Telangana High Court

Balde Siddilingam vs The State Of Telangana on 3 May, 2024

Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka

Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka

           HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

                 WRIT PETITION No.1598 of 2024

ORDER:

The Writ Petition is filed seeking to declare G.O Rt. No 158

Agriculture and Cooperation (MKT.1) Department, dated 12.01.2024

and the consequent proceedings No. AGM-S-III/260303/2020 dated

12.01.2024 issued by the Director of Agriculture Marketing, Hyderabad

as arbitrary, discriminatory, whimsical, violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India and principles of natural justice and consequently

to set aside the same.

2. The issue involved in the Writ Petition was 'whether the State

Government has power to terminate Members of the Committee including

Chairman and Vice-Chairman nominated under Section 5 of the

Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Live Stock) Markets Act, 2014 at the

pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11).'

3. Initially, vide order dated 12.02.2024, this Court dismissed the

Writ Petition, duly considering the settled position of law 'Doctrine of

Pleasure' i.e. with regard to the power of the government to withdraw its

pleasure, without there being any counter-affidavit. Aggrieved thereby,

petitioners preferred Writ Appeal No.161 of 2024. The Division Bench

vide judgment dated 28.02.2024 set-aside the said order dated

12.02.2024. Relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:

"7. We have considered the submissions made on both sides and have perused the record.

Paragraph 34 of the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal (supra) reads as under:

34. The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not alicence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words, "at pleasure" doctrine enables the removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of an authority, summarily, without any obligation to give any notice or hearing to the person removed, and without any obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.

Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked for valid reasons. The valid reasons must exist and must be disclosed by the respondents by filing counter affidavit.

However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge. The respondents shall file the counter within two weeks. The learned Single Judge shall decide the writ petition afresh in accordance with law.

4. Pursuant to the said direction, Respondents 1 to 5 filed counter

affidavit on 13.03.2024, for which petitioners also filed reply on

22.03.2024.

Contentions of petitioners in the writ affidavit:

5. The main grievance of petitioners is that the 1st petitioner is the

Chairman and the 2nd petitioner is the Vice-Chairman, whereas the

other petitioners are Members of the Agriculture Market Committee,

which was constituted vide G.O.Rt.No.117, dated 14.03.2023 and in

exercise of powers under Section 5(11) of the 1966 Act. The Government

issued G.O.Rt.No.158, dated 12.01.2024 withdrawing its pleasure from

the Members of Agricultural Market Committee i.e. petitioners, who

ceased to hold the office with immediate effect. According to petitioners,

the said G.O. is absolutely arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution and the consequent proceedings was

issued in a mala fide manner and in abuse of power conferred under

Section 5(11) of the Act, in as much as petitioners were appointed by

previous government and only with a mala fide view to arbitrarily curtail

their tenure.

Further, it was stated that Section 5(11) of the Act provides that

the members of the Committee including Chairman and Vice Chairman

shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government, the said

pleasure is not absolute, cannot be exercised whimsically without

reasons, arbitrarily or mala fide. It is stated that in a democracy,

government is governed by rule of law, no government or authority has

right to do what it pleases and there is nothing like unfettered

discretion. Withdrawal of pleasure cannot be a licence to act with

unfettered discretion solely with a view to curtail the terms of the

existing members and pack committees with the followers of the party

in power.

It is also stated that the impugned G.O. and proceedings visit the

petitioners with civil consequences without giving them any opportunity

of being heard and thus they are violative of principles of natural

justice. The principles of natural justice have to be read into Section

5(11) of the Act as otherwise, it is liable to be struck down as being

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution conferring unfettered and

whimsical power without any guidelines.

Contentions of Respondents 1 to 5 in the counter-affidavit

6. While denying the allegations/averments made in writ affidavit,

respondents also denied that petitioners are appointed on the basis of

merits and satisfaction of eligibility criteria. Further, respondents stated

that as per Section 5, every market committee shall consist of members

nominated in terms of the procedure prescribed therein. It is stated

that Writ Petitions are filed majorly on two grounds i.e. 1) violation of

Article 14 of the Constitution; and 2) violation of principles of natural

justice. It is stated that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Om Narain

Agarwal v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur 1 held that right of

nominated members is governed by statute and not by the Constitution

and nominated members are not entitled to any notice as their removal

depends on pleasure of the government and that their removal does not

put any stigma on their performance or character, and such removal of

1993(2)SCC242,

nominated members is purely on political consideration. Therefore,

there is no violation of Article 14 Constitution of India.

Respondents also relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Krishna v. State of Maharashtra 2 wherein it has been held

specifically that 'once doctrine of pleasure is invoked or applicable,

there is no question of giving opportunity before removal and principles

of natural justice are not applicable'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

further relied and fortified the view in Om Narain Agarwal (supra).

Further, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in B.P.Singhal v. Union of India 3, in which while dealing with

exercise of 'doctrine of pleasure' in matters of withdrawal of pleasure in

case of Governors held that loss of confidence will be a very relevant

criteria for withdrawal of pleasure in case of Ministers and Attorney

General.

Respondents have specifically stated that petitioners were all

nominated by the earlier government and their ideology is not in sync

with the policies / ideologies of the present government and that loss of

confidence in them by the present government is the reason for removal

from their nominated posts and withdrawal of pleasure does not put

any stigma on their performance and character. Therefore, the

respondents have prayed for dismissal of Writ Petition.

Reply affidavit of petitioners to the counter affidavit of Respondents 1 to 5:

2001(2) SCC 441

2010(6) SCC 331

7. Petitioners have stated that even though they are not entitled to

protection under the provisions of the Constitution, petitioners as

Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the Agriculture Market

Committee are entitled to protection as provided by the 1966 Act.

Further, it was stated that judgment in Om Narain Agarwval (supra)

is not applicable to the facts of the case and it is no longer a good law

having regard to the subsequent judgments of the Constitution Bench

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal.

8. Heard learned Senior Counsel Sri B. Nalini Kumar on behalf of Sri

A. Dasharatha, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Special

Government Pleader Sri S. Rahul Reddy on behalf of learned

Government Pleader for Cooperation and Sri C. Hari Preeth, learned

Standing Counsel for the 6th respondent.

9. Having heard learned counsel on either side, the point that arises

for consideration is 'whether there is violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution and principles of natural justice'.

10. In order to deal with the point for consideration, it is imperative to

extract the relevant provisions of the Act, particularly Sections 5(1) &

(11):

5(1) Every market committee shall consist of fourteen members and shall be constituted by the Government by notification in the following manner:-

(i) [eight] members to be nominated by the Government in consultation with the Director of Marketing from among the following categories of growers of agricultural produce, owners of livestock and products of livestock in thenotified area, namely

(ii) two members to be nominated by the Government in consultation with the Director of Marketing from among the licensed traders in the notified area;

(iii) one member to be nominated by the Government from among the Presidents or Persons-in-charge, if any, for the time being performing the functions of Primary Agricultural Co-operative Societies or the Cooperative Marketing Societies having areas of operation within the notified area;

(iv) the Assistant Director of Marketing having jurisdiction over the notified area or any other officer nominated in this behalf by the Director of Marketing

(v) the Assistant Director of Agriculture or Assistant Director of Horticulture or Assistant Director of Animal Husbandry or Assistant Director of Fisheries having jurisdiction over the notified area or any other officer nominated in this behalf by the concerned Head of the Department;

(vi) Chairperson of the Municipality or the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, as the case may be, in whose jurisdiction the office of the market committee is located

Provided that in the case of a Municipal Corporation constituted under any law relating to Municipal Corporation for the time being in force in the State, one person as may be nominated by the Corporation shall represent the Corporation in the Agricultural Market Committee concerned where a notified area comprises the Corporation also.

S.5(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in any provisions of this Act, members of the Committee including theChairman and Vice- chairman shall hold the office during the pleasure of the Government."

So in terms of Section 5(11), notwithstanding anything contained

in any provisions of the Act, members of the Committee including

Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall hold the office during the pleasure

of the Government.

11. Petitioners' main contention was that the impugned G.O. is

arbitrary and was issued in mala fide exercise of power under Section

5(11) and is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Reference is

made to the recent change in government after elections on 30.11.2023,

leading to issuance of the impugned G.O. and proceedings, allegedly

aimed at arbitrarily curtailing petitioners' tenure. Further, Section 5(11)

provides that Members of the Committee including Chairman and Vice-

Chairman shall hold office during the pleasure of the government, the

said pleasure is not absolute and cannot be exercised whimsically

without reasons, arbitrarily or mala fide. In this case, Chairman, Vice-

Chairman and members are nominated posts and they are pleasure

posts, still the government is under obligation to follow the principles of

natural justice. Further, it was contended that withdrawal of pleasure

cannot be at the whim and fancy of authority but can only be for valid

reasons. According to learned Senior Counsel, in democracy,

government is governed by rule of law; no government or authority has

right to do what it pleases and there is nothing like unfettered

discretion. It is submitted that withdrawal of pleasure should not be a

tool for unfettered discretion, aimed at altering committee composition

based on political allegiance. The impugned G.O. and proceedings, it is

argued, impose civil consequences on petitioners without affording them

an opportunity to be heard, thus violating principles of natural justice.

In support of their contentions, learned Senior Counsel relied on the

judgments in 1) M.Thirupathi Rao v. The State of Telangana 4, 2)

Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra 5 and 3) Dasari Raja Master v. State

of Andhra Pradesh 6.

2015 (1) ALT 589

2022(4) Mh.L.J

(2021) 4 ALD 196.

12. On the other hand, respondents have contended that there is no

violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the principles of natural

justice; the State Government has power to terminate Members of the

Committee including Chairman and Vice-Chairman nominated under

Section 5 at the pleasure of the Government under Section 5 (11) of the

Act. Also further contended, the right of nominated members is

governed by the Statute and not by the Constitution. The nominated

members are not entitled to any notice as their removal depends on

pleasure of the government which is based on political consideration.

Their removal does not put any stigma on their performance or

character. Further it was contended that loss of confidence will be a

relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure and the ideology of the

preset Committee may not be in sync with the policies or ideologies of

the Government may also be a ground. In support of their contentions,

the respondents, apart from the judgments relied on in the counter-

affidavit, further relied on Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of

Telangana 7.

13. It is relevant to quote the judgments relied on by the petitioners

in Sanjay's case (supra). In paragraphs 16 to 18, it is held as under:

"16. In the present case, absolutely no reason is forthcoming, nor the respondents have come with case as to what was the cause for terminating the Part Time Chairmanship of the petitioner. The State Government can only exercise this power on the basis of any relevant and strong material to suggest that continuation of such member

(2017) 1SCC 283

would not be in public interest. There should be reason for removal of member.

The powers of removal of the office bearers of statutory board is to be exercised, firstly to ensure that the circumstances exist for the exercise of powers of removal and to safeguard the institution from continuation of such office-bearers.

17. As observed above, no reason has been set out by the State Government for removal of petitioner, when the admitted position is that the removal of the petitioners on account of Doctrine of Pleasure. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of B.P. Singhal (supra) would clearly apply to the facts of case that withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority but can only be for valid reasons. Mere using the word public interest can not become a ground for removal of petitioner from the Board. There should be valid reasons for removal."

14. In Dasari Raja Master's case, the Hon'ble High Court Andhra

Pradesh held as under:

"59. In any view of the matter, in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (referred supra), the Doctrine of Pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words, "at pleasure" doctrine enables the removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of an authority, summarily, without any obligation to give any notice or hearing to the person removed, and without any obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons and public good."

15. Learned counsel for petitioners contend that Clause 3 of

Telangana Ordinance No.1 of 2014 by which Chairman, Vice Chairman

and Members of every Market Committee shall cease to hold office, was

invalidated by the Division Bench of this Court in M. Thirupathi Rao's

case (supra). In the said judgment, it has been observed thus:

"On reading of the above clause-3of the Ordinance, it appears to us that existing members, vice-chairmen and chairmen of the market committee are sought to be removed prematurely and in their place some other person or persons to be appointed to discharge the functions of the committee till reconstituted. In the writ affidavits we find that the chairman-cum-members of the market committee were appointed on various dates in 2013 except one being 7th petitioner in W.P. No. 24877 of 2014 who was appointed on 3.2.2012. Therefore, going by the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the said Act they should remain in office for a period of three years from the date of appointment. Precisely all of them were to remain in office till 2016except 7th petitioner in W.P. No. 24877of 2014 till 2015 with rider of extension which might be granted for one year. We do not find the aforesaid amendment is sought to be given any retrospective effect. In absence of any stipulation thereof, it can safely be held that the said Ordinance has to take prospective effect. Even going by reduced term all the petitioners except one (7th petitioner in W.P.No.24877 of 2014) are entitled to remain in office till 2015 if not 2016 in the event of extension is granted. The removal of all of the petitioners vide clause-3 by way of legislative action appears to be discriminatory as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as future appointees in the office of the members, vice-chairmen and chairmen are liable to be removed or denuded of their power under the existing provisions as provided under Sections 5, 6, 6(A) & 6(B) of the said Act whereas the above petitioners are sought to be removed prematurely taking away procedural safeguard established by law against vulnerability of arbitrary, whimsical action of removal as provided in Sections 5, 6, 6(A) & 6(B). The petitioners and each of them have been picked up as a class to treat in discrimination with the class of future members, vice-chairmen and chairmen without any intelligible differentia as similar provision of removal hasnot been made by way of amendment like the present one for future members, vice-chairmen and chairmen who are kept with procedure safeguard as above against summary dismissal. Article 14 permits reasonable classification, but does not permit any classification without intelligible differentia as

settled by Supreme Court firmly. We are unable to comprehend what is the difference between the present members, vicechairmen and chairmen of the market committee and future members of the same committee for which different provision with regard to their removal, is required. No explanation is forthcoming for this impermissible differentiation, by counter affidavit, in absence thereof what petitioners contend is correct, that is for political purpose. Supreme Court in case of Dr. D.C. Wadhwa case (1 supra) has discarded forcefully this sort of classification as rightly contended by the learned lawyers for the petitioners. By clause-3of the Ordinance, the petitioners and each of them have not been treated in equality with future appointees as above who belong to the same class in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

14. Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."

16. Conversely, learned Special Government Pleader for respondents

relied on the judgments, cited supra, wherein it was held as under:

In Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur, it was

held at Para 11 to 13 as under:

"11. Section 39 deals with resignation by a member of the Board. Section 40 provides the grounds for removal of a member of the Board. Sub-section (5) of Section 40 deals with suspension of a member. From a perusal of the above provisions it is clear that the term of an elected or nominated member is coterminous with the term of the Board. The normal term of the Board is five years, but it may be curtailed as well as extended. If the term of the Board is curtailed by dissolution or supersession, the term of the members so gets curtailed. Similarly, if the term of the Board is extended, the term of the member is also extended. Apart from the curtailment of the term of a member of the Board by dissolution or supersession of the Board itself, the term of a member also gets curtailed by his resignation or by his removal from

office. Section 40 specifically provides the grounds under which the State Government in the case of a city, or the prescribed authority in any other case, may remove a member of the Board. The removal under Section 40 applies to elected as well as nominated members. In respect of a nominated member, power of curtailment of term has now been given to the State Government under the fourth proviso to Section 9 added after the third proviso through the amending Act of 1990. In the cases before us, we are concerned with the removal of nominated members under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act and we are not concerned with the removal as contained in Section 40of the Act. The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body, depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorized the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the legislature has provided the grounds in Section 40 of the Act under which the members could be removed. But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

12. In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations. In Dr Rama Mishracase (WritPetition No.11114 of 1990, Order dated December 9,1991), the High Court wrongly held that the pleasure

doctrine incorporated under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 and Article 15(3) of the Constitution. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid reasoning of the High Court. Clause (3) of Article 15 is itself an exception to Article 14 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Under Article 14, a duty is enjoined on the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(2) provides that "no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public".

13. Thereafter Article 15(3) provides that "nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children". This means that in case any special provision is made for women, the same would not be violative on the ground of sex which is prohibited 13 under clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution. Thus, the special provision contained for nominating one or two women members as the case may be provided in Section 9 of the Act would be protected from challenge under clause (3) of Article 15of the Constitution. It may also be worthwhile to note that the provision of pleasure doctrine incorporated by adding the fourth proviso does not, in any manner, take away the right of representation of women members in the Board, but it only permits the State Government to keep the nominated women members of its own choice. The High Court in Dr Rama Mishra case (Writ Petition No.11114 of 1990, Order dated December 9, 1991) took a wrong view in holding that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act was violative of Article 15(3) of the Constitution under an erroneous impression that this provision in any manner curtailed the representation of women members in the Board. We are not impressed with the reasoning given by the High Court that the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act in any manner deprived the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article14 of the

Constitution. It is well established that the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and not to un equals. The nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and cannot claim equality with the elected members. We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even the highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney-General and the Advocate-General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralised or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office."

17. In Krishna v. State of Maharashtra at Para 8, 9 and 11, it was

held as under:

"8. In the present case, the appellant was appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 4read with clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 414and was removed by order dated 9-2-2000 under Section 6 of the Act.

Having considered the submissions for the parties and after perusing the language of the sections, we have no hesitation to hold, that the field of Section 6 and Section 10 are separate. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section 10is removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz., Section 6empowers and Section 10 lays down the conditions and procedure to remove, then removal of trustee could only be for penal consequences and not otherwise. If that be so, there could be no reason to enact Section 6 as Section 10 covers such cases. It is significant, the removal under Section 6 is confined only to such trustees who are covered under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4and who are also nominated by the State Government. Rights of trustees falling under the aforesaid clause (e) are rights created under a statute and hence that very creator can always limit or curtail such right. In such cases, if a trustee

is removed, he cannot project any grievance that no opportunity was given to him. If any right which is creature of statute, is limited or curtailed by that very statute, in the absence of any other right under that very statute or the Constitution of India, such trustee cannot claim any right based on the principle of natural justice.

9. The removal spoken of here neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of pleasure which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent of the legislature.

11. Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then subsection (3) of Section 10 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing an order of removal under Section 10, while there is no such corresponding sub- section under Section 6. Thus intent of legislature is very clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of pleasure is implicit under Section 6. In Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur [(1993) 2 SCC 242] this Court was considering the provisions of Section 9 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 as introduced by U.P. Act 19 of 1990, which made provision for the nomination of two women members by the State Government, and the fourth proviso provides that the nomination of such two members is at the pleasure of the State Government. This Court held: (SCC p. 254, paras 11-12)

"The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as

may be present in the case of an elected member. ... But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14and 15of the Constitution.

In our view, such provision neither offends any article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations."

18. It is essential to extract the relevant paragraphs of B.P. Singhal

v. Union of India (supra):

"The writ petition is filed as a public interest litigation in the wake of the removal of the Governors of the States of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa on 2-7- 2004 by the President of India on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. The petitioner sought:

(a) a direction to the Union of India to produce the entire files, documents and facts which formed the basis of the order dated 2-7- 2004 of the President of India;

(b) a writ of certiorari, quashing the removal of the four Governors; and a writ of mandamus to the respondents to allow the said four Governors to complete their remaining term of five years.

35. The Governor constitutes an integral part of the legislature of a State. He is vested with the legislative power to promulgate ordinances while the Houses of the Legislature are not in session. The executive power of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is taken in his name. He exercises the sovereign power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment. He is vested with the power to summon each House of the Legislature or to

prorogue either House or to dissolve the Legislative Assembly. No Bill passed by the Houses of the Legislature can become law unless it is assented to by him. He has to make a report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. He thus occupies a high constitutional office with important constitutional functions and duties.

40. It is thus evident that a Governor has a dual role. The first is that of a constitutional head of the State, bound by the advice of his Council of Ministers. The second is to function as a vital link between the Union Government and the State Government. In certain special/emergent situations, he may also act as a special representative of the Union Government. He is required to discharge the functions related toh is different roles harmoniously, assessing the scope and ambit of each role properly. He is not an employee of the Union Government, nor the agent of the party in power nor required to act under the dictates of political parties. There may be occasions when he may have to be partial or neutral umpire where the views of the Union Government and the State Governments are in conflict. His peculiar position arises from the fact that the Indian Constitution is quasi-federal in character.

44. In such a scenario of myriad policies, ideologies, agendas in the shifting sands of political coalitions, there is no question of the Union Government having Governors who are in sync with its mandate and policies. Governors are not expected or required to implement the policies of the Government or popular mandates. Their constitutional role is clearly defined and bears very limited political overtones. We have already noted that the Governor is not the agent or the employee of the Union Government. As the constitutional head of the State, many a time he may be expressing views of the State Government, which may be neither his own nor that of the Centre (for example, when he delivers the special address under Article 176 of the Constitution). Reputed elder statesmen, able administrators and eminent personalities, with maturity and experience are expected to be appointed as Governors. While some of them may come from a political background, once they are appointed as Governors, they owe their allegiance and loyalty to the Constitution and not to any political party and are required to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution

(see the terms of oath or affirmation by the Governor, under Article 159 of the Constitution). Like the President, Governors are expected to be apolitical, discharging purely constitutional functions, irrespective of their earlier political background. Governors cannot be politically active.

We therefore reject the contention of the respondents that Governors should be in "sync" with the policies of the Union Government or should subscribe to the ideology of the party in power at the Centre. As the Governor is neither the employee nor the agent of the Union Government, we also reject the contention that a Governor can be removed if the Union Government or party in power loses "confidence" in him.

70. We have however already rejected the contention that the Governor should be in sync with the ideologies of the Union Government. Therefore, a Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is not in sync or refuses to act as an agent of the party in power at the Centre. Though Governors, Ministers and the Attorney General, all hold office during the pleasure of the President, there is an intrinsic difference between the office of a Governor and the offices of Ministers and the Attorney General. The Governor is the constitutional head of the State. He is not an employee or an agent of the Union Government nor a part of any political team. On the other hand, a Minister is a hand- picked member of the Prime Minister's team. The relationship between the Prime Minister and a Minister is purely political. Though the Attorney General holds a public office, there is an element of lawyer- client relationship between the Union Government and the Attorney General. Loss of confidence will therefore be a very relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure, in the case of a Minister or the Attorney General, but not a relevant ground in the case of a Governor.

(v) Judicial review of withdrawal of President's pleasure.

71. When a Governor holds office during the pleasure of the Government and the power to remove at the pleasure of the President is not circumscribed by any conditions or restrictions, it follows that the power is exercisable at any time, without assigning any cause. However, there is a distinction between the need for a cause for the removal, and the need to disclose the cause for removal. While the President need not disclose or inform the cause for his removal to the

Governor, it is imperative that a cause must exist. If we do not proceed on that premise, it would mean that the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may make any order which may be manifestly arbitrary or whimsical or mala fide. Therefore, while no cause or reason be disclosed or assigned for removal by exercise of such prerogative power, some valid cause should exist for the removal. Therefore, while we do not accept the contention that an order under Article 156is not justiciable, we accept the contention that no reason need be assigned and no cause need be shown and no notice need be issued to the Governor before removing a Governor.

76. This Court has examined in several cases, the scope of judicial review with reference to another prerogative power--power of the President/Governor to grant pardon, etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences. The view of this Court is that the power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and not an act of grace as in England. It is a constitutional responsibility to be exercised in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not a matter of privilege but a matter of performance of official duty. All public power including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide. While the President or the Governor may be the sole judge of the sufficiency of facts and the propriety of granting pardons and reprieves, the power being an enumerated power in the Constitution, its limitations must be found in the Constitution itself. The Courts exercise a limited power of judicial review to ensure that the President considers all relevant materials before coming to his decision. As the exercise of such power is of the widest amplitude, whenever such power is exercised, it is presumed that the President acted properly and carefully after an objective consideration of all aspects of the matter. Where reasons are given, the Court may interfere if the reasons are found to be irrelevant. However, when reasons are not given, the Court may interfere only where the exercise of power is vitiated by self- denial on wrong appreciation of the full amplitude of the power under Article72 or where the decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide (vide Maru Ram v. Union of India [(1981)1 SCC 107:1981 SCC (Cri)112], Kehar Singh v. Union of India [(1989) 1SCC 204: 1989SCC (Cri) 86], etc.).

80. The extent and depth of judicial review will depend upon and vary with reference to the matter under review. As observed by Lord Steyn in Daly [R. Daly v. Secy. Of State for the Home Department, (2001)2 AC 532: (2001)2 WLR 1622: (2001) 3 All ER 433(HL)], in law, context is everything, and intensity of review will depend on the subject-matter of review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard to administrative action, legislations and constitutional amendments. But the extent or scope of judicial review for one will be different from the scope of judicial review for the other. Mala fides may be a ground for judicial review of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial review of legislations or constitutional amendments. For withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General, loss of confidence may be a relevant ground. The ideology of the Minister or Attorney General being out of sync with the policies or ideologies of the Government may also be a ground. On the other hand, for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Governor, loss of confidence or the Governor's views being out of sync with that the Union Government will not be grounds for withdrawal of the pleasure. The reasons for withdrawal are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney General, when compared to Governors. As a result, the judicial review of withdrawal of pleasure, is limited in the case of a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General.

83. We summarise our conclusions as under:

(i) Under Article 156(1), the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. Therefore, the President can remove the Governor from office at any time without assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity to show cause.

(ii) Though no reason need be assigned for discontinuance of the pleasure resulting in removal, the power under Article 156(1) cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. The power will have to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons. The compelling reasons are not restricted to those enumerated by the petitioner (that is physical/mental disability, corruption and behaviour unbecoming of a Governor) but are of a wider amplitude. What would be compelling reasons would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

(iii) A Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of the Union Government or the party in power at the Centre. Nor can he be removed on the ground that the Union Government has lost confidence in him. It follows therefore that change in government at the Centre is not a ground for removal of Governors holding office to make way for others favoured by the new Government.

(iv) As there is no need to assign reasons, any removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the pleasure will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only a limited judicial review. If the aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary, mala fide, capricious or whimsical, the Court will call upon the Union Government to disclose to the Court, the material upon which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union Government does not disclose any reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or mala fide, the Court will interfere. However, the court will not interfere merely on the ground that a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are insufficient.

19. From the above cited cases, it is discernable that the aspect of

'loss of confidence' is a relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure. In

this case, it was specifically averred that the ideology of the present

Committee may not be in sync with the policies or ideologies of the

newly-elected government. Though learned counsel for petitioners'

attack is on violation of Article 14 and principles of natural justice, the

issue is no more res integra, as the 'doctrine of pleasure' was dealt with

in catena of judgments, quoted supra, relied on by the learned Special

Government Pleader. The contention of petitioners that 'withdrawal of

pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority

but can only be for valid reasons', was retaliated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the above-quoted judgments, where in it has been

categorically held, once 'doctrine of pleasure' is applicable, neither the

principles of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving

an opportunity before removal would arise. If appointments are based

on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of

the Constitution in case the Legislature authorized the State

Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to

nominate new members in their place. There is also no question of any

violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity

to the nominated members before their removal nor removal under

doctrine of pleasure. As far as nominated posts are concerned, the

Legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during

the pleasure of the government.

20. At this juncture, the specific observation of the Hon'ble Division

Bench at Paras 8 & 9 of the judgment dated 28.02.2024 in Writ Appeal

No. 161 of 2024 are extracted hereunder.

Paragraph 34 of the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal (supra) reads as under: 34.

The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words, "at pleasure" doctrine enables the removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of an authority, summarily, without any obligation to give any notice or hearing to the person removed, and without any obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.

Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked for valid reasons. The valid reasons must exist and must be disclosed by the respondents by filing counter affidavit.

The Hon'ble Division Bench while concurring with the settled position of law as expressed by this Court in its order dated 12.2.2024has set-aside the earlier order dated 12.2.2024 passed in the present writ petition on the ground that the valid reasons must exist and must be disclosed by the respondents by filing counter affidavit.

21. The respondents now in their counter affidavit stated the reasons

that there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and the

principles of natural justice, the State Government has power to

terminate Members of the Committee including Chairman and Vice-

Chairman nominated under Section 5 at the pleasure of the

Government under Section 5(11) of the Act, and also further contended

the right of nominated members is governed by the Statute and not by

the Constitution. The nominated members are not entitled for any

notice as their removal depends on pleasure of the government which is

based on political consideration. Their removal does not put any stigma

on their performance or character. Further it was contended that loss of

confidence will be a relevant criterion for withdrawal of Pleasure and the