purpose of filing present appeal. In considered opinion of this Court,

there is a considerable force in the submission of the learned counsel

for respondents. In the absence of specific period of hospitalization,

dates of treatment given to the petitioner, reports etc.

9. The reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of delay

application are that petitioner/appellant he was severely affected by

the second wave of Covid during February, 2021 and he was suffering

with prolonged illness and after knowing about passing of impugned

order during the month of May, 2024 in Appeal Suit, he filed the

present appeal along with I.A., to condone the delay of 1196 days in

preferring the appeal and the said delay was occurred due to the

above reasons only. Perusal of record would show that appeal was

filed on 08.08.2024 and admittedly, A.S.No.243 of 2009 was decreed

on 29.01.2009 and thus, there was a delay of 1196 days in preferring

the present appeal. However, no explanation has been offered for the

inordinate delay of 1196 days in filing appeal.

10. In considered opinion of this Court, the reasons offered by the

appellant for condonation of delay does not inspire the confidence of

this Court since no plausible explanation has been offered for huge

inordinate delay of 1196 days in filing appeal.

11. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

xxx

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the

2013 (14) SCC 81

"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

12. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India

Limited and another 2, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena

of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs.

Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 3,

wherein it was held that,

"17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights".

and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:-

"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by

(2012) 3 SCC 563

(2008) 17 SC 448

resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

13. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources

Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers

Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 4, Hon'ble Supreme

Court held as under:

"63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

14. Considering the facts of the case and the legal position and also

in view of the fact that the reasons for condonation of inordinate delay

of 1196 days in preferring appeal are not properly explained and no

sufficient cause has been shown for such delay, the I.A.No.2 of 2024

is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently,

the Second Appeal No.364 of 2024 stands rejected.

15. Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.

__________________________________ LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY,J Date: 17.02.2025 kkm

(2021) 6 SCC 460