Telangana High Court

Narsamma Died, Medak Dist And Two Others vs Smt.Sumitramma, Bidhar Dist And ... on 22 January, 2024

Author: G. Radha Rani

Bench: G. Radha Rani

      THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
                  SECOND APPEAL No.1294 of 2017
JUDGMENT:

This second appeal is filed by the appellants-defendant No.15 (died

represented by his legal representatives) defendants 16 and 17 aggrieved by the

judgment and decree dated 09.08.2017 passed in A.S.No.14 of 2015 on the file

of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Sangareddy, Medak District, confirming the judgment and decree dated

19.01.2015 passed in O.S.No.14 of 2009 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,

Zaheerabad, Medak District.

2. The respondents 1 and 2 -plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of

agricultural lands i.e., agricultural land in Sy.No.113 admeasuring Ac.5-28 gts.

situated at Mogudampally village, Zaheerabad Mandal, Medak District and

agricultural land in Sy.No.289/B, admeasuring Ac.11-28 gts situated at

Mogudampally village, Zaheerabad mandal, Medak district ('A' and 'B'

schedule properties).

3. The parties are hereinafter referred as arrayed before the trial court.

4. The plaintiffs are daughters of late O. Yellappa and Smt.

Lingamma. As per the plaintiffs, Yellappa died on 05.07.1981 leaving behind

him three sons and three daughters as his legal representatives. The first son of

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Yellappa, by name, O. Devadas died on 24.06.1985 leaving behind him his legal

representatives - defendants 1 to 6 and the second son of Yellappa was O.

Veeraswamy, who died on 20.02.2002 and his legal representatives were

defendants 9 to 14 and the third son of Yellappa was O. Samuel (defendant

No.8) and the elder daughter of Yellappa was Miss O. Kantha (defendant No.7).

The plaintiffs were the second and third daughters of O. Yellappa and Smt.

Lingamma. Yellappa was having a brother, by name, Balappa and Balappa was

having a daughter by name, Narasamma (defendant No.15) and one Mollappa

was the husband of defendant No.15. Defendants 16 and 17 (appellants herein)

were the sons of defendant No.15 and Mollappa.

5. As per the contention of the plaintiffs in view of their education,

occupation and their marital status, they were living in Hyderabad and Medak

and used to visit Mogudampally village as guests to their parents' house during

Christmas and other occasions. The plaintiffs came to know through village

elders that late Mollappa manipulated the revenue records and by

misrepresentation and fraud got his name mutated in respect of half of the suit

schedule 'A' and 'B' properties representing that he was one of the legal

representatives of late O. Yellappa. The revenue authorities without any due

enquiry and without giving any notice to the plaintiffs, at the behest of

Mollappa registered his name in the revenue records. The plaintiffs and the

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defendants 1 to 14 were alone successors of late Yellappa and were entitled to

get 1/6th share in the suit schedule 'A' and 'B' properties equally among

themselves to the exclusion of one and all. The defendants 15 to 17, who were

legal heirs of late Mollappa were no way concerned with the suit schedule 'A'

and 'B' properties.

6. The plaintiffs had shown the cause of action as defendants 1 to 8

along with late O. Veeraswamy executed a registered gift settlement deed in

favour of defendant No.7 in respect of the 'A' schedule property. On

22.12.2008, the plaintiffs demanded defendants 1 to 6 and 8 for partition of the

suit schedule properties by metes and bounds, as per the Indian Succession Act,

as the defendants 1 to 6 and 8 refused, filed the suit. They also contended that

defendants 1 to 6 and 8 along with defendants 15 to 17 were trying to dispose of

the suit schedule 'A' and 'B' properties and were trying to create multiplicity of

litigation, as such, filed the suit.

7. The defendants 1 to 14 filed their written statements admitting their

relationship with the plaintiffs as well as the contention of the plaintiffs that

they were alone legal heirs of late Yellappa and were only entitled for the suit

schedule properties. Mollappa was not part of their family pedigree and prayed

to distribute the suit schedule properties, as per the Indian Succession Act

amongst the legal representatives of late O. Yellappa.

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8. The defendant No.17 filed written statement and the same was

adopted by defendants 15 and 16. They contended that suit schedule 'A' and 'B'

properties were jointly cultivated by O. Yellappa and Mollappa. In the year

1970, there was a dispute regarding partition of the suit lands in between O.

Yellappa and Mollappa and the matter was reported to the village elders. The

village elders conducted panchayath and in that panchayath, it was decided that

until and unless a sum of Rs.2,085/- which fell to the side of Mollappa if not

paid within a period of four years by him to O. Yellappa, his half share right in

the agricultural lands would extinguish. As per panchayat's decision, Mollappa

paid the entire outstanding amount to O. Yellappa. They further submitted that

after demise of O. Balappa, Yellappa brought Mollappa to Mogudampally

village and performed the marriage with defendant No.15, Narsamma by

keeping Mollappa as illatom son-in-law of late O. Balappa, S/o. Jettappa.

9. The defendants 15 to 17 filed I.A.No.178 of 2011 for amendment

of their written statement which was allowed on 04.02.2013. As per the

amended pleadings of defendants 15 to 17, the suit schedule properties belonged

to Jettappa and the name of Yellappa was coming in the revenue record on

behalf of his father Jetteppa and his brother Balappa. Yellappa used to manage

the agricultural activities on behalf of the joint family. The suit properties were

jointly cultivated by Yellappa and Mollappa and the suit lands were orally

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partitioned into two equal shares. Out of the partition, an extent of Ac.2-34 gts.

in Sy.No.113 and an extent of Ac.5-34 gts. in Sy.No.289/B, a total extent of

Ac.8-28 gts. of Mogudampally Village fell to the share of Mollappa and his

legal successors. As such, they were in possession and enjoyment of the half

share in the suit schedule lands and contended that the remaining half share fell

to the share of Yellappa. They further contended that as per the amendment

as notified as per the Form No.8 of R.O.R. Act, no objections were received.

The M.R.O., Zaheerabad accorded sanction and gave permission for mutation

and the same was incorporated in the revenue records by way of faisalpatti for

the year 1988-89 and since then the name of Mollappa was continuously

appearing in the revenue records as owner to an extent of half share in the suit

lands. Mollappa died leaving behind him, defendants 15 to 17 as his legal heirs.

The defendants 15 to 17 were lawful owners by virtue of the partition deed

dated 18.04.1970 and faisal patti for the year 1988-89. Even after the demise of

O. Yellappa, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants 1 to 14 never challenged

the R.O.R. entries. No appeal was preferred before the R.D.O. Sangareddy

under Section 5(5) of R.O.R. Act. Hence, the mutation entries made by virtue

of partition dated 18.04.1970 and the faisal patti for the year 1988-89 became

final. After expiry of 20 years from the date of mutation, challenging the same

was not tenable and the suit was liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches.

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The plaintiffs colluded with defendants 1 to 14 and conspired to knock away the

properties of defendants 15 to 17 and filed the suit for partition with a malafide

intention, knowing well that the suit properties were already partitioned long

back by late Yellappa and re-partition of the suit lands without seeking

cancellation of the earlier partition was not maintainable and liable to be

dismissed.

10. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as

follows:

1. Whether late Mollappa is no way part of the family pedigree and he is not the successor of Yellappa?

2. Whether Mollappa was illatom son-in-law for all practical purposes?

3. Whether the plaintiffs had filed the suit with malafide intention for partition, declaration and delivery of possession knowing well that the suit properties were already partitioned long back by late Yellappa and re-partition of suit lands without seeking cancellation of earlier partition is not maintainable?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition of the suit schedule property of their 1/6th share to each of the plaintiffs as prayed for?

5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for final decree as prayed for?

6. To what relief?

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And also framed two more additional issues as under:

1. Whether there was oral partition that was affected between O. Yellappa and Mollappa into two equal shares prior to 18.04.1970?

2. Whether the purported partition deed propounded by the defendants is really partition deed and is valid, legal and admissible document?

11. The plaintiff No.2 was examined as PW.1 and Exs.A1 to A27 were

marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendant No.17 was examined as DW.1

and got examined DW.2 to prove the oral partition between Mollappa and

Yellappa under Ex.B14. Exs.B1 to B28 were marked on behalf of defendants

15 to 17.

12. The trial court, on considering the oral and documentary evidence

on record, passed a preliminary decree awarding 1/6th share each to the plaintiffs

in 'A' and 'B' schedule properties and dismissed the claim of defendants 15 to

17. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 19.01.2015, the

defendants 15 to 17 preferred A.S.No.14 of 2015. The said appeal was heard by

the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Sangareddy, Medak District. Vide judgment dated 09.08.2017, the first

appellate court dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree

passed in O.S.No.14 of 2009 passed by the Senior Civil Judge at Zaheerabad.

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13. Aggrieved further, the defendants 15 to 17 preferred this second

appeal. This Court on 05.06.2018 formulated the following substantial

questions of law:

1. Whether the Ex.B14 Jaijatu Pampakam is liable to be impounded and even after its marking and therefrom for what purpose it can be admitted in evidence from any registration required or not; and

2. Whether the revenue records and the ROR proceedings of mutation are sufficient to say with reference to Ex.B14 if any of there was partition earlier in 1970 to non-suit the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 14 of the branch of Yellappa by the defendants 15 to 17 of the branch of Balappa brother of Yellappa including as to any plea of ouster by adverse possession and if so, whether the findings of the courts below in decreeing the suit for partition granting 1/6th interested in plaint A & B schedule properties to the plaintiffs out of half share for the remaining out of the half to another defendants among defendants 1 to 14 in saying half share remaining that of defendant No.15 daughter of Balappa brother of Yellappa, for defendants 16 and 17 to claim any right after lifetime of defendant No.15 are unsustainable and perverse and requires interference?

3. To what result?

14. On considering the above, this Court considers it better to simplify

the same as follows:

1. Whether there was any earlier partition between Yellappa and Mollappa?

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2. Whether Ex.B14 can be admitted in evidence for want of any registration and whether the same is liable to be impounded even after its marking?

3. Whether non-challenge of revenue records can be the basis to non-suit the case of the plaintiffs for partition?

4. Whether the appellants had perfected their title by way of adverse possession?

5. Whether the courts below appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record in a proper perspective or whether there was any perversity which requires interference?

15. Before proceeding to answer the above aspects, it is considered

necessary to keep in mind the scope of the second appeal. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in Nazir Mohamed Vs. J. Kamala and Ors. 1 summarized the principles

for entertaining the second appeal and held that:

"22. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to re- agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal.

23. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended, restricts the right of second appeal, to only those

(2020) 19 SCC 57

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cases, where a substantial question of law is involved. The existence of a "substantial question of law" is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.

26. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 1314], where this Court held:-

"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law."

27. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [(2006) 5 SCC 545], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law.The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out hereinbelow:-

"21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of

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law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance"

as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal 2(2006) 5 SCC 545 shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] , SCR p.

557)

"When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views,

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then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law."

28. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.

29. To be a question of law "involved in the case", there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

30. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra Goswami [(1997) 4 SCC 713].

31. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in

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the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [(2001) 3 SCC 179].

32. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation ofevidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam Chettiar [AIR 1963 SC 302]. An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter.

33. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:

33.1. An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

33.2. The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

33.3. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express

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provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered 5 AIR 1963 SC 302 on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

33.4. The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule.

Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence;(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."

16. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the judgment

of the Hon'ble Apex Court in G. Mahalingappa Vs. G.M. Savitha 2 with regard

to the scope of interference by High Court in second appeal wherein it was held

that:

"where such findings were found to be rendered on consideration of the pleadings and on oral and documentary evidence on record and neither perverse nor without any reason nor suffering from non-consideration of any important

(2005) 6 SCC 441

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evidence or admission of any party, interference therewith by High Court in second appeal is not justified."

17. Keeping in view the said principles stated by the Hon'ble Apex

Court, the above questions need to be answered.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION No.1:

Whether there was any earlier partition between Yellappa and Mollappa?

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Shasidhar and Ors. Vs. Ashwini Uma

Mathad and Anr. 3 had stated the factors that were necessary to be determined

by Court for proper disposal of the partition suits as follows:

"24. We may consider it apposite to state being a well settled principle of law that in a suit filed by a co-sharerer, coparcener, co-owner or joint owner, as the case may be, for partition and separate possession of his/her share qua others, it is necessary for the Court to examine, in the first instance, the nature and character of the properties in suit such as who was the original owner of the suit properties, how and by which source he/she acquired such properties, whether it was his/her self-acquired property or ancestral property, or joint property or coparcenary property in his/her hand and, if so, who are/were the coparceners or joint owners with him/her as the case may be. Secondly, how the devolution of his/her interest in the property took place consequent upon his/her death on surviving members of the family and in what proportion,

(2015) 11 SCC 269

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whether he/she died intestate or left behind any testamentary succession in favour of any family member or outsider to inherit his/her share in properties and if so, its effect. Thirdly whether the properties in suit are capable of being partitioned effectively and if so, in what manner? Lastly, whether all properties are included in the suit and all co-sharerers, coparceners, co- owners or joint-owners, as the case may be, are made parties to the suit? These issues, being material for proper disposal of the partition suit, have to be answered by the Court on the basis of family tree, inter se relations of family members, evidence adduced and the principles of law applicable to the case. (see "Hindu Law" by Mulla 17th Edition, Chapter XVI Partition and Reunion - Mitakshara Law pages 493-547)."

18. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit schedule 'A' and 'B'

properties were the self-acquired properties of their father. Their contention

was that the Khasra pahani for the year 1954-55 marked under Ex.A3 would

show that Yellappa was pattadar and possessor of suit schedule 'A' property and

for schedule 'B' property their father was conferred the right as protected tenant

and the said rights were inherent and relied upon Ex.A27 Tenancy Certificate

dated 20.06.1976 where the father of the plaintiffs' name O. Yellappa was

declared as a protected tenant under Section 38-E to an extent of Ac.11-28 gts.

in Sy.No.289/B. The plaintiffs also filed Exs.A4, A6 to A14, pahanies for the

period 1977-1978 to 1987-1988 to show that the name of O. Yellappa was

recorded as pattadar and cultivator for both the suit schedule properties. Exs.A1

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and A2 are the certified copies of R.O.R. for the year 1979-1980 and 1989-

1990, wherein the name of O. Yellappa was recorded as the pattadar and

possessor of suit schedule 'A' and 'B' properties. As per the written statement

filed by defendant No.17, which was adopted by defendants 15 and 16,

Mollappa and Yellappa were jointly cultivating the said lands. The trial court

recorded that no document was filed by the defendants showing the joint names

of Yellappa and Mollappa in the revenue records as joint cultivators. In the

amended written statement, the defendants 15 to 17 had taken a plea that the

suit schedule properties were the ancestral properties belonging to Jettappa

andYellappa was holding the same on behalf of the joint family, there was an

oral partition between Yellappa and his brother Balappa. Half share of Yellappa

was in the possession of the legal representatives of Yellappa and another half

share was in the possession of Mollappa, who was brought in by Balappa as his

illatom son-in-law to Mogudampally village, as such, Mollappa succeeded to

half of the suit schedule properties. There was also variance in the amended

written statement filed by defendants 15 to 17, wherein they contended that after

demise of Balappa, his brother Yellappa broughtMollappa and performed the

marriage of Mollappa with D15 and kept him as illatom son-in-law.

19. But defendant No.17, who was examined as DW.1 admitted in his

cross examination that the suit schedule properties did not belong to Jettappa

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and he did not file any document to show that Mollappa was owner of the suit

schedule properties. Defendant No.15 was the daughter of Balappa, but her

name was not entered in the revenue records in the mutation that took place in

the year 1987-88. He also admitted that Mollappa was not illatom son-in-law of

Yellappa and that Mollappa was not the family member of Yellappa entitled for

inheritance. He admitted that Mollappa was Yellappa's brother's daughter's

husband, but denied that Mollappa by misrepresentation and projecting himself

as legal successor of Yellappa got his name entered into revenue records with

regard to half of the suit schedule properties. DW.1 also admitted that he had

not filed any document to show that Balappa executed any document in favour

of Yellappa asking him to manage his land and no document was filed to show

that the name of Balappa was included in the revenue records and there was no

document filed to show that Yellappa and Mollappa jointly cultivated the lands.

20. Defendants 15 to 17 got marked Exs.B14 to B18 in proof of their

contention that there was a dispute with regard to partition in between Yellappa

and Mollappa and that matter was referred to village elders and that the village

elders conducted panchayath and decided that until and unless a sum of

Rs.2,085/- that fell to the side of Mollappa was not paid within a period of four

years to O. Yellappa, his half share right would automatically extinguish, as per

panchayat's decision, Mollappa paid the above amount. The document styled as

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'Jaijathu Pampakam paper' dated 18.04.1970 was marked as Ex.B14 and the

receipts for payment of certain amounts for Rs.400/-dated 22.05.1970, for

Rs.400/-dated 05.06.1971, for Rs.400/-dated 25.06.1972 and for Rs.300/-dated

09.06.1973 were marked as Exs.B15 to B18.

21. Whether this document marked under Ex.B14 can be considered as

acknowledging the partition is answered by the trial court under additional

issues 1 and 2 observing thatExs.B14 and B15 to B18 were not part of the

original written statement of defendants 15 to 17, but subsequently amended

and incorporated as part of the defence of D15 to D17. Both DWs.1 and 2 were

accepting and acknowledging that there was no document whatsoever to show

that Yellappa and Mollappa jointly cultivated the suit schedule lands at any

point of time. The document acknowledging the partition i.e., Ex.B14 as per the

own admission of DW.1, does not mention how Mollappa was entitled for a

share in the suit schedule properties and how the village elders could divide the

properties into two halves and give one half to Mollappa. The same being prior

to 1970, then the natural consequence would be that the name of Mollappa

ought to be incorporated in the revenue records jointly along with Yellappa from

the year 1970, but the same was not so, as evident from Exs.A3 and A4.

Between 1970 and 1979, there was no entry whatsoever in favour of Mollappa.

The same would make the joint cultivation version vulnerable and open to doubt

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as to what prevented Mollappa to make an entry of his name during the life time

of Yellappa. Even in Exs.A4 to A14, no where the name of Mollappa was

recorded contrary to what DW.1 was stating. The trial Court further observed

that one further surprising and curious aspect was that when Mollappa owes

money to Yellappa and pays the money and then how Mollappa could be given

half share on such a payment which he was due, the said payment not being any

sale consideration was not explained by DW.1.

22. The English translation of Ex.B14 was filed by the parties. It was

recorded therein that:

ESTATE PARTITION DOCUMENT

1970 Year, Ninaram 18th Day, 4th Month, before all Panchas, Othi Yellappa and Mollappa,

When all of them are together, about the loan amount that was brought by Mollappa, when it was calculated and found by the panch's that the Rs.2,085/- loan amount of Mollappa, unless and until this loan amount is paid back, he should not go his share borewell, Mollappa must pay back by 1974 and if the said amount is not paid back, he will be released from the Estate.

23. PW.1 denied that the document was bearing her father's signature.

Before considering the document as a partition deed between Yellappa and

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Mollappa, the right of Mollappa for half share has to be established. But,

admittedly no document was filed by the defendants to show that Mollappa was

brought as illatom son-in-law of Balappa and that it was agreed to give half

share in the joint family properties to Mollappa. Admittedly, the name of

neither Jettappa nor Balappa was recorded against the suit schedule 'A' or 'B'

properties to consider that they were joint family properties.

24. The trial court basing on the admission of DW.1 that Mollappa was

not the family member of the Yellappa and entitled for inheritance, observed

that the said statement was enough to draw an inference that Mollappa was not

from the branch of Yellappa, but his elder brother's son-in-law and not his real

son-in-law and that Mollappa was not entitled for inheritance of Yellappa's

properties. Thus, Mollappa was neither a co-heir or co-owner entitled to any

partition in the properties of Yellappa. The document marked under Ex.B14

does not show the flow of title and how Mollappa has become a co-sharer and

how by paying the loan amount due, he was entitled for a share in the property

of Yellappa. No antecedent title of Mollappa was established by the defendants,

even if it was considered that Ex.B14 was an acknowledgment of the earlier

partition effected between Yellappa and Mollappa. The first appellate court is

the final court of facts and it also confirmed the judgment of the trial court on

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record. This Court does not

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find any question of law involved in formulating this issue, as this issue is

solely based on the facts.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION No.2:-

Whether Ex.B14 can be admitted in evidence for want of any registration and whether the same is liable to be impounded even after its marking?

25. Ex.B14 was executed on a white paper, but not on any stamped

paper and the above document was not registered. As no objection was taken at

the time of marking, the document was admitted in evidence and a marking was

given to it. As such, this Court formulated this question that whether Ex.B14

can be considered as admitted in evidence for want of any registration and

whether the same is liable to be impounded even after its marking. The

contention of the learned counsel for the appellants was that once the document

was admitted in evidence without any objection, the objection with regard to

stamp duty could not be taken at a later stage; the objection with regard to non-

registration of the document lies only if the document was considered as a

partition deed, but the document marked under Ex.B14 was a memorandum of

settlement which was not compulsorily registerable and relied upon the

judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. Vs.

Manjit Kaur & Ors. 4 and Korukonda Chalapathi Rao & Anr. Vs.

AIR 2019 SC 3827

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

Korukonda Annapurna Sampath Kumar 5. In both the above cases, the

Hon'ble Apex Court extracted its earlier judgment in Kale Vs. Dy. Director of

Consolidation 6 wherein it had summarized the essentials of the family

settlement agreement as follows:

"10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of

Civil Appeal No.6141 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021

AIR 1976 SC 807

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Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."

(Emphasis supplied)

26. As seen from the above judgment, the members who were parties

to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest.

This document marked under Ex.B14 was not a mere memorandum prepared

after a family arrangement, but one party who is having a right over the property

was relinquishing his half share or title in favour of the other person who was

not a family member or co-sharer or co-owner of the property. The recitals of

the document were also not clear as to how the other party Mollappa would get

any right. It refers to some loan amount and states that unless and until the said

loan amount was paid back, Mollappa would not get his share in borewell and

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Mollappa must pay back by 1974 and if the said amount was not paid back, he

would be released from the estate. It would only show that Mollappa was due

some amount to Yellappa and he need to pay the same within a period of four

years and unless he pays the said amount, he would be released from the estate,

but how Mollappa was entitled to the estate is not clear from the recitals of the

above document. There was also no acknowledgment by Yellappa declaring

Mollappa as the sole owner to the half share on payment of such amount. There

was no description of the property which was allotted to Mollappa or

relinquished by Yellappa and its boundaries to identify the same. Thus this

document cannot be termed as a partition deed or relinquishment deed. There

was no specific description of the properties to identify the same.

27. Though DW.2 was examined claiming to be one of the attestors to

the document, DW.2 admitted in his evidence that he neither stood as a witness

nor signatory to Exs.B15 to B18, as he was a child by then. No other witness or

the scribe by name Sangram alleged to have scribed the said document was

examined by the defendants. In his evidence, DW.2 also admitted that Balappa

and Yellappa were brothers and Mollappa was not the son-in-law of Yellappa

and that he had not verified whether there was any document showing that

Balappa was having any lands in his name. Thus, no witnesses were examined

on behalf of the contesting defendants to prove Exs.B14 to B18 documents.

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28. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of

the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. 7,

wherein it was held that:

"...We reiterate that the plea of an oral partition or memorandum of partition, unregistered one can be manufactured at any point in time, without any contemporaneous public document needs rejection at all costs. We say so for exceptionally good cases where partition is proved conclusively and we caution the courts that the finding is not to be based on the preponderance of probabilities in view of provisions of gender justice and the rigor of very heavy burden of proof which meet intendment of Explanation to Section 6(5). It has to be remembered that courts cannot defeat the object of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the Courts were rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. It was approached as a last resort when parties were not able to settle their family dispute amicably. We take note of the fact that even before 1956, partition in other modes than envisaged under Section 6(5) had taken place.

...In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition unless effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of

(2020( 9 SCC 1

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oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly."

29. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the judgment

of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Das and Ors. Vs. Girija Shanker and

Ors. 8 wherein it was held that:

"... a partition deed under the law requires registration. Since, the document Ex.P2 was not registered, it was not admissible in evidence."

30. Thus the document marked under Ex.B14 cannot be considered as

a partition deed or as a memorandum of family settlement prepared after any

family arrangement. The document executed on a blank paper before some

village elders who were not examined before the Court cannot be considered as

a document under which the father of D16 and D17 and husband of D15 by

name Mollappa could claim any right over the properties of Yellappa. As this

document marked under Ex.B14 also would not disclose the description of suit

schedule 'A' and 'B' properties or the terms of division of the properties inter se

between the parties or the relationship between the parties or their entitlement to

the same, it cannot even be considered as a memorandum of family settlement

Civil Appeal No.3825 of 1990 dated 20.09.2000

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and does not carry any evidentiary value. It is not recording a past transaction

of division or partition of property. As such, this document does not carry any

evidentiary value extinguishing the rights of Yellappa. The rights of Yellappa

were not extinguished or limited by this document.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION No.3 :-

Whether non-challenge of revenue records can be the basis to non-suit the case of the plaintiffs for partition?

31. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants was that

the name of Mollappa, the father of defendants 16 and 17 was recorded in the

amendment register of Mogudampally village, in the ROR proceedings marked

under Exs.B3 and B4 for the years 1979-1980 and 1989-1990, in the Faisal patti

for the year 1988-1989 marked as Ex.B2 and in the pahanies marked under

Exs.B5 to B13, but the courts below grossly erred in holding out that the ROR

and mutation of name of Mollappa was not necessary to be challenged as they

would not create any right in favour of the parties without appreciating the fact

that the revenue court had already decided and mutated the name of Mollappa

and his successors D16 and D17 after a detailed enquiry. The respondents-

plaintiffs had not challenged the revenue records and allowed the same to be

continued for a period of more than 40 years and had set up this case in

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collusion with defendants 1 to 14, so as to defeat the legitimate rights of the

appellants.

32. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs

on the other hand was that Mollappa by playing fraud and misrepresentation got

entered his name in the revenue records by stating that he was the son of

Yellappa and subsequently, his name was recorded as son-in-law of Yellappa.

The entries in revenue records would not confer title on any person whose name

appears in the records of right, as per the settled law and relied upon the

judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. Vs. Financial

Commissioner and Ors. 9, Meghmala and Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy

and Ors. 10, A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. 11and

Pratap Singh (dead) through L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Shiv Ram (dead) through

L.Rs. 12

33. As per the learned counsel for the respondents, Yellappa died on

05.07.1981 and the documents marked under Exs.B1 to B13 came into

existence only after the death of Yellappa. The revenue entries in these

documents would show that in some of the documents the name of Mollappa is

recorded as the son of Yellappa and in some recorded as he was Yellappa's son-

(2007) 6 SCC 186

(2010) 8 SCC 383

(2007) 4 SCC 221

(2020) 11 SCC 242

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

in-law. Ex.B14 document also would not disclose the basis for mutation. No

proceedings of revenue authorities were filed by the appellants-defendants to

show that any enquiry was conducted by them. As such, it would disclose that

the revenue authorities without any basis had incorporated the name of

Mollappa to an extent of half share in the suit schedule properties without

giving any notices to the successors of Yellappa. The trial court as well as the

first appellate court on appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on

record and by placing reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court

held that the revenue records cannot be the basis to make a claim for title.

34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. Vs. Financial

Commissioner and Ors. (9 supra) held that:

"...It is well settled that an entry in Revenue Records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in Record of Rights. It is settled law that entries in the Revenue Records or Jamabandi have only 'fiscal purpose' i.e. payment of land- revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent Civil Court..."

35. In Meghmala and Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy and Ors.(10

supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:

"20. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

"Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. &Ors. [AIR 1994 SC 853].

In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay[1956 All. E.R. 349], the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything."

23. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh &Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1165], this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.

26. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1]; Gowrishankar &Anr. Vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust &Ors. [AIR 1996 SC 2202]; Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi &Ors. [(2003) 8 SCC 319]; Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal [AIR 2002 SC 33]; Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education [AIR 2003 SC

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

4628]; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu &Anr. [AIR 2004 SC 2836]."

36. Some of the entries in revenue records showing the name of

Mollappa as son of Yellappa, some showing Mollappa as son-in-law of Yellappa

and some showing Mollappa as the son-in-law of Balappa, itself would prove

the misrepresentation made by Mollappa and that without any basis, he got his

name mutated in the revenue records.

37. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. Vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors.(11

supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:

"26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.

27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. &Ors. [(1994) 1 SCC 1] this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the application.

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, observing that "there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". B approached this Court.

28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', Kuldip Singh, J. stated:

"The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property- grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation".(emphasis supplied)

29. The Court proceeded to state:

"A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party".

30. The Court concluded:

"The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".

38. In Pratap Singh (dead) through L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Shiv Ram

(dead) through L.Rs.(12 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while referring to a

case underHimachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 held that:

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

"...record-of-rights carries presumption of correctness under Section 45 of the 1954 Act and also under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Entries in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value. Courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. However, presumption of correctness of record-of-rights whether they show the existence, or, absence of the claimed right, title or interest, can apply only to genuine, but not to forged or fraudulent entries. Distinction may be fine but entry in the revenue record states that the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.

Presumption of truth attached to the record-of- rights can be rebutted only if there is a fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made or that prescribed procedure was not followed."

39. The Hon'ble Apex court in the above referred judgment also held

that:

"21. This Court in Vishwa Vijai Bharti v. Fakhrul Hasan &Ors. [(1976) 3 SCC 642] held that the entries in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. This Court held as under:

"14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was Made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.""

40. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants was that

these revenue records were not challenged by the plaintiffs for a period of 40

years. But as the revenue records are not documents of title, the non-challenge

of the same could not be the basis to non-suit the case of the plaintiffs for

partition.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION No.4 :-

Whether the appellants had perfected their title by way of adverse possession?

41. As seen from the records, there was no pleading claiming right of

title through adverse possession by the defendants 15 to 17 and no issue was

framed about adverse possession by the trial court. The learned counsel for the

respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.T.

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Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. Vs. Revamma and Ors. 13 wherein it was

held that:

"5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. [See Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock, 227 Ark. 1085, 303 S.W.2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo.

494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929).]

22. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, necprecario has been noticed by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Others [(2004) 10 SCC 779] in the following terms:

"Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession,(b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and ( e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him

(2007) 6 SCC 59

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to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession"

30. In Karnataka Wakf Board (Supra), the law was stated, thus:

"In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam, necprecario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See : S M Karim v. Bibi Sakinal AIR 1964 SC 1254, Parsinni v. Sukhi ( 1993 ) 4 SCC 375 and D N Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka (1997) 7 SCC567.) Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to

Dr.GRR, J sa_1294_2017

defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession."

31. Inquiry into the particulars of Adverse Possession Inquiry into the starting point of adverse possession i.e. dates as to when the paper owner got dispossessed is an important aspect to be considered. In the instant case the starting point of adverse possession and Other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalized, nature of possession: whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession - have not been disclosed. An observation has been made in this regard in S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina [AIR 1964 SC 1254]:

"Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea."

32. Also mention as to the real owner of the property must be specifically made in an adverse possession claim.

33. In Karnataka Wakf Board vs. Govt. of India (Supra), it is stated:

"Plaintiff, filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it."

In P Periasami v. P Periathambi [(1995) 6 SCC 523] this Court ruled that -

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"Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property."

The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.

42. Without any pleading and proof as to when the possession of the

appellants-defendants 15 to 17 became adverse to the plaintiffs, the appellants

cannot take the plea of adverse possession. As the appellants are contesting the

matter contending that they were having right as a sharer in the property, the

plea of title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent. As such, this

question is also answered against the appellants by holding that the appellants

could not perfect their title by taking the plea of adverse possession.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION No.5 :-

Whether the courts below appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record in a proper perspective or whether there was any perversity which requires interference?

43. On considering the judgments of the trial court as well as the first

appellate court, this Court is of the view that there was no perversity in the

judgments of the courts below and both the courts had appreciated the oral and

documentary evidence on record in a proper perspective without ignoring or

acting contrary to any legal principles and that there are no debatable questions

arising in this matter which are not previously settled by the law of the land.

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44. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the

judgment and decree dated 09.08.2017 passed in A.S.No.14 of 2015 on the file

of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VII Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Sangareddy, Medak District, confirming the judgment and decree dated

19.01.2015 passed in O.S.No.14 of 2009 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,