Jarpula Ravi vs The State Of Telangana
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Telangana High Court

Jarpula Ravi vs The State Of Telangana on 24 April, 2025

      THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
                       AND
     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL

              CRIMINAL APPEAL No.477 of 2020

JUDGMENT:

(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice K.Surender)

This Criminal Appeal is filed by the appellant/accused,

aggrieved by the judgment and sentence dated 25.04.2019 in

S.C.No.400 of 2017, on the file of the II Additional District and

Sessions Judge (FTC), Mahabubnagar, whereby the appellant

was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of

IPC.

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/accused and

Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for

respondent - State.

3. The case of the prosecution is that Smt. Jarpula Sunitha

(hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') is the wife of the

appellant. The appellant was convicted for pouring kerosene on

his wife and setting her on fire.

4. After the deceased received burn injuries, she was taken

to Osmania General Hospital, Hyderabad, where the Station

House Officer, Afzalgunj Police Station, visited and gave a

requisition to the concerned Magistrate to record the dying

declaration of the deceased. No Police Officer from the Afzalgunj

Police Station was examined. However, the prosecution relied

on Ex.P10/requisition. In the said requisition, it is mentioned

that a request was made to record the dying declaration of the

deceased, who allegedly received accidental burns in her house

on 10.10.2016. Based on the said requisition, PW.11 visited the

hospital and recorded the dying declaration/Ex.P.11 of the

deceased. To a question posed by the learned Magistrate as to

how she received burning injuries, the deceased explained as

follows:

"It has been five years that I got married. From the time I got married he used to scold, beat and say filthy words. Today morning he brought mutton. He asked me to cook and I cooked. Asked to me make rotis and I made them. My mother-in- law brought gave him liquor (Sarai) to drink. He drank it. I asked him that why he brought mutton instead of chicken and from where do you get money. In response he said lanjamunda who are you to tell me and beat me as he wished. He beat me on waist. I still have pain in my waist. I scolded him back that you are beating and scolding me according to your wish. He does not send me to work. If I stay at home he suspects me asking who came? With whom have you been? And says filthy

words. Even today he beat me and used filthy words as usual. Do not I get angry madam. In anger I said few words. So, my husband said lanjamunda you oppose me and poured kerosene and lit fire. Fire was caught up. Fire was put off and I was brought to hospital. This much happened. As I was read I heard. It is correct. No one forced me to say this."

5. The learned Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of

the deceased at 09.30 P.M. The endorsement of the duty doctor

was taken regarding the condition of the patient, and

thereafter, the statement was recorded. Ex.P12 is the statement

recorded by the Constable/PW.12, who went to the hospital

and recorded the statement of the deceased at 11.00 P.M. In

the statement given to PW.12, the deceased stated as follows:

"I am resident of Suryanaik thanda. My mother belongs to Nuchukunta thanda, Amangal Mandal. Aprroximately five years back my parents gave me to Jarpula Ravi S/o Jarpula Ramulu who belongs to the Suryanaik thanda, for marriage. Presently I have two male children. They are kids. My husband drives auto at Hyderabad. So we are staying at sainagar colony, Hyderabad in a rented house. Approximately from five, six months my husband Ravi, having an illegal relation with other woman was roaming with her and when I strongly questioned about this he used to beat me. The day before yesterday on 08.10.2016 he beat

me and took me with my children in auto to Suryanaik thanda from sainagar colony. On 10.10.2016 in the morning at 11.00 hrs, my husband Ravi came home fully drunk, beat me severely, took kerosene from house, poured it over me and lit fire. Because of that fire I screamed and people in the neighbourhood came to me and put off the fire and took me to Osmania and admitted for treatment. My husband Ravi beat me severely, poured kerosene over me and lit fire. This was the submission made by the deceased."

6. The statement recorded by PW.12 formed the basis for

registering an FIR by Talakondapally Police.

7. The deceased, while undergoing treatment in the hospital,

died on account of burn injuries on 28.10.2016, i.e., 10 days

after the incident. According to PW.14/Doctor, who conducted

the autopsy, the cause of death of the deceased was

"septicemia due to burns".

8. The appellant was arrested by the police on 24.10.2016.

His confession was recorded, and at his instance, M.O.1 was

recovered. MO.1 is the kerosene tin which was found at the

scene.

9. The learned Sessions Judge found favour with the

statement made by the deceased to the Magistrate and

accordingly, convicted the appellant, despite all the relatives of

deceased/witnesses, who were examined to speak about the

alleged harassment, turning hostile to the prosecution.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would

submit that placing reliance on the dying declaration would be

incorrect since the initial information given to the Afzalgunj

Police was suppressed. The learned Magistrate had not followed

due procedure while recording the dying declaration. It was

made on a printed proforma and the version given to the

Magistrate is contrary to what was stated to the

constable/PW.12, who recorded the statement of the deceased.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Banarsi

Dass v. State of Haryana 1, wherein it was held as follows:

"18. In the case before us, the incident occurred on 18.06.1998 whereas the death is on 04.08.1998. Exhibit-PM- dying declaration was recorded on 18.06.1998 itself. At the time of recording of the statement, the condition of the patient no doubt was very stable and she was in a very good state of

(2014) 15 SCC 485

mind as recorded by the doctor. The burn injury was only 40-

45% of the body and, according to doctor 40-45% burns is not fatal and such a patient can be saved if given proper treatment. It has also come out in evidence that the death is not caused by the burns but because of septicemia, an infection on account of improper management of the wounds. It is fairly clear that the patient on 18.06.1998 was not apprehending death, not merely because she lived for more than seven weeks after the incident but because of the nature of the burn injuries which we have referred to above. No doubt, as laid down by this Court in Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal[2], merely because a person died long after making the dying declaration, the statement does not become irrelevant. It was a case where the incident was on 29.06.1985 and death was on 31.07.1985 and in that case, there was a certificate by the doctor who conducted the postmortem that death was due to ante- mortem burns and the burns were extending over the whole body. To quote:

"9. There is no merit in the contention that the appellant's wife died long after making the dying declarations and therefore those statements have no value. The contention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of sub-section (1) reads as follows:

"Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question."

No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is expecting his death to take place shortly he would not be indulging in falsehood. But that does not mean that such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a longer time than expected. The question has to be considered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is nothing on record to show that the statement could not have been true or if the other evidence on [pic]record corroborates the contents of the statements, the court can certainly accept the same and act upon it. ..."

(Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, however, Exhibit-PM-dying declaration does not either show the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant-Chander Kalan. The burns were not fatal either."

12. Relying on the said judgment, the learned counsel argued

that the death was not a consequence of the burns received by

the deceased on the date of the incident but rather due to

subsequent developments while undergoing treatment,

specifically septicemia.

13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor argued that there is

no reason why the wife of the appellant would speak against

the appellant. The statement was recorded by the Magistrate

only after the examination of the duty Doctor, who certified that

the deceased was conscious, coherent and in a fit state of mind.

Considering the certification, the Magistrate recorded the dying

declaration. The Doctor endorsed regarding the mental

capability and fitness both prior to and after recording the

statement. The said dying declaration formed the sole basis for

conviction of the appellant.

14. PWs.1 and 2 are the neighbors of the deceased. Both of

them turned hostile to the prosecution and stated that the

deceased committed suicide on account of the unbearable

stomach pain. PW.3 is the husband of the deceased's sister.

According to him, the appellant informed him that during a

quarrel with deceased, she herself poured kerosene and set fire

to herself. PW.4 is another neighbor who turned hostile to the

prosecution case. PW.5 was the neighbor where the deceased

and appellant lived in Hyderabad. PW.6 is the mother of the

deceased. According to her, the deceased committed suicide

due to unbearable stomach pain. PWs.7 and 8 are the scene of

offence panchas, and both of them were declared hostile to the

prosecution case. The prosecution has no help from PWs.1 to 8.

15. The entire case rests on the two dying declarations made

by the deceased. Ex.P11/dying declaration was recorded by the

Magistrate at 09.30 P.M. In the said statement, deceased stated

that on the morning of the date of the incident, the appellant

brought mutton to the house and asked the deceased to cook

it. The mother of the appellant brought liquor and asked him to

drink. After drinking the liquor, there was a fight and the

appellant abused and beat her. The deceased then scolded him

back. For the reason of deceased questioning the appellant, the

appellant became suspicious of her fidelity, accusing her of

spending time with someone else, and beat her. The deceased,

in fact, questioned the Magistrate, stating that if someone beats

and abuses you, it is likely to provoke anger. Since she said few

words in anger, the appellant poured kerosene on her and set

her on fire.

16. In the statement given to the constable/PW12, which is

Ex.P12, the deceased mentioned her two children and also that

the appellant was driving an auto. She further stated that 5 or

6 months prior to the incident, the appellant was having an

illegal relationship with another woman, and when she

questioned about the said relationship, the appellant beat the

deceased on 08.10.2016. Again, on the date of the incident, i.e.,

on 10.10.2016 around 11.00 A.M., the appellant came home in

a fully drunken condition, beat her indiscriminately, and

poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The neighbors

came there and took her to the Osmania General Hospital. As

seen from both the statements, the statements are totally

contradicting one another.

17. All the witnesses who were supposed to speak about the

incident and the harassment by the appellant did not support

the case of the prosecution. The only evidence remaining are

the two statements made by the deceased, which contradict

each other. There is neither any evidence to support the version

given to the Magistrate, nor is there any corroborating evidence

for the events narrated in the statement made to the Constable.

Exs.P11 and P12 were recorded with a difference of one hour

between them.

18. In Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of A.P., the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held that it would be unsafe to convict any

person on the strength of fragile and rickety dying declaration.

The said observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is

applicable to the facts of the case. It was further held that a

noticeable discrepancy made by the very same person was

overlooked by the High Court and the High Court could not

afford to sideline such material discrepancy. The following are

the observations of the Supreme Court:

11. We would proceed on the assumption that Ext.P-11 and Ext.P-14 contained what Lakshmi Devi had told the scribes of those two documents. The pivotal question is whether the said version of Lakshmi Devi is credible and reliable, or is there room for entertaining any doubt about the truthfulness of her version.

12. In view of the impossibility of conducting the test on the said version with the touchstone of cross-examination we have to adopt other tests in order to satisfy our judicial conscience that those two dying declarations contain nothing but truth.

13. First among such tests is to scrutinise whether there are inherent improbabilities in that version. We are unable to detect any such improbability inherent therein. The next test is whether there is any inherent contradiction therein. In that scrutiny we came across one material contradiction as between the two dying declarations regarding the context in which deceased caught fire. Ext.P-14 shows that she was set fire to when she was lighting a stove for preparing the coffee. The relevant portion of Ext.P14 is extracted herein below:

Today morning i.e. 09.10.94 when I was lighting the stove in the kitchen and preparing coffee at about 6.00 a.m. my mother- in-law and husband came from behind. After entering the kitchen, my husband caught hold of my hair and I was unable to move. My mother-in-law Narayanamma sprinkled kerosene on my body and clothes. She asked her son to set fire, my husband lit the match- stick and threw on my clothes. When my clothes caught fire I started shouting with fear. My mother-in-law Narayanaamma and my husband Laxmi Reddy ran away from there."

14. In Ext.P-11 (which is a dying declaration given to the judicial Magistrate of 1st class) the context stated by the declarant was altogether different. The relevant portion is extracted below:

"My mother-in-law's name is Narayanamma, my husband's name is Dandu Lakshm Reddy. In the morning at 6.00 a.m. when I was sweeping, my mother-in- law Narayanamma and my husband Laxmi Reddy both poured kerosene on me, lit the match-stick and set me to fire."

15. The above material divergence between two dying declarations pertaining to the occasion for launching the murderous attack on the deceased did not create any impression in the minds of the learned judges of the High Court, as they have observed thus:

"Though there is a difference in the version of the deceased as to what she was doing at the relevant point of time the fact remains that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene and lit fire to her. These aspects are mentioned in Ex.P.11 P.14. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the accused appellants."

16. Thus the High Court has sidelined such a noticeable discrepancy looming large as between the two different statements made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of dying declaration is a restricted area, the court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime. Either the context spoken to in one was wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course.

19. A dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction,

however, such a statement should inspire confidence in the

Court. For any reason, if the statement made by the deceased

is doubtful, the Court can rely on any corroborating or

supporting evidence. However, in the present case, as already

discussed, two contradictory dying declarations were made.

Further, at the very first instance, the Afzulgunj police had

gone to the Osmania General Hospital and gave a requisition to

the Magistrate stating that the deceased had received the

accidental burns. All these circumstantial evidences, when

viewed together, makes the version of the prosecution doubtful.

For the said reasons, the benefit of doubt is extended to the

appellant.

20. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the

judgment dated 25.04.2019 in S.C.No.400 of 2017, on the file

of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC),

Mahabubnagar. The appellant/accused is acquitted for the said

offences, and he shall be set at liberty if he is not required in

any other cases. The fine amount paid, if any, shall be

returned.

Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand

closed.

__________________ K.SURENDER, J

_____________________ E.V.VENUGOPAL, J

Date: 24.04.2025 PNS

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.477 of 2020

Dated 24.04.2025 PNS