Telangana High Court
A. Jeeth Rao Died vs The State Of Telangana on 9 January, 2023
Bench: Ujjal Bhuyan, N.Tukaramji
* THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI
+ Writ Appeal No.643 of 2022
% 09.01.2023
# Between:
A.Jeeth Rao (died) & others
Appellants
Vs.
The State of Telangana,
Rep by its Principal Secretary,
Municipal Administration Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad & others.
Respondents
! Counsel for Appellants : Mr. Vedula Venkata Ramana
^ Counsel for
Respondent Nos.1 & 6 : Mr. Parsa Ananth Nageswar Rao
Counsel for Respondent No. 3 : Mr.Y.Rama Rao
Counsel for Respondent No. 7 : Mr.G.Vidya Sagar
Counsel for
Respondent Nos.8 & 9 :Polkampally Pavan Kumar Rao
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1 AIR 1957 SC 344
2 (1976) 1 SCC 800
3 (2010) 8 SCC 467
4 (2010) 13 SCC 158
5 (2003) 1 SCC 335
6 (2020) 8 SCC 129
7 (2020) 8 SCC 129
8 (2014) 3 SCC 183
9 (2016) 6 SCC 387
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI
Writ Appeal No.643 of 2022
JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)
Heard Mr. Vedula Venkatramana, learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants; Mr.Parsa Ananth Nageswar
Rao, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the
Office of learned Advocate General for Municipal
Administration representing respondent Nos.1 and 6;
learned standing counsel for Greater Hyderabad Municipal
Corporation representing respondent Nos.2, 4 & 5;
Mr.Y.Rama Rao, learned standing counsel for Hyderabad
Metropolitan Development Authority representing
respondent No.3; Mr.G.Vidya Sagar, learned Senior
Counsel representing respondent No.7; and Mr.
Polkampally Pavan Kumar Rao, learned counsel for
respondent Nos.8 & 9.
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated
28.07.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing
the writ petition being W.P.No.976 of 2020 filed by the
appellants as the writ petitioners.
3. Appellants had filed the related writ petition for a
direction to the State to re-convey the lands to an extent of
Acs.34 - 17 gts in Sy.Nos.1011/1 and 1011/2 situated at
Kukatpally Revenue Village in Kukatpally Mandal, Medchal
- Malkajgiri District (subject land) in favour of the
petitioners.
4. From the materials on record, it appears that the
subject land was acquired by the State Government in the
year 1966 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the
purpose of allotment in favour of Indian Detonators
Limited. Predecessors of the petitioners were the owners of
the subject land which was acquired by the State. After
acquisition, the land was kept vacant for a long time. It
was alleged that Indian Detonators Limited has entered
into a development agreement with Gulf Oil Corporation
Limited (Respondent No.7), who inturn has entered into a
further development agreement with Hinduja Estates
Private Limited (Respondent No.8) on 30.07.2012 for real
estate business.
5. According to the petitioners, the land was acquired
for a public purpose i.e., for industrial use but now the
acquired land is being used for commercial purpose. The
purpose for which the land was acquired has been
changed. Therefore, petitioners submitted representation
dated 21.10.2019 before the GHMC authorities seeking
survey and demarcation of the acquired land and
thereafter to re-convey the subject land to the petitioners.
This was followed by legal notice dated 18.11.2019 and
reminder dated 28.12.2019. With the grievance that no
corrective steps were taken on the basis of the above
representations, related writ petition came to be filed.
6. While learned counsel for the appellants had
contended before the learned Single Judge that the
acquired land was being utilized for a purpose which was
different from the public purpose for which the acquisition
was made, learned Government Pleader for Revenue had
submitted before the learned Single Judge that once a
property is acquired, question of re-conveying the same
does not arise.
7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and
on due consideration, learned Single Judge passed the
order dated 28.07.2022 taking the view that relief sought
for by the petitioners cannot be granted. Disposing of the
writ petition, liberty has been granted to the appellants to
avail appropriate remedy if any.
8. Hence the appeal.
9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submit
that on 28.09.2022, this Court had issued notice and
directed maintenance of status quo in respect of the subject
land. Once notice has been issued, State should file
affidavit. Elaborating further, he submits that the purpose
for which the land was acquired has to be maintained; it
must be in the public interest. Ofcourse once acquired, the
land can be utilized for B public interest instead of A public
interest but it cannot be used for a private cause like
constructing commercial complexes or constructing villas.
His further submission is that though the land was
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section
103 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (briefly 'the 2013 Act' herein) provides that provisions
of the 2013 Act would be in addition to and not in
derogation of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
9.1. Section 101 of the 2013 Act provides for return
of unutilized land, in case the acquired land is not utilized
during a particular period, for the purpose for which it was
acquired. Such a provision was absent in the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. He therefore submits that on a
conjoint reading of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
2013 Act, since it is evident that the subject land is being
utilized not for public purpose but for commercial purpose,
which was not the object of land acquisition, the same
should be resumed by the State and retained in the 'Land
Bank' of the State.
10. Mr. Parsa Ananth Nageshwar Rao, learned
Special Government Pleader representing respondent Nos.1
and 6 submits that respondent No.6 has filed counter
affidavit objecting to the contention of the appellants. He
submits that learned Single Judge was fully justified in
dismissing the writ petition.
10.1. He has referred to the decision of the Supreme
Court in the cases of Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union
Vs. Delhi Improvement Trust1, Gulam Mustafa Vs.
State of Maharashtra2, Sulochana Chandrakant
Galande Vs. Pune Municipal Transport3 and Om
Prakash Verma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh4 and
contends that once a land is acquired, it vests entirely with
the State free from all encumbrances. Thereafter it is not
open to the land owners to contend that post acquisition,
the land has to be utilized in a particular manner.
11. Mr.G.Vidya Sagar, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for respondent No.7 submits that the writ
petition has been filed after 54 years of land acquisition.
Such a writ petition cannot be entertained at all. In
AIR 1957 SC 344
(1976) 1 SCC 800
(2010) 8 SCC 467
(2010) 13 SCC 158
support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a
decision of the Supreme Court in Northern Indian Glass
Industries Vs. Jaswant Singh5. His further contention is
that in the instant case, subject land was acquired under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when the 2013 Act was not
even visualized or conceptualized. There cannot be
application of the provisions of the 2013 Act, in the present
case, to support resumption of the acquired land. Referring
to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs.
Manoharlal6, more particularly to paragraph Nos.363 and
364, learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 101 of
the 2013 Act cannot be made applicable to an acquisition
made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
11.1. However on facts, denying the allegation of the
appellants, he would assert that the acquired land was
utilized by respondent No.7 for industrial purpose in
respect of which he has requisite documents to prove prior
to entering into development agreement.
(2003) 1 SCC 335
(2020) 8 SCC 129
11.2. Further, from the cause title, learned Senior
Counsel has pointed out that appellant Nos.1, 5 and 6 are
no more alive, yet they have been presented before the
Court as surviving and contesting appellants. His
submission is that the writ petition as well as the writ
appeal are not bonafide and therefore the writ appeal
should be dismissed.
12. Learned counsel representing the other
respondents has supported the contentions advanced on
behalf of the State as well as on behalf of respondent No.7.
13. Submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties have received the due consideration of the Court.
14. The subject land was acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, in 1966. The land was acquired by
the State for the purpose of utilization thereof by Indian
Detonators Limited. According to the appellants, the
acquired land was not utilized by Indian Detonators
Limited for a long time. Subsequently, Indian Detonators
Limited entered into development agreement with Gulf Oil
Corporation Limited, who inturn entered into a further
development agreement with Hinduja Estates Private
Limited on 30.07.2012 for real estate business.
14.1. Appellants filed representations on 21.10.2019,
18.11.2019 and 28.12.2019 contending that the acquired
land was not being utilized for the purpose for which it was
acquired. Therefore, the land should be resumed and
returned back to the appellants.
15. This has been denied by Mr. G.Vidya Sagar,
learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.7. According to
him, the acquired land was utilized by respondent No.7 for
industrial purpose i.e., for the purpose for which the land
was acquired. Much much later the development
agreements were entered into.
16. In the course of the hearing, learned counsel for
the parties have submitted that land acquisition
proceedings were completed in the year 1966 and the land
owners were duly compensated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The subject land thereafter vested with the State
Government whereafter it was handed over to respondent
No.7.
17. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants (supra)
Supreme Court examined the meaning of the word 'vesting'
in the context of Sections 16 and 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. It was held therein that the property
acquired becomes the property of the Government without
any conditions or limitations. 'Encumbrance' actually
means the burden caused by an act or omission of a man
and not that created by nature. It means a burden or
charge upon the property or a claim or lien on the land. It
means a legal liability on property. Thus, it constitutes a
burden on the title which diminishes the value of the land.
17.1. The expression 'free from all encumbrances'
appearing in Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
would mean wholly unqualified and would encompass
extinguishing of 'all rights, title and interests including
easementary rights'. Thus, 'free from all encumbrances'
means vesting of land in the State without any charge or
burden in it. State has absolute title or ownership over it.
18. Again in Gulam Mustafa (supra) Supreme Court
held that once the original acquisition is valid and title has
vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is of
no concern to the original owner and cannot be the basis
for invalidating the acquisition.
19. Supreme Court in Sulochana Chandrakant
Galande (supra), reiterated the above decision holding that
it is the legal proposition that once land vests in the State
free from all encumbrances, there cannot be any rider on
the power of the State Government to change user of the
land in the manner it chooses. Summing up the law,
Supreme Court held that once the land is acquired, it vests
in the State free from all encumbrances. It is not the
concern of the landowner how his land is used and
whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it
was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes
persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has
a right to get compensation only for the same. Person
interested cannot claim right of restoration of land on any
ground, whatsoever.
20. On the question of delay, Supreme Court in
Northern Indian Glass Industries (supra) set aside the
order of the High Court entertaining the writ petition
seventeen years after finalization of the acquisition
proceedings. In that case, the writ petition was entertained
on the ground that full enhanced compensation amount
was not paid to the land owners. Supreme Court opined
that merely because full enhanced compensation amount
was not paid to the land owners, that itself was not a
ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ
petition. It was held that High Court was not justified in
ordering restoration of land on the ground that land
acquired was not used for which it had been acquired.
Reiterating the settled principle, Supreme Court held that
after passing of award and taking overall possession under
Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the acquired
land vests with the Government free from all
encumbrances. Even if the land is not utilized for the
purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not
get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask
for restitution of possession.
21. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal7 was
examining legality of Section 24 of the 2013 Act in the
context of divergence of views expressed in Pune
Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki8 and Yogesh Neema Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh9. In the above context and considering the
provision for return of unutilized land under Section 101 of
the 2013 Act, Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
emphatically held that Section 101 of the 2013 Act cannot
be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
22. Thus, on a thorough consideration of all relevant
aspects of the matter, we are of the unhesitant view that
both the writ petition as well as the writ appeal are wholly
(2020) 8 SCC 129
(2014) 3 SCC 183
(2016) 6 SCC 387
devoid of any merit. There is no question of the appellants
availing appropriate remedy as observed by the learned
Single Judge.
23. Writ Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall
stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
______________________________________
UJJAL BHUYAN, CJ
______________________________________
N.TUKARAMJI, J
09.01.2023
MRM
