Telangana High Court
Reddy Praveen Reddy, Medak Dt., vs The State Of Telangana, Rep Pp., on 14 November, 2024
1
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
*****
Criminal Appeal No. 310 OF 2016
Between:
Reddy Praveen Reddy ... Appellant
And
The State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Public Prosecutor ...
Respondent
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 14.11.2024
Submitted for approval.
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
And
THE HON'LE SRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
1 Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? Yes/No
2 Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals Yes/No
3 Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
__________________
K.SURENDER, J
_________________________
ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI, J
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
And
THE HON'LE SRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
+ CRL.A. No. 310 OF 2016
% Dated 14.11.2024
# Reddy Praveen Reddy ... Appellant
And
$ The State of Telangana ... Respondent
Rep. by Public Prosecutor
! Counsel for the Appellant: Sri T.Pradyumnakumar Reddy, Senior
Counsel for Sri T.S.Anirudh Reddy
^ Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Arun Kumar Dodla,
Additional Public Prosecutor
>HEAD NOTE:
1
(2019) 12 Supreme Court Cases 784
2
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 169
3
(2021) 18 Supreme Court Cases 353
4
(2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 681
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
And
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.310 OF 2016
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice K.Surender)
1. The appellant is the sole accused convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment for life under Section 302 of IPC and he is also
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under
Section 201 IPC vide judgment in S.C.No.264 of 2014 dated
02.03.2016 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at
Sangareddy.
2. In all three persons died in the present case, who are
parents and elder sister's son of the appellant. Parents will be
referred as D1 an D2 and the boy as D3 hereinafter.
3. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that on 29.08.2013, at
around 3.15 a.m, P.Ws.3 and 4 heard screams of the appellant.
When they opened the door, they observed the appellant outside
his house screaming and they found smoke coming from his
house. P.W.3 called the Fire Station in BHEL. Around 3.30 a.m,
P.W.9/fire station officer received information that smoke was
coming from home of the deceased. Immediately, he along with
his crew took the fire engine and proceeded towards the house of
the deceased. There, he found smoke and sprayed water. Around
3.50 a.m, the appellant telephoned to his cousins P.Ws.1 and 2
and asked them to come to his house in BHEL. Immediately, they
proceeded to the house and observed a fire engine and fire
personnel trying to extinguish the fire. D2 and D3 were shifted in
an ambulance to Apollo DRDO Hospital. One more ambulance
came and shifted D1 to BHEL Hospital. The accused informed
them that he was sleeping in the hall. Around 8.30 a.m, P.W.1
gave report to P.W.21/Sub-Inspector of Police,
Ramachandrapuram Police Station. Basing on the said report,
P.W.21 registered case in Crime No.395 of 2023 under Section
174 Cr.P.C. Ex.P16 is the original FIR sent to the Court. P.W.21
recorded the statement of P.W.1 in the police Station. P.W.21
found the dead body of D1 in the BHEL Hospital and proceeded
to the scene of offence and conducted scene of offence
panchanama under Ex.P5 and seized MO1-Bottle containing
liquid. P.W.21 conducted inquest over the dead body of D1 in the
presence of P.W.10 at BHEL Hospital. Ex.P3 is the inquest report
of D1 and shifted the dead body of D1 to Government Hospital,
Sangareddy for postmortem examination.
4. P.W.19 conducted autopsy over the dead body of D1
between 1.05 p.m and 2.45 p.m and found one injury. According
to the doctor, the cause of death was due to Cardio Respiratory
Arrest due to burns and approximate time of death was between
8 to 11 hours prior to postmortem examination. Ex.P13 is the
postmortem report of D1. P.W.18 treated D2 and D3 who
suffered burn injuries. D2 died in the evening. Ex.P11 is the
death summary of D2. On 30.08.2013, P.W.21 went to the
Apollo Hospital and conducted inquest over the dead body of D2
in the presence of P.W.11. Ex.P4 is the inquest report of D2.
Later shifted the dead body of D2 to Gandhi Hospital for
postmortem examination. P.W.21 also recorded the statements
of D3, P.Ws.3 and 4.
5. P.W.20 conducted autopsy over the dead body of D2
between 10.45 a.m and 1.00 pm and observed one injury.
According to the Doctor, the death was due to 92% burns. Ex.P14
is the postmortem examination report of D2 and Ex.P15 is the
final opinion.
6. On 13.09.2013, in the morning, the appellant went to
P.W.14 who is a resident of Tellapur village and made an
extrajudicial confession stating that due to family disputes, he
killed D1 by pouring petrol on him and lit fire. During the said
process, D2 and D3 also received burn injuries. P.W.14 then
informed the police Inspector/P.W.21. P.W.21 recorded the
statement of P.W.14 basing on which he altered the Section of
law to Section 302 and 201 of IPC. Ex.P17 is the alternation
memo. Thereafter, he handed over the investigation to P.W.22.
On the same day, P.W.22 arrested the appellant. On
interrogation, the appellant confessed to the crime in the
presence of P.W.16 and in pursuance of the confession, P.W.22
seized MO2 empty plastic can from the house of the appellant.
Exs.P8 and P9 are confession and seizure report respectively.
Thereafter, P.W.22 recorded the statement of P.W.5, who worked
as cashier in the petrol bunk from where the appellant purchased
petrol in a can.
7. On 1.10.2013 at 4.30 p.m, P.W.22 received intimation that
D3 died while undergoing treatment at Apollo Hospital. Ex.P12 is
the death summary of D3. P.W.22 conducted inquest over the
dead body of D3 in the presence of P.W.13. Ex.P6 is the inquest
report of D3. Then he shifted the dead body of D3 to Gandhi
Hospital, Secunderabad for postmortem examination. P.W.17
conducted autopsy over the dead body of D3 and found one
injury. According to him, the death was due to burns. Ex.P10 is
the postmortem report of D3. Thereafter, P.W.22 obtained FSL
report Ex.P18. After completing investigation, P.W.22 filed charge
sheet.
8. In order to prove the case of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 22
were examined. P.Ws.3 and 4 neighbours of appellant did not
completely support the case of the prosecution and declared
hostile to the prosecution case. Exs.P1 to P18 and MOs.1 and 2
were marked.
9. Learned Sessions Judge on the basis of circumstantial
evidence of P.Ws.1 to 6 coupled with medical evidence, convicted
the appellant as stated supra.
10. Sri T.Pradyumnakumar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri T.S.Anirudh Reddy, learned counsel
for the appellant would submit that the motive as put forth by
the prosecution is that the appellant would be considered for
compassionate appointment if D1, who was working in BHEL
expires while in service. In this regard, the prosecution examined
P.W.6, who was an employee in BHEL. P.W.6 stated that D1 and
the appellant met him in August, 2013 and D1 requested for the
recruitment of the appellant in BHEL. He argued that another
motive suggested by the prosecution is that ten days prior to the
incident, D1 and the appellant had quarreled regarding loss in
the work shop business of the appellant. In this regard, the
prosecution examined P.W.7-father of D3 and P.W.8-mother of
D3.
11. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that originally, the
FIR Ex.P16 was registered by P.W.21 under Section 174 Cr.P.C
on a report given by P.W.1 on 29.08.2013. Thereafter, Section of
Law was altered to Sections 302 and 201 of IPC basing on the
extrajudicial confession made by the appellant to P.W.14 on
13.09.2013. However, P.W.14 turned hostile to the prosecution
case. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several
judgments that extrajudicial confession is a weak piece of
evidence and should be corroborated by other evidence on record.
He further argued that basing on the confession of the appellant
in the presence of P.W.21 and P.W.16, who is panch for
confession and recovery, MO2-empty plastic can was seized from
the backyard of his house. He submitted that the incident
happened on 13.09.2013 and the recovery was made on
13.09.2013 i.e., after 15 days of the incident. Admittedly, P.W.21
conducted scene of offence panchanama Ex.P5 on 29.08.2013,
but MO2 was not found or seized by P.W.21.
12. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that P.W.21
though recorded the statement of D3, but for the reasons best
known to the prosecution, the said statement has never seen the
light of the day. According to the charge, the appellant poured
kerosene on the deceased and set fire, but however, the case of
the prosecution, the appellant poured petrol on the deceased and
set fire. The prosecution examined P.W.5 to show that the
appellant got filled 3 liters of petrol in MO2 plastic can on
25.08.2013 i.e., three days prior to the incident. The prosecution
ought to have conducted test identification parade to prove that
P.W.6 could identify the appellant. However, P.W.5 stated that no
receipt was given to the appellant and he further deposed that
they would fill petrol in cans only when the vehicles are air
locked and in the cross-examination, he stated that only diesel
cars will be air locked. He submitted that P.W.21 failed to prepare
the rough sketch of scene of offence.
13. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the learned
Sessions Judge convicted the appellant on the basis that
appellant did not offer any explanation as to how the fire engulfed
in the bedroom of the deceased. In a case of circumstantial
evidence, absence of explanation or false explanation will amount
to an additional link to complete the chain, provided the
prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt.
14. Learned Senior also relied on the judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Raju Manjhi v. State of Bihar 1
wherein it was held as follows:
"13. The other ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that
the so-called confessional statement of the appellant has no
evidentiary value under law for the reason that it was extracted
from the accused under duress by the police. It is true, no
confession made by any person while he was in the custody of
police shall be proved against him. But, the Evidence Act
provides that even when an accused being in the custody of
police makes a statement that reveals some information leading
to the recovery of incriminating material or discovery of any fact
concerning the alleged offence, such statement can be proved
against him. It is worthwhile at this stage to have a look at
Section 27 of the Evidence Act:
"27. How much of information received from accused may
be proved.-- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may
be proved."
17. Moving on to the other limb of argument advanced on behalf
of the appellant that the appellant-accused had no motive and
the courts below have failed to consider the fact that the
evidence on record is not sufficient to establish motive of the
accused. Undoubtedly, "motive" plays significant role in a case
(2019) 12 Supreme Court Cases 784
based on circumstantial evidence where the purpose would be
to establish this important link in the chain of circumstances in
order to connect the accused with the crime. But, for the case
on hand, proving motive is not an important factor when
abundant direct evidence is available on record. The
confessional statement of the appellant itself depicts the motive
of the team of the accused in pursuit of which they committed
the robbery at the house of the informant and the appellant
being part of it."
15. In Satye Singh & another v. State of Uttarakhand 2, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"15. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, the
Court is of the opinion that the prosecution had miserably failed to
prove the entire chain of circumstances which would unerringly
conclude that alleged act was committed by the accused only and none
else. Reliance placed by learned advocate Mr. Mishra for the State
on Section 106 of the Evidence Act is also misplaced, inasmuch
as Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution from
discharging its duty to prove the guilt of the accused.
In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer , AIR (1956) SC 404, this
court had aptly explained the scope of Section 106 of the Evidence Act
in criminal trial. It was held in para 9:
"9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of
proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to
relieve it of that duty.
On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in
which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult,
for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the
knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty
or inconvenience. The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts
that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the
section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very
startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the
accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could
know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that
cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to
construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India,
to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did
not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v.
Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 169] and Seneviratne v. R. [(1936) 3 All ER 36,
49]"
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 169
16. In Parubai v. State of Maharashtra 3, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as follows:
"16. Further the mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless the
circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to the
conclusion that it "must be true" and not "may be true". In that regard, it
is necessary to take note of the decision of this Court in Devi
Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 19
SCC 447 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 719] , wherein this Court on noting the
decision of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda [Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487]
has held as hereunder : (Devi Lal case [Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan,
(2019) 19 SCC 447 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 719] , SCC p. 453, paras 17-19)
"17. It has further been considered by this Court in Sujit
Biswas v. State of Assam [Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12
SCC 406 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 677] and Raja v. State of
Haryana [Raja v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 43 : (2015) 4 SCC
(Cri) 267] . It has been propounded that while scrutinising the
circumstantial evidence, a court has to evaluate it to ensure the chain of
events is established clearly and completely to rule out any reasonable
likelihood of innocence of the accused. The underlying principle is
whether the chain is complete or not, indeed it would depend on the facts
of each case emanating from the evidence and there cannot be a
straitjacket formula which can be laid down for the purpose. But the
circumstances adduced when considered collectively, it must lead only to
the conclusion that there cannot be a person other than the accused who
alone is the perpetrator of the crime alleged and the circumstances must
establish the conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused.
18. On an analysis of the overall fact situation in the instant case, and
considering the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the
prosecution and noticed by the High Court in the impugned judgment
[Babu Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2009 SCC OnLine Raj 333] , to prove
the charge is visibly incomplete and incoherent to permit conviction of the
appellants on the basis thereof without any trace of doubt. Though the
materials on record hold some suspicion towards them, but the
prosecution has failed to elevate its case from the realm of "may be true"
to the plane of "must be true" as is indispensably required in law for
conviction on a criminal charge. It is trite to state that in a criminal trial,
suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot substitute proof.
19. That apart, in the case of circumstantial evidence, two views are
possible on the case of record, one pointing to the guilt of the accused
and the other his innocence. The accused is indeed entitled to have the
benefit of one which is favourable to him. All the judicially laid
parameters, defining the quality and content of the circumstantial
evidence, bring home the guilt of the accused on a criminal charge, we
(2021) 18 Supreme Court Cases 353
find no difficulty to hold that the prosecution, in the case in hand, has
failed to meet the same."
21. The High Court holding the appellant guilty of pouring kerosene
around the deceased and her children and setting them on fire since the
appellant had failed to explain the reason for eruption of fire in view of
such obligation to explain under Section 106 is also not sustainable in
the present circumstance. As held in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4
SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487] the failure to explain can only be held as
an additional link to complete the chain of circumstance. In the instant
case, since the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the
same cannot be held against the appellant. On the other hand, the case
itself is that the fire had erupted at midnight when the appellant and
others were sleeping and she came out shouting. The explanation for the
cause of fire by the appellant would have arisen only if there was any
other evidence to the effect that the appellant was already awake and
was outside even before the fire erupted."
17. On the other hand, Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that the appellant was
present in the house when the incident has taken place. Duty is
cast upon him to explain as to how the fire engulfed in the room
where D1 to D3 were sleeping. They received burn injuries. Even
assuming that D3, son of P.Ws.7 and 8 did not make statement,
it cannot be said that the appellant is not guilty. The prosecution
has proved its case by laying foundation to invoke Section 106 of
the Evidence Act whereby the burden has been shifted on to the
appellant. The appellant failed to discharge his burden except
saying that he was not responsible, nothing is brought on record
to believe his evidence.
18. The main argument advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel is that D3 was examined during inquest proceedings and
survived for nearly one month. However, his statement though
recorded by P.W.21 was suppressed, which creates any amount
of doubt regarding prosecution case. D3 was boy aged 13 ½ years
who received injuries and suffered for one month before he died.
His statement will be of no consequence. The incident happened
in the early hours around 3.30 a.m to 4.00 a.m and the boy
would be in deep sleep. Appellant could not convince this Court
as to how prejudice was caused if the alleged statement of D3
recorded by P.W.21 was not provided during investigation. No
request was made by appellant during examination of P.W.21 to
either furnish the alleged statement or ask the Court to look into
the CD file when P.W.21 deposed.
19. The case is one of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution
has to prove all the circumstances without any reasonable doubt
for the Court to infer that it was the appellant who had
committed the murder of the deceased. Presumption under
Section 106 of Evidence Act can be raised only in the event of the
prosecution laying foundation that the appellant was responsible
to shift the burden on to the appellant to explain his defence and
the circumstances under which the deaths occurred.
20. The incident happened in the early hours of 29.08.2013
around 3.00 am to 4.00 am according to the witnesses P.Ws.1 to
4. P.W.1 is the cousin of the appellant and P.W.2 is another
cousin. Both of them were informed on phone by the appellant
that D1 to D3 received burn injuries. Both P.Ws.1 and 2 went to
the house of the appellant and found that D1 to D3 received
severe burn injuries. When P.Ws.1 and 2 asked about the
incident, the appellant informed them that he was sleeping in the
hall and does not know as to how D1 to D3 were burnt.
21. P.Ws.3 and 4 are the neighbors of the house where the
incident has taken place. P.W.3 stated that around 3.15 a.m, he
heard the appellant shouting for help and he called the Fire
Station in BHEL. The fire engine arrived and thereafter, P.Ws.1 to
3 went inside and saw that all the three deceased D1 to D3
received severe injuries, who were shifted to the BHEL General
hospital. Similar is the evidence of P.W.4, who is another
neighbor. He also stated that around 3.00 a.m, he heard the
appellant shouting and he went out and PW.3 called for the fire
engine and public gathered and they found D1 to D3 burnt in the
house and they were shifted to the hospital.
22. P.Ws.1 to 4 specifically spoke about the presence of the
appellant in the house when the incident has taken place.
Appellant informed P.Ws.1 and 2 that he was sleeping in the hall
of the house and it is not known how D1 to D3 were engulfed in
the fire. Admittedly apart from the appellant no one else was in
the house when the incident happened. P.Ws.1 to 4 were not
cross-examined by the defence and their evidence is not disputed
about presence of appellant in the house apart from D1 to D3.
P.Ws.3 and 4, who are the independent witnesses also speak
about the appellant shouting for help when they went to the
house and found smoke and after fire engine came and
extinguished flames, they saw three bodies burnt. During Section
313 Cr.P.C examination also, in support of the evidence of P.Ws.1
to 4, except stating that the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 is false, no
explanation is given by the appellant. Even the Court asked if he
intended to say anything during examination under Section 313
Cr.P.C, he only stated that a false case was filed against him.
Initially, P.Ws.1 to 4's cross-examination was treated as nil as
there was no representation by counsel. However, the defence
counsel appeared and cross-examined all the other witnesses and
no attempt was made to recall P.Ws.1 to 4 for cross-examination.
Appellant did not plead prejudice for not cross-examining P.Ws.1
to 4.
23. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra 4, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a
house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be
upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led
by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required
in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a
comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to
give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and
offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to
establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty
at all on an accused to offer any explanation."
24. The evidence against the appellant is that he was present in
the house when the incident has taken place. There was no one
else apart from D1 to D3 and the appellant in the house, which
fact was not disputed. It is not the case of appellant that there
was accidental fire. As to how fire engulfed in the room where D1
to D3 were sleeping has to be explained by the appellant and also
as to how there was no fire in the place where he was sleeping in
the room. According to Ex.P5, scene of offence panchanama, the
(2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 681
bodies of D1 to D3 were lying in the eastern side bed room which
was 10 x 10 feet. The other room in the house is 10 x 10 bed
room No.2 and hall 10 x 12 feet. Appellant's case is that he was
sleeping in the hall adjoining bed room. The hall leads to both
bed rooms and the kitchen. According to the Investigating Officer,
at the scene, petrol was found floating on water. According to the
prosecution version, the appellant had purchased petrol from
P.W.5 on 25.08.2013.
25. The entire house was very small house and in between the
hall and the bed room, there is one door and the appellant was
sleeping in the hall which would have hardly been at a distance
of 10 to 15 feet. It cannot be said that the appellant was ignorant
of the fire which engulfed in the bed room where D1 to D3 were
sleeping. Admittedly, the appellant had not made any attempt to
rescue D1 to D3 nor he received any burn injuries.
26.The prosecution has proved through the evidence of P.Ws.1 to
4that the appellant was alone present in the house, which is not
disputed by the appellant. It is not the case of appellant that any
third person entered into the house and lit fire. It is not the case
of appellant that the fire was accidental. The prosecution has laid
foundation to shift the burden on to the appellant under Section
106 of the Evidence Act. The motive though was suggested is of
no consequence since the appellant failed to discharge his
burden which was shifted on to him under Section 106 of IPC.
Similarly, the hostility of P.W.14, to whom the alleged
extrajudicial confession was made, is of no help to the appellant
nor a dent in the prosecution case. Though the case of the
prosecution is that the appellant went to P.W.14 and confessed to
him on 13.09.2013, however, P.W.14 not stating about the
confession, will not in any manner help the appellant nor is it a
missing link in the case of the prosecution. The contradictions in
the case of the prosecution which are projected by the learned
counsel regarding seizure of the can/MO2 and the other
discrepancies are minor in nature, having no bearing on the case
of the prosecution. When the evidence on hand, relied on by the
prosecution is consistent pointing guilt only against the
appellant, minor discrepancies which creep in during the trial
which will not affect the prosecution case or go to the root of the
prosecution case, such discrepancies can be ignored. We do not
see any reason to set aside the conviction recorded by the learned
Sessions Judge.
27. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Since the
appellant is on bail, the trial Court is directed to cause
appearance of the appellant and send him to prison to serve out
the remaining period of sentence. Consequently, miscellaneous
applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________
K.SURENDER, J
____________________________________
ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI, J
Date : 14.11.2024
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o.kvs
