Telangana High Court

The State vs B.Ramalinga Raju on 9 July, 2024

         THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL
  CRIMINAL REVISION CASE Nos.3044, 3048, 3053, 3055,
     3089, 3092, 3218, 3221, 3222 and 3223 of 2017

COMMON ORDER :

These Criminal Revision Cases are preferred by the

petitioner/complainant/Central Bureau of Investigation (for short 'CBI')

under Sections 397 and 401 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short 'Cr.P.C.')

aggrieved by the orders as tabulated hereunder :

Preferred against the order dated 03.10.2017 Sl.

Crl.RC No. on the file of the learned Metropolitan No. Sessions Judge, Hyderabad passed in Crl.MP No.2619 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11427 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2628 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11431 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2623 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11432 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2625 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11428 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2627 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11424 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2620 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11426 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2622 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11430 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2621 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11425 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2626 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11423 of 2015.

Crl.MP No.2624 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR

No.11429 of 2015.

The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad vide the orders

impugned, dismissed the above criminal miscellaneous petitions filed by the

petitioner/CBI seeking to condone the delay of 215 days in preferring

appeals against the common judgment dated 09.04.2015, passed in CC

Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010 on the file of the learned XXI Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Special Sessions Judge, Hyderabad holding

that the petitioner failed to explain the delay in preferring the said criminal

appeals in a convincing manner.

2. Heard Sri Srinivas Kapatia, learned Special Public Prosecutor

for the petitioner/CBI, Sri P.Subhash learned counsel for the respondents in

Crl.RC Nos.3044, 3089, 3092, 3222 and 3223 of 2017, Sri K.Mahesh, learned

counsel representing Sri Monohar, learned counsel for the respondent in

Crl.RC No.3048 of 2017, Sri Vishal Gandhi, learned counsel representing Sri

V.Surender Rao, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3053 of

2017, Sri A.Sanjay Kishore, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC

No.3055 of 2017, Sri MS Srinivas Iyengar, learned senior counsel for the

respondent in Crl.RC No.3218 of 2017 and Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior

counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3221 of 2017.

3. CC Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010 are the cases registered on the

strength of FIR in Crime No.2 of 2009, registered against the accused for

the offences under Sections 120-B, 201, 406, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471

and 477-A of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and under Sections 90 and

91 of Income Tax Act, 1961 alleging certain misdeeds like fudging of

company accounts and manipulation of records with the help of auditors

showing incorrect balance sheets resulting in causing loss to the

public/investors and gain to the accused. The learned Judge of the trial

Court, vide judgment dated 09.04.2015, found the accused guilty and

sentenced them as under :

" (a) The accused Al to A10 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees one lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A 10 shall suffer SI for a period of 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge under First Head).

(b) The accused Al to A10 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each and the accused Al and A2 to pay a fine of rupees five crore each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for a period of 1 (one) year each and further the accused A3 to A 10 to pay a fine of rupees 25 (twenty five) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused A3 to A10 shall suffer SI for a period of 6 (six) months each for the offence punishable under section 420 read with 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) of Fourth Head).

(c) The accused Al and A2 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 10 (ten) lakh each for each count and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for 6 (six) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 409 of Indian Penal Code (total two counts)(charge (ii) and (iii) under Second Head).

(d) The accused Al and A2 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 10 (ten) lakh each for each count and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for 6 (six) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 409 of Indian Penal Code (total five counts) (charge (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) under Second Head).

(e) The accused A3, A4 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 1 (one) lakh each for each count and in

default of payment of fine the accused A3, A4 and A7 shall suffer Sl for 3 (three) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 406 Indian Penal Code (total four counts) (charge (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) under the Second Head) and further the accused A3, A5 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each and to pay a fine of rupees I (one) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused A3, A5 and A7 shall suffer Sl for 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 406 of Indian Penal Code (charge (viii) under the Second Head).

(f) The accused Al to A5 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 1 (one) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 shall suffer SI for 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 420 read with 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Fourth Head).

(g) The accused A4 and A5 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused A4 and A5 shall suffer Sl for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 419 of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) under Third Head).

(h) The accused A7 is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/-

(fifty thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused A7 shall suffer St for 2 (two) months for the offence punishable under section 419 of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Third Head)

(i) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused A1 to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer Sl for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 467 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Fifth Head).

(j) The accused to A1 to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 2 (two) months each for the offence

punishable under section 468 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Sixth Head).

(k) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 1 (one) year each and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 1 (one) month each for the offence punishable under section 471 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Seventh Head).

(l) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 477-A of Indian Penal Code (charge under Eighth Head).

(m) The accused Al is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused Al shall suffer SI for I (one) month for the offence punishable under section 201 of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) under Ninth Head).

(n) The accused A7 is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused A7 shall suffer SI for 1 (one) month for the offence punishable under section 201 of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Ninth Head)."

4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the quantum of

imprisonment imposed against the accused persons, the petitioner/CBI

preferred criminal appeals seeking enhancement of the imprisonment

awarded to the accused in CC Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010. Since 215 days of

delay was occurred in preferring the said appeals, the petitioner/CBI filed

criminal miscellaneous petitions, as detailed in the above table, requesting

the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad to condone the said

delay contending that due to the procedural aspects in getting permission

from the Government and other allied things, beyond their control, the said

delay was occurred. The accused resisted the said applications contending

that the petitioner without giving proper explanation for the inordinate

delay, approached the Court to condone the delay. The learned

Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad holding that condonation of delay is

an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for

Government Departments and usual explanations cannot be accepted for

condoning the delay.

5. Aggrieved by the said dismissal orders, the petitioner/CBI

preferred the present criminal revision cases mainly contending that the

Court below failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case

since for the purpose of thoroughly scrutinizing the quantum of punishment

awarded against the accused and arriving at an opinion for preferring appeal

upon perusing the voluminous documents as well as copy of judgment

considerable time had taken for the officials at various stages and that when

the public exchequer is subjected to a fraud and the Government agencies

are trying to unearth the truth and punish the culprits, mere technicalities

cannot be given much importance in condoning the delay in filing the

appeal. Further, the Court below failed to follow the settled principle that

while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the Courts are

not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

6. In support of their contentions, the petitioner/CBI relied upon

the following decisions :

(i) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through legal representatives and others Vs.Union of India and another 1.

(ii) Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Binod Kumar Maheswari and others 2.

Basing on the above decisions it is contended on behalf of the

petitioner/CBI that the Courts have to exercise discretion for taking a liberal

and justice-oriented approach by granting leeway when the State is the

petitioner. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of

governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on

balancing of the competing interests. Further, the intent of Section 5 of

Limitation Act is to help the Courts in providing substantial justice to the

parties.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents/accused vehemently opposed the present criminal revision

cases mainly contending that there is no illegality in the impugned order

since the Court below, after careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances

of the case as well as the record, has rightly dismissed the applications filed

(2023) 10 Supreme Court Cases 531

2024 LawSuit (Cal) 182

by the petitioner/CBI. It is further contended that though the petitioner is

the State, it cannot be given leverage by condoning the inordinate delay

without there being any cogent and convincing explanation. Sri B.Nalin

Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3221 of 2017 relied

upon the following decisions :

(i) Postmaster General and others Vs.Living Media India Limited and another 3.

(ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others 4.

(iii) Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Nirmal Pradhan 5.

Basing on the above decisions, it is contended that sufficient cause must be

given for condonation of delay and that there is no straightjacket formula

uniformly applicable to all the cases. It is also contended that condonation

of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for

Government Departments on offering usual explanation.

8. This Court perused the entire material available on record,

heard the rival contentions advanced on either side and gave utmost

consideration to the same. In the case between Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs.

Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project 6 the Hon'ble Apex Court

held that the laws of limitation are founded on public policy.

Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of

peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates

(2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563

(2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 685

2013 SCC OnLine Sikk 129

(2008) 17 SCC 448

insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for

public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest

reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State

requires that there should be an end to the litigation but at the

same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice

suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and

preventing oppression. The object for fixing timelimit for litigation

is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the

purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties

do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies

promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come

to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

9. Learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decision of

Hon'ble Supreme Court arising out of the judgment passed by the Kolkata

High Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Binod Kumar

Maheswari and others (2 supra). The facts of the case are that CBI

filed an appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. along with an application for

condonation of delay of 1452 days in filing an appeal against the acquittal.

But the case on hand is a revision filed seeking to set aside the order of

dismissal of an application filed to condone the delay. Hence, the facts of

the said case are quite distinguishable to the facts of the cases on hand

since the trial Court observed that the explanation offered by the CBI for

condoning the inordinate delay was not convincing and it has placed heavy

reliance on the administrative lapses.

10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the petitioner/CBI

relied on the decision of Sheo Raj Singh case (1 supra), which has already

been referred in the decision of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs.

Binod Kumar Maheswari and others (2 supra). The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the said decision categorically held that consideration to condone

delay could only be made on presentation of a reasonable explanation, and

the same could not be done simply because the appellant therein was a

public body. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Court of

appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the

Courts below. Reliance placed by the petitioner/CBI on the orders passed by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not applicable to the case on hand as the said

order was passed against the orders passed by the High Court of Delhi

arising out of a matter pertaining to Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is

purely in civil in nature. The present case on hand is filed to exercise

revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which is quite distinguishable. Moreover,

this Court does not see any sufficient cause or explanation offered by the

petitioner before the trial Court and it has placed reliance only on the

administrative procedural lapses.

11. While deciding the present applications, on the aspect of

limitation, it is pertinent to mention the observations made by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in a case between The State of Madhya Pradesh and others

Vs. Bherulal (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.9217 of 2020 dated

15.10.2020 in IA No.62372 of 2020) wherein it was held as under :

"6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible."

12. When the facts of the case on hand are tested on the

touchstone of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

decision cited supra, this Court finds nothing convincing in the explanation

offered by the CBI requesting to condone the delay by way of filing an

affidavit before the trial Court. The grounds urged by the CBI before the

trial Court requesting to condone the delay appear to be casual. Assailing

the said orders, filing a revision with some other reasoning or grounds

before this Court without pointing the apparent errors, if any, on the face of

the impugned order is impermissible. The trial Court, after carefully

perusing the material before it and the explanations offered by the CBI, has

rightly dismissed the application filed for condoning the delay and hence, the

interference of this Court is unwarranted in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.