Telangana High Court
Dandamudi Phani Krishna vs Boyapati Lakshmi Aparna on 22 March, 2024
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA:
HYDERABAD
***
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.517 of 2024
Between:
Dandamudi Phani Krishna
Petitioner No.1
VERSUS
Boyapati Lakshmi Aparna
Petitioner No.2
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 22.03.2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
__________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.517 of 2024
% 22.03.2024
# Between:
Dandamudi Phani Krishna
Petitioner No.1
VERSUS
Boyapati Lakshmi Aparna
Petitioner No.2
! Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mr. K.Sunil Chowdary
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) (2017) 8 Supreme Court Cases 746
2) 2023 SCC online P&H 4608
3) 2020(7) KLR 693
4) FAO No. 658/2021 decided on 06. 08.2021
by the Punjab & Haryana High court
5) 2021 SCC OnLine All 138
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.517 OF 2024
ORDER:
(per Hon'ble Sri JusticeP.SAM KOSHY)
The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the
petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing
the order dated 09.12.2023 passed by the Court of the Judge,
Principal Family Court-cum-XIII Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge,
Hyderabad (for short, 'the Court below') in I.A.No.871 of 2023 in
OPSR.No.10248 of 2022.
2. Heard Mr. K.Sunil Chowdary, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
3. The petitioners have filed a petition under section 13-B of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter will be referred as 'H.M. Act')
seeking divorce on mutual consent along with a petition under
Section 14(1) of H.M. Act with a prayer to waive the one year period
for filing the divorce petition.
4. As could be seen from the order of the Court below while
deciding the above interlocutory application in I.A.No.871 of 2023
and as per the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner herein, the marriage of these petitioners was performed
on 01.06.2023. The petitioners continued their marital life for few
months and thereafter the difference arose between them due to
health problems and impotency. Despite exchanging views, both the
petitioners are unwilling to continue their current marital
relationship. Therefore, they have filed the present petition under
the Section 13-B of the H.M. Act seeking a decree of divorce from
this Hon'ble Court through mutual consent. Since the petition is
filed within one year, they filed I.A.No.871 of 2023 in
OPSR.No.10248 of 2022 under Section 14(1) of H.M Act and sought
for waiver of one year waiting period. The Court below rejected the
said request vide order dated 09.12.2023, therefore the revision.
5. The petitioners have claimed that the Court below erred in
dismissing their application and failed to understand the hardship
faced by the petitioners that is the personal health issues and
impotency, which they had explicitly stated. Their petition under
Section 14(1) of H.M. Act was dismissed mechanically, without
appropriate examination of the content. They have also pleaded that
the Court below dismissed their petition without considering their
arguments and the precedents they cited, thus exceeding the scope
of the matter.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before the
Court that the petitioners have been waiting for a divorce for ten
(10) months and only two (02) more months are required to fulfil the
waiting period for mutual consent under Section 14 of the H.M. Act.
7. The petitioner No.2 is forty (40) years old and who appeared
personally through video conferencing submitted that she has
received a marriage proposal which is at the final stage of
settlement. However, things cannot materialise unless the divorce is
obtained so far as the present marriage is concerned. She wishes to
remarry due to biological complications that can occur with
pregnancies at her age, such as a higher risk of miscarriage and
potential complications during delivery.The delay in the divorce
process is causing her a great deal of anxiety, as she is keenly
aware that time is not on her side which is an immediate resolution
to her request for divorce.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment
in the case of Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur 1 wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that:
(2017) 8 Supreme Court Cases 746
"The statutory period contemplated under Section 13-B(2)
of the Act is directory and that it is open to the Court to
exercise discretion on the facts and circumstances of each
case, where there is no possibility of parties resuming
cohabitation and there are chances of alternative
rehabilitation".
9. In the case of Ramnik Kaur vs. Harvinder Pal Singh 2, the
Hon'ble High Court in paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10 and 11 held as under:
"8. Thus, proviso to the Section 14 of the Act lays down
that in case of exceptional hardship to the appellant or of
exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, if it
appears to the Court, the time of one year can be
reduced/waived-off. At this stage, we find it relevant to
refer to discuss the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in the case of Mandeep Kaur Bajwa supra where a
similar application under Section 14 of the Act had been
dismissed by Family Court and the parties were not
allowed to present the petition under Section 13-B of the
Act before expiry of one year of the marriage. In that case,
the parties had lived together as husband and wife for a
period of three months after marriage whereafter the
appellant had moved to Canada. Both the parties were
young and keeping in view that they were of marriageable
age and had settled all matters and claims between them
mutually, condonation of the period of one year was held to
be appropriate and the parties were granted a decree of
divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Act.
9. In a judgment of similar nature by a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Manpreet Kaur supra, marriage between
2023 SCC online P&H 4608
the parties was solemnized on 13.02.2022. Soon after three
months of the marriage, they separated from each other.
Considering the factum that both parties were of young age
and there was settlement of all matters pertaining to
permanent alimony (past, present and future maintenance)
and that no dispute as to any claims was left between the
parties, their application filed under Section 14 of the Act
for waiving off the mandatory period of one year of the
marriage to present the petition under Section 13-B of the
Act was admitted and allowed. Thus, the parties were
granted a decree of divorce by mutual consent under
Section 13-B of the Act.
10. Coming to the case at present, immediately after the
marriage, the parties could not adjust due to different
temperaments and ideologies which led to strained
relations between them. They stayed together as a couple
for 15 days only. Both the parties are young and of
marriageable age who wish to move ahead and settle in life.
Furthermore, all matters and claims have been already
settled by the parties mutually on 10.04.2023. Neither
there is any child from the wedlock in question nor there
any reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the
parties.
11. Therefore, in view of the discussion made herein above
and decisions referred above, we are of the considered
opinion that this is sufficient ground to allow their
application filed under Section 14 of the Act for waiving off
the mandatory period of one year."
10. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of
Vishnudas H. and another vs. Nil 3 while dealing with a case
2020(7) KLR 693
wherein the facts are more or less similar to the case on hand,
made the following observation:
"The parties therein remained together only on their
wedding night, thereafter the wife left the house of the
husband in the morning of the day-after the marriage.
They had no physical relationship and they were not able
to arrive at a consensus regarding their future life together.
Several attempts of mediation through relatives were made,
but the only consensus arrived at was, to dissolve their
marital life. They filed a joint application before the
jurisdictional Family Court seeking permission to file a
petition for divorce and the same was dismissed".
11. Against the above said backdrop, the Hon'ble Division Bench
considered the matter at length and set aside the order of the
Family Judge, by making the following observation:
"What is an exceptional hardship to the petitioner and
what would be the exceptional depravity for the
respondent, are matters which the Court will have to
identify, based on the factual situation that arise in each
individual case. These two terms cannot be defined or
explained in a straight-jacket formula, but will depend
upon the circumstances of each case. Allegations that may
be sufficient to grant a decree of divorce may not, in all
cases, constitute the 'exceptional hardship' contemplated
under the section. The factors that shall be weighed by the
Court while deciding a petition for grant of leave to present
a petition for divorce are inter alia, reasonable probability
of a reconciliation between the parties, interests of children
in the marriage, as is indicated in Section 14(2) of the Act.
With the above factors in mind, the terms exceptional
hardship and exceptional depravity ought to be appreciated
by the Court by stepping into the shoes of the petitioner or
the respondent, as the case may be, in our system of
adversarial jurisprudence, when, parties who are
discrepant in all aspects, are in accord that continuance of
therelationship causes more hardship to them, in the
absence of materials to the contrary, Court need not and
cannot disbelieve their affirmations, especially at the initial
stage of granting permission to present a petition for
divorce. The power conferred under the latter part of the
proviso to Section 14 of the Act is sufficient safeguard
against misrepresentation or concealment in obtaining the
above referred permissions."
12. In the case of Shivani Yadav vs. Amit Yadav 4, it was held as
under:
"The application filed by the couple for waiver under
Section 14 (1) of H.M. Act was rejected by the trial Court
and Hon'ble High Court taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances of the case that the couple had stayed
together only for two days opined that it is a sufficient
ground to allow their application filed under Section 14 of
the Act."
13. In another judgment in Priyanka Chauhan vs. Principal
Judge, Family Court and another 5, it was held as under:
FAO No. 658/2021 decided on 06. 08.2021
by the Punjab & Haryana High court
2021 SCC OnLine All 138
"The High Court set aside the order of the trial Court by
which the request of the couple was negatived considering
aspects that the parties within 4 days of solemnizing of
their marriage departed, that the marriage has not been
consummated and have decided with full conscious that
they have to be separated."
14. The Court below while considering the petition filed by the
parties under section 14(1) of H.M.Act, was of the opinion that the
period of one year as living separately in Section 13(B) of H.M.Act is
a part of the substantive law for seeking divorce by mutual consent
and not a procedural formality that can be done away with. It also
held that the said condition is not directory but mandatory.
15. In the present case the marriage between the petitioners was
solemnized on 01.06.2023 and they commenced their matrimonial
life together. However, their marital journey was short-lived as they
continued their marital life for two (02) months. During this brief
period, their relationship was beset by differences that arose
primarily due to health problems and impotency. These issues
created a barrier in their relationship and led to the consensual
decision of dissolving their marital bond. The primary reason that
necessitated the divorce is the couple's incapacity to continue their
marital relationship, which has been severely affected by health
problems and impotency. Both parties are unequivocally in
agreement about their decision to divorce, and there seems to be no
possibility of reconciliation. Their mutual consent for divorce
underscores the irreparable breakdown of their marriage. Further
adding to the complexity of the situation is the fact that the
petitioner No.2, who is forty (40) years old, has received marriage
proposals and is keen on remarrying. Her decision is fuelled by the
potential biological complications associated with pregnancies at
her age. She is acutely aware of the higher risks of miscarriage and
potential complications during delivery that can occur with
pregnancies at her age. Therefore, she wishes to remarry as soon as
possible to mitigate these risks at the earliest. Since they have
already completed their ten (10) months waiting period and just
about two (02) months time is left to complete the waiting period.
Hence, they already waited for the substantial part of the statutory
waiting period.
16. In the view of the above circumstances presented in this case
and the legal precedents cited, it is apparent that the petitioners are
experiencing genuine hardship and also made out an exceptional
hardship considering the age at which the respondent is presently
poised. Both the parties have today personally appeared before this
Hon'ble Court and requested for waving of the remaining waiting
period enabling them to seek dissolution of marriage under mutual
consent. The dissolution of their marital bond is beyond dispute,
marked by an irreparable breakdown with no conceivable chance
for reconciliation. The specific health complications faced by the
petitioners, coupled with the urgency expressed by the petitioner
No.2, who has the desire to remarry, and also considering her age
at this juncture provides a compelling testament to the exceptional
hardship they are currently enduring. These elements of hardship
are not merely ordinary discomforts of life, but situations of
extraordinary burden that will gravely affect the petitioners and
their future life.
17. After considering these substantial evidences of exceptional
hardship, this Hon'ble Court recognizes the necessity to exercise its
discretion judiciously, as stipulated under Section 14 of the H.M.
Act. The law provides the Court with the authority to waive the
mandatory waiting period of one year in cases of exceptional
hardship, which this case unquestionably presents.
18. Therefore, in the view of the above circumstances, this Court
is hereby inclined to grant waiver of the mandatory waiting period of
one year. The petitioners can be allowed to file petition for divorce
by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the H.M. Act.
19. In the result, the present Civil Revision Petition is allowed.
The order of the Court below dated 09.12.2023 is set aside and the
petitioners are granted permission to present joint petition for
Divorce by waiving the statutory period prescribed under Section
14(1) of H.M. Act.
20. No order as to costs.
21. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall
stand closed.
___________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Date: 22.03.2024
Note: LR Copy to be marked: Yes
B/O. GSD
