Telangana High Court

The State Of Telangana vs Maila Chaitanya on 21 October, 2024

Author: P.Sam Koshy

Bench: P.Sam Koshy, N.Tukaramji

     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
                     AND
     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI
                     Crl.A.No.913 OF 2024

JUDGMENT:

(per Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)

Heard Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public

Prosecutor representing the appellant-State on admission. Perused

the record.

2. The challenge in the present criminal appeal is to the

judgment dated 16.05.2023 passed by the learned Principal

Sessions Judge, Bhadradri Kothagudem in S.C.No.138 of 2021.

3. Vide the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has

found the respondent/accused not guilty of the offence punishable

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

4. The facts of the case, in brief, are that on 14.07.2019, the

de facto complainant Maila Sarveswar Rao (P.W.1), the son of the

deceased, lodged a complaint informing that his mother Maila

Kanakathara was found dead in a pool of blood in the middle room

of their house. He immediately alerted the other family members

and relatives who stay in the nearby vicinity. According to the

complainant, at the time of incident, it was the respondent/accused

alone who was supposed to be available at the house where the

incident took place. On the basis of suspicion of the respondent/

accused to be the only person available at the time of incident, the

prosecution registered an offence against the accused vide

Cr.No.308 of 2019 at Paloncha Town. Subsequently, after the

investigation was complete, the matter was put to trial vide

S.C.No.138 of 2021.

5. The prosecution, in all, examined as many as 12 witnesses

and also got exhibited 11 documents Exs.P1 to P-11. In addition,

four material objects were also got marked i.e., M.Os.1 to 4.

No witnesses were examined in defence, neither was there any

documents exhibited on behalf of the prosecution. Considering

the evidence which has come on record, particularly the fact that

all the material witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution

either having turned hostile or having not elicited anything against

the respondent/accused by which it could be proved and

established that it was she alone who has committed the said

offence, the trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused vide the

impugned judgment leading to the present appeal being preferred

by the prosecution.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant-State contended that

the trial Court missed certain material facts in the course of the

adjudication of the session case. According to the appellant, the

trial Court has not properly appreciated the facts in proper

perspective. It was the respondent/accused herself who was

present in the house during the time when the incident occurred.

She was the person who was supposed to be last seen in the

company of the deceased and it was further contended that the

material objects, particularly M.Os.3 and 4 were recovered at the

behest of the accused person. Both these objects had human

blood stains on it which sufficiently establishes the prosecution

case so far as linking of the circumstantial evidence is concerned.

Ex.P.10 also is the FSL report which only establishes human

blood said to have found on M.Os.3 and 4. In addition to this, the

learned counsel for the appellant-State also contended that in the

evidence of P.W.2, there is evidence of the accused having

confessed of her having assaulted the deceased with the pestle and

it was on account of the repeated blows being given by the

accused, the deceased succumbed. This again is link of the

circumstantial evidence which ought to have been considered by

the trial Court and thus the learned counsel for the appellant/State

prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment and the

respondent/accused be held guilty for the offence under Section

302 of the IPC.

7. However, a perusal of the evidence which has been adduced

clearly reflected that the material witnesses, particularly P.W.1 the

complainant who has lodged the F.I.R himself has not supported

the case of the prosecution and has turned hostile. So also, P.W.2,

the sister of the deceased also except for a statement of the

accused having confessed to her, has not laid any substantial

cogent evidence by which it can be proved beyond reasonable

doubt of the offence to have been committed by the respondent/

accused alone. The trial Court itself has found the confession to

be highly doubtful and had not accepted the same while passing

the judgment. This Bench also upon perusal of record finds that

the aspect of confession by the accused to P.W.2 is missing in the

F.I.R itself which further gives rise to great element of doubt.

Moreover, the non-reference of the confession in the F.I.R

further fortifies the finding given by the trail Court in doubting

the deposition of P.W.2 so far as confession is made. The said

deposition of P.W.2 also cannot be made the basis for the

conviction of the respondent/accused for the reason that P.W.2 is,

in fact, sister of the deceased and this would clearly fall in the

purview of an interested witness, so far as the prosecution case is

concerned. So far as the material objects M.Os.3 and 4 with

blood stains on it are concerned, except for the FSL report of

human blood being traced on these two objects, there is no

evidence so far as the blood stains on these two objects being of

the same blood group that of the deceased is concerned.

Secondly, there was no evidence so far as M.O.3 pestle which is

said to have used in the commission of the offence had finger

prints of the respondent/accused. In the absence of the aforesaid

material evidences so far as M.Os.3 and 4 are concerned, we are

of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly not

accepted the same to be cogent evidence so far as holding the

respondent/accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC is

concerned. To make things worst, so far as prosecution case is

concerned, from a perusal of the prosecution evidence, it would

also reveal that there is no evidence to show that it was the

respondent/accused alone who was present in the house at the

time of the incident.

8. So far as interfering with the judgment of acquittal in an

appeal by the trial Court, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in a catena of decisions that unless there is substantial

strong evidence which is not been appreciated by the trial Court

and where the commission of offence by the accused is glaringly

established, the judgment of acquittal is not be interfered as a

matter of routine. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Ballu and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1 in paragraph

Nos.6 to 9 observed as under:

"6. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case

2024 SCC ONLINE SC 481

of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 2, wherein this Court held thus:

"152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far

(1984) 4 SCC 116 = 1984 INSC 121

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

7. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused 'must be' and not merely 'may be' proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved'. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.

8. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below:

"13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. (2016) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court has held that:--

"In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and !aw. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded."

14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has held that:--

"No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if

the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating the evidence If the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.""

9. In the given factual backdrop and the judicial precedents

flowing from the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject matter and

also on interfering with the judgment of acquittal and for the

reasons narrated in the preceding paragraphs, we find it difficult to

interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

10. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of considered opinion

that no strong case has been made out by the appellant/State for

interference to the impugned judgment of acquittal.

11. The appeal fails and is, accordingly, rejected.

Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall

stand closed.

__________________ P.SAM KOSHY, J