Telangana High Court

T. Sowmya, D/O Balaji, vs State Of Telangana, on 13 February, 2024

        THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
                                    AND
        THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI


    WRIT PETITION Nos.8293, 10107, 10598, 14061,
 23945, 24608, 27505 of 2005; 33376, 38695 of 2013;
22798, 22803, 23787, 24373, 24390, 24400, 24408 of
                      2015 and 8291 of 2023

COMMON ORDER:

(Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Alok Aradhe)

Mr. C.Hanumantha Rao and Mr. S.Sudeep Reddy,

learned counsels for the petitioners in W.P.No.14061 of

2005.

Mr. M.V.Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the

petitioners in W.P.Nos.23945, 24608 and 27505 of 2005.

Mr. M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel

representing Mr. M.V.Pratap Kumar, learned counsel for

the petitioners in W.P.Nos.33376, 38695 of 2013 and also

representing Mr. Aravala Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel

for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.22798, 22803, 23787,

24373, 24390, 24400 and 24408 of 2015.

Mr. V.Ravi Kiran Rao, learned Senior Counsel

representing Mr. V.Rohith, learned counsel for the

petitioner in W.P.No.8291 of 2023.

Mr. Mohd. Imran Khan, learned Additional Advocate

General for the State.

2. In this bunch of writ petitions, singular issue with

regard to validity of the notification issued under Section

4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred

to as, "the Act") arises for consideration. Therefore, the

instant writ petitions were heard analogously and are being

decided by this common order.

3. Facts giving rise to filing of one of the writ petitions,

namely W.P.No.33376 of 2013, in a nutshell are that the

petitioners claim to be the owners of different extents of

land situated in various survey numbers of Gopanpally

Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The

Zonal Manager, Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure

Corporation Limited (APIIC) submitted a requisition on

08.11.2004 for acquisition of land measuring Acs.50.02

guntas situated Survey Nos.158, 159, 160, 161, 162 and

163 of Gopanpally Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga

Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as 'the subject land'),

for the purpose of establishment of IT Park and related

projects.

4. Thereupon, a draft notification under Section 4(1) of

the Act in respect of the subject land was submitted to the

District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, on 23.02.2005.

The same was approved by the District Collector, Ranga

Reddy District, on 04.03.2005 and a notification under

Section 4(1) of the Act was published in Andhra Pradesh

Gazette on 06.03.2005 and in Telugu and English Daily

Newspapers on 10.03.2005. The names of the pattadars in

respect of the subject land were published as per the

entries in the revenue records of the Gopanpally Village.

5. After publication of the notification under Section 4(1)

of the Act, notices in Form III of Section 5(A) of the Act were

issued to the pattadars/owners on 20.03.2005 for filing

claims and objections, if any, to the proposed land

acquisition on or before 04.04.2005. The enquiry under

Section 5-A of the Act was envisaged to be conducted on

06.04.2005.

6. A Division Bench of this Court by an order dated

26.10.2005 dismissed the writ petitions. The orders

passed by the Division Bench of this Court were assailed in

various civil appeals before the Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court by an order dated 04.03.2008 passed in

Civil Appeal No.1781 of 2008 (N.Lakshmi v. Government

of Andhra Pradesh), remitted the matters to this Court for

a fresh decision. The order reads as under:

ORDER

Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

In all these appeals, it is not in dispute by and between the parties that the Divisional Bench of the High Court relying on earlier orders passed in other matters dismissed all these matters and the said orders have been challenged by the appellants herein. It was stated that even counter affidavits had not been filed in these matters. It was stated by the learned counsel for the appellants appearing in these matters that several other questions were also raised which were not the subject matter of earlier group and were not agitated in those matters and were not answered one way or the

other by the Court raised in these matters. In all these matters, in our opinion, the abovesaid fact also is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if we set aside the order passed by the High Court and remit the matters for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Mr. P.P.Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for contesting respondents contended that when the Division Bench in the order impugned in the present appeals had not observed anything with regard to other arguments, it should be presumed that no such argument had been advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants. However, in view of the fact stated above, in our opinion, it would be advisable if the matters are sent to the Division bench for fresh disposal. The writ petitions/appeals are, therefore, restored to file. It is, however, clarified that it is open to the parties to raise all contentions available in law.

In view of the urgency of the nature and the type of litigation, it would be appropriate if the High Court decides all the matters as expeditiously as possible. We would request the High Court to decide them expeditiously. The contesting respondents will file counter affidavit(s) within six weeks and rejoinder, if any, will be filed within a period of two weeks thereafter. Status quo to continue till the disposal of matters by the High Court.

It was stated by the learned counsel for the appellants in some appeals that the appellants/ petitioners intend to amend petition/appeal. It is open to

them to request the High Court and the High Court will pass an appropriate order.

The civil appeals are disposed of. No costs. The learned counsel for the petitioners in contempt petitions seeks permission to withdraw the contempt petitions. Permission is granted. The contempt petitions are dismissed as withdrawn without observing anything on the merits of the petitions.

7. The Supreme Court in another civil appeal, namely

Civil Appeal No.1978 of 2010 (Teegala Ranjeeth Reddy v.

Government of Andhra Pradesh) by an order dated

24.11.2015 remitted the writ petitions for a fresh disposal

by this Court in the light of the observations made by the

Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1781 of 2008. The said

order is extracted below for facility of reference:

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P.No.11613 of 2005, dated 25.10.2005.

2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties to the lis and carefully perused the material available on record. Both sides would agree that the issues raised in this Civil Appeal are identical with the issues raised and considered in Civil Appeal No.1781 of 2008, disposed of on 04.03.2008.

3. Learned counsel on both sides would submit that in the light of the observations made by

this Court in Civil Appeal No.1781 of 2008, the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside and the matter be remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal, in accordance with law.

4. Further, a request is made that the appellants should be permitted to make appropriate application(s) under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act') before the High Court with a request to consider that application along with the main petition.

5. The request of both the learned counsel is reasonable and shall not prejudice the rights of the parties if the same granted.

6. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law in light of the order passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No.1781 of 2008.

7. If such a petition is filed by the appellants under Section 24(2) of the Act, we request the High Court to consider the same in accordance with law.

8. The interim order granted by this Court shall continue till the final order in the matter is passed.

9. All the contentions of both the parties are kept open.

Ordered accordingly.

8. In the aforesaid factual background, these writ

petitions arise for our consideration.

9. Mr. M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel

submitted that the impugned notifications are in

contravention of Section 4 of the Act, as the reference in

the aforesaid notifications has been made to the

satisfaction of the Government for issuing the notifications,

whereas the satisfaction of the Collector is required for

issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is

further submitted that the State Government is the

competent authority to issue a notification under Section

4(1) of the Act. It is further submitted that the State

Government is the competent authority to issue

authorisation in exercise of powers under Section 4(2) of

the Act, whereas in the instant cases, the Governor has

authorised the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)

to exercise power under Section 4(2) of the Act. It is

contended that authorisation to act under Section 5-A of

the Act issued in favour of the Special Deputy Collector

(Land Acquisition), International Airport Authority,

Shamshabad, is invalid as the same has been issued by

the Governor.

10. It is pointed out that the District Collector is

competent authority to appoint an officer to perform the

functions under Section 5-A of the Act. It is also urged

that in view of the amendment to the Act by the erstwhile

Andhra Pradesh, the objections had to be called for within

a period of thirty days. However, in the instant cases,

objections have been called within a period of fifteen days.

Therefore, the impugned notifications are liable to be

quashed.

11. Mr. V.Ravi Kiran Rao, learned Senior Counsel has

adopted the submissions made by Mr. M.V.S.Suresh

Kumar, learned Senior Counsel.

12. Mr. C.Hanumantha Rao and Mr. S.Sudeep Reddy,

learned counsel submitted that the erstwhile Legislature of

Andhra Pradesh has amended the Act by Act No.22 of 1976

and has incorporated Section 3-A in the Act. Section 3-

A(2) of the Act provided that any power conferred or any

duty imposed on them by the Act shall in such

circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may

be specified in the notification be exercised or discharged

by the District Collector. It is also pointed out that the

power to issue notification under Section 4 of the Act has

been conferred on the Collector only for construction,

extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the

poor. It is, therefore, contended that since the land is

being required for construction of an IT Park, the

notification cannot be issued by the Collector under

Section 4(1) of the Act. In support of the aforesaid

submissions, learned counsels have placed reliance on the

decisions of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Limited v. Darius Shapur Chenai1, Global

Energy Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission 2 and Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director,

Health Services, Haryana 3.

13. Mr. M.V.Durga Prasad, learned counsel has

submitted that under the Salient Features of IT &

Hardware Industry Policy 2005-2010, the land is required

1 (2005) 7 SCC 627 2 (2009) 15 SCC 570 3 (2013) 10 SCC 136

to be allotted to APIIC, who in turn allots the same to the

companies. Therefore, it is contended that issuance of

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is an instance of

colourable exercise, as the power under Section 4 of the

Act has been invoked to bypass the provisions of Part VII of

the Act which contains the special provisions for

acquisition of the land for the companies.

14. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate

General submitted that the State Government has issued a

notification dated 10.03.1987 by which powers under

Section 4, 5-A and 6 as well as Section 17(4) of the Act for

the purposes of acquisition of land for establishment of

industrial estates, industrial development areas and

industrial complexes undertaken by APIIC have been

delegated to the Collector. Therefore, the Collector is well

within his authority to issue the notification under Section

4(1) of the Act. It is also urged that development of

infrastructure squarely falls within the expression "public

purpose" and therefore, the contention that the acquisition

of land for purposes of IT Park is not a public purpose, is

misconceived.

15. It is urged that even if the power is delegated by an

authority to its subordinate, still the delegating authority is

not denuded of its power to exercise the same. Therefore,

it is urged that merely because in the impugned

notification, the expression "Governor" has been used, the

same cannot be found fault with as the Government has

the authority to delegate the power to the Special Deputy

Collector. Therefore, the authorisation to act under

Section 5-A of the Act does not suffer from any infirmity.

In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on

the decisions in State of Mysore v. V.K.Kangan 4,

Kilarapu Satyavati v. District Collector 5, Sooraram

Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy

District 6 and Indore Development Authority v. Burhani

Grih Nirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit Sneh Nagar 7.

4 (1976) 2 SCC 895 5 2006 (2) ALD 342 6 (2008) 9 SCC 552 7 2023 OnLine SC 232

16. Our attention has also been invited to the prayers

made in W.P.Nos.33376 and 38695 of 2013.

17. In compliance of the order passed by this Court, the

learned Additional Advocate General has produced the

original record before this Court. We have considered the

rival submissions made on both sides and perused the

record.

18. The Act was enacted to amend the law for acquisition

of land for public purposes and for companies. Section 3(c)

of the Act defines the expression "Collector" to mean the

Collector of a district, and includes a Deputy

Commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the

appropriate Government to perform the functions of a

Collector under the Act. Section 3(f) of the Act defines the

expression "public purpose" and includes the purposes

mentioned in clauses (i) to (viii) thereof. Section 4 of the

Act deals with the publication of preliminary notification

and powers of officers thereupon. The provisions of the Act

were amended by the erstwhile State Legislature vide Act

No.22 of 1976. By Section 2 of Act No.22 of 1976, Section

3-A has been incorporated in the Act which deals with

delegation of functions. Section 3-A of the Act No.22 of

1976 modifies the provisions of the Act. The aforesaid

provisions namely Section 3A and relevant extract of

Section 4, which are relevant for the controversy involved

in these petitions, are extracted as under:

2. After Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), the following section shall be inserted, namely:-

3-A. The State Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on them by this Act, shall in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, be exercised or discharged by the District Collector.

3. For the purpose of acquisition of land for the construction, extension or improvement of any dwelling house for the poor, the principal Act shall have effect in relation to such acquisition subject to the following modifications; namely:-

(1) in Section 4, -

(a) in sub-section (1), after the words "appropriate Government", the words "or the District Collector" and after the words "Official Gazette", the words "or the District Gazette" shall be inserted;

(b) in sub-section (2), after the words "such Government", the words "or the District Collector" shall be inserted;

19. Thus, it is evident that under Section 3-A of the Act,

as applicable to the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh, the

State Government has the authority to confer any power.

Section 3-A of the Act provides for delegation of functions.

It enables the State Government to direct that any power

conferred or any duty imposed on them by the Act, shall in

such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as

may be specified in the notification, be exercised or

discharged by the District Collector. Similarly, from a

perusal of the relevant extract of Section 3 of the Act No.22

of 1976, it is evident that for the purpose of acquisition of

land for the construction, extension or improvement of any

dwelling house for the poor, the Collector in addition to the

appropriate Government, shall have the authority to issue

the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.

20. The State Government in exercise of powers conferred

under Section 3-A of the Act has issued a notification dated

10.03.1987. The relevant extract of the notification is

extracted below for the facility of reference:

NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby directs that all the District Collectors shall exercise all the powers conferred and discharge all the duties imposed on the State Government under Sections, 4, 5-A, 6 and sub- section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act, for the purpose of acquisition of land for establishment of Industrial Estates, Industrial Development Areas and Industrial Housing Complexes undertaken by the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited, Hyderabad.

21. From a careful scrutiny of Section 4(1) of the Act as is

applicable to the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh, it is

evident that the notification enables the State Government

or the Collector to form an opinion that the land in any

locality is needed for public purpose. Section 4(1) of the

Act further mandates that the notification to that effect

shall be published in the official gazette. However, Section

4(1) of the Act is conspicuously silent with regard to the

authority by whom notification is required to be issued. It

does not provide that if an authority records a satisfaction

that the land is required for public purpose, the same

authority has to issue the notification. The action of

issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is a

ministerial act.

22. In the backdrop of the aforesaid relevant statutory

provisions, we may advert to the impugned notification

issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. The translated

version of the notification which has been annexed with the

memorandum of the petitions reads as under:

No.G1/6979/2004 Dated 3-3-2005

Notification by District Collector, Ranga Reddy District

FORM 2-A

Draft Notification to be issued under Section 4 of 1894 as Amended by Act XXXVIII of 1923

WHEREAS it appears to the Government of Andhra Pradesh that the land specified in the Schedule below are situated at Gopanpally village of Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District are needed for public purpose to wit for Establishment of IT Park & Related Projects by APIIC Limited. Notice to that effect is hereby given to all whom it may concern, in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act - 1 of 1894 as amended by the

Land Acquisition Amendment Act, XXXVIII of 1923 and the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby authorizes the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), I.A.P., Shamshabad, Ranga Reddy District, Hyderabad - 500 004 his staff and Workmen to exercise the powers conferred by Section 4(2) of the Act. Under Section 3(c) of the same Act, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh appoints the Special Deputy Collector (L.A.), I.A.P., Shamshabad to perform the functions of the Collector under Section 5-A of the Act.

Hence, notice is hereby given under Section 5-A of the Act that all the persons interested in the lands are required to lodge before the Land Acquisition Officer & Special Deputy Collector (L.A.), I.A.P., Shamshabad, Hyderabad at Spoorthy Bhavan, Third Floor, Collectorate, Ranga Reddy District Premises, Lakdikapul, Hyderabad, within (15) days from the date of publication of the above notification a statement in writing of their objection, if any, to the acquisition of the said lands.

23. Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid notification, it is

evident that the notification dated 04.03.2005 states that

the Government has opined that the subject land is

required for public purposes i.e., for IT Park by APIIC

Limited and the Special Deputy Collector, International

Airport Authority, Shamshabad, Ranga Reddy District is

authorised by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh to exercise

the powers conferred under Section 4(2) of the Act. The

aforesaid notification has been issued by the Collector.

24. However, the position which emerges from a perusal

of the record as well as from page No.1 of the counter

affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is that

requisition issued by the APIIC Limited was sent to the

District Collector. Thereupon, the District Collector has

formed an opinion that the land is needed for the public

purpose and the District Collector has issued the

notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Thus, the

District Collector has apparently acted within the scope

and authority conferred on him under the notification

dated 10.03.1987, under Section 3-A of the Act as

applicable to erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh.

25. Therefore, the issue which arises for consideration is

whether mere reference to the notification about the

opinion of the Government, the notification under Section

4(1) of the Act is vitiated in law. As stated supra, the State

Government by a notification dated 10.03.1987 had

delegated the powers to the Collector. The Collector has

acted within the scope of the authority delegated to him by

the notification. The validity of neither Section 3-A nor the

validity of the notification dated 10.03.1987 is under

challenge in these writ petitions. Therefore, merely because

a reference has been made in the notification with regard

to the opinion of the Government about formation of

opinion that the subject land is required for public

purpose, the notification is not vitiated in law. Even if it is

assumed that the State Government had formed an opinion

that the subject land is required for public purpose, yet

nothing prevents the Collector in law from issuing the

impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Suffice

it to say that the notification is not happily worded but the

same cannot be quashed merely on this ground.

26. For the reasons assigned by us in the preceding

paragraphs, the contention urged on behalf of the

petitioners that the impugned notifications are contrary to

Section 4 of the Act as applicable to the erstwhile State of

Andhra Pradesh does not deserve acceptance. Therefore,

the decision dated 31.10.2008 passed by the learned Single

Judge in W.P.No.1036 of 2001 is overruled.

27. It is trite law that despite delegation of power, the

delegating authority is not denuded of its power to exercise

the power which has been delegated to it. The proposition

that the delegating authority is not denuded of the

statutory power despite delegation has been dealt with by

the Supreme Court in OCL India Limited v. State of

Orissa 8. The principle laid down in Huth v. Clarke9 has

been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Ishwar

Singh v. State of Rajasthan 10.

28. It is equally well settled legal proposition that in case

a power in an authority exists, mere reference to a wrong

provision or omission to mention the provision which

contains the source of power does not invalidate the

exercise of such a power (see Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v

State of Bihar 11, a Constitution Bench decision of

8 (2003) 2 SCC 101 9 (1980) 25 QBD 391 10 (2005) 2 SCC 334 11 AIR 1966 SC 740

Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 12 and

a seven-Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court in Union

of India v. Mohit Minerals (Private) Limited 13). On the

analogy of the same principle, merely because the

expression "Governor" has been used in the notification,

the same does not render the Special Deputy Collector

incompetent in law to exercise the powers conferred on him

under Section 4(2) of the Act. Admittedly, under Section

4(2) of the Act, the State Government/Collector has the

authority to delegate the power. Therefore, mere use of

expression "Governor" in the notification, which is used

apparently inadvertently, would not have any impact on

the authority of the Special Deputy Collector (Land

Acquisition). Therefore, contention that Deputy Collector is

not competent to exercise the powers under Section 4(2) of

the Act does not deserve acceptance.

29. Provisions of Section 5-A of the Act incorporate the

principles of natural justice. Provisions of Section 5-A of

the Act were dealt with by the Supreme Court in Anand

12 (1985) 3 SCC 398 13 (2022) 10 SCC 700

Singh v. State of U.P 14 wherein the Supreme Court, while

placing reliance on the decisions in Babu Ram v. State of

Haryana 15 and Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), held that

Section 5-A of the Act confers an important right in favour

of a person whose land is sought to be acquired. The right

to file objection besides a valuable right also makes the

provision for compulsory acquisition of land just and in

conformity with the fundamental principles of natural

justice.

30. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note

of Section 5-A of the Act as is applicable to the State of

Andhra Pradesh and the relevant portion of the same is

extracted below for the facility of reference:

5-A. Hearing of objections:- (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days of causing public notice under the said sub- section, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.

14 (2010) 11 SCC 242 15 (2009) 10 SCC 115

31. Thus, it is evident that the provision requires that the

land owner has to be given an opportunity to submit an

objection within a period of thirty days. In the instant

cases, the petitioners have been asked to submit the

objections within a period of fifteen days only. Therefore,

the impugned notifications insofar as they direct the

petitioners to submit the objections within a period of

fifteen days are in contravention of Section 5-A(1) of the

Act, which is mandatory in nature. Therefore, the

impugned notifications insofar as they provide that the

petitioners have to submit the objections within a period of

fifteen days cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

32. Now we may deal with the contention urged on behalf

of the petitioners that the exercise of power in the facts of

the present cases amounts to colourable exercise of power

and the acquisition is not for a public purpose. One of the

Salient Features of the IT & Hardware Industry Policy

2005-2010 is that lands have to be acquired for public

purposes of setting up Hyderabad Knowledge Corridor. The

State Government had envisaged under the aforesaid policy

that the Hyderabad Knowledge Corridor would be planned

with the help of international consultant of repute with a

visionary master plan and the appropriate extent of land

would be declared as Special Economic Zone. Under the

aforesaid policy, the allotment of land was to be made to

the IT industry through APIIC. The issue whether the

acquisition of land for the aforesaid purpose would be a

public purpose was considered by the Supreme Court in

Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) and in paragraphs 130

and 131 it was held as under:

130. APIIC is an instrumentality of State and works as "nodal agency" developing the project which would facilitate socio-economic progress of the State by generating revenues, weeding out unemployment and bringing in new avenues and opportunities for public at large. Development of infrastructure is legal and legitimate "public purpose" for exercising power of eminent domain. Simply because a company has been chosen for fulfilment of such public purpose does not mean that the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or disregarded. It will also not make exercise of power bad, mala fide or for collateral purpose vitiating the proceedings.

131. In our judgment, the respondents are right in submitting that in case of integrated and indivisible project, the project has to be taken as a whole and must

be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public at large, it will serve public purpose.

33. Thus, in view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it

is beyond any pale of doubt that the land acquisition in the

instant cases is for a public purpose and therefore, the

proceedings initiated for acquisition of land by notifying

under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot be said to be a

colourable exercise of power. The contention therefore

deserves to be repelled.

34. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned

notifications insofar as they pertain to the lands of the

petitioners and insofar as they provide that the petitioners

are required to submit the objections within a period of

fifteen days are hereby quashed. Needless to state that the