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The Chairman And Managing Director, ... vs K. S. Ravi Kumar
2024 Latest Caselaw 2929 Tel

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 2929 Tel
Judgement Date : 30 July, 2024

Telangana High Court

The Chairman And Managing Director, ... vs K. S. Ravi Kumar on 30 July, 2024

      THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
                          AND
          THE HON'BLE JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI


                     WRIT APPEAL.No.1020 OF 2018

JUDGMENT:

(Per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

The Writ Appeal arises out of an order dated 04.01.2018 passed by

the learned Single Judge of this Court in a Writ Petition filed by the

respondent herein challenging the order issued by the Superintending

Engineer, Operation/appellant No.5 dated 10.02.2005. The respondents

in the Writ Petitions (appellants before this Court) are officials of the

Andhra Pradesh Central Power Distribution Company Limited (APCPDCL)

which is now known the Telangana South Power Distribution Company

Limited (TSSPDCL).

2. The Divisional Engineer (Elec & Operative)/appellant No.6 had

ordered stoppage of 2 increments of the writ petitioner with cumulative

effect and treated the suspension period undergone by the writ petitioner

from 01.06.2001 to the date of joining duty on reinstatement as

"suspension". The writ petitioner challenged this order before the

Superintending Engineer, Operation/appellant No.5 and by order dated

10.02.2005, the Appellate Authority reduced the punishment to stoppage

of 2 increments without cumulative effect but treated the suspension

period as "suspension".

MB,J & MGP,J

3. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.8932 of 2005 in this Court which

was disposed of by way of the impugned order setting aside the part of

the order dated 10.02.2005 i.e., treating the period of suspension as

"suspension". The learned Single Judge directed that the said

"suspension" period should be treated as "spent on duty".

4. The appellants/TSSPDCL authorities have challenged the order

dated 04.01.2018 of the learned Single Judge in this Appeal.

5. A few more factual details relevant to the Appeal are necessary

although the background has been stated above.

6. The writ petitioner worked as Assistant Lineman in the Central

Breakdown Division of the appellant authorities. A criminal case was

registered against the writ petitioner in April 2001 pursuant to the

inspection of the premises of a consumer of electricity where it was found

that the Electricity Meter and sealed wire had been tampered with and

there was theft of electricity. The writ petitioner was arrested for the

commission of the alleged offence and released on bail. The writ

petitioner was suspended and the appellant No.1 appointed the

Divisional Engineer (Elec & Enquiries)/appellant No.8 as Enquiry Officer.

The writ petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on 03.12.2003 and

the Divisional Engineer (Elec & Enquiries)/appellant No.8 submitted a

report exonerating the writ petitioner of the charges. The Divisional

Engineer (Elec & Operation)/appellant No.6 however issued a Show

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Cause Notice dated 31.01.2004 to the writ petitioner to which the writ

petitioner furnished his explanation on 11.02.2004. The writ petitioner

thereafter filed W.P.No.13453 of 2004 seeking reinstatement with all

consequential benefits. The said writ petition was disposed of directing

the Divisional Engineer (Elec & Operation)/appellant No.6 to pass

appropriate orders in the pending enquiry. The Divisional Engineer (Elec

& Operation)/appellant No.6 passed an order on 20.09.2004 awarding

the punishment of stoppage of 2 increments with cumulative effect and

treating the period of suspension as "suspension".

7. The writ petitioner filed an Appeal before the Superintending

Engineer (Operation) who modified the punishment of stoppage of 2

increments without cumulative effect but did not interfere with the other

part of the order i.e., treating the period of suspension as "suspension".

8. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.8932 of 2005 which was disposed

of by the learned Single Judge by way of the impugned order dated

04.01.2018.

9. The learned Single Judge relied on A.V. Vinod Kumar Vs. Executive

Committee of the Central Ware Housing Corporation, New Delhi 1to hold

that in case of minor penalties, the period of suspension should be

treated as "spent on duty".

12007 5 ALD 445

MB,J & MGP,J

10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relies on Regulation

57(1) of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) Service

Regulations, Part-I amended up to 30.04.2016, to urge that the authority

competent to order reinstatement is empowered to make a specific order

as to whether the period of suspension shall be treated as "period spent

on duty": Regulation 57(1)(c). Counsel submits that the writ petitioner

has not presented any grounds to claim the period of suspension as

"spent on duty" in the face of the Regulations.

11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner relies

on A.V. Vinod Kumar (supra) as well as a decision of a Division Bench of

the Madras High Court in The Principal Secretary, Government of Tamil

Nadu, Department of Home Vs. Mr.K.Muthukaruppan, IPS 2 to urge that

minor punishment cannot result in the orders passed by the Enquiry

Officer and the Appellate Authority to the extent of treating the period of

suspension as "suspension".

12. The only point which falls for adjudication in the Appeal is whether

the writ petitioner is entitled to an order treating the period of suspension

from 01.06.2001 to the date of reinstatement i.e., the period of

suspension, as "spent on duty".

13. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner was exonerated of the

charges of theft of electricity and tampering of Electricity Meter and

22015 SCC OnLine Mad 1360 8

MB,J & MGP,J

sealed wire by the Divisional Engineer (Elec & Operation)/ appellant No.6

and the Superintending Engineer (Operation)/appellant No.5 on

20.09.2004 and 10.02.2005 which would be evident from the 2 orders

passed by the concerned authorities.

14. The 1st order specifically records that the writ petitioner advised the

consumer to change the Meter upon finding the same to be sluggish and

also reported the said fact to the concerned authority. The 2nd order

concludes that the petitioner was guilty of negligence having failed in his

duty to record the Meter in the Meter Observation Record or having the

Meter tested by the concerned wing of the respondents. It was on this

finding that the Appellant Authority/Superintending Engineer

(Operation)/appellant No.5 reduced the punishment awarded by the

Divisional Engineer (Elec & Operation)/appellant No.6 for stoppage of 2

increments without cumulative effect. The most important fact was that

the writ petitioner was acquitted from the criminal charges on

03.12.2003. Such acquittal means that the petitioner emerged clean and

fully-vindicated from the offence of theft of electricity and tampering of

the Meter. Both the orders passed by the 1st forum and the 2nd forum

were subsequent to the acquittal. However, there is no evidence in the

orders of the acquittal having any bearing on the withholding of

increments or treating the concerned period as "suspension".

MB,J & MGP,J

15. Reading both the orders together, it is clear that the authorities

proceeded only on the charge of 'negligence' and hence punished the writ

petitioner by withholding 2 increments on a cumulative, and later, on a

non-cumulative basis. We are however of the view that the appellant

authorities' decision to treat the period of suspension as "suspension" as

opposed to "on duty" amounts to a severe punishment. Treating the

period as "suspension" would not only constitute a break in service

affecting seniority and other consequential benefits but would also be

contrary to the minor punishment in terms of withholding of 2

increments on non-cumulative basis.

16. We do not find any justification recorded in either of the 2 orders

for awarding a severe punishment such as treating the period as

"suspension" particularly where the admitted offences for which the

punishment was imposed was negligence of duty in reporting a sluggish

Meter.

17. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in The Principal

Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu (supra) considered a line of

decisions on the aspect of the entitlement to arrears and allowances and

other benefits during the period of suspension. The Division Bench relied

on Y.P. Sehgal Vs. State of Punjab 3, (decision of a Division Bench of the

Bombay High Court), and on A.V. Vinod Kumar (supra) to hold that the

3(1991) 1 SLR 583 (P&H) (DB)

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consistent view of the Courts has been to the effect that imposition of

minor penalty would warrant the period of suspension being treated as

"on duty".

18. We do not find any reason to depart from the consensus arrived at

by the Courts and particularly in the facts of the present Appeal where

the 2nd forum/Appellate Authority reduced the punishment imposed by

the 1st forum upon revisiting the relevant facts. Our view is reinforced by

the writ petitioner's acquittal from the criminal case, which would also

prove that the writ petitioner's alleged offence was only with regard to the

negligence of duty and not a criminal offence of theft of electricity.

19. The appellants' reliance on Regulation 57(1)(c) of the APSEB Service

Regulations is not of relevance since the said Regulations only point to

the jurisdiction of a competent authority making an order with regard to

treating the period of suspension as "spent on duty". Principal Secretary,

Government of Tamil Nadu (supra) considered a similar Rule -

"Fundamental Rule 54 B of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal)

Rules" contained a similar provision with regard to a competent authority

ruling the nature of the period of suspension. Rule 57(1)(c) only satisfies

the authority or the competent person to decide on the tag of the 'period

of suspension' but leaves it wholly on the discretion of the competent

authority. Needless to say, Article 226(1) of The Constitution of India

guarantees protection and enforcement of Fundamental Rights by

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issuance of writs against a person or authority for violation of these

Rights. Article 226 essentially provides protection against arbitrary

action on the part of the State/State Authority.

20. The decisions placed by the appellants, namely, Management of

Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal 4, and

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintending Engineer, Gujarat 5 relate

to an individual's right to pay and allowances and whether an order of

suspension is automatically set-aside on reinstatement. In Management

of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi (supra), the Supreme Court however

held that the question whether the period to be treated as a "leave" or "on

duty" would depend on the circumstances of each case and that full

acquittal of blame should be held as being "on duty" during the period of

suspension. It should also be mentioned that in both cases, the conduct

of the concerned employee weighed with the Supreme Court with regard

to involvement in criminal offences.

21. We accordingly do not find any infirmity in the impugned order

passed by the learned Single Judge. Our view for upholding the

impugned order dated 04.01.2018 and the reasons for the same are

stated in the paragraphs above.

1994 1 SCC 541

1996 11 SCC 603

MB,J & MGP,J

22. We are aghast that the writ petitioner has been waiting for justice

from 20.09.2004, even after the impugned order of 04.01.2018 i.e., for a

period of 20 years at worst and 6 years at best.

23. W.A.No.1020 of 2018 along with all connected applications is

dismissed on the above basis. The appellant authorities and the

concerned officers thereof are directed to treat the period of suspension of

the writ petitioner during the period 01.06.2001 - 22.09.2004 (the

appellants have mentioned the date of reinstatement as 22.09.2004 at

paragraph No.11 in the Grounds of Appeal) as "on duty" and make all

arrears of payments and grant all consequential benefits including

seniority to the respondent/writ petitioner for the said period. The

appellants shall make payment of the arrears and other consequential

benefits to the respondent/writ petitioner within 6 weeks from the date of

this judgment. The appellants shall also correct and make good any

denial of benefits, including that of seniority, within 6 weeks from the

date of this judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

______________________________________ MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J

_______________________________ M.G.PRIYADARSINI, J July 30, 2024 BMS

 
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