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Samala Mallikarjun Reddy vs K. Vijaya Laxmi And 11 Others
2024 Latest Caselaw 2623 Tel

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 2623 Tel
Judgement Date : 9 July, 2024

Telangana High Court

Samala Mallikarjun Reddy vs K. Vijaya Laxmi And 11 Others on 9 July, 2024

Author: P.Sree Sudha

Bench: P.Sree Sudha

      THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE P.SREE SUDHA

            CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.714 of 2021

ORDER:

This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the Order dated

18.03.2021 in I.A.No.265 of 2020 in O.S.No.422 of 2001 passed

by the learned II-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy

District.

2. Petitioner herein had filed an application in I.A. No. 265 of

2020, against the respondents under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, to condone the delay of 1159 days in filing the application

to set aside the preliminary decree dated 27-11- 2017. The trial

Court considering the arguments of both sides, dismissed the

application. Aggrieved by the said Order, petitioner therein

preferred the present Civil Revision Petition.

3. Admittedly the Petitioner was brought on record as per

the order dated 11-09-2019, passed in I.A.No.914 of 2019 filed

under Order XXII Rule 4 R/w. Section 151 of CPC only after

passing the Preliminary Decree dated 27-11-2017 and Final

Decree dated 02-07-2019, the said fact was admitted by the

contesting respondent No.1 in the counter filed before the trial

court at para No.3.

4. Though the delay of 1159 days was mentioned in the

application under revision, but actual delay is only 111 days i.e.

from the date of petitioner brought on record. In that regard the

learned Counsel for the petitioner is relying on the judgment the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra

Raj Singh Vs.The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and

another, 1 in which it was observed that, "it was held that in a

case where an order was not passed in the presence of the

parties or after notice to them of the date when the order would

be passed the expression "within 30 days after the making of the

order" used in the section means within 30 days after the date on

which the communication of the order reached the parties

affected by it." In this case, admittedly as per the counter

affidavit averments, the petitioner was brought on record only

on 11-09-2019, therefore the starting point of limitation is

11-09-2019, but not from the date of passing of the preliminary

decree dated 27-11-2017.

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that respondent

No. 1 herein had filed the suit for partition and separate

possession in respect of suit schedule properties vide

O.S.No.422 of 2001 on the file of the learned II-Additional

AIR 1961 SC 1500

Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at L B. Nagar against

the Respondents No 2 to 9. In the said suit, the Respondent

No.3 i.e., father of the Revision Petitioner was set ex-parte, as

his residential address is wrongly mentioned in the plaint as

H.No.1-49, Hakimpet, Secunderabad, in fact the Respondent

No.3 is residing in H.No.4-2-215, MB Dargah, Kowkoor, Alwal,

Secunderabad, as per Ex.P1-death certificate and Ex-P2

Aadhaar Card. Respondent No.1 by playing fraud on the court,

shown the Respondent No.3-father of the Revision Petitioner

i.e., S.Sanjeeva Reddy, as a dead person in the fair copy of

amended plaint, filed on 19-01-2017 vide S.R.No.288/2017 and

so also in the judgment dated 27-11-2017 at para no.4 it is

mentioned that "Defendant No.2 was died" if such being the

case the question of serving the notice to the father of the

Revision Petitioner does not arise, on the face of the record, and

thus respondent No.1 played fraud on the court and obtained

ex-parte preliminary decree. In support of his arguments, he

relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in the case of

S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs.Jagannath, 2 in which it was

held as follows:

"1."Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled

(1994) 1 SCC 1

proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings...

... 3. One Jagannath was the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. He was working as a clerk with one Chunilal Sowcar. Jagannath purchased at court auction the properties in dispute which belonged to the appellants. Chunilal Sowcar had obtained a decree and the court sale was made in execution of the said decree. Jagannath had purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar, the decree-holder. By a registered deed dated November 25, 1945, Jagannath relinquished all his rights in the property in favour of Chunilal Sowcar. Meanwhile, the appellants who were the judgment-debtors had paid the total decretal amount to Chunilal Sowcar. Thereafter, Chunilal Sowcar, having received the decretal amount, was no longer entitled to the property which he had purchased through Jagannath. Without disclosing that he had executed a release deed in favour of Chunilal Sowcar, Jagannath filed a suit for partition of the property and obtained a preliminary decree. During the pendency of the suit, the appellants did not know that Jagannath had no locus standi to file the suit because he had already executed a registered release deed, relinquishing all his rights in respect of the property in dispute, in favour of Chunilal Sowcar. It was only at the hearing of the application for final decree that the appellants came to know about the release deed and, as such, they challenged the application on the ground that non- disclosure on the part of Jagannath that he was left with no right in the property in dispute, vitiated the proceedings and, as such, the preliminary decree obtained by Jagannath by playing fraud on the court was a nullity. The appellants produced the release deed (Ex. B- 1 5) before the trial court. The relevant part of the release deed is as under:

"Out of your accretions and out of trust vested in me, purchased the schedule mentioned properties benami in my name through court auction and had the said sale confirmed. The said properties are in your possession and enjoyment and the said

properties should henceforth be held and enjoyed with all rights by you as had been done:

So far if any civil or criminal proceedings have to be conducted in respect of the said properties or instituted by others in respect of the said properties you shall conduct the said proceedings without reference to me and shall be held liable for the profits or losses you incur thereby. All the records pertaining the aforesaid properties are already remaining with you.

...5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation"

cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

He also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the case of Esha Battacharjee Vs. Managing Committee

Ragunathpur Nafar Academy and others, 3 in which it was

held that, "it is to be borne in mind but no one gets away with the

fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the

(2013) 12 SCC 649

technicalities of law of limitation." preliminary decree cannot

withstand on the ground of limitation, as it is obtained by

playing a fraud.

6. As on the date of passing the final decree dated

02-07-2019, the father of the Revision Petitioner was no more,

he expired as 23-09-2018 as per Ex.P1 death certificate, thus

decree passed against dead person is non est in the eye of law,

therefore the contesting respondent has no right to say that

after passing the final decree the application under revision is

not maintainable. It is settled law if an order is bad in its

inception, it does not get sanctified at later stage. A subsequent

action/development cannot validate an action which was not

lawful at its inception, for the reason that illegality strike at the

root of the order. In this case also the preliminary decree is

passed by showing the petitioner's father as a dead person,

though he was alive, therefore passing of final decree at a later

stage cannot validate preliminary decree.

7. The trial Court mainly discarded the case of the Revision

Petitioner on the ground that the suit summons were served on

respondents No.2 to 9 through registered post in the year 2001,

petitioner has not produced any document to show that

respondent No.3 was not residing in the address shown in the

plaint as on the date of filing of suit. Further the petitioner has

not disputed the signature on the acknowledgment card of the

respondent No.3 herein. The observation of the trial Court is

erroneous for the reasons mentioned below:

(i) In the entire counter and order under revision failed to

mention on which date the notice was ordered, on which date

notice was served.

(ii) When the Judgment and Decree itself shows that the father

of the revision petitioner was no more as on the date of passing

of the order, if such being the case, no question arises for

service of notice to the dead person.

8. The other finding of the trial Court is that the notice was

served to the father of the Petitioner in the final decree petition

and he remained ex- parte. There is no explanation as to why

respondent No.3 has not challenged the preliminary decree

during his lifetime. It is not proper for the reason as mentioned

below:

(i) When admittedly as on the date of passing the final decree,

the father of the revision Petitioner i.e. Defendant No.2 is died

on 23-09-2018,

(ii) admittedly the Petitioner was brought on record only after

passing the final decree, if such being the case, how could the

notice would serve on the dead person and how could the dead

person would question either preliminary decree or final decree

and hence the petitioner was brought on record only after

passing of the final decree.

‎9. The finding of the trial Court that advocate

commissioner's report shows that on 22-12-2008, when the

advocate commissioner visited the suit schedule property,

petitioner was present and he did not co-operate for the

commission. The advocate commissioner submitted his report

on 03-05-2019 and thereafter the final decree was passed on

02-07-2019. In that context, the submission of the revision

petitioner is that while deciding an application under Order IX

Rule 13 of CPC, the sufficient cause for non-appearance refers

to the date on which absence was made a ground for proceeding

ex-parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon the other

circumstances anterior in time. Further, setting aside the

ex-parte decree against the respondent No.3, the court cannot

see narrow and technical approach and has to allow the

respondent No.3 to prove his case within a reasonable time.

10. The trial Court recorded the finding that there is no

explanation as to why the petitioner kept quiet from 22-12-2018

to 29-01-2020 on which date the petition is filed. In this context

the submission of the petitioner is that in his affidavit in Para

No.1 it was stated that he was brought on record on

11-01-2019, in Para No.2 of the affidavit stated the address of

the father of the revision petitioner was shown wrong, in Para

No.3, it was stated that on 31-12-2019, the certified copy of the

preliminary decree was delivered to him, then he came to know

about the proceedings, but the trial Court failed to see the said

explanation and thereby the order under revision is erroneous.

11. The trial Court rejected the application of the petitioner

on the ground that petitioner has not explained the delay from

2018 to 2020, further rejected the application on the ground

that the Petitioner has failed to substantiate his contention with

cogent and reliable proof. The said finding is contrary to the

above record for the reasons in above mentioned paragraph. At

the time of passing of final decree, the father of the revision

petitioner is no more and it is passed against a dead person.

The preliminary decree and final decree is passed behind the

back of the petitioner and the father of the petitioner, but none

of the said reasons either dealt with or considered, but

dismissed the application under revision only on assumptions

and presumptions. The erstwhile combined High Court of

Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, in the case of Kavali Narayana

and others Vs. Kavali Chennammai, 4 held that when the

application filed to condone the delay in setting aside the ex-parte

decree, the reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed under section

5 of Limitation Act and reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed

under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC are one and the same, then the

court has to allow both the applications and permit the person to

contest the matter.

12. The amended plaint dated 17.03.2001, shows that

S.Sanjeeva Reddy/defendant No.2 as dead person, and thus the

question of serving summons to respondent No.3/defendant

No.2 does not arise. In fact, there is no whisper in the Judgment

regarding service of notice and hence this Court finds it

reasonable to give an opportunity to the petitioner to contest the

matter on merits to meet the ends of justice.

13. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, the

delay of 1159 days is condoned and exparte decree dated

27.11.2017 in O.S.No.422 of 2001, is set aside. As the suit is of

2005 (1) ALD 672

the year 2001, targeted case, the trial Court is directed to

dispose of the same in eight months from the date of this Order

and learned Counsels on both sides are directed to co-operate

with the Court for disposal of the suit within stipulated time.

Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand

closed.

_________________________ JUSTICE P.SREE SUDHA

DATE: 09.07.2024 tri

 
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