Telangana High Court

K. Ravindra, vs The Andhra Pradesh State Seed ... on 9 February, 2024

     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK

           WRIT PETITION No.34988 of 2012

O R D E R:

This Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief:

"...to issue or order or direction more particularly in the nature of Writ of Certiorari, declaring the action of the respondent No.2 imposing major penalty of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect on 18.07.2011 vide Proc.No.SCA/Estt./1563/2006, and the action of respondent No.3 in confirming the punishment order vide Proc.No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006, dated 18.10.2012 as illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of Natural Justice and violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and violative of Job chart of Respondent Department, provisions of Seed Rules and quash the same and consequently direct the Respondents to grant all the service benefits, monetory benefits and all other consequential benefits including promotion as per his original entitlement and pass such other order or orders as the Hon'ble Court may deems fit and proper in the interest of Justice..."

2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as

Seed Certification Officer in respondent No.1-Andhra Pradesh

State Seed Certification Agency on 01.08.1985. During Rabi,

2003-04 season, while he was working as Seed Certification

Officer at respondent No.1-Office at Tanuku, West Godavari

District, the petitioner has attended field inspection of

agricultural lands. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred 2 PK,J wp_34988_2012

from Tanuku to Hyderabad as Seed Certification Officer and

joined at Hyderabad on 17.07.2009. While things stood thus,

respondent No.2 issued Charge Memo No.SCA/Estt/1563/

2006, dated 03.03.2010, alleging that the petitioner has

committed irregularities in verifying the allotted seed

production plots of pulses of certified seed growers and in

bringing the false claims of the farmers to the notice of his

superiors, to which, the petitioner has submitted a detailed

explanation. But, without considering the said explanation,

respondent No.2 has ordered a regular enquiry and appointed

an Enquiry Officer. After conducting enquiry, the Enquiry

Officer has submitted his report on 03.11.2010 holding that

the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved.

Thereafter, respondent No.2 being the Disciplinary Authority,

issued Show Cause Notice No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006, dated

19.03.2011, against the petitioner calling for his explanation,

to which, the petitioner has submitted his explanation, dated

27.04.2011. Thereafter, respondent No.2 has passed final

order, vide proceedings No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006, dated

18.07.2011, imposing major penalty of withholding of one

increment with cumulative effect. Aggrieved by the same, the 3 PK,J wp_34988_2012

petitioner has preferred an appeal before respondent No.3 on

20.10.2011, who vide proceedings No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006,

dated 18.10.2012, rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner

confirming the order, dated 18.07.2011. Challenging by the

same, the petitioner is before this Court.

3. Heard Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the

petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Services - III

appearing for the respondents. Perused the record.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the

charges levelled against the petitioner by the Disciplinary

Authority are not at all sustainable either in law or in facts.

The Disciplinary Authority ought to have considered that the

guidelines were issued in the year, 2006, for registration and

consideration of areas. The Charge Memo, dated 03.03.2010

issued against the petitioner is pertaining to the Rabi season

2003-04, by which time, there was no such procedure of

verification of pattadar pass book or survey numbers etc. It is

further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority has relied on

the observations of the Vigilance officials as apparent from the

statement of imputation of charge. But, the Disciplinary 4 PK,J wp_34988_2012

Authority did not figured the Vigilance officials as list of

witnesses in the Charge Memo, dated 03.03.2010, so as to

enable the petitioner to cross-examine them for conducting a

fair play of enquiry. It is further submitted that the

Disciplinary Authority was influenced by both the Vigilance

and Enforcement Department. The Disciplinary Authority had

imposed the major punishment by violating the Rule 18 of

CCCA Rules, since the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer

clearly shows that "since it is proved that there is no sufficient

land as registered vide Form No.1 in the name of said seed

producers and his defence is not convincing, he may be

awarded with suitable punishment in accordance to the

APSSCA employees Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 2001"

and even the Enquiry Officer has exceeded his role by

recommending for punishment. It is further submitted that

the Disciplinary Authority has utterly failed to mark the

vigilance Report of Vigilance and Enforcement Department as

list of documents or exhibit since the very reliance of the

Disciplinary Authority in framing the alleged charge is on the

basis of Vigilance report. Therefore, the action of the

Disciplinary Authority is nothing but violation of principles of

5 PK,J wp_34988_2012

natural justice. It is further submitted that in the Enquiry

Report, in the remarks column, it was specifically mentioned

that the seed was rejected in respect of three lots by the

petitioner, which, in fact, discloses that the petitioner was

prompt in discharge of his duties. Therefore, the action of

respondents in imposing major penalty of withholding of one

increment with cumulative effect vide proceedings

no.SCA/Estt/1563/2006, dated 18.07.2011 as confirmed by

respondent No.3 vide proceedings No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006,

dated 18.10.2012 is illegal, arbitrary, violative of principles of

natural justice, violative of Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution

of India, violative of job chart of respondent - Department and

provisions of Seed Rules. In support of his contentions,

learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad

(D.B.) in M.Periya Desan v. Dy.Inspector General, Chennai

and another 1.

5. Per contra, learned Government Pleader appearing for the

respondents has contended that on receipt of complaints from

the Seed Organizers regarding fraudulent activities in

2014 LawSuit(Hyd) 746 6 PK,J wp_34988_2012

APSSDC, which is popularly known as 'A.P.Seeds', Tanuku

(M), West Godavari District and Vijayawada, the Vigilance and

Enforcement Department enquired into the matter and basing

on report No.41, dated 16.03.2005, and Lr.No.10362/Vig.I(2)/

2005-07, dated 14.09.2009, of Principal Secretary to

Government (Agriculture & Co-Operation) A.P. Secretariat,

Hyderabad, the Charge Memo No.SCA/Estt/1563/ 2006,

dated 03.03.2010, was issued to the petitioner for the

irregularities committed by him, while he was working as Seed

Certification Officer, Tanuku, stating that while he was

working as Seed Certification Officer, Tanuku, during the

period from 17.08.2002 to 21.06.2004, he had certified 113

acres seed production plots of pulses as against the actual

area of 29.78 acres during the Rabi, 2003-04 and committed

irregularities due to his slack supervision, neglected his duties

in not verifying allotted seed production plots of pulses of

certified seed growers and in not bringing the false claims of

the farmers to the notice of his Superior Officers of APSSCA,

which was considered as an act of misconduct and an act of

violation under Regulation 4(i) & (iv) of the APSSCA Employees

Discipline & Appeal Regulations, 2001. Thereafter, the 7 PK,J wp_34988_2012

petitioner has submitted his explanation to the said Charge

Memo. As the respondents were not satisfied with the said

explanation, an Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were

appointed to conduct inquiry against the petitioner under Rule

(8) of APSSCA Employees Discipline & Appeal Regulations,

2001 vide proceedings No.SCA/Estt/1563/2006, dated

30.04.2010. The Enquiry Officer, after conducting the

enquiry, has submitted his report, dated 03.11.2012, holding

that the charges against the petitioner are proved. Therefore,

the respondents are justified in imposing the punishment of

withholding of one increment with cumulative effect on the

petitioner.

6. This Court has taken note of the submission made by

respective parties.

7. A perusal of the record reveals that while the petitioner

was working as Seed Certification Officer, respondent No.1 has

issued Charge Memo, dated 03.03.2010, which culminated

into the order dated 18.07.2011 imposing the major penalty of

withholding of one increment with cumulative effect.

8 PK,J wp_34988_2012

8. A perusal of the material on record reveals that at every

stage of enquiry, the petitioner was afforded reasonable

opportunity to putforth his case. Therefore, no procedural

irregularities can be said to have committed by the

respondents during the course of enquiry and therefore the

domestic enquiry is valid. Further, in the Enquiry Report, the

Enquiry Officer has given a categorical finding that three

farmers in their evidence have stated that though they have

less extents of land for cultivation, a huge extent of land was

shown in the records of A.P. Seeds. This part of the Enquiry

Report clearly established that the petitioner has neglected his

duties by not properly conducting the field inspection.

However, the guidelines for certification of areas and

quantities, on which much reliance has been placed by the

petitioner, were issued on 25.05.2006 whereas the alleged

irregularities pertain to the period 2003-2004. Therefore, the

said guidelines have no application to the present case.

Further, it is well settled that when no procedural lapses are

proved in conducting the domestic enquiry, the only duty cast

upon the Court is to see whether the punishment imposed is

proportionate or not.

9 PK,J wp_34988_2012

9. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment in

Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. v. H. Amaresh 2,

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paras 20 to 23, held

as under:

"20. Once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion normally it is not open to the tribunal and the courts to substitute their subjective opinion in place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal.

21. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, this Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane 3 has held as under:

"12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporatio's funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal."

22. We may also beneficially refer to a judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma 4. This Court held that the tribunals would not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a statutory provision in this behalf. Moreover, the Labour Courts must act within the four corners of the statute concerned, in terms of the provisions thereof. When the Labour Court had held that Charge 4 stood proved, no interference by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench was called for. In the instant case, the jurisdiction

2 (2006) 6 SCC 187 3 (2005) 3 SCC 254 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 407 4 (2005) 3 SCC 401 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 417 10 PK,J wp_34988_2012

vested with the Labour Court has been exercised capriciously and arbitrarily in spite of the finding that Charge 4, with regard to the pilferage, has been proved beyond any doubt. In our opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in ordering reinstatement was shockingly disproportionate in the nature of Charge 4 found proved. When Charge 4 is proved, which is grave in nature, interference with the punishment of dismissal cannot be justified. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution only when it finds that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved.

23. Ms Anitha Shenoy also cited a recent decision of this Court in Rajasthan SRTC v. Zakir Hussain 5 (Ruma Pal and Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, JJ). The respondent therein was also a conductor of the appellant Corporation. He challenged the termination of his service as being in violation of the provisions of the standing order. However, without availing the remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he approached the civil Courts and obtained decrees in his favour. It was challenged by the management before the High Court. The High Court declined to interfere with the orders passed by the lower court since there is concurrent findings on fact by both the courts below and that no substantial question of law arises, the appellant Corporation preferred the special leave petition before this Court questioning the correctness of the orders passed by the courts below and of the High Court particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain and try the suit instead of an industrial dispute. This Court held that the civil court has no jurisdiction and that the jurisdiction cannot be conferred by any by any order of the court and that where an act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner the performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. It was held that the employees of the State Road Transport Corporation are not civil servants and, therefore, they are not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution and that their terms of appointment

5 (2005) 7 SCC 447 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 945 11 PK,J wp_34988_2012

are governed by the letter of appointment and, therefore, the management was well within its right to terminate the services of the respondent during the period of probation if their services were not found to be satisfactory during the said period and in such an event the appellant Corporation was not obliged to hold an enquiry before terminating the services. In the concluding part of the judgment, this Court has observed that since the respondent workman has not acted bona fide in instituting the suit, the respondent was not entitled to any back wages and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the said case, it would not be appropriate to order refund of the back wages paid to him and that he shall not be allowed to continue in service any further and shall be discharged forthwith."

10. Further, in Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya

Vidyalaya Sangathan v. J. Hussain 6, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, at paras 7 to 9, held as under:

"7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instant case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of the charge. The disciplinary authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. A host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist.

8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the

6 (2013) 10 SCC 106 12 PK,J wp_34988_2012

appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts.... In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities.

9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine of Wednesbury rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. "

11. In the light of the above, once the domestic enquiry is

valid, it is not open for the Courts to show misplaced

sympathy on the employee and interfere with the punishment

imposed, as a matter of course. In the case on hand, this

Court is of the considered view that the punishment imposed

on the petitioner commensurate with the charges proved

against the petitioner and this Court does not find any 13 PK,J wp_34988_2012

substantial material to interfere with the punishment imposed

on the petitioner.

12. Coming to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench

of this Court in M. Periya Desan's case (referred supra), the

said judgment has no application to the facts of the present