Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3803 Tel
Judgement Date : 26 November, 2021
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI
WRIT PETITION NO.26805 OF 2003
ORDER
This Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a
Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings No.BPA/PER/41/3096
dt.07.08.2002 issued by the respondent as illegal, arbitrary, contrary to
the judgments rendered by this Court in W.P.No.7828 of 1991 and
W.A.No.739 of 1992 and to consequently direct the respondent to
release the salary and other benefits for the period from 20.05.1991 to
31.07.1992 by treating her husband's date of birth as 15.07.1932.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this Writ Petition are that the
petitioner is the wife of late K.P. John who joined the service of the
respondent company on 23.04.1948. The age of superannuation of the
employees of the respondent company is 60 years. The petitioner's
husband's date of birth is 15.07.1932 as per his matriculation
certificate, but at the time of appointment, in his service register, the
date of birth of the petitioner's husband was entered as 23.04.1930.
Alleging that the said date of birth is wrong, the petitioner's husband
refused to sign his service register. Subsequently, his date of birth was
corrected as 15.07.1932 in the service book on 28.11.1982. However,
the petitioner's husband was referred to the Apex Medical Board for
examination for determination of his correct date of birth. The Apex
Medical Board after physical examination issued proceedings
dt.07.05.1991 determining the age of the petitioner's husband as 18
years as on 23.04.1948, i.e., the date of joining the respondent
company. On the basis of the said Medical Board proceedings
dt.07.05.1991 treating the date of birth of the petitioner's husband as
23.04.1930, proceedings No.P.BPA/28/1884 dt.25.05.1991 were
issued to retire the petitioner's husband from service with effect from
20.05.1991. Contending that as per the date of birth entered in his
matriculation certificate, the petitioner's husband was entitled to be
continued in service up to 31.07.1992, but he was sought to be retired
by 31.04.1990 depriving him 27 months service and consequently, the
employee filed W.P.No.7828 of 1991. Vide orders dt.29.01.1992, this
Hon'ble Court directed the respondent to determine the age of the
petitioner by Age Determination Committee by taking into
consideration the certificate of the Head Master of the school
dt.30.07.1945 and the matriculation certificate dt.01.04.1966 and after
affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the
said direction in the Writ Petition, the respondent filed W.A.No.739 of
1992, but the same was dismissed.
3. Thereafter, in compliance with the directions in the Writ
Petition, the petitioner's husband was directed to appear before the
Medical Board constituted for the purpose, along with proof of his
date of birth as 15.07.1932. The petitioner's husband submitted the
matriculation certificate dt.01.04.1966. However, he was directed to
produce matriculation certificate afresh. Meanwhile, the petitioner's
husband died on 24.12.1999 and thereafter, the petitioner obtained a
fresh certificate of matriculation and submitted a representation
requesting the respondent to pay the salary and other benefits of her
late husband from 20.05.1991 to 31.07.1992. The same was rejected
mentioning that if the date of birth of the late employee is accepted as
15.07.1932 as claimed by him, his age at the time of his appointment
would have been 15 years 9 months and therefore, he could not have
been appointed to the service at all and therefore the said date of birth
cannot be accepted. Aggrieved, this Writ Petition is filed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri K. Vasudeva Reddy,
submitted that no such objection of the employee being under-aged at
the time of his appointment was taken by the respondent earlier in any
of the proceedings and therefore, the respondent is precluded from
taking such objection at this stage. He submitted that as directed by
this Hon'ble Court in W.P.No.7828 of 1991, the respondent company
should have considered the date of birth of the employee as per the
Head Master certificate dt.30.07.1945 and matriculation certificate
dt.01.04.1966.
5. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, Sri J.
Sreenivasa Rao, on the other hand, has reiterated the contentions of
the respondent that the petitioner's husband could not have been
appointed at the age of 15 years 9 months as even at that point of time,
the minimum age for appointment into the respondent company was
18 years. Therefore, according to him, the petitioner's husband must
have satisfied the authorities that he was eighteen years of age at the
time of his appointment and accordingly his date of birth was
recorded as 23.04.1930 in the service record. Thus, according to him,
the petitioner's husband has been rightly retired at the age of 60 on
20.05.1991.
6. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on
record, this Court finds that from the beginning of his service, the
petitioner's husband had been claiming his date of birth to be
15.07.1932 on the basis of his Matriculation Certificate and had
accordingly refused to sign his service register. He had relied upon the
Head Master's Certificate dt.30.07.1945, which is prior to the date of
appointment and Matriculation Certificate dt.01.04.1966 which is
after the date of appointment. Since, the minimum age for
appointment into the respondent company is 18 years, and the
respondent company, presumably, has verified the age of the
employee before appointing him as a Clerk, the Apex Medical Board
has certified the age of the employee as 18 years as on 13.04.1948,
i.e., the date of appointment of the employee. Therefore, the fact
that the employee would have been under-aged at the time of
appointment if the date of birth is to be considered as 15.07.1932,
cannot be brushed aside. If only the date of birth of the petitioner's
husband is taken as 23.04.1930, the petitioner's husband would be 18
years of age at the time of his appointment. Therefore, this Court does
not find any reason to set aside the impugned order of the respondent.
7. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.
8. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Writ Petition
shall also stand dismissed.
___________________________ JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI
Date: 26.11.2021 Svv
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