Vorla Ramachandra Reddy vs Joint Collector
2021 Latest Caselaw 1671 Tel

             THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
                                AND
            THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY

                   WRIT APPEAL No.898 of 2018



% Dated: 18.06.2021



#       Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and another.


                                                    ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS


$       Joint Collector I,
        Ranga Reddy District,
        Lakdikapool,
        Hyderabad and others.

                                                  ...RESPONDENTS

! Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma

^ Counsel for the Respondents : Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao Mr. Resu Mahender Reddy GP for Revenue Mr. T. Lakshmi Narayana Mr. A. Pulla Reddy Mr. T. Rajinikanth Reddy Mr. A. Venkat Laxma Reddy Ms. M.L. Neelima Mr. Polali Venkatesh

< GIST:

> HEAD NOTE:

? Case referred

1. AIR 1988 AP 77

2. (2003) 7 SCC 667

3. 2005 (5) ALD 9

4. 2015 (4) ALD 490

5. AIR 1989 SC 1753

HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY

WRIT APPEAL No.898 of 2018

Date: 18.06.2021 BETWEEN

Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and another.

... APPELLANTS AND

Joint Collector I, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad and others.

...RESPONDENTS

Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma

Counsel for the Respondents : Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao Mr. Resu Mahender Reddy GP for Revenue Mr. T. Lakshmi Narayana Mr. A. Pulla Reddy Mr. T. Rajinikanth Reddy Mr. A. Venkat Laxma Reddy Ms. M.L. Neelima Mr. Polali Venkatesh

The Court made the following:

JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Vijaysen Reddy)

This appeal has been filed by the appellants/petitioners

challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated

01.05.2018, dismissing WP.No.16546 of 2005.

2. The matter arises under Section 32 of the A.P. (Telangana Area)

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short 'the Tenancy Act')

in connection with the claim of the legal heirs of the protected tenants

for restoration of possession of lands. The parties are hereinafter

referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Single Judge.

3. The relevant facts of the case, necessary to decide the present

appeal are as follows. On 14.10.2000, a petition was filed by the writ

petitioners in Proceeding No.B/3948/2000, before the Mandal Revenue

Officer/respondent No.2 under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act,

claiming that they are tenants in respect of land covered by

Sy.Nos.58, 59, 66, 658, 659 and 660 of Yellareddyguda, Kapra Village,

Keesara Mandal (hereinafter referred to as 'the schedule lands').

Their father, Vorla Ramachandra Reddy, was a tenant of the schedule

lands along with one Dudigalla Mallaiah and both of them were equal

shareholders and cultivating tenants as defined under the Tenancy Act.

Vorla Ramachandra Reddy expired on 14.02.1979 and till his demise,

his status remained that of a tenant. Another petition was filed by one

Sri Lakshmi Narayana and three others claiming inter alia that they

were the successors of Dudigalla Mallaiah, who, allegedly, was 50%

share holder of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the schedule

lands. The Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) passed an order dated

04.04.2001 in proceeding No.B/3948/2000, granting succession in

respect of the schedule lands and declaring the petitioners No.1 to 4

as the successors of Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and the petitioner

No.5, as the successor of Dudigalla Mallaiah.

4. On the strength of the said succession order dated 04.04.2001,

the petitioners filed an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act

before the MRO registered as proceedings No.B/1542/2001in respect

of the schedule lands, admeasuring Ac.42.23 guntas in Sy.Nos.58, 59,

66 and 658 of Kapra village. Thirteen persons were arrayed as

respondents in the aforesaid petition. It appears that the respondents

No.9 to 13 therein, on receiving notices, did not appear or contest the

case. Respondent No.1 and respondents No.2 to 8 appeared through

their respective counsel and filed a counter on 18.08.2001, admitting

the claim of the petitioners that they were the successors-in-title of

the original protected tenants in respect of the schedule lands.

They admitted that the petitioners had been in possession of the

aforesaid land since a long time and they had no objection to

restoration of possession thereof to them, as per the protected tenant

rights. Resultantly, the MRO passed an order dated 07.09.2011,

restoring physical possession of Ac.40.33 guntas covered by

Sy.Nos.59, 66, 658 and part of Sy.No.58 under Section 32 of the

Tenancy Act in favour of the petitioners. However, land admeasuring

Ac.1.20 guntas in Sy.No.58, that was covered by built up houses and

possessed by one S.E. Srinivas, was deleted since it appears that the

petitioners did not press their claim in respect of the said parcel of

land.

5. Subsequently, on receiving a representation dated 04.10.2001

submitted by S.E. Srinivas stating that land to the extent of Ac.7.32

guntas situated in Sy.No.658 had already been converted into

non-agriculture land and HUDA had also approved a layout in the year

1991 and the said lands hae been sold by the respondents to one

Sri C. Santhu, S/o. China Thambi, S. Vishvanatham etc., through a

registered sale document dated 09.06.1997, the MRO passed an order

dated 11.10.2001 in proceedings No.B/1542/2001. The MRO issued an

Errata in the captioned proceedings, clarifying that land measuring

Ac.8.30 guntas in Sy.No.658 should be read instead of Ac.16.22

guntas in Sy.No.658, on the premise that the restoration orders dated

07.09.2011, were not applicable to the land covered by Sy.No.658,

to an extent of Ac.7.32 guntas from out of the larger chunk of land

measuring Ac.16.32 guntas.

6. An appeal under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act, was filed by

third parties, M/s. Sanala Srinivasa Chary and others, before the Joint

Collector, registered as Case No.F2/5450 of 2001, challenging the

order dated 07.09.2011 passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer in

respect of land situated in Sy.Nos.58, 59, 66 and 658. The said appeal

was allowed by the Joint Collector vide order dated 12.04.2015,

inter alia holding that a belated application had been filed by the

petitioners; though no express period of limitation is prescribed for

filing an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, the said

application must be moved within a reasonable time; the position

(nature of land) might have been changed in the meantime; the other

side (third parties) is likely to be adversely affected since equities may

have arisen in their favour and they may have spent huge amounts on

the land by improving it. It was also observed that the subsequent

purchasers or their successors had carved out plots and sold smaller

parcels of land to various persons and the respondents therein had not

taken any steps from 22.07.1952 to seek legal recourse (i.e. from the

date of purchase of the land) and the petition filed by them was highly

belated. Consequently, the order of the MRO dated 07.09.2011,

was set aside by the Joint Collector.

7. Assailing the order dated 12.04.2005, passed by the Joint

Collector, the petitioners filed WP.No.16546 of 2006, which came to be

dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated

01.05.2018.

8. The learned Single Judge elaborately discussed the rival

contentions of the parties and held that the application under Section

32 of the Tenancy Act had not been filed by the petitioners within a

reasonable time; no details had been furnished by the petitioners in

respect of the subsequent events between 1952 to 2000; the

application dated 18.04.2001 filed by them under Section 32 of the

Tenancy Act, for restoration of possession before the MRO did not

contain the dates of the death of the tenants and did not disclose the

change of the status of the land from agricultural to

non-agricultural; the record did not disclose that a PT certificate had

been enclosed by the petitioners and the names of the purchasers viz.

Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah had been incorporated in the

revenue records, as pattadars and possessors; the predecessors-in-

interest (i.e., the protected tenants) of the writ petitioners did not

challenge any of the orders or decisions. On the contrary, they allowed

those orders and decisions to attain finality during their lifetime. It was

observed that the names of Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah

had continued to appear in the revenue records; the writ petitioners

did not file any document showing enjoyment of the subject land by

the tenants or by themselves as their successors. The Court held that

without verifying the ground position or the state of affairs reflected in

the revenue records, the MRO had straightaway ordered restoration of

possession on a consent being given by persons who had no interest in

the subject land. Thus, the contention of the writ petitioners was held

to be misconceived since they had miserably failed to disclose what

had transpired for a period spanning over 48 years and therefore it

was impermissible for them to call upon the purchasers/respondents

No.3 to 11 and the other respondents to disclose the sales, change of

agricultural land into a layout and sale of plots carved out by Chindam

Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah through GPAs executed by them in

favour of several individuals. The learned Single Judge also referred to

the recitals in the sale deed dated 22.07.1952 bearing document

No.26 of 1952, wherein it was recorded that Chindam Durgaiah and

Doddi Komaraiah had purchased the land after obtaining the required

permission under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act.

9. The contention of the petitioners that the permission granted

under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act for alienation of the

schedule land had not been filed by the respondents No.3 to 11, was

rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that restoration of

possession claimed by them is not premised on the ground that no

permission had been granted under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy

Act. Further, it was held that by reference to such a permission,

registered sale deeds had been executed and based on the registered

sale deeds executed by the pattadar, M. Narayana, mutation had been

carried out in the revenue records in favour of the purchasers.

The tenants had lived up to the years 1975 and 1979 and they did not

question any proceedings which had resulted in execution of sale

deeds, mutation etc. The contention of the petitioners was held to be

misconceived since the Joint Collector was required to consider the

singular issue which was as to whether the application for restoration

of possession filed by the petitioners was filed within a reasonable time

or not. Relying on the ratio in PONNALA NARSING RAO v.

NALLOLLA PANTAIAIH [(1998) 9 SCC 183], where the Supreme

Court has held that a petition for restoration under Section 32 of the

Tenancy Act is required to be filed within a reasonable time, the

learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.

10. The appellants/petitioners have assailed the impugned

judgment on the ground that the judgment in PONNALA NARSING

RAO's case (supra), does not lay down any ratio decidendi;

that the impugned judgment is contrary to the law laid down by a Full

Bench of this Court in SADA v. THE TAHSILDAR1 wherein it was held

that neither limitation nor the plea of adverse possession can be raised

against protected tenants; the provision of Section 32 of the Tenancy

Act does not prescribe any limitation period for recovery of possession

of land by a protected tenant; the interest of the protected tenants

over the land, to the extent of 60%, could never get extinguished and

the same is heritable by the lineal descendants of the protected

tenants; the respondents are purchasers of land covered by protected

tenancy and the sale transactions are illegal. It was further argued

that the statutory Tribunals do not have any discretionary jurisdiction,

they exercise compulsive jurisdiction and therefore, delay and laches

cannot be a ground for consideration under Section 32 of the Tenancy

Act since no limitation has been prescribed under the Statute.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners asserted that the

succession granted under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act has remained

unchallenged and no finding has been returned by the Joint Collector

about the alleged oral surrender that had taken place in the year

1952. It was thus submitted that for all the above reasons, the appeal

AIR 1988 AP 77

preferred by third parties before the Joint Collector ought to have been

rejected and the writ petition ought to have been allowed in favour of

the appellants/petitioners.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents

submitted that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any error

of law or jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge, having rightly applied

the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in PONNALA

NARSING RAO's case (supra) and confirmed the order of the Joint

collector. There are no merits in the writ appeal and the same is liable

to be dismissed.

13. We have heard Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma, learned counsel for

the appellants/petitioners and Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao and Mr. Resu

Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents and carefully

perused the records.

14. The issue involved in SADA's case (1 supra) was whether it is a

condition precedent for a protected tenant to be in possession of the

land at the time when a notification is issued under Section 38-E (1)

for the purposes of issuance of an ownership certificate under Section

38-E (2) of the Tenancy Act and whether the new proviso introduced

in Section 32 (2) by virtue of an amendment vide Act 2 of 1979, that

enables a Section 38-E (2) certificate holder to seek restoration of

possession, is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Several incidental issues including the applicability of the law of

limitation and the claim of adverse possession have also been dealt

with in the said decision. However, the law laid down in SADA's case

(1 supra) is not of much of relevance for the lis involved the instant

case. There is no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down by the

Full Bench and contended by learned counsel for the

appellants/petitioners, that the law of limitation is not applicable to the

proceedings under the Tenancy Act and nor is the claim of adverse

possession available to landlords against protected tenants.

(see para 68).

15. The issue raised in the present case is however different.

The learned Single Judge was required to examine whether an

application for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the

Tenancy Act filed beyond a reasonable time, would be liable to be

rejected notwithstanding the fact that the law of limitation is

inapplicable to such proceedings. This stands answered by the

Supreme Court in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra),

where the following pertinent observations have been made:-

"3. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that

though no express period of limitation is provided for filing

application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have

to be moved within reasonable time. It may be because of such

belated applications, the other side may stand adversely

affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime.

Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent

large amounts ton land by improving it. But all these questions

have to be pleaded and proved..."

16. The Supreme Court has reiterated the settled proposition of law

that applications under Section 32 of the Act have to be moved within

a reasonable time even if the statute does not provide for an express

period of limitation. The reasons for the same are not far to see.

An inordinate delay in approaching the court for relief is likely to cause

irreparable injury to the opposite party. The status of the land may

have undergone a change and it may not be practical to put the clock

back. The contention of the learned counsel for the

appellants/petitioners that there is no ratio decidendi laid in

PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra) is therefore without any

merit and is turned down. The ratio in PONNALA NARSING RAO's

case (supra) has been consistently followed in several subsequent

decisions by this Court.

17. In IBRAHIMPATNAM TALUK VYAVASA COOLIE SANGHAM

v. K. SURESH REDDY2, the issue involved was regarding cancellation

of the validation certificates issued under Section 50-B of the Tenancy

Act and alleged to have been obtained by playing a fraud. The

interpretation of the expression 'at any time' used in sub-section (4) of

Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act, which empowers the authority to

exercise suo motu power for examining the legalilty or propriety of the

certificate issued under Section 50-B of the Act also came up for

discussion by the Supreme Court and it was held as under:

"9. ... Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute

(2003) 7 SCC 667

and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub- section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation."

(emphasis added)

18. It will also be useful to refer to the judgments of two learned

Single Judges of this Court, which arise out of matters relating to

restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act by

protected tenant or his legal heirs. The learned Single Judges, having

considered the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court

and the High Court, have reiterated the principle of law that

applications for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the

Tenancy Act have to be filed within a reasonable time.

In A. NARASIMHA v. A. KRISHNA3, it was held as under:

26. In the instant case, if it is to be said that the protected tenant lost the possession over the land, it occurred in the year 1952. The same land was transferred 20 years thereafter, in favour of respondents 6 and 7. The application under Section 32 of the Act is filed 30 years thereafter. Whether one treats two spells as a single unit or two distinct spans of period;

2005 (5) ALD 9

the delay is in decades. The record discloses that the respondents 6 and 7 have developed the land; obtained electric connections, brought it under cultivation, by incurring expenditure. From this point of view also, the application under Section 32 of the Act was not maintainable.

19. In ITHAGANI LACHAIAH v. JOINT COLLECTOR AND

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTARTE, NALGONDA4, it was held

as under:

"32. ... No doubt right is vested in a protected tenant for possession and enjoyment of tenancy lands and primary objective of the Act is to protect the interest of the protected tenant. But, merely because the right is vested in a protected tenant, he cannot keep quiet, allow others to enjoy the property and sleep over the said right and wake up after long lapse of time without regard to the subsequent developments and apply for enforcement of the provision under Section 32 of the Act.

33. In the several decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, uniformly it is held that whenever there is inordinate delay in invoking the provisions of a statute, an application should be rejected on that ground alone. Principle reiterated from time and again that even if no time limit is prescribed in the statute for exercise of power, such power has to be exercised within reasonable time and what is reasonable time depends on the facts of each case. In the cases discussed above, the delay in filing an application for suo moto exercise of power ranged between five years in one case to 12 to 15 years in another case and delay of 20 years and more in other cases. The Supreme Court held it is unreasonable to exercise power in such cases."

(emphasis added)

20. Admittedly, the original authority under the provisions of the

Tenancy Act is the Mandal Revenue Officer now designated as the

Tahsildar. The procedure for restoration of possession under Section

2015 (4) ALD 490

32 of the Tenancy Act is regulated by the "Transfer of Possession and

Eviction Rules, 1957". Rules 3 of the said Rules reads as under:

"3. (1) The Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, shall on his own motion or on receipt of an application made by a person being put in possession of land, issue a notice to the person whose occupation of the land is alleged or considered to be unauthorized or wrongful, to show cause within two weeks from the date of service of the notice as to why he should not be evicted from such land and the application or any other person be put in possession thereof.

2) The Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar, shall also issue a notice to the applicant or any other person to adduce within two weeks, evidence, if any, in support of his claim for possession of the land.

3) After expiry of the period of notice under sub-rules (1) and (2), the Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar shall, after hearing such objections and representations as are made before him, determine.

(i) whether or not the occupation is unauthorized or wrongful, and

(ii) whether the claim for being put in possession by the applicant or any other person is valid and shall pass an order accordingly.

4) In case the present occupation is held to be unauthorized or wrongful the order shall specify the time within which the unauthorized wrongful occupant shall vacate the land and handover possession to the person in whose favour an order has been passed. Every such order to vacate shall be complied with within the time specified therein.

21. It is, thus, clear from a perusal of the above Rules that the

Tahsildar shall have to conduct a necessary enquiry as to who is in the

alleged wrongful possession of the lands in question. In the present

case, it is borne out from the record that the landlords had sold the

property in question vide registered sale deed bearing document No.26

of 1952, dated 22.07.1952 after obtaining permission under Sections

47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act. There are consistent entries spanning

over about five decades, that show that the lands have changed hands

several times over, right from the year 1952 onwards and several third

party rights have been created. The sale of lands by the original

landlord, M. Narayana to Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah is

duly reflected in the Faisal Patti maintained for the year 1953-54,

Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 and Sesala Pahani for the years

1955-58 and the subsequent pahanies. The sale deed and the revenue

entries have remained unchallenged for several decades.

The scheduled lands are stated to have been converted into plots in

the year 1972 under a Gram Panchayat layout. Admittedly, a part of

the land was found to be covered by plots to the extent of Ac.1.20

guntas of land in Sy.No.58 and subsequently, on an application moved

by one S.E. Srinivas, the MRO had deleted land to the extent of

Ac.7.32 guntas in Sy.No.658, also covered by house sites,

which shows that the nature of land had been changed several years

ago.

22. The MRO, who is the original authority under the provisions of

the Tenancy Act, is also the original/recording authority under the

provisions of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act,

1979 (for short 'ROR Act'). The MRO was under a mandate to conduct

a preliminary enquiry on the basis of the revenue records so as to

verify as to whether there was any change in the title. It was also

necessary to find out whether the protected tenancy rights had been

surrendered or not and the land was capable of being used for

agricultural purposes. Unfortunately, without resorting to such an

exercise, the MRO had in a casual manner, directed delivery of

possession of the land to the writ petitioners by recording the consent

of the contesting respondents before it, who by then, were not left

with any interest over the lands in question. It is also relevant to point

out that if a proper, genuine and honest exercise had been conducted

by the MRO to establish as to who was in the alleged unauthorized

possession of the land, whether third party rights had been created

and as to the nature of the land, this entire avoidable and wasteful

litigation could have been avoided.

23. It needs to be emphasized that the Tenancy Act is a beneficial

legislation. It has been enacted for implementing agrarian reforms and

more particularly, to protect the interest of cultivators of the land.

The underlying philosophy of 'land to the tiller' was introduced to

bestow certain statutory benefits and protection to the tenants so that

they could not be unduly and arbitrarily evicted by the landlords who

were found to be influential, both economically and socially. Towards

this end, several amendments have been made in the Tenancy Act

from time to time, that have been upheld by the constitutional courts.

24. However, the authorities cannot be oblivious to the fact that the

agricultural landscape of the Ranga Reddy District (wherein the

schedule lands are situated) and the surrounding areas has drastically

changed with rapid urbanization. For the past over three decades,

many agricultural lands have been converted into residential and/or

commercial plots. Several areas of Ranga Reddy District have been

merged into the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation.

Master Plans have been prepared from time to time for regulating

urban development in the Ranga Reddy District. The Cyberabad

Development Authority had been constituted two decades ago under

the relevant statute for regulating urban development in several areas

of the Ranga Reddy District which are contiguous to Hyderabad and

Secunderabad cities. Such being the changed scenario, the authorities

are expected to exercise reasonable care and caution while enquiring

into claims filed belatedly under Section 32 of the Act by trying to take

undue advantage of the beneficial legislation. It is also incumbent for

the authorities to conduct local inspections to verify the nature of the

land, change of title etc. apart from verifying the revenue records so

as to find out who is in actual physical possession of the land and as to

whether any third party interests are likely to be adversely affected.

25. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has

observed that in the application for mutation filed by the

appellants/petitioners, the dates of death of Varla Ramachandra Reddy

and Dudigalla Mallaiah was shown as 08.08.1965 and 09.04.1960.

In the writ affidavit, the date of demise of Varla Ramachandra Reddy is

mentioned as 1979 and of Dudigalla Mallaiah, in the year 1975.

The question that arises is as to when were the appellants/petitioners

dispossessed. The date or period of dispossession would enable the

authorities to decide whether the application for restoration under

Section 32 was filed within a reasonable time. But the

appellants/petitioners have conveniently failed to furnish the date or

the period of dispossession and made a bald statement in the

restoration application that they were dispossessed after the demise of

their father and grandfather, which is highly ambiguous and open

ended.

26. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/

petitioners that successions proceedings dated 04.04.2001 were not

challenged and as such, the contesting respondents could not have

opposed the petition filed under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act,

is found to be without any merit. The dispute regarding succession is

inter se the legal heirs. In certain circumstances, perhaps third parties

can intervene to oppose such succession proceedings. But, succession

proceedings is only for the purposes of declaring the

appellants/petitioners as legal heirs of the original protected tenants.

That alone does not create or confer any further rights on them.

However, when a petition under Section 32 of the Act is instituted,

every third party or any person whose rights are affected, can oppose

such a petition on any of the legal grounds available to them, as has

been done in the instant case.

27. Another contention raised by learned counsel for the

appellants/petitioners is that the sale deed dated 22.07.1952, is

contrary to Section 38-D of the Tenancy Act. To substantiate the said

submission, learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Supreme

Court in KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF BAPTIST

CHURCHES (PVT) LTD.5

28. The issue raised in KOTAIAH's case (5 supra) relates to the

claim of the respondent - company therein for eviction of tenants

under Section 19(2) of the Tenancy Act. The Tahsildar passed an order

of eviction against the tenants and the respondent - company was

held to be the owner of the land. On appeal being filed by the tenants,

the Joint Collector, Warangal, dismissed the appeal. The matter was

carried in revision to the High Court under Section 91 of the Tenancy

Act, which was also dismissed. The tenants carried the matter to the

Supreme Court wherein the appeal filed by the tenants had been

allowed and the appellants - tenants were directed to be put in

possession of the subject land. It was held by the Supreme Court that

the appellants are protected tenants as recognized under the

provisions of the Tenancy Act. The transfer of subject land in favour of

the respondent - company was not in accordance with Section 38-D of

the Tenancy Act, which mandates that the land owner, intending to

AIR 1989 SC 1753

sell his land, has to first offer sale of such land to the protected

tenants. Finding that there is contravention of such provision,

the Supreme Court held that the title of the respondent - company is

not legitimate. The instant case does not deal with the issue regarding

title of the purchasers under sale deed dated 22.07.1952 as pointed

out in the preceding paragraphs. The appeal filed by the contesting

respondents herein was allowed by the Joint Collector on the ground

that there was inordinate delay in filing the petition under Section 32

of the Tenancy Act. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the KOTAIAH's

case (5 supra) does not render any help to the petitioners.

29. The contents of the sale deed dated 22.07.1952 reflect that

before alienating the lands, permission was obtained by the landlords

from the concerned Tahsildar vide Letter No.76/30750 dated

15.04.1952 under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act. Thus,

a presumption arises that all statutory formalities had been complied

with by the MRO before granting such permission. Though such

permission granted under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act has

not been placed on record, it needs to be noted that the contesting

respondents are third parties and cannot be expected to have such

permission in their custody. In any case, when the sale deed was

registered as long back as on 22.07.1952, it has to be presumed that

the registering authority had taken all the precautions by satisfying

itself that such a permission had been granted. It is also noteworthy

that it was never the case of the appellants/petitioners before the MRO

in proceedings No.B/1542/2001 that the sale deed dated 22.07.1952

was illegal and/or void. Further, in the order dated 12.04.2005, passed

by the Joint Collector, the issue discussed was not regarding the

validity of the sale deed. The main ground on which the appeal was

allowed by the Joint Collector was the inordinate delay on the part of

the appellants/ petitioners in filing the Section 32 application, the fact

that several third party rights had been created in the meantime and

the land had been converted into residential sites. The said order was

passed by rightly placing reliance on PONNALA NARSING RAO's

case (supra).

30. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that such an

application filed by the appellants/petitioners could not have been

entertained unless and until the date or period of dispossession was

disclosed in clear terms for the authorities to understand the date on

which the cause of action had first accrued in their favour. Though

there is no exact time mentioned by the appellants/petitioners as to

when were they dispossessed, even going by the admitted facts, as

stated in the writ affidavit that the tenants viz. Vorla Ramachandra

Reddy had expired in 1979 and Dudigalla Mallaiah in the year 1975,

there is clearly an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than two

decades in filing an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, in

the year 2001. The protected tenants have slept over their rights for

over two decades and having acquiesced to the change of ownership of

the land from the original landlords to Chindham Durgaiah and Doddi

Komaraiah in the year 1952 and to the transfer of title to the

subsequent purchasers from time to time and later, to the conversion

of the land into plots from the year 1982 onwards,

the appellants/petitioners cannot be permitted to take undue

advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Tenancy Act.

31. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, as discussed

above, it is held that the application filed by the appellants/petitioners

for restoration under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, was far beyond

reasonable time and lacked bonafides. Thus, the order impugned,

upholding the order passed by the Joint Collector, does not warrant

any interference. The writ appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby

dismissed along with the pending miscellaneous petitions, if any with

no order as to costs.

_____________ HIMA KOHLI, CJ

__________________ B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J

June 18, 2021 Note: LR copy to be marked (B/o) DSK/PLN