Telangana High Court

K. Shiva Kumar vs The State Of Telangana on 4 April, 2024

        THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK

              WRIT PETITION No.14677 of 2023

O R D E R:

This Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief:

"...to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, by declaring the proceedings of the 2nd respondent bearing proceedings No.VSII(1)1391/2017, dated 12.05.2023, imposing the penalty of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect, solely based on the instructions of the 1st respondent, as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of Constitution of India and set aside the same, consequently direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion/appointment by transfer to the post of Deputy Tahsildar with effect from a due date, with all consequential benefits and to pass..."

2. The case of the petitioner is that he was initially appointed

as Typist in Revenue Establishment of Nalgonda District on

compassionate grounds, during the month of May, 2005.

Thereafter, in the month of March, 2009, he was promoted as

Revenue Inspector and posted at Chandur Mandal. While so,

respondent No.2 issued Charge Memo, dated 06.04.2018 in

respect of the incident that took place in the year, 2011 i.e., after

nearly lapse of seven years, alleging that the petitioner failed to

scrutinise the application of an individual and issued Income

Certificate to an ineligible candidate, without furnishing the list of

documents though it is mandatory as per Rule 20 (4) of TS Civil 2 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

Services (Classification, Control &Appeal) Rules, 1991. Since, no

documents or statements were furnished to the petitioner along

with the Charge Memo, the very initiation of disciplinary

proceedings is being vitiated. Therefore, the petitioner filed

W.P.No.21057 of 2018 seeking a direction to the respondents to

furnish the documents, based on which, the charge sheet was

drawn against him. This Court, vide order, dated 10.09.2018,

disposed of the said Writ Petition with a direction to the petitioner

to submit his explanation to the charge memo dated 06.04.2018

and thereafter the disciplinary authority to take steps in

accordance with law. Accordingly, the petitioner has submitted

his explanation, dated 03.10.2018 to respondent No.2, denying

the charges stating inter alia that he never neglected his duties as

Revenue Inspector; as the issue pertains to the year 2011, it is

highly impossible to remember each and every case; and the

Income Certificate was issued on the strength of the report of

V.R.O., who was the Field Officer. Thereafter, no further steps

were taken by the respondents. While so, respondent No.3 has

communicated the list of eligible Senior Assistants for promotion

to the post of Naib/Deputy Tahsildar, vide proceedings, dated

30.08.2018, wherein the name of the petitioner has been shown at

Sl.No.35 and upto Sl.No.50 promotions were granted to the post 3 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

the Deputy Tahsildar. Since the Charge Memo, dated 06.04.2018

is pending against the petitioner, he was not promoted. Therefore,

the petitioner has submitted a representation, dated 20.02.2019,

to respondent No.2 with a request to promote him to the post of

Deputy Tahsildar, without reference to the Charge Memo. As the

case of the petitioner was not considered for promotion to the post

of Naib/Deputy Tahsildar, he was constrained to file W.P.No.8485

of 2019 before this Court and this Court vide order, dated

23.04.2019, directed the respondents therein to consider the case

of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Deputy Tahsildar in

terms of G.O.Ms.No.257, dated 10.06.1999. Pursuant thereto,

respondent No.3 has issued Memo, dated 17.06.2019, informing

the petitioner that his candidature would be considered for

promotion as Deputy Tahsildar in the next DPC. Thereafter,

respondent No.1 has issued Memo, dated 21.03.2023, instructing

the second respondent to impose the penalty of 'withholding of two

annual grade increments without cumulative effect' against the

petitioner and five others. Based on such instructions,

respondent No.2 has issued the impugned proceedings

No.VSII(1)1391/2017, dated 12.05.2023, against the petitioner

imposing a penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments 4 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

without cumulative effect against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the

same, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition.

3. Heard Sri S.Gopal Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the petitioner, and learned Government Pleader for Services - II

appearing on behalf of the respondents. Perused the material

available on record.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the juniors

of the petitioner were promoted to the post of Deputy Tahsildar

ignoring the case of the petitioner on the ground that the

disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner.

Learned counsel has vehemently contended that the very initiation

of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in issuing the

Charge Memo, dated 06.04.2018, in respect of the allegations

pertaining to the year 2011, is contrary to law laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab v. Chaman

Lal Goyal 1 wherein it was held that the disciplinary proceedings

must be conducted soon after the alleged irregularities are

committed and if the delay is too long, the charges are liable to be

quashed. In the present case, the allegations levelled against the

petitioner pertain to the year 2011 and the Charge Memo was

1 (1995) 2 SCC 570 5 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

issued to the petitioner in the year 2018 i.e., after a lapse of about

seven years and respondent No.2 has issued the impugned

proceedings after lapse of more than twelve years from the date of

delinquency and after more than five years from the date of

Charge Memo, due to which, the petitioner was not promoted to

the post of Deputy Tahsildar. Learned counsel has further

contended that the delay has caused prejudice to the petitioner as

at this length of time he would not be in a position to put forward

a comprehensive defence in relation to the facts, which have faded

away from his memory. It is further submitted that despite many

requests made by the petitioner to submit relevant documents, no

documents were furnished to him, which is mandatory as per Rule

20 (4) of TSCS (CC&A) Rules. Therefore, the very initiation of the

disciplinary proceedings is defective and therefore the further

proceedings are to be held void ab initio. It is further submitted

that the petitioner has submitted a detailed explanation to the

charge memo denying the allegations levelled against him and no

enquiry as contemplated under Rule 20 (4) of TSCS (CC&A) Rules,

has been conducted and without conducting the enquiry, the

Enquiry Officer has held that the charges against the petitioner

are proved on presumptions and assumptions. Basing on the said

report, respondent No.1 i.e., the Appellate Authority straight away 6 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

issued Memo, dated 21.03.2023, instructing respondent No.2 to

impose a penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments

without cumulative effect against the petitioner. Therefore, on

such instructions of the Appellate Authority, respondent No.2 has

issued the impugned proceedings No.VSII(1)1391/2017, dated

12.05.2023, against the petitioner imposing a penalty of stoppage

of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect against

the petitioner by taking away the right of appeal, which is

absolutely illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional being violative of

Articles 14, 16 and 21 of Constitution of India. Therefore, learned

counsel prayed this Court to set aside the proceedings, dated

12.05.2023, issued by respondent No.2. To support his

contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the

judgments of the High Court of Judicature, Hyderabad in

Government of Andhra Pradesh v. H.K.V.P.B. Chemicals (P)

Limited 2, D.Srinivas v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,

Roads and Buildings (Vig.I) Department 3, the judgment passed

by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Maruboyina

Ramanjaneulu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 4 and the

2 1991 (1) ALT 472 (D.B.) 3 2013 (4) ALT 1 (D.B.)

7 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

judgment of this Court in T.Narasimha v. The State of

Telangana 5.

5. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Services-II

has submitted that without availing the alternative remedy

available to the petitioner under Rule 33 of TS (CCA) Rules, 1991,

he has directly approached this Court and therefore the present

Writ Petition is not maintainable. It is further contended that

while the petitioner was working as Revenue Inspector at Chennur

Mandal, he committed certain irregularities in issuing Income

Certificate, due to which, adverse news was published in Vartha

Telugu news paper, dated 01.07.2016 under the caption 'Joruga

Revenue Dandha'. Further, the petitioner has recommended

issuance of Income Certificate in File No.B/3636/2011, dated

18.07.2011, to the ineligible candidate namely Kurimella Manoj

Kumar, B-Pharmacy student of Nalgonda Pharmacy College,

Nalgonda, inspite of knowing that his father viz., K. Raj Kumar is

a government employee working in Revenue Department as Village

Revenue Officer, Gurrampode Mandal, Nalgonda District.

Further, as per Memo, dated 21.12.2020 and 21.03.2023 in File

No.17557/Vig.-III(1)/2017-3, the Vigilance Department, has

requested to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the erred

8 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

officials involved in issuing income certificate to the ineligible

candidates. It is further contended that for issuance of the

Certificates, certain guidelines were issued by the Government

from time to time, but the petitioner without following the same

has recommended for issuance of Income Certificate to the

ineligible candidates with malafide intention. It is the primary

duty and responsibility of the petitioner, being the core field

officer, to verify every inquiry thoroughly. Even if it is erroneously

recommended by the Village Revenue Officer, the petitioner cannot

absolve himself stating that he has recommended based on the

report/remarks of the Village Revenue Officer. It is further

submitted that the respondents after careful examination of the

charges, findings in the Enquiry Report and as per the orders of

the Government in Memo No.17557/Vig.III(1)/2017, dated

21.03.2023, imposed a penalty of stoppage of two increments

without cumulative effect against the petitioner under Rule 9 of

TSCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991 vide CCLA proceedings No.VSII(1)/

1391/2017, dated 12.05.2023, which is minor punishment in

nature. Therefore, respondents are justified in imposing the

penalty of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect to

the proven charges against the petitioner. Hence, prayed this

Court to dismiss the Writ Petition.

9 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

6. This Court has taken note of the submissions made by

respective parties.

7. A perusal of record discloses that admittedly, the

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide

Charge Memo, dated 06.04.2018, in respect of the incident

pertaining to the year 2011 i.e. after a lapse of seven years. Thus,

the very initiation of disciplinary proceedings after such a long

time evidently prejudices the delinquent officer. Admittedly, the

impugned proceedings were issued against the petitioner by

respondent No.2, at the instructions of respondent No.1.

8. In similar circumstances, a Division Bench of the then High

Court in the case of D.Srinivas (2 Supra), at paras 15 and 18,

held as under:

"15. This Court is of the view that the defence of the respondents on the allegation of abnormal delay raised by the petitioner is not satisfactory. Except administrative reasons, no other reason is indicated which contributed to delay in disciplinary proceedings.

18. Coming to the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the charge relates to the year 1998 and no steps were taken immediately on the subject-matter of the charge. Only pursuant to the complaint lodged against the Executive Engineer (Electrical) alone before the Upa-Lokayuktha, A.P., and basing on the ex parte preliminary enquiry report, proceedings were initiated which were later dropped. Thereafter, regular departmental enquiry is conducted and on one ground or the other the enquiry officers were changed, which is admitted in the counter-affidavit, stating that delay is only on account of administrative reasons. Having regard to the nature of charge 10 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

and the plea of delay, we are of the considered view that there is abnormal and unexplained delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in completing the enquiry and imposing punishment. Such an action is contrary to the judgments referred above apart from the executive instructions issued by the Government itself. Even for the said reason, the impugned order is liable to be set aside."

(ii) In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India 6 while considering the

plea of initiation and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer."

(iii) In P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board 7, the

inordinate delay of ten years in initiating and completing enquiry

was found fault by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by holding that

delinquent employee has already suffered enough on account of

disciplinary proceedings. On the said ground, charge memo itself

was quashed.

(iv) Further, in case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence v.

Prabash Chandra Mirdha 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held

that delay in initiating or concluding enquiry proceedings causes

6 2006 4 SCJ 788 7 2005 6 SCJ 15 8 (2012) 11 SCC 565 11 PK,J Wp_14677_2023

prejudice to the delinquent; as such the same is also a ground for

quashing the charge itself.

(v) Further in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal9 while

dealing with a case where the High Court had quashed the memo

of charges communicated to the public servant on the ground of

delay as the charge memo issued in 1992 related to incident in

1986. In this context, while dealing with the question of delay, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.