Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3301 Tel
Judgement Date : 9 November, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, HYDERABAD
****
W.P.No.14020 of 2019
Between:
Smt. Vemula Jayanthi & Another Petitioners VERSUS The Authorised Officer, State Bank of India, Nizamabad Main Branch, Nizamabad & Another.
Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 09.11.2021
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
____________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, J
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
+ W.P.No.14020 of 2019
% 09.11.2021
# Between:
Smt. Vemula Jayanthi & Another Petitioners VERSUS The Authorised Officer, State Bank of India, Nizamabad Main Branch, Nizamabad & Another.
Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioners : Sri G.K. Deshpande
^ Counsel for the respondents : M/s. Podila Hari Prasad
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
2018 (4) ALD 322 (DB)
(2009) 8 SCC 366
(1998) 8 SCC 1
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA
W.P.No.14020 OF 2019
Order:
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)
By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, petitioners seek quashing of order dated 09.01.2019 passed
by the Debts Recovery Tribunal - I, Hyderabad, in S.A.No.190 of 2016
and consequently to allow the said securitization application of the
petitioners.
2 Petitioners are mother and son respectively. Petitioner No.1 is
the wife of late Rajeshwar Reddy, whereas petitioner No.2 is the son of
late Rajeshwar Reddy.
3 From the materials on record, it appears that State Bank of
India, Nizamabad Main Branch, Nizamabad, had sanctioned loan of
Rs.25,92,500-00 to the petitioners against security provided by the
petitioners by way of equitable mortgage over the schedule property. It
further appears that petitioners defaulted in repayment of loan on
account of various reasons for which petitioners requested respondent
State Bank of India for settlement of the liabilities under one time
settlement (OTS) scheme. During the course of negotiations
respondent Bank had issued notice to the petitioners for
regularization of the loan account, pursuant to which petitioners had
paid certain amounts on five different occasions towards
regularization of the loan account. Notwithstanding the same,
respondent State Bank of India had quantified the total dues of the
petitioners at Rs.44,75,000-00. Without following the due procedure,
respondent State Bank of India forcibly took physical possession of
the schedule property on 19.4.2016 whereafter e-auction sale notice
was published in the newspapers on 04.5.2016 for auction sale of the
schedule property.
4 Petitioners challenged the legality and validity of the e-auction
sale notice dated 04.5.2016 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I at
Hyderabad (briefly, 'the Tribunal' hereinafter) by filing a securitisation
application under Section 17 (1) of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (briefly referred to hereinafter as 'SARFAESI Act'),
which was registered as S.A.No.190 of 2016. It appears that
petitioners had filed an interlocutory application before the Tribunal
for stay of the auction sale proceedings. Tribunal, by order dated
09.6.2016, took the view that there was no merit in the application for
stay. Accordingly respondent State Bank of India was granted liberty
to go ahead with the sale, but it was clarified that the sale would be
subject to final outcome of the proceedings in S.A.No.190 of 2016.
5 Following the aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 09.6.2016,
respondent State Bank of India obtained fresh valuation of the
schedule property on 23.01.2017 and issued notice dated 10.5.2017
under Rule 8 (6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002
(briefly, the 'SARFAESI Rules' hereinafter) fixing auction sale on
12.6.2017. It is stated that in the auction sale, respondent No.2 was
the highest bidder for Rs.48,00,000-00, which bid was accepted;
accordingly sale certificate was issued on 22.6.2017.
6 At that stage, petitioners preferred a writ petition before this
Court assailing the sale e-auction, which was registered as Writ
Petition No.35574 of 2017. By the order dated 06.11.2017, this Court
observed that S.A.No.190 of 2016 was pending before the Tribunal for
consideration, with the Tribunal permitting the respondent State
Bank of India to go ahead with the auction sale but making the same
subject to final outcome of the proceedings. In such circumstances,
this Court took the view that petitioners should prosecute the pending
S.A.No.190 of 2016 before the Tribunal and that no case was made
out for interference at that stage. Consequently the writ petition was
dismissed as being devoid of merit.
7 Thereafter petitioners proceeded with the securitisation
application, which was heard and decided by the Tribunal, vide, the
impugned order dated 09.01.2019. As per the impugned order,
Tribunal dismissed the securitisation application filed by the
petitioners.
8 Contending that the procedure prescribed under Rule 8(6) and
Rule 9(1) of the SARFAESI Rules r/w Section 13 (8) of the SARFAESI
Act were violated by the respondent State Bank of India which vitiated
the auction sale notice, petitioners have filed the present writ petition
challenging the aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 09.01.2019.
9 Respondent No.1 i.e. State Bank of India has filed counter
affidavit. Stand taken in the counter affidavit is that the writ petition
should not be entertained in view of the fact that petitioners have
adequate and efficacious alternative remedy in the form of filing
appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Since the petitioners
have not availed the remedy of appeal, the writ petition should not be
entertained.
10 On merits it is contended that principle of Rule 9(1) of the
SARFAESI Rules is applicable in the instant case as the present
auction notice dated 10.5.2017 was a subsequent notice to earlier e-
auction sale notice dated 08.5.2016 which did not materialize in
auction. Referring to the proviso to Rule 9(1) it is contended that if
sale of immovable property by any one of the methods specified by
sub-rule (5) of Rule 8 fails and the sale is required to be conducted
again, then notice of sale has to be given with 15 days time to the
borrower for the subsequent sale. In the instant case respondent
State Bank of India had published e-auction notice dated 10.5.2017
in two leading newspapers of the State on 12.5.2017 fixing auction
sale on 12.6.2017 which shows that the auction was conducted 31
days after publication of auction sale notice, though under the law
only 15 days notice for subsequent sale was adequate. In the
circumstances respondent State Bank of India seeks dismissal of the
writ petition.
11 Respondent No.2 i.e. auction purchaser has also filed counter
affidavit. In addition to the contentions already made by respondent
No.1 to oppose the writ petition, respondent No.2 has stated that the
writ petition was filed after inordinate delay raising technical pleas.
Respondent No.2 is a bona fide purchaser having paid the total sale
consideration following the auction sale. Writ petition should,
therefore, be dismissed.
12 Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the sale notice
dated 10.5.2017 was issued under Rule 8(6) of the SARFAESI Rules,
calling upon the petitioners to discharge the liabilities in full within
30 days of the notice. But on the same day e-auction sale notice was
issued fixing date / time of e-auction on 12.6.2017 from 2.00 PM to
3.00 PM. This he contends has jeopardized the rights of the
petitioners for redemption of the schedule property by discharging the
liability. According to him, the e-auction sale notice could not have
been issued till completion of 30 days period provided under the sale
notice. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this
Court in M/s. Venshiv Pharma Chem (P) Ltd. Vs. State Bank of
India, Stressed Assets Recovery Branch, Koti, Hyderabad1.
13 On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents asserts
that there has been no violation of the procedure laid down under the
SARFAESI Rules. Besides the e-auction, sale has taken place, sale of
the schedule property in favour of the highest bidder i.e. respondent
No.2 has been confirmed, whereafter sale certificate has also been
issued. Impugned order of the Tribunal dated 09.01.2019 is correct
and no interference is called for.
14 Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have been
duly considered.
15 We have already noted the factual aspect of the dispute leading
to passing of the impugned order dated 09.01.2019 by the Tribunal.
The above order was passed by the Tribunal on a securitisation
application filed by the petitioners under Section 17 (1) of the
SARFAESI Act. As per the aforesaid provision any person (including
borrower) if aggrieved by any of the measures taken under sub-
section (4) of Section 13 by the secured creditor or by his authorised
2018 (4) ALD 322 (DB)
officer, may make an application to the jurisdictional Tribunal within
45 days from the date on which such measures were taken. The
contours of the power of the Tribunal while dealing with such an
application are provided in sub-sections 2 to 7 of Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act. Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, Indian
Overseas Bank Vs. Ashok Saw Mill2, had examined in detail the
provisions of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as it stood then and
discussed the wide powers of the Tribunal. It has been held that
action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13 (4) is open to
scrutiny by the Tribunal and the same can not only be set aside but
even status quo ante can be restored by the Tribunal. In the process
Tribunal can undo an auction sale if the same is in contravention of
the law.
16 Once an order is passed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act,
any person aggrieved by the same may prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from the date of receipt of such
order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. As per the second
proviso, no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has
deposited with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due
from him as claimed by the secured creditor or determined by the
Tribunal, whichever is less. The third proviso confers discretion on
the Appellate Tribunal for reduction of such deposit which should not
be less than 25% of the debt referred to in the second proviso. Under
sub-section (2) of Section 18, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as
may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
and the Rules framed thereunder.
(2009) 8 SCC 366
17 Supreme Court has clarified that even though Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 may impliedly be inapplicable, delay in filing an
appeal under Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by
the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 (2) of the SARFAESI Act r/w
the proviso to Section 20 (3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
18 Thus, it is seen that the statute itself has provided for the
remedy of appeal if a person is aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal
passed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
19 While the power of the High Court to issue a high prerogative
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary in nature
and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution, not to
speak of any statutory limitation, however, the High Court has the
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. This
position of law has been beautifully summarized by the Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Mumbai3. It is held as follows:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field."
20 Thus from the above, we find that the High Court has imposed
upon itself certain restrictions before invoking its extra-ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, one of
(1998) 8 SCC 1
which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the
High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. However,
this self imposed restriction would not operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies:
1. where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
2. where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; or
3. where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
21 In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax Vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited,
Civil Appeal No.5121 of 2021, decided on 03.9.2021, it has been held
that though existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar
to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, but a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional
circumstances where there is-
1. a breach of fundamental rights;
2. violation of the principles of natural justice;
3. excess of jurisdiction; or
4. a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation.
22 In the instant case, we find that none of the above exceptions
have been made out by the petitioners. Petitioners have challenged
the impugned order of the Tribunal on the ground that the procedural
requirements under the SARFAESI Act have not been followed
causing prejudice to the petitioners which however has been disputed
and denied by the respondents. This is a matter which can certainly
be agitated and gone into by the appellate forum. Therefore, we are of
the firm opinion that petitioners should be relegated to the forum of
Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
23 In so far the decision of this Court in M/s.Venshiv Pharma
Chem (P) Ltd (supra) is concerned, we find that the said decision has
been stayed by the Supreme Court, vide order dated 24.8.2018
passed in SLP (C) No.18906 of 2018 (State Bank of India Vs.
M/s.Venshiv Pharma Chem (P) Ltd).
24 For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition fails and is
accordingly dismissed. However, dismissal of the writ petition would
not preclude the petitioners from availing the remedy of appeal under
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act subject to limitation. However, there
shall be no order as to costs.
25. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition,
shall also stand dismissed.
___________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, J
_________________________________ Dr.CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA, J
Date: 09.11.2021.
L.R. Copy be marked B/o Kvsn
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