Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 1753 Tel
Judgement Date : 29 April, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SAMBASIVARAO NAIDU
I.A.No.1 of 2023
IN/AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2643 OF 2018
JUDGMENT:
(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P.SAM KOSHY)
Heard Mr.S.Nagender, learned counsel for the
appellants/accused Nos.1 & 2 and Ms.Shalini Saxena, learned
Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the material available on
record.
2. The instant is a bail application filed under Section 374 (2)
of Criminal Procedure Code, assailing the judgment of conviction
in S.C.No.342 of 2013, passed by the Principal Sessions Judge,
Adilabad.
3. Vide the said impugned judgment, the Court below has
found the two appellants herein guilty of having committed the
offence under Section 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the 'IPC'). The two appellants, were
sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for life with fine of
Rs.5,000/- and with default stipulation for the offence under
Section 302 and further sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for
five years with fine of Rs.2,000/- with default stipulation for the
offence under Section 201 read with Section 34 of IPC.
4. The appeal is of the year 2018.
5. The bail petition earlier was rejected by this Bench when the
appeal was admitted after hearing on 01.10.2018.
6. Today, the matter was taken up for consideration on I.A.No.1
of 2023, which is an application for suspension of sentence moved
on behalf of the appellant/accused No.1.
7. The primary ground on the basis of which the suspension
was sought was the period of custody undergone by the appellants
herein being more than five years, in the light of the decision of
the Division Bench of this Court in Crl.A.M.P.No.1687 in
Crl.A.No.607 of 2011 decided on 19.12.2016.
8. Upon appreciation of the evidence which have come on
record, we found it more appropriate to decide the appeal itself on
merits rather than deciding the I.A.No.1 of 2023 which is for
suspension of sentence.
9. Accordingly, with the consent of the learned counsel for the
appellant and also learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, we
proceeded to decide the appeal itself on merits.
10. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the
appellant/accused Nos.1 and 2 along with two other accused had
conspired and later killed the deceased by throttling to death and
thereafter drowned the dead body in the well which situates in the
field of PW-1. On the recovery of the dead body and later the
complaint lodged by PW-2, the father of the deceased had
suspected the involvement of appellant/accused Nos.1 and 2 in so
far as causing the death of the deceased. They were taken into
custody and at the behest of the Police Authorities of Police
Station Khanapur, there was a confession made by the appellant
Nos.1 and 2 in the presence of PW-10. That on the basis of the
said judgment, the Charge Sheet was filed and the matter was put
for trial before the Principal Sessions Judge, Adilabad, where the
case was registered as S.C.No.342 of 2013. The crime that was
registered was Crime No.5 of 2013 in Khanapur Police Station.
11. The prosecution in all examined thirteen (13) witnesses i.e.,
PW-1 to PW-13. There was no witness on behalf of the defence.
Subsequently, after recording the statements under Section 312 of
the appellants, the impugned judgment of conviction has been
passed.
12. Initially, the Charge Sheet was filed against four accused
persons. Since accused No.3 Bhole Bhumesh, S/o.Duganna, was
absconding all along, his trial was separated and other three
accused were put to trial.
13. Vide the impugned order, the Court below found that the
prosecution has failed to lead sufficient evidence so far as the
involvement of the accused No.4, Kothari, S/o.Vedula, for the
offence under Section 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC
and accordingly, the accused No.4 was acquitted.
14. However, the learned Sessions Judge found the
appellant/accused Nos.1 and 2 to be guilty of the offence under
Section 302 and 201 of IPC and for which after conviction they
have been sentenced for the period which is already stipulated in
the preceding paragraph.
15. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the entire
case is based on circumstantial evidence and that there is no
proof whatsoever cogent enough on the part of the prosecution to
establish and conclude that the offence could have been
committed only by the appellants herein and not by any other
person. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants that even if the entire version of the prosecution is
accepted as it is, there is no way of links made out so as to reach
to the only conclusion of the offence to have been committed by
the appellants alone.
16. According to the learned counsel for the appellants the very
basic materials required for establishing of an offence which is to
be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence is not available.
Neither is there strong motive involved, nor is there the evidence
on last seen theory. The so-called confession made before the
PW-10 also has no admissibility value, as admittedly the so-called
confession made by the appellant Nos.1 and 2 was in the presence
of the Police Authorities themselves. Moreover, the categorical
stand of PW-10 was that when the confession was made before
him he was already with Police authorities who had called him to
be a punch witness for the confession statement.
17. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the judgment of conviction further also is not
sustainable for the reason that the cause of death also cannot be
admissible also to be that by throttling as would be evident from
the postmortem report itself. In the postmortem report it is
revealed that there was water found in the lungs of the deceased.
The fact that the postmortem report shows water in the lungs give
rise to a doubt of the deceased being alive at the time when he had
fallen or thrown by the accused persons. That in the absence of
cogent and concrete evidence of the death having arisen due to
throttling, the case of the prosecution gets weakened. The entire
case of the prosecution therefore gets collapsed. The fact that the
death of the deceased to be by way of drowning cannot be ruled
out, in the factual backdrop available on record, particularly, the
postmortem report Ex-P-18.
18. Per contra, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor opposing
the appeal submits that the prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubts as would be evident from the evidence
which has been led before the trial Court. Therefore, the judgment
of conviction does not require any interference.
19. According to the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, it is a
case where the PWs-2 and 3, the parents of the deceased have
categorically stated that their son have gone missing from the time
the deceased left the house in company of the appellant No.2 on
the garb of watching a movie in one of the theaters in village
khanpur.
20. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further contended
that so far as motive is concerned, there was a motive for the
appellant to have committed the offence for the reasons that he
found the deceased to be maintaining illicit relationship with the
wife of the appellant No.1. The appellant No.1 had personally
found the two persons together and had warned both the deceased
as also his wife. This fact also stands proved from the statement of
PWs-2 and 3. Further, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
contended that the police in the course of investigation have also
recovered a belt and Bajaj Chetak Scooter belonging to the
deceased at the instance of the appellant Nos.2 and 2 and also
from the house of the appellant. Which again thereby becomes
incriminating material on the part of the prosecution in proving its
case. Lastly, it was contended that the statement of PW-10 before
whom the accused Nos.1 and 2 made a confession which
completes the chain of links so far as the circumstantial evidence
is concerned and therefore, the appeal deserves to be rejected.
21. Having heard the learned counsel on either side, some of the
admitted factual matrix is revealed from the material papers
available on record, the deceased herein was a young boy, aged
around 21-22 years. He was living in the neighborhood of the
appellant No.1. The appellant/accused No.2 is said to be the
friend of the deceased. The deceased went missing from
06.01.2013, when he left his house to watch a movie at Khanapur.
The deceased has gone to watch movie along with appellant No.2
at around 11 A.M. on 06.01.2013. PW-2, the father of the
deceased went to lodge a report at Khanapur Police Station only
after three to four days. That when PW-2 had reached the Police
Station, he was informed by the Police Authorities about the dead
body being found at the well in the fields of PW-1. The body by
then had already started decomposing and was putrefied state
and the tender parts of the body were in a putrefied state and the
tender parts of the body was eaten by the fish and other living
creatures in the well. The postmortem was conducted on
10.01.2013 at around 11:30 A.M. The postmortem was conducted
by PW-11, viz., Dr.Venugopalakrishna, Civil Assistant Surgeon at
Government Hospital at Khanapur at the relevant point of time.
22. The Doctor conducting the postmortem has opined the cause
of death to be "the cause of death to the best of my knowledge and
belief is due to shock due to asphyxia due to THROTTLING".
23. Before we proceed further, it would be relevant to take note
of the factual details found in the course of the postmortem.
The material portion of the postmortem is being reproduced herein
under:
"Unable to identify as the dead body is putrified and in the process of decomposition.
A male body lying flat with the eyes opened. Mouth opened. Tongue swollen and visible out and distended. Foul smelling. The greenish black in appearance. Skin peeled off in various areas. Neck
swollen and dark colored. Palms and soles wrinkled and pale.
Entire body is in the process of decomposition. INJURIES:-
Laceration of about 4x22 cms oval in shape on the neck region below chick, is seen.
Left ear and parts of soft tissues of different areas are eaten away by water animals.
Skull and brain- tissues are in the procees of putrefication.
Neck is thickened, swollen and darkened in both sides. Mouth is opened. Lips swollen. Tongue is swollen and seen outside.
Blood stained watery fluid present. Water present in the lungs.
Hyoid bone is intact with the thickened tissues."
24. Coming to the circumstantial evidence as has been
contended by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, the first
contention is that of the last seen theory. According to the
prosecution, the deceased was last seen together with the
appellant No.2. It is said that on 06.01.2013, accused No.2 went
to the house of deceased and took him to watch a movie at village
Khanapur. Thereafter, the deceased is said to be missing.
However, there is no cogent evidence led on the part of the
prosecution to show that after 06.01.2013 or on 06.01.2013 itself,
the deceased was murdered from the statement of PW-2.
The father of the deceased on the very next day i.e., on 07.01.2013
at around 4 A.M. in the morning itself had gone to the house of
the accused No.2 inquiring about his missing son from their
residence to the house of the appellant No.1 and if the statement
of PW-2 is to be believed at 4 A.M. in the morning itself both these
persons were found at their respective houses. Which itself shows
that things were too natural at their end and that it would not
have been a natural reaction if they would had committed the
murder and immediately come back to their respective residence
peacefully.
25. However, what is also reflected is that the father also did not
lodge a missing complaint even then that both the accused had
expressed their ignorance of the whereabouts of the deceased.
According to the PW-4, he went to the Police Station after three or
four days and when he had reached to the police station, the
police had informed him about the dead body found. The police
took PW-1 to the well where the body was found and he identified
it to be of his son. This again seems to be un-natural conduct on
the part of the father whose only son was missing from
06.01.2013 and he does not go to the police station even for
lodging a missing report.
26. Thus, the last seen theory propounded by the prosecution in
the given factual backdrop does not seem to be convincing that of
the deceased to be found in the company of the accused No.2
when they had gone to the cinema and even after the cinema.
27. The prosecution has not conducted any investigation so as
to even verify the fact whether the deceased and the appellant
No.2 had gone to any of the theaters in village Khanpur to watch a
cinema. It further weakens the case of the prosecution.
28. As regards the second stance, what action is reflected from
the postmortem report is that of water being found in the lungs of
the deceased. It is a known fact that if it would have been a case
of throttling and the deceased having died before being thrown
into the well there was hardly any scope for water to enter the
lungs of a dead body. The fact that in the course of conducting
the Post-Mortem the Doctor found water gives rise to a serious
doubt as to whether the deceased fell into the well or was thrown
in the well alive or dead. The finding of water in the lungs of the
deceased indicates that the deceased was alive when he fell into
the well or when he was thrown in the well: either of the
possibilities cannot be proved. If that is the situation, the entire
case of the prosecution itself would get collapsed for the reason
that the prosecution has been sticking on one particular stand
that the appellants had throttled the deceased to death and
thereafter he was thrown into the well. The medical evidence does
not support this theory propounded by the prosecution. This
finding in the Post-Mortem also breaks the chain of links required
in a case of circumstantial evidence. Another fact which needs to
be appreciated is that the father of the deceased (PW-1) in his
cross-examination in chief has made a categorical disclosure that
he had gone to the house of the accused Nos.1 and 2 inquiring
about the whereabouts of his missing son and both of them did
not give a satisfactory reply. The said deposition of PW-1
established the fact that both the appellants were available at
their respective residences on the day when the deceased had
gone missing. Another fact which is something unnatural is that
though the PW-1 (father of the deceased) has stated to have gone
to the house of both the appellants on the very same night but
could not get a favourable response or information, yet as per the
deposition of PW-1 itself, he went to the Police Station after three
or four days which does not appear to be a natural reaction of a
father whose only son has gone missing and it is in this context
that this Court presumes that perhaps the statement given by
PW-1 may be on account of instructions provided by the
Prosecution so as to make out that the case of the appellant is
stronger.
29. Another aspect which is difficult to accept from the
prosecution side is that the accused No.2, who was in fact the
friend of the deceased, might have helped the accused No.1.
Whereas the accused No.2 and accused No.1 have not stated or
claimed to be good friends. Apart from the aforesaid
circumstances which have been discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, there does not seem to be any further strong
materials available or brought by the prosecution to establish the
offence. PW-8, who was one of the persons who had first seen the
dead body floating in the well, has stated that one cycle tube was
tied around the waist of the dead body. There is no further
averment whether there was a big stone tied to the tube so that
the dead body does not float and would be drowned because of the
weight of the stone, nor is there any indication by the prosecution
to show that the other end of the tube also had a knot which must
have been tied to a stone. The case of the prosecution here also is
not very convincing. The possibility of the deceased who did not
knew swimming having entered the well with a tube around his
waist and if the air in the tube got released, the deceased would
not have got drowned, cannot be ruled out. It is nobody's case
that the deceased knew swimming.
30. Another aspect which does not have a convincing
explanation on the part of the prosecution is the retaining of one
leather belt and the Bajaj Chetak Scooter with its R.C. book at the
instance of accused No.1. The leather belt and the Bajaj Chetak
Scooter are things which are quite familiar to the family members
and the neighbours, and they could have been easily identified by
the neighbouring people as belonging to the deceased. In the said
circumstances, it is difficult to accept that after appellants would
kill the deceased, they would retain the leather belt and the Bajaj
Chetak Scooter with the appellant No.1. The prosecution only
says of having recovered the aforesaid two items, viz., leather belt
and Bajaj Chetak Scooter at the instance of Appellant No.1, but it
does not disclose as to the place from which it was seized.
31. Now we go to the legal position as to whether in the aforesaid
chain of events and the links attached are sufficient to meet the
requirements in a case of circumstantial evidence to hold a
person/persons guilty of having been committed the offence of
murder.
32. The High Court of Kerala in the case of Raman vs. State of
Kerala 1 in paragraph Nos.12 to 17 has held as under:
"12. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 cannot be believed. She submitted that the behaviour of PW 1 is suspicious since he did not go to the house of the accused on the information given by the accused that the deceased did not take water and the accused had beaten her. The learned counsel also submitted that the recovery of material objects is doubtful and many blood stained articles alleged to have been seized by the police were not
1 2015 SCC OnLine Ker39691
sent for Chemical Analysis. The learned counsel also submitted that even assuming that the accused has committed any offence, it would not attract Section 302 of the IPC and at best, the offence would be one under the second part of S. 304, IPC.
13. She also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kusha Laxman Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2014 SC 3839).
14. As stated earlier, there is nothing to disbelieve the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3. We do not also think that the conduct and behaviour of PW 1 was suspicious in the facts and circumstances. MOs. 1 to 3 were seized as per Ext. P4 Scene Mahazar. As rightly held by the court below, we do not think that MOs. 1 and 3 were recovered as per Ext. P3 Mahazar. The prosecution case to that extent is not believable.
15. In Kusha Laxman Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2014 SC 3839), the Supreme Court held thus:--
"After giving our anxious consideration in the matter and after analysing the entire evidence, we are of the view that it is not a fit case where conviction could be sustained under Section 302, IPC. The weapon used by the appellant is a wooden stick and as per the prosecution case, the deceased was severely beaten by the said stick. As a result thereof, she died. There is no cogent evidence to show that the appellant had beaten the deceased with an intention to cause her death. In such circumstances, the conviction of the appellant under Section 304, Part-II, IPC will be just and proper."
16. In Anil v. State of Kerala (2014 (4) KLT 489), a Division Bench of this Court held thus:
"But, the nature of the transaction and all attendant circumstances would clearly show that the alleged acts, though could have been done with the knowledge that they are likely to cause death, were evidently done without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the legal evidence on record proves, only that the accused had committed the offence punishable under Part-II of S. 304, IPC. The conviction and
sentence are, therefore, to be altered accordingly."
17. Ext. P4 Scene Mahazar shows that one crow bar and a hammer were found in the house of the accused. There is no case that the crow bar or hammer were used by the accused to beat his wife. On the other hand, the specific case of the prosecution is that the accused inflicted injuries on the deceased with M.O. 1 and M.O. 2. When PW 9 was examined, he was asked whether the injuries could be caused with M.O. 1 stick. It is also alleged that M.O. 3 stem of a coconut leaf was also used for inflicting the injuries. From the facts and circumstances, it is not discernible that the injuries were inflicted with an intention to cause the death of the victim or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. However, it is clear that the acts were done by the accused with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death of the victim. We are of the view that the offence under Section 302, IPC is not attracted in the case and only an offence under Section 304 Part-II, IPC is made out."
33. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Lavghanbhai Devjibhai Vasava vs. State of Gujarat 2 laying
down the basic parameters to consider while deciding the question
as to whether a case falls under Section 302 IPC or Section 304
IPC in paragraph Nos.6 to 8 as held as under:
"6. We have perused the evidence in this behalf. We find that the prosecution case itself proceeds that the incident took place in the spur of moment. On 15-3- 2008, when the deceased along with her mother went for labour work in agricultural field and she returned home around noon, she was preparing lunch in the kitchen when, as per the prosecution story, the appellant came to the house and questioned the deceased about delay in cooking lunch. On this, altercation took place between the appellant and his wife. At that stage, the appellant got furious and in a rush of the moment, he picked a wooden object lying near the place of incident and inflicted injury to the
2 (2018) 4 SCC 329
deceased. It is also an admitted case of the prosecution that only one single blow was inflicted. The death of Shakuben took place 10 days after the said incident while she was undergoing treatment at Baroda Hospital. This is the case of the prosecution itself.
7. This Court in Dhirendra Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand [Dhirendra Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 163] has laid down the parameters which are to be taken into consideration while deciding the question as to whether a case falls under Section 302 IPC or Section 304 IPC, which are the following:
(a) The circumstances in which the incident took place;
(b) The nature of weapon used;
(c) Whether the weapon was carried or was taken from the spot;
(d) Whether the assault was aimed on vital part of body;
(e) The amount of the force used.
(f) Whether the deceased participated in the sudden fight;
(g) Whether there was any previous enmity;
(h) Whether there was any sudden provocation.
(i) Whether the attack was in the heat of passion; and
(j) Whether the person inflicting the injury took any undue advantage or acted in the cruel or unusual manner.
8. Keeping in view the aforesaid factors it becomes evident that the case of the appellant would fall under Section 304 IPC as the incident took place due to a sudden altercation which was a result of delay in preparing lunch by the deceased. The appellant picked up a wooden object and hit the deceased. The medical evidence shows that not much force was used in inflicting the blow to the deceased. The prosecution has not set up any case suggesting that relationship between the husband and wife was not cordial, otherwise. Manifestly, the incident took place due to sudden provocation and in a heat of passion the appellant had struck a blow on his wife, without taking any undue advantage. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was an offence which would be covered by Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 302 IPC."
34. In the light of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and the
principle laid down therein when we look into the facts of the
present case, the discrepancies, doubts and the suspicion referred
to firstly being as to whether the death of the ceased was in fact
due to drowning or throttling ? secondly, whether the theories of
last scene are leading to any conclusive proof of the availability of
the appellants anywhere near? and thirdly, whether the so-called
circumstantial evidence collected in the course of the
investigation, can it be conclusively held that the offence to have
been committed only by the appellants alone and not by anybody
else if at all if it is a case of murder? The other general
circumstance also referred to and relied on by the Trial Court also
does not seem to be convincing and strong enough to find the
appellants themselves having the motive of committing the offence
of murder. Therefore, the appellant Nos.1 and 2 are therefore
entitled for the benefit of doubt which is relevant to the facts
discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Hence, granting the
benefit of doubt in favour of the appellants, we hold that the
prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all
reasonable doubt. As a consequence, the appeal deserves to be
allowed, and the appellants stand acquitted of the charges levelled
against them. The appellant Nos.1 and 2 shall be released from
jail forthwith, if they are not wanted in any other criminal case.
35. Accordingly, the Appeal stands allowed. No costs.
36. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall
stand closed.
____________________ P.SAM KOSHY, J
______________________________ SAMBASIVARAO NAIDU, J Date: 29.04.2024 AQS/Ndr
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