Chandra Gupta Talreja vs State Of Telangana
2021 Latest Caselaw 3685 Tel

              HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI

                       CRL. P.No.13700 of 2018

ORDER:

The petitioners, who are Accused Nos.1 to 6, in C.C.No.230 of

2018 on the file of the XVII-Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, City Criminal Courts, Hyderabad, filed this Criminal

Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against

them in the above C.C, arising out of Crime No.39 of 2017 of

Begumbazar Police Station, Hyderabad City.

The facts, which led to filing of the present Criminal Petition,

are that the 2nd respondent/complainant (hereinafter referred to as

the "2nd respondent") filed a private complaint against the

petitioners/A-1 to A-6 before the XVII Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, for the offences punishable

under Sections 420, 468, 471, 451, 324, 506 read with Section 34 of

I.P.C., and the same was referred to the police under Section 156 (3)

of Cr.P.C. for investigation and report. Basing on the said reference,

the police, Begumbazar Police Station, Hyderabad City, registered a

case in Crime No.39 of 2017 and took up investigation. After

completion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet. The

allegations in the charge sheet are that the 2nd respondent is the wife

of Shrichand Kumar Talreja and in the year 1970, A-1 and her

husband and her father-in-law, V.G.Talreja, constituted a Firm by

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name Pamul Industries and got it registered with the Registrar of

Firms vide Registration No.964 of 1970, dated 25.02.1970.

Thereafter, A-1 with dishonest intention to cheat the husband of the

2nd respondent and to grab the share, submitted Form No.V i.e.,

notice of change in the constitution of Firm or of the dissolution of

the Firm without the knowledge of the husband of the 2nd

respondent by showing the name of the husband of the 2nd

respondent as Outgoing Partner with forged signature and included

the names of A-2 and one Rajendra Kumar in the said Firm, dated

18.08.1988, as Incoming Partners, but it was rejected due to

mismatch of signatures of the husband of the 2nd respondent. Again

A-1 in collusion with A-2 prepared an affidavit and filed it before

the Registrar of Firms stating that the signature submitted is that of

the present signature of the husband of the 2nd respondent. In the

year 1993, A-1 submitted Form No.V and mentioned the names of

A-2 and Rajendra Kumar as outgoing partners and took the entire

Firm in the names of A-1 and late V.G.Talreja, father-in-law of the

2nd respondent. It is also stated that in the year 1999, V.G.Talreja

expired and in the year 2010, A-1 submitted Form No.V by

mentioning that A-2 is Incoming Partner and V.G. Talreja was

Outgoing Partner and got it registered in the name of A-1.

Thereafter, the husband of the 2nd respondent died on 15.02.2015 and

after the death of her husband, 2nd respondent demanded her share,

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but the accused refused the same. It is further alleged in the charge

sheet that on 01.01.2017 at about 8.30 P.M., when the 2nd respondent

and her family members were present in the house, the petitioners

came to her house and forced her to sign on N.O.C., and when she

refused the same, A-1 beat her and abused her in filthy language

and threatened with dire consequences and fled away from the spot.

A-1 to A-4 are the present owners of Firm titled as Pamul Industries,

which clearly shows that A-1 and A-2 colluded with each other with

dishonest intention to cheat the 2nd respondent and her family

members in order to grab the share of the husband of the 2nd

respondent by forging the signatures of the husband of the 2nd

respondent and transferred into their names and when they

questioned about their share, they beat one Dinesh Sharma and

threatened with dire consequences. The said charge sheet was

taken cognizance as C.C.No.230 of 2018.

Heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side and

perused the record.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that

petitioners 1 and 2 are the brothers and children of late Vishnu Das

Talreja; petitioners 3 and 4 are the children of petitioners 2 and 1

respectively and petitioners 5 and 6 are the wives of petitioners 1

and 2 respectively and the 2nd respondent is the wife of late Srichand

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Kumar, who is the brother of petitioners 1 and 2. It is submitted

that even as per the records produced by the prosecution in support

of the charge sheet would show that Pamul Industries was

registered in the year 1970 with three partners namely V.G. Talreja,

Srichand Talreja and Chandra Gupta Talreja; In the year 1977,

Srichand Talreja resigned from the partnership firm and new

partners were inducted; In the year 1988, Form No.5 was submitted

to the Registrar of Firms showing that late Srichand Talreja has

resigned from the partnership firm and his account was settled and

subsequently an affidavit was also submitted by him to the Registrar

of Firms, confirming his signature on Form No.5. That being the

case, the present complaint against the petitioners is that the

signature on Form No.5 and affidavit executed way back in the year

1988 are alleged to have been forged and the said fact is being

challenged by the petitioners on the grounds that (a) the forensic

report submitted by the prosecution shows that the questioned

signatures Q1 and Q2 pertain to both the Form No.5 and affidavit

and out of these questioned signatures, only signature on affidavit

was verified with the standard signatures but not the signature on

Form No.5 i.e., Q1 and no explanation has been given by the

prosecution on this aspect; (b) Exhibit Q2 was also not examined or

compared with contemporary signatures of the year 1977 or the

latest 1988. These questioned signatures were compared with

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driving licence, passport, permission plan etc., which cannot contain

the original signature of late Srichand Talreja, but are the impressed

signatures. Therefore, comparison of the questioned signatures with

imprinted signatures on the above documents which were not

original, cannot be compared to come to a conclusion; (c) the alleged

offence is of the year 1977 and 1988, even taking the later date, the

complaint was lodged in the month of January, 2017, which is more

or less 28 to 38 years old and the petitioners 3 and 4 were obviously

not even born at the alleged time of offence and were happened to

be children and as such, they cannot be fastened with the allegations

of forgery and that there is no whisper, as to why there is a

considerable delay in lodging the present complaint. It is further

submitted that the petitioners have also submitted Will deed

executed by V.G.Talreja vide document No.105/1999 dated

26.07.1999; Will deed of Srichand Kumar Talreja vide document

NO.37/2007 dated 09.03.2007; Bunch of assessment orders of Sales

Tax pertaining to Pamul Industries between 1984-1989; copies of

income tax returns of late Srichand Kumar Talreja for three years

2012-2015 and copy of the plaint in O.S.No.972 of 2017, but the said

documents were not looked into by the police. In Vidya

Dharmananda and others v. Gopal Sheelam Reddy1, wherein the

Apex Court held that the Court has to proceed on the basis of the

AIR 2017 SC 5846

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material produced with the charge sheet for dealing with the issue

of charge, but if the Court is satisfied that there is material of sterling

quality which has been withheld by the investigator, the Court is

not debarred from summoning or relying upon the same even if

such documents are not part of charge sheet. It is also submitted

that a perusal of the above documents clearly indicates that they are

public documents obtained from competent authorities and

belonging to the deceased Srichand Talreja and the 2nd respondent

and as such, the 2nd respondent has not denied the said documents.

Further, a perusal of the documents, it can be seen that the conduct

of the parties are contrary to the allegations made by the 2nd

respondent that her husband is continued to be a partner of Pamul

Industries and that his signatures have been forged for his

retirement, but the above documents indicated contra to the claim of

the 2nd respondent as the Sales Tax Returns for a number of years do

not show the name of Srichand Kumar Talreja as a partner of Pamul

Industries. It is further submitted that the income tax returns of late

Srichand Kumar Talreja also do not show that he has shown any

income from partnership firm and if at all, he was a partner, he

would have shown the income from this firm in his income tax

returns. It is also submitted that in the will deed executed by late

Srichand Kumar Talreja, it is shown that he bequeathed his

properties to various people, but there is no whisper about this

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partnership firm. The will deed executed by V.G.Talreja, father of

Srichand Kumar Talreja and petitioners 1 and 2, shows that Srichand

Kumar Talreja is not partner and there is a reference to bequeath his

capital in Pamul Industries to Chandra Gupta Talreja and Ashok

Kumar Talreja (petitioners 1 and 2) being the only partners. Even in

O.S.No.792 of 2017 filed by the 2nd respondent before the XXV

Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the 2nd

respondent at paragraph No.4 of her claim, has admitted that there

is a joint family business in the name and style of Pamul Industries,

thereby contradicting her own claim that the same is a partnership

firm where her husband was a partner of the firm. These documents

clearly and clinchingly establish that the 2nd respondent has filed a

false case only to harass the petitioners. It is also submitted that

even as per the alleged incident that is supposed to have taken place

on 01.01.2017, the same is clouded with suspicion and falsity. A

medico legal report submitted by the prosecution itself shows that

an M.L.C. certificate was issued by the doctor on 01.01.2017. The

authenticity of the said document is also prima facie in doubt i.e., to

say that the said document contains an endorsement that the patient

was accompanied by a police constable of Begum Bazar

(P.C.No.9174) in the casualty O.P.No.236, but surprisingly, there is

no F.I.R. or even petty case registered in consequence to this alleged

M.L.C. case and there is also no G.V. entry pertaining to this

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particular M.L.C. case. That being the case, the very document

which the prosecution is relying upon to bring upon the charge of

assault alleged to have occurred at the house of the 2nd respondent is

found to be baseless and fabricated. It is further submitted that as

far as the charge of Section 420 of I.P.C. is concerned, it is an

admitted and unreliable fact that at no point of time, the petitioners

have met the 2nd respondent and have induced her to part with any

amounts and the very fact that there was no contractual or social

contract or relationship between the petitioners and the 2nd

respondent and the basic element of offence under Section 420 of

I.P.C. is not existing and as such the charge cannot stand against the

petitioners. Insofar as the charge of forgery is concerned, relying

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Shiela Sebastian v.

R.Jawahar2 learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that

the question of maintaining the complaint against the petitioners

under Sections 468 and 471 of I.P.C. does not arise. Relying upon

the judgment of the Apex Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P.3,

learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that since there is

civil litigation already pending and that the 2nd respondent is using

the criminal procedure process only to harass the petitioners, he

prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners.

(2018) 7 SCC 581

Manu/SC/0859/2021

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Reiterating the allegations made in the complaint, learned

Counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that the complaint was

lodged immediately after knowing about the forgery made by A-1

and A-2 and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners that there is

abnormal delay in lodging the complaint does not stand and the

same has to be decided in the trial since the limitation aspect is a

mixed question of law and fact. It is also submitted that the charge

sheet was filed when it was categorically found that the signatures

in question and the standard signatures are not by single person, as

such, the argument of the petitioners that the signatures were not

compared with contemporaneous signatures is again a triable issue

and the fact finding Court can only conclude the same after

examining the witnesses. It is further submitted that the contention

of the petitioners that constable was not accompanied when the

injured was treated as out-patient also does not stand to the scrutiny

since P.C.No.9174 of P.S. Begum Bazar had accompanied the injured

Dinesh Sharma to the Hospital and Dr.B.Shankar had treated and

issued the Wound Certificate and the original Medico Legal Record

Certificate was obtained by the Investigating Officer and, therefore,

the contention of the petitioners that the same was handed over to

the patient is incorrect or for that matter the said certificate was

produced by the 2nd respondent. It is also submitted that the

various documents filed by the petitioners seeking to quash the

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proceedings in C.C.No.230 of 2018 are all unconcerned documents of

the offences alleged against the petitioners in the charge sheet and

the documents sought to be relied upon by the petitioners should

only be considered on examining the witnesses, who are concerned

with the said documents by the trial Court. It is further submitted

that the petitioners sought to rely upon the Will of the husband of

the 2nd respondent, but that can only be considered at the time of

trial and that the contents of the Will cannot be the ground to quash

the proceedings in C.C. without examining the witnesses to speak

about the Will. It is further pertinent to submit that the son of the

2nd respondent had sought information under R.T.I. Act from the

office of the Registrar, Red Hills, Hyderabad, to produce the copy of

the alleged Will, but it was informed that there is no original Will

Deed copy said to have been deposited, hence the allegation of

execution of Will does not arise and further the contentions of the

petitioners shall not be considered for the purpose of quashing the

proceedings. It is also submitted that the petitioners sought to rely

upon the Income Tax Returns of the husband of the 2nd respondent,

but the said Income Tax Returns cannot be put into service to quash

the offences against the petitioners and that the said Income Tax

Returns shall be filed purely for a different purpose and the same

shall not be used to disprove the allegations in the charge sheet. It

is further submitted that after filing the present quash petition, the

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petitioners filed Crl.M.P.No.1004 of 2019 in C.C.No.230 of 2018

before the trial Court seeking discharge. By an order, dated

12.07.2019, the trial Court dismissed the said discharge petition.

Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed Crl.R.P.No.127 of 2019

before the VII-Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.

By an order, dated 21.10.2017, the said revision was dismissed

holding the quash petition is pending before this Court. It is also

submitted that the industry for which reconstitution is affected on

forging the signatures by the petitioners 1 and 2 is not claimed in a

suit as his property is altogether a different issue and the charge

sheet shall not be quashed without there being conclusion in a trial

after examination of witnesses and that the pendency of civil suit

shall not deter initiation of criminal proceedings. It is also submitted

that the material produced and the charge sheet laid by the

prosecution prima facie proved that the petitioners have committed

the offences as stated in the charge sheet and the same are to be

decided in a trial alone by examining the witnesses and the case do

not fall under the category of rarest of rare cases. In support of his

contentions, he relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in

C.P.Subhash v. Inspector of Police, Chennai4; Priti Saraf and

another v. State of NCT of Delhi5 and Central Bureau of

(2013) 11 SCC 559

2021 SCC Online SC 206

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Investigation (CBI) and another v. Thommandru Hannah

Vijayalakshmi @ T.H.Vijayalakshmi and another6.

In the light of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the

respective parties, the following case laws are necessary to be

referred:-

In Devendra v. State of U.P.7, the Apex Court held as under:

"A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the courts would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of the offence has been made out."

In Joseph Salvaraja vs. State of Gujarat and others8 Hon'ble

the Apex Court has held as under:

"Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. or not.

In our opinion, the matter appears to be purely civil in nature. There appears to be no cheating or a dishonest inducement for the delivery of property or breach of trust by the Appellant. The present FIR is an abuse of process of law.

Crl.A.NO.1045/2021 SC, dt. 08.10.2021

(2009) 7 SCC 495

(2011) 7 SCC 59

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The purely civil dispute, is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreak vengeance against the Appellant. It does not meet the strict standard of proof required to sustain a criminal accusation.

The Appellant cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole of a criminal prosecution for long number of years, even when admittedly a civil suit has already been filed against the Appellant by the Complainant-Respondent No. 4, and is still subjudice. In the said suit, the Appellant is at liberty to contest the same on grounds available to him in accordance with law as per the leave granted by Trial Court. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the complainant has not been able to show that at any material point of time there was any contract, much less any privity of contract between the Appellant and Respondent No. 4 - the Complainant. There was no cause of action to even lodge an FIR against the Appellant as neither the Complainant had to receive the money nor he was in any way instrumental to telecast "GOD TV" in the central areas of Ahmedabad. He appears to be totally a stranger to the same. Appellant's prosecution would only lead to his harassment and humiliation, which cannot be permitted in accordance with the principles of law."

In Mohammed Ibrahim and others vs. State of Bihar and

another9 Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:

"This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure

(2009) 8 SCC 751

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on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes."

I have considered the respective submissions made by both

the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and I have also gone

through the relevant case laws and also the case laws cited by both

the parties. The following are the main points for consideration by

this Court.

1. Whether in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court can enter into the controversy that any case is made out against the petitioners or not?

2. Whether a criminal colour has been given to a dispute of civil nature, which is not permitted under the provisions of law?

The scope and exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

has time and again come before the Apex Court. It is settled

position of law that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. It is also

settled position of law that if any abuse of the process leading to

injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would

be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in

absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

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In R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab10 the Hon'ble Apex Court

has specifically held that if there is legal bar against the institution or

continuance of the proceedings or there is no legal evidence to prove

the charge, then the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be

exercised.

In this regard, the land mark judgment is the State of Haryana

v. Bhajan Lal11 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the

following guidelines.

"In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

AIR 1960 SC 866

(1992) SCC (Crl.) 426

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2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

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In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and

others12 the Apex Court reviewed the precedents on the exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and formulated guiding

principles in the following terms.

"(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the

(2006) 6 SCC 736

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complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

(v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not."

In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal13 the Apex

Court observed as under:

"46. The Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurize the Accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible Rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained."

(2007) 12 SCC 1

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In Randheer Singh v. The State of U.P. and others14 the Apex

Court observed as under:

"33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the F.I.R. does not disclose any offence so far as the appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court, has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand15.

35. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the F.I.R. read with the charge sheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other accused Rajan Kumar has died."

Manu/SC/0859/2021

(2013) 11 SCC 673

GSD, J Crlp_13700_2018

In the instant case, the case of the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant is that in the year 1970, the 1st petitioner, her husband

and her father-in-law by name V.G. Talreja constituted a firm

namely Pamul Industries and got it registered with the Registrar of

Firms; thereafter A-1 with a dishonest intention to cheat her

husband and to grab the share, submitted Form No.IV i.e., notice of

change in the constitution of firm by forging the signature of her

husband.

A perusal of the record would show that the husband of the

2nd respondent died on 15.02.2015. The husband of the 2nd

respondent executed a Will Deed, which was registered on

09.03.2007 and nothing has been mentioned in the said Will Deed

with regard to Pamul Industries. Further, in the income tax returns

also, the husband of the 2nd respondent did not refer anything about

the income earned by him in Pamul Industries. The record further

discloses that on 29.04.1990 an affidavit has been filed by the

husband of the 2nd respondent stating that on 31.03.1977, he has

retired from the partnership firm and all the claims accruing to him

as on the date of his retirement were settled amicably by the said

concern. It is not the case of the 2nd respondent that the signature of

her husband on the said affidavit is forged by the petitioners. The

case of the 2nd respondent is that the signature of her husband in the

affidavit dated 25.10.1988 has been forged by the petitioners. If the

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signature of the husband of the 2nd respondent on the affidavit dated

25.10.1988, has been forged by the petitioners, the husband of the 2nd

respondent did not file an affidavit on 29.04.1990 before the

Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay. The record also discloses that

after the death of the husband of the 2nd respondent, she along with

her children got issued a legal notice to the petitioners 1 and 2 and

others on 27.03.2016, calling upon them to effect partition of the joint

family properties and industry by metes and bounds and to allot

1/6th undivided legitimate share to them. In the said legal notice,

there was no reference that the signature of the husband of the 2nd

respondent on the affidavit dated 25.10.1988 has been forged by the

petitioners 1 and 2. After receiving the said legal notice, the

petitioners 1 and 2 and others, got issued a reply notice, dated

30.05.2016 stating that in the Will Deed executed by V.G.Talreja

(father-in-law of the 2nd respondent) in the year 1993, which was

deposited with the Joint Registrar-I, Registration Office, Hyderabad

and the same was opened on 20.07.1999 after the death of

V.G.Talreja, it has been categorically mentioned therein that "My

two sons namely Gurumukh Das Talreja and Srichand Talreja

(husband of the 2nd respondent) are separated from me, more than

20 years ago and are living separately, who are in no way concerned

or connected to me and hence, not given any share in my properties

under this Will". Therefore, after receiving the reply notice, the 2nd

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respondent filed the private complaint in order to pressurize the

petitioners to make partition of the properties left by V.G.Talreja.

That apart, the 2nd respondent, along with her children filed

O.S.No.972 of 2017 before the XXV Additional Chief Judge, City

Civil Courts, Hyderabad, seeking to declare the Will Deed executed

by the father-in-law of the 2nd respondent as null and void and not

binding on the parties and also sought for partition of Schedule "A"

to "I" properties, and the same is pending. The 1st petitioner is

defendant No.4 and the 2nd petitioner is defendant No.5 in the said

suit. Further, Item 'I' of the suit schedule property mentioned in

O.S.No.972 of 2017 is Pamul Industries, which is the subject matter

in this C.C. The petitioners 1 and 2 and others have filed

I.A.No.2014 of 2017 in the said suit for rejection of the plaint and the

2nd respondent filed counter stating that they are in the joint

possession of the suit schedule properties and the defendants

therein with an intention to deprive the legitimate share over the

properties making false and baseless statements and they have

ample evidence to prove their case. From the above, it is clear that

there is a dispute with regard to the title, possession and enjoyment

of the subject property and, therefore, the contentions raised by the

petitioners have some substance. Apparently, it seems that the

matter is of purely civil nature, which is to be determined by a

competent civil Court.

GSD, J Crlp_13700_2018

Insofar as the alleged incident took place on 01.01.2017, it is

the case of the 2nd respondent that on 01.01.2017 at about 8.30 P.M.,

when she and her family members were at her residence, the

petitioners trespassed into the house with sticks in their hands,

abused her and her family members in filthy language and when her

son-in-law by name Dinesh Sharma tried to stop the petitioners, the

1st petitioner slapped her, petitioners 3 and 4 abused him and

petitioners 5 and 6 caught hold the hair of the 2nd respondent. But a

perusal of the Medico Legal Report filed by the prosecution would

show that M.L.C. Certificate was issued by the doctor on 01.01.2017

and the said Certificate contains an endorsement that the patient by

name Dinesh Sharma was accompanied by a police constable

No.9174 of Begum Bazar to the casualty O.P.No.236. The F.I.R. was

registered on the reference of the private complaint filed by the 2nd

respondent on 16.01.2017. There is no F.I.R. or even a petty case was

registered on the date of incident alleged to have been occurred on

01.01.2017. Therefore, the allegation with regard to the alleged

incident on 01.01.2017 prima facie found to be false.

On over all consideration of entire material placed on record

and the contentions urged before this Court by the learned Counsel

for the petitioners and learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent and

the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgments referred

supra, it is suffice to conclude that the contentions raised by the

GSD, J Crlp_13700_2018

learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent are without any substance

and the material produced before this Court, directly indicates the

mala fides in prosecution of criminal proceedings against the

petitioners, so also, by abuse of process of the Court and as an arm-

twisting method to bring the petitioners to the terms of the 2nd

respondent and to cloak a civil dispute with criminal nature, she

has resorted to criminal litigation.

In view of my foregoing discussion, I find that it is a fit case to

exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings against the petitioners.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Criminal Petition is

allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.230 of 2018 on the file of the

XVII-Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal

Courts, Hyderabad, against the petitioners/A-1 to A-6 for the

offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 451, 324, 506 read

with Section 34 of I.P.C. are hereby quashed.

As a sequel thereto, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in

this Criminal Petition shall stand dismissed.

_____________________ JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI

23.11.2021 Gsn/gkv

GSD, J Crlp_13700_2018