Telangana High Court

The State Of A.P., vs Mohd. Younus on 8 March, 2021

Bench: G Sri Devi

               HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI

               CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1260 of 2009

JUDGMENT:

The appellant-State filed the present appeal by invoking the

provision under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, challenging the judgment dated 24.11.2006 in C.C.No.49

of 2002 on the file of the XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate (Mahila Court), Hyderabad, wherein and whereby the

learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents/A1 and A3 for the

offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and under Sections 4

and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 24.08.2001 at

1245 hours, the de-facto complainant lodged a report stating that her

marriage was performed with A1-Mohd. Younus on 08.05.1996 as

per Muslim rites and customs, and at the time of marriage, her

parents gave an amount of Rs.50,000/-, one alimrah, household

articles and 10 tulas of gold. Thereafter, she joined with her

husband and in-laws and later, her husband demanded her to bring

dowry of Rs.50,000/- from her parents and when she expressed her

parents inability, her husband and in-laws used to insult and abuse

her in several times, due to the said harassment, her father gave an

amount of Rs.3500/- to her husband. Even thereafter, her husband

used to harass her physically and mentally by demanding additional

dowry for establishment of a new shop and that even after the birth

of a female child in the year 1999 and after a panchayat held by the

elders, her husband failed to look after them, but the accused GSD, J Crl.A.No.1260 of 2009

demanded her to bring additional dowry of Rs.1.00 lakh or else her

husband will marry another lady. Based on the said complaint, a

case in Cr.No.80 of 2001 was registered for the offences under

Sections 498-A IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition

Act, against the accused.

3. Heard learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the appellant-

State, Sri A. Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents/A1

and A3 and perused the record.

4. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the trial Court,

while discussing with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has

rightly came to the conclusion that the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 is

contradictory to each other with regard to the amount given as

dowry, Jode-ki-rakham, gold ornaments and other household

articles. P.Ws.1 and 2 have stated that as per the demand of the

accused, they paid an amount of Rs.50,000/-towards Jode-ki-

Rakham, one almirah, 10 tulas of gold ornaments and other

household articles. P.W.3 stated that the parents of P.W.1 paid an

amount of Rs.50,000/-towards Jode-ki-Rakham, 10 tulas of gold,

jahez articles and furniture worth Rs.1.00 lakh. However, P.W.4

stated that the parents of P.W.1 have paid an amount of Rs.50,000/-

towards Jode-ki-rakham, 10 tulas of gold and furniture to the

accused. Thus, there are material contradictions in the evidence of

all these prosecution witnesses regarding payment of cash towards

Jode-ki-rakham, gold ornaments and other household articles and

that there was no corroboration between the complaint and the GSD, J Crl.A.No.1260 of 2009

depositions of P.Ws.1 to 4, and that when these contradictions were

pointed out to the Investigating Officer-P.W.5, he had categorically

stated that the prosecution witnesses have not stated anything

before him about the dowry, gold and household articles and he did

not collect any documents from P.W.1 regarding payment of either

dowry or gold or household articles. He further stated that Ex.P4-

Marriage Booklet in Urdu did not contain the signatures of the

accused, but there are two signatures, for which the accused stated

that A2's signature was forged. However, the prosecution has not

taken any steps regarding proof of those signatures on Ex.P4.

Though panchayat was conducted between the de-facto

complainant and the accused with the intervention of the elders of

Masjid, the prosecution did not examine those elders. Thus, the trial

Court , after evaluating the entire evidence available on record, has

rightly acquitted the accused for the offences under Sections 498-A

IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

Therefore, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the findings of

the trial Court.

5. In Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura1 the Apex Court held as

under:

"It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-

appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any

1 (2011) 9 SCC 479 GSD, J Crl.A.No.1260 of 2009

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed."

6. In Maloth Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh2 the Apex

Court held that there can be no two opinions that merely because

the acquittal is found to be wrong and another view can be taken,

the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has

more and serious responsibility while dealing with the judgment of

acquittal and unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or not at all

supportable and where the appellate Court comes to the conclusion

that conviction is a must, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset.

2 (2011) 8 SCC 635 GSD, J Crl.A.No.1260 of 2009

The appellate Court has to examine as to whether the trial Court,

while upsetting the acquittal, has taken such care.

7. In view of the judgments referred to above and having regard