Telangana High Court

D.Shankar Prasad vs The State Of Telangana And 2 Others on 2 December, 2021

Bench: Abhinand Kumar Shavili

           HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI

                                     W.P.No.23814 of 2020
ORDER:

This writ petition is filed seeking the following relief:

"to issue an order or direction, more particularly, one in the nature of writ of mandamus (A) declaring the orders of the 2nd respondent vide proceedings L.Dis.No.C1/8761/2019, dated 9/11/2020 and the consequential orders of the 3rd respondent vide Rc.No/1059/2018 dated 20/12/2020 as illegal, improper, unjust, and contrary to law (B) declare the action of the 2nd and 3rd respondents in not reckoning the services of the petitioner in the cadre of Operator/upgraded post of Mechanic for the promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (water works branch) as illegal, and misconceive (C) declare that the petitioner is entitled for the promotion as Assistant Engineer (water works branch) with effect from 3/1/2019 i.e., the date of creation of post in the cadre strength with all consequential benefits (D) and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."

Heard Sri Gangaiah Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Endowments

appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri Jagan Mohan Reddy,

learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.3

It is the case of the petitioner that initially, he was appointed as

Helper in the 3rd respondent-Devasthanam in 2000, and later, his

services were converted from Helper to that of 'Operator' vide

proceedings dated 13.4.2005. Thereafter, the post of Operator, in which

he is working, was upgraded as 'Mechanic' vide proceedings dated

31.08.2018. Hence, he is fully eligible and qualified to be promoted to

the post of Assistant Engineer. But, as per the Recruitment Rule, the

Mechanic, who has rendered 10 years of service, is entitled for

promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer. Admittedly, in the instant

case, the post of Operator has been up-graded as Mechanic. When the

post of Operator was upgraded to that of Mechanic, the respondents

ought to have taken the services rendered by the petitioner as Operator

also into account for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer.

When the respondents have not taken into consideration the case of the

petitioner for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer, he has filed

W.P.No.2018 of 2019 before this Court and this Court disposed of the

same vide order dated 20-02-2019 directing the respondents to consider

the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Assistant

Engineer and pass appropriate orders. Thereafter, the respondents have

considered the case of the petitioner, but, mechanically rejected his

case by passing a single line order dated 09.11.2020. Challenging the

same, the present writ petition is filed.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the

respondents ought to have assigned reasons while rejecting the case of

the petitioner and in fact, no reasons were assigned except stating that

the request of the petitioner cannot be considered. In support of his

contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in

A.K.Kraipak and others vs. Union of India and others1, wherein at para

graph Nos.13 and 14, the Apex Court held as under:

The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi- judicial power. The following observations of Lord Parker C.J., in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex parte Lain2 are instructive.

"With regard to Mr Bridge's second point I cannot think that Atkin L.J., intended to confine his principle to cases in which the determination affected rights in the sense of enforceable rights. Indeed, in the Electricity Commissioners case the rights determined were at any rate not immediately enforceable rights since the scheme laid down by the commissioners had to be approved by the

1969(2) SCC 262

Minister of Transport and by resolutions of Parliament. The Commissioners nevertheless were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, as can be seen from Rex v. Postmaster-General Ex parte Carmichael3 and Rex v. Boycott Ex parte Kesslay4 the remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected.

The position as I see it is that the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court, later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter partes. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or subsequent rights of a citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is, from the agreement of the parties concerned.

Finally, it is to be observed that the remedy has now been extended, See Reg. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, Ex parte R.A. Brand & Co. Ltd.5 to cases in which the decision of an administrative officer is only arrived at after an inquiry or process of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. In such a case this court has jurisdiction to supervise that process.

We have as it seems to me reached the position when the ambit of certiorari can be said to cover every case in which a body of persons of a public as opposed to a purely private or domestic character has to determine matters affecting subjects provided always that it has a duty to act judicially. Looked at in this way the board in my judgment comes fairly and squarely, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is, as Mr Bridge said, 'a servant of the Crown charged by the Crown, by executive instruction, with the duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown.' It is clearly, therefore, performing public duties".

14. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand has held that the power to make a zoning order under Dairy Factory Supply Regulation, 1936, has to be exercised judicially, see New Zealand and Dairy Board v. Okita Co-operative Dairy Co. Ltd.6 This Court in Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar7 held that the power to alter the area reserved under the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, is a quasi-judicial power. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis.

Learned counsel further contended that even the administrative

authority also must assign reasons. But, in the instant case, no reasons

were assigned by the Authority while rejecting the case of the petitioner.

Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the short

point that no reasons were assigned and no opportunity was given to

the petitioner while passing the impugned rejection order. Learned

counsel further contended that let the respondents re-consider the case

of the petitioner afresh by assigning reasons and let the respondents

pass a speaking order in accordance with law.

Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has

fairly conceded that since the impugned order is a single line rejection

order, let the impugned order be set aside and let the respondents