Telangana High Court
V.L Sujatha vs State Of Telangana on 1 June, 2021
Bench: Hima Kohli, B.Vijaysen Reddy
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICEHIMA KOHLI
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY
WRIT PETITION No.11585 of 2021
Date: 01.06.2021
BETWEEN
V.V.L. Sujatha.
... PETITIONER
AND
State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Govt.,
Consumer Affairs, Food & Civil Supplied Department,
Civil Supplies Bhavan, Erramanjil,
Somajiguda, Hyderabad and others.
...RESPONDENTS
Counsel for the Petitioner : Chakaragalla Gopal and
Mr. J. Venkataram Narasimha Reddy
Counsel for the Respondent No.4:Mr. Mamilla Ashwin Reddy
The Court made the following:
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ORDER: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice B.Vijaysen Reddy)
This writ petition has been filed to declare the action of the
State Consumer Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (State
Commission) in entertaining F.A.No.144 of 2021 and passing an order
dated 25.03.2021 on the interim application (F.A.I.A.No.295 of 2021)
moved in F.A.No.144 of 2021, thereby staying the conviction order
passed against the respondent No.4/Developer by the District
Consumer Redressal Commission, Hyderabad III (District Forum) in
EA.No.38 of 2013 dated 09.03.2021 as illegal, arbitrary and
unconstitutional and consequently to direct the District Forum to
enforce the order passed in E.A.No.38 of 2013 dated 09.03.2021,
in accordance with law.
2. The brief facts of the case are as under:-
(a) The petitioner is the owner of property admeasuring
876 sq. yards bearing Municipal No.5-8-29, situated at Fathe Sultan
Lane, Nampally, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as 'schedule
property'). The petitioner and the respondent No.4/Developer entered
into a Development Agreement dated 01.06.2003 for redeveloping the
aforesaid property and building flats thereon. The parties had agreed
that the petitioner shall receive a share of 45% and the respondent
No.4/Developer shall receive a share of 55% of the built up flats.
Alleging that there was a breach of the terms and conditions of the
Development Agreement and failure on the part of the respondent
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No.4/Developer in meeting his commitments, the petitioner filed a
complaint before the District Forum, registered as C.C.No.1026 of
2007. The said petition was allowed on 09.12.2009 and the respondent
No.4/Developer was directed to complete the construction and
handover to the petitioner, her share of the flats.
(b) The order of the District Forum was challenged by the
respondent No.4/Developer in F.A.No.208 of 2010 before the State
Commission. A separate appeal, F.A.No.316 of 2010 was also filed by
the petitioner, not being satisfied with the award passed by the District
Forum and seeking damages before the State Commission. Both the
appeals were disposed of by a common order dated 29.04.2011, with a
direction to the respondent No.4/Developer to complete the
construction and deliver 45% share of the built up area to the
petitioner within a period of four months. Respondent No.4/Developer
carried the matter in appeal to the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission (National Commission), which is stated to
have been dismissed. The matter was further carried to the Supreme
Court in SLP, which also came to be dismissed. Thus, the order dated
09.12.2009 passed by the District Forum and affirmed by the State
Commission in the two appeals, F.A.Nos.208 and 316 of 2010,
attained finality. Thereafter, the petitioner filed E.A.No.38 of 2013
before the District Forum for execution of the order dated 29.04.2011.
(c) It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent
No.4/Developer evaded service of notices in E.A.No.38 of 2013 and
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the matter underwent several adjournments. Though NBW's were
issued against the respondent No.4/Developer, they could not be
executed. The petitioner was constrained to file W.P.No.29718 of
2014 for directions to the police to execute the NBW against the
respondent No.4/Developer in accordance with the directions of the
District Forum issued in E.A.No.38 of 2013. However, during the
pendency of the said writ petition, since there was an inordinate delay
in the disposal of the E.A, the petitioner was compelled to file another
writ petition, registered as W.P.No.36528 of 2015, for an early
disposal of E.A.No.38 of 2013. Vide order dated 15.12.2015, the High
Court directed the District Forum to pass final orders in E.A.No.38 of
2013 as expeditiously as possible and preferably in two months.
Eventually, E.A.No.38 of 2013 was allowed on 19.07.2017.
(d) Respondent No.4/Developer then proceeded to file
F.A.No.278 of 2017 under Section 27A of the Consumer Protection
Act (for short 'the Act') before the State Commission, which was
dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2017, confirming the conviction
order dated 19.07.2017 passed by the District Forum in E.A.No.38 of
2013. Respondent No.4/Developer challenged the order of the State
Commission dated 07.11.2017, before the National Commission by
way of a revision petition, registered as R.P.No.3715 of 2017, which
was dismissed as not maintainable on 25.01.2021, in the light of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Housing Board v.
K.A.Nagamani, reported as (2019) 6 SCC 424, wherein it has been
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held that no Revision Petition under Section 21(6) of the Act is
maintainable against an order passed on an appeal preferred under
Section 27A of the Act in execution proceedings.
(e) Having exhausted all the remedies available to him in law,
both in the original proceedings and the execution proceedings,
respondent No.4/Developer instituted yet another fresh proceeding by
filing a miscellaneous application, I.A.No.29 of 2021 under Section
151 CPC, in the disposed of E.A.No.38 of 2013 before the District
Forum for acquittal. Vide order dated 09.03.2021, the District Forum
dismissed I.A.No.29 of 2021 and issued NBW's against the
respondent No.4/Developer with the following observations:
"The Petitioner misconstruing the above orders of
the Hon'ble National Commission in Revision Petition
No.3715/2017, approached this Commission and filed
this petition. The Commission having discharged its
function u/s. 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, by
convicting the petitioner for non-compliance of direction
No.2 of the order dated 29/4/2011 in F.A.No.208/2010
has become functus officio. As the Hon'ble State
Commission also by its order dated:07/11/2017 in
F.A.No.278/2017 confirmed the conviction imposed by
this Commission on the petitioner, the order dated:
19/7/2017 in E.A.No.38/2013 had merged in the order of
the State Commission in F.A.No.278/2017 by invocation
of the Doctrine of Merger as held in Kunhayammed &
Others v/s State of Kerala & another's 2000 (6) SCC
359. In view of the above discussion there is therefore
nothing that can be done in the matter of conviction of
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the petitioner U/s. 27 of the Consumer Protection Act,
imposed by this Commission in E.A.No.38/2013. This
petition is therefore not maintainable and is liable to be
dismissed. Accordingly this petition is dismissed."
(f) Challenging the aforesaid order of the District Forum passed
in I.A.No.29 of 2021, F.A.No.144 of 2021 was filed by the respondent
No.4/Developer before the State Commission on 24.03.2021. The said
appeal was admitted on 25.03.201 and stay of all further proceedings
in the execution proceedings was granted in I.A.No.295 of 2021 filed
along with F.A.No.144 of 2021. The relevant portion of the impugned
order dated 25.03.2021, passed by the State Commission reads as
follows:
"3. Written submissions filed by Respondent. The
appeal that is preferred is the statutory appeal as
provided U/s. 73 of C.P.Act, 2019 which corresponds to
Section 27-A of C.P.Act, 1986. As per the provisions of
Section 24-A of C.P.Act, 1986 which corresponds to
Section 68 of C.P.Act, 2019, any order of the District
Forum shall be come final only if no appeal is preferred.
It is laid down by High Court in a decision in Writ
Petition No.30234 of 2017 reported in Ms.Raghavendra
Associates and another V. District Consumer Redressal
Forum-I, Hyderabad and another, that once appeal has
been preferred, no execution proceedings can continue
till the disposal of the appeal. Therefore, there shall be
stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the order
impugned in the present appeal. For enquiry, call on
29.04.2021."
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(g) It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that the
petitioner had filed a Review Petition, I.A.No.379 of 2021 in
F.A.No.144 of 2021 under Section 50 of the Act of 2019. However,
the same was dismissed vide docket order dated 25.03.2021.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that once
F.A.No.278 of 2013 filed under Section 27A of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 was dismissed, confirming the conviction order,
there was no question of the respondent No.4/Developer yet again
filing F.A.No.144 of 2021 against the conviction order passed by the
District Forum under Section 73 of the Consumer Protection Act,
2019. The respondent No.4/Developer is thus estopped from filing an
appeal against his conviction order under Section 73 of the Act of
2019 and that State Commission ought not to have entertained
F.A.No.144 of 2021, muchless stay all further proceedings.
4. To substantiate his argument, learned counsel has relied upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Neena Aneja v. Jai Prakash
Associates Limited, reported as 2021 SCC Online SC 225. He has
further contended that the respondent No.4/Developer is depriving the
petitioner of much needed justice and is obstructing her from enjoying
the benefits of the award passed in her favour by the District Forum,
that was confirmed upto the Supreme Court. It has been argued that
the application filed by the respondent No.4/Developer before the
District Forum under Section 151 CPC, is nothing but a camouflage to
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gain wrongful entry on the file of disposed of E.A.No.38 of 2013, that
too after having exhausted all the available legal remedies against the
order of conviction passed against him for non-compliance of the
order dated 09.12.2009, passed by the District Forum which has
attained finality.
5. The petitioner is invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that
the impugned order is in gross violation of the provisions of law and
Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and has pleaded
that the respondent No.4/Developer is indulging in illegal
misadventures and filing misconceived applications and appeals by
misrepresentation of facts which are being erroneously entertained. It
has been asserted that the judgment of this Court in WP.No.30234 of
2017, based on which the impugned interim order has been passed,
has no application to the facts of the instant case and the appeal is a
gross abuse of the process of law.
6. The learned counsel for the caveator/respondent No.4 submitted
that his client has complied with the interim directions issued by the
National Commission vide order dated 09.10.2018 by delivering
seven flats to the petitioner which constitute 45% of the built up area
share. In effect, the order of the District Forum dated 09.12.2009 in
C.C.No.1026 of 2007 as modified by the order of the State
Commission in FA.No.208 of 2010 dated 29.04.2011 has been
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implemented and thus the conviction order has to be recalled.
The District Forum is having inherent jurisdiction to set aside the
conviction order since the petitioner has been delivered 45% of his
built up area share. The dismissal order of the District Forum dated
09.03.2021 is perverse and violative of Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India. The appeal, FA.No.144 of 2021, is thus
maintainable under Section 73 of the C.P. Act, 2019. The interim
order in IA.No.295 of 2021 is passed by the State Commission in
exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 38(8) of the C.P. Act, 2019
read with Section 151 CPC.
7. We have heard Mr. J. Venkatram Narasimha Reddy, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. Ashwin Reddy, learned counsel
for the caveator/respondent No.4 and perused the record.
8. As discussed above, the award dated 09.12.2009 passed in the
original proceedings in C.C.No.1026 of 2007, was confirmed right
upto the Supreme Court. In the second round of the litigation, the
conviction order dated 19.07.2017 passed by the District Forum
against the respondent No.4/Developer in E.A.No.38 of 2013, also
attained finality. Thus, the original proceedings and the execution
proceedings stood concluded. After a gap of four years, I.A.No.29 of
2021 was filed by the respondent No.4/Developer under Section 151
CPC for acquittal in E.A.No.38 of 2013, arising from C.C.No.1026 of
2007. The point is whether the conviction order passed by the District
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Forum in E.A.No.38 of 2013 having attained finality upto the
National Commission (albeit the revision petition was rejected on the
ground of maintainability), could such an application invoking the
provisions of Section 151 of the CPC be entertained, that too in a
disposed of petition?
9. In the light of the above sequence of events, the following
points arise for consideration:-
1. Whether another round of proceedings could have been
instituted by the respondent No.4/Developer before the District
Forum, by invoking Section 151 of the CPC, for acquitting him
in E.A.No.38 of 2013, which stood disposed of on 19.07.2017?
2. Whether the State Commission could have entertained an
appeal purportedly filed under Section 73 of the Act of 2019
against the order of the District Forum, dismissing the above
application filed by the respondent No.4/Developer?
10. Before answering the questions framed above, we may briefly
dwell on the aspect of the maintainability of the present petition.
Ordinarily, this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, may not entertain a petition for
issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari, if there is an alternate
remedy available under the statute. However, when administrative
authorities, judicial forums or quasi-judicial authorities act in excess
of the jurisdiction vested in them or act without any jurisdiction, this
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Court is not precluded from exercising its discretion in favour of an
aggrieved party to prevent abuse of the process of law, undo patent
illegality, intervene where the proceeding are wholly without
jurisdiction or the orders passed are grossly arbitrary.
11. In the above context, we may usefully cite Whirlpool
Corporation v. the Registrar of Trademarks, reported as (1998) 8 SCC
1, where the Supreme Court has held as follows:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition.
But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain
restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would
not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative
remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to
operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely,
where the writ petition has been filed for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or
where there has been a violation of the principle of
natural justice or where the order or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is
challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point
but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we
would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era
of the constitutional law as they still hold the field."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India, reported
as (2020) 13 SCC 285, the Supreme Court held as under:
12
"11. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution confers on
High Courts the power to issue writs, and consequently,
the jurisdiction to entertain actions for the issuance of
writs.4 The text of Article 226(1) provides that a High
Court may issue writs for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, or "for
any other purpose". A citizen may seek out the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court not only in cases where
her fundamental right may be infringed, but a much
wider array of situations. Lord Coke, commenting on the
use of writs by courts in England stated:
The Court of King's Bench hath not only the
authority to correct errors in judicial proceedings,
but other errors and misdemeanours [...] tending to
the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects,
or raising of faction, controversy, debate or any
other manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong
or injury, public or private, can be done, but that
this shall be reformed or punished by due course of
law....
Echoing the sentiments of Lord Coke, this Court in Uttar
Pradesh State Sugar Corporation Limited v. Kamal
Swaroop Tondon (2008) 2 SCC 41 observed that:
35... It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the
High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution is
equitable and discretionary. The power under that
Article can be exercised by the High Court "to
reach injustice wherever it is found."
12. The role of the High Court under the Constitution is
crucial to ensuring the Rule of law throughout its
13
territorial jurisdiction. In order to achieve these
transcendental goals, the powers of the High Court under
its writ jurisdiction are necessarily broad. They are
conferred in aid of justice. This Court has repeatedly
held that no limitation can be placed on the powers of the
High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In A.V.
Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v.
Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani (1962) 1 SCR 753 a
Constitution Bench of this Court held that the nature of
power exercised by the High Court under its writ
jurisdiction is inherently dependent on the threat to the
Rule of law arising in the case before it:
10... We need only add that the broad lines of the
general principles on which the court should act
having been clearly laid down, their application to
the facts of each particular case must necessarily be
dependent on a variety of individual facts which
must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of
the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-
eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or
even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down
inflexible Rules which should be applied with
rigidity in every case which comes up before the
court.
The powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction cannot be circumscribed by strict legal
principles so as to hobble the High Court in fulfilling its
mandate to uphold the Rule of law.
13. While the powers the High Court may exercise
under its writ jurisdiction are not subject to strict legal
14
principles, two clear principles emerge with respect to
when a High Court's writ jurisdiction may be engaged.
First, the decision of the High Court to entertain or not
entertain a particular action under its writ jurisdiction
is fundamentally discretionary. Secondly, limitations
placed on the court's decision to exercise or refuse to
exercise its writ jurisdiction are self-imposed. It is a well
settled principle that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court
cannot be completely excluded by statute. If a High Court
is tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the
Rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must
necessarily have the power to examine any case before it
and make a determination of whether or not its writ
jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review Under Article
226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the
Constitution.
14. These principles are set out in the decisions of this
Court in numerous cases and we need only mention a few
to demonstrate the consistent manner in which they have
been re-iterated. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Indian
Hume Pipe Co. Limited (1977) 2 SCC 724 this Court
observed that the High Court's decision to exercise its
writ jurisdiction is essentially discretionary:
4...It is always a matter of discretion with the Court
and if the discretion has been exercised by the High
Court not unreasonably, or perversely, it is the
settled practice of this Court not to interfere with
the exercise of discretion by the High Court.
...
19. This understanding has been laid down in several
decisions of this Court. In Uttar Pradesh State Spinning
Co. Limitedv. R.S. Pandey (2005) 8 SCC 264 this Court
held:
11. Except for a period when Article 226 was
amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to
alternative remedy has been considered to be a Rule
of self imposed limitation. It is essentially a Rule of
policy, convenience and discretion and never a Rule
of law. Despite the existence of an alternative
remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of
the High Court to grant relief Under Article 226 of
the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost
sight of that though the matter relating to an
alternative remedy has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court
should not interfere if there is an adequate
efficacious alternative remedy."
(emphasis supplied)
13. As can be gleaned from the above, the self imposed restriction
of the High Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India on the ground of availability of an alternate
remedy, is founded on the principles of propriety, equity, consistency
and for enforcing rule of law. However, such a restriction shall not
deter this Court from invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction to
advance the cause of justice and to do substantial justice to the parties
concerned.
14. In the instant case, the petitioner has approached this court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a grievance that by
entertaining the appeal preferred by the respondent No.4/Developer,
the State Commission has acted wholly without jurisdiction. The
Consumer Protection Act is a special statute and a self contained code.
The appeal in FA.No.144 of 2021 has been filed by the respondent
No.4/Developer before the State Commission under Section 73 of the
Act, 2019. Section 73 is extracted below for ready reference:-
"73 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, where an order is
passed under sub-section (1) of section 72, an appeal
shall lie, both on facts and on law from--
(a) the order made by the District Forum to the
State Commission;
(b) the order made by the State Commission to the
National Commission; and
(c) the order made by the National Commission to
the Supreme Court.
(2) Except as provided in sub-section (1), no appeal shall
lie before any court, from any order of a District Forum
or a State Commission or the National Commission, as
the case may be.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of order of a
District Forum or a State Commission or the National
Commission, as the case may be:
Provided that the State Commission or the
National Commission or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be, may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within the said period of thirty days."
15. It is thus evident that not every appeal filed against any order of
the District Forum can be entertained for the asking and a stay order
granted mechanically. When it is a question of jurisdiction, the
appellate authority, should have first satisfied itself as to whether it is
vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal at all, more so,
when the District Forum has clearly held that an application moved by
the respondent No.4 under Section 151 CPC, is not maintainable. It is
apparent that the order passed by the District Forum dated 09.03.2021,
dismissing I.A.No.29 of 2021 filed by the respondent No.4/Developer
on the ground that such an application is not maintainable, is not an
order passed under Section 72(1) so as to attract the provisions of
Section 73 of the Act, 2019. However, instead of deciding the aspect
of maintainability of the appeal at the threshold, the State Commission
chose to mechanically entertain the said appeal and further, relying on
the judgment dated 08.06.2017 passed by a Division Bench of this
Court in M/s.Raghavendra Associates v. Consumer Disputes
Redressal Forum-I, Hyderabad (W.P.No.30234 of 2017), granted a
stay of all further proceedings.
16. We are of the opinion that the principles of law laid down in the
aforesaid decision do not have any application to the case in hand.
The ratio laid down in M/s.Raghavendra Associates's case (supra)
would have been applicable if a substantive appeal or an appeal,
which is otherwise maintainable in law, would have been pending. In
the instant case, I.A.No.29 of 2021, filed by the respondent
No.4/Developer under Section 151 CPC, in a disposed of Execution
Petition has been dismissed by the District Forum on the ground of
maintainability. There was no question of entertaining an appeal under
Section 73 of the Act, 2019 against the said order.
17. In fact, Section 72(1) of the Act, 2019 corresponds to Section
27 of the Act, 1986. As pointed out above, the order dated 19.07.2017
was passed by the District Forum in EA.No.38 of 2013 by invoking its
jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Act, 1986 and the same had
attained finality. Neither has any new order been passed, nor could
any order have been passed under Section 72(1) of the Act, 2019 or
under Section 27 of the Act, 1986, as the case may be. The District
Forum having rightly held that it has become 'functus officio', has
dismissed the application moved by the respondent No.4/Developer
vide I.A.No.29 of 2021 filed under Section 151 CPC, as being not
maintainable. Thus, the purported appeal preferred by the respondent
No.4/Developer against the said order before the State Commission in
F.A.No.144 of 2021, is not maintainable since the State Commission
lacked the inherent jurisdiction to entertain the same.
18. Even assuming for a moment that an incorrect provision of law
has been mentioned by the respondent No.4/Developer and Section
151 of the CPC, has been erroneously invoked, learned counsel for the
caveator/respondent No.4 has not been able to convince this Court by
drawing our attention to any other corresponding provision under the
Act, 2019 which would vest jurisdiction on the State Commission to
entertain a petition and grant such a relief, as has been sought by the
respondent No.4/Developer in I.A.No.29 of 2021.
19. Further, assuming that the order of the State Commission
directing delivery of 45% of flats in the developed building has been
complied with by the respondent No.4/Developer, as has been
contended by learned counsel for the respondent No.4/Developer, his
remedy lies elsewhere. However, it needs to be noted that the
petitioner has vehemently denied such an assertion of compliance of
the order of the District Forum by the respondent No.4/Developer. It
is the case of the petitioner that 20 flats have been constructed in
terms of the Development Agreement and her share of 45%, comes to
just less than 10 flats, whereas, pursuant to the interim order dated
25.01.2021 passed by the National Commission, the petitioner has
taken possession of only 7 flats, without prejudice to her rights.
20. This Court is however refraining from making any observations
on such claims lest it prejudices the rights of the parties. We are only
concerned with the maintainability of the appeal (F.A.No.144 of
2021) as filed by the respondent No.4/Developer before the State
Commission and not the compliance or otherwise of the order of the
District Forum and/or the State Commission. The District Forum
having held that there is non-compliance of the order of the State
Commission, has dismissed the application moved by the respondent
No.4/Developer vide order dated 19.03.2001, reiterating that nothing
can be done in the matter of his conviction under Section 27 of the
Act, as imposed by the Forum in E.A.No.38 of 2013. No appeal lies
against such an order under the statute.
21. In the guise of moving an application under Section 151 CPC,
the relief actually sought is to set aside the order of conviction. This
would amount to reviewing the order of the District Forum in
E.A.No.38 of 2013, which has attained finality. By doing so, the
respondent No.4/Developer is trying to indirectly achieve something
which he could not achieve directly. That cannot be permitted.
22. The facts of this case remind the court of the oft quoted legal
maxim "Justice delayed is Justice denied" which is not a cosmetic
statement. All the stake holders have a role to play in ensuring that
justice is not delayed. There are several factors that contribute to
inordinate delays in the disposal of cases, including the abuse of the
legal process, adoption of dilatory tactics and cumbersome
procedures. The case at hand is a classic example of abuse of the legal
process. The petitioner, who had instituted a complaint before the
District Forum as long back as in the year 2007 and has been
successful in two rounds of litigation right from the District Forum to
the National Commission, has so far, not been able to receive the
benefits of the favourable orders. The reason being that the respondent
No.4/opposite party before the District Forum has left no stone
unturned to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the orders to the
point of filing an appeal against an order passed by the District
Forum, where no such appeal is maintainable in law, wherein the
State Commission has proceeded to grant a stay order in his favour.
23. In the light of the above discussion, the present petition is
allowed and it is held that F.A.No.144 of 2021 filed by the respondent
No.4/Developer before the State Commission is not maintainable in
law. As a result, the proceedings in appeal, F.A.No.144 of 2021 and
interim order dated 25.03.2021 in F.A.I.A.No.295 of 2021 is also
declared as non est and accordingly, quashed and set aside. Pending
miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed with no order as to
costs.
_________________
HIMA KOHLI, CJ
______________________
B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J
01st June, 2021
DSK/PLN
Note : LR copy be marked.
(By order)
DSK/PLN
