Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 1266 Tel
Judgement Date : 20 April, 2021
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.ABHISHEK REDDY
WRIT PETITION No. 21623 OF 2020
ORDER:
This writ petition is filed by M/s. Hamilton Medical AG,
seeking to set aside the Intimation-cum-Notice, dated 22.10.2020
(received through mail), the Notice, dated 04.11.2020 (received
through mail, dated 18.11.2020); and Notice, dated 12.11.2020
(received through email, dated 23.11.2020) having reference No.
1581/MSEFC/2020 issued by the respondent No. 1 with reference
to the application being UDYAM-TS-02-0002716/M/00001 filed by
the respondent No. 1 and to stay all consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom.
The petitioner is a Company registered under the laws of
Switzerland, having its office at Bonaduz, Switzerland and is a
manufacturer and supplier of critical care ventilation solutions for
a variety of patient segments, applications and environments
across the world. The petitioner-Company does not have any
factory within India and therefore, is in the process of setting up a
domestic private limited company. The Company has its own
consultants, engaged in India, who facilitate the installation of the
equipment of the petitioners and undertake related ancillary work.
It also supplies the equipment to its distributors who supply to the
customers in the private and Government sectors. In August-
September, 2018, M/s. Vaishno Enterprises, respondent No. 2
herein, a partnership firm, which provides consultancy services,
approached the petitioner-Company and requested to be
associated with the Company in implementation of their projects in
India. While so, HLL Infra Tech Services Limited, a Nodal Agency
of Government of India, had floated a tender, dated 20.08.2018 to
purchase/procure 1186 high end ventilators and other medical
equipment to be supplied to various hospitals/medical colleges/
departments across India. The petitioner has participated in the
said tender by offering its bid through its authorized local agent,
M/s. Medelec Health Care Solutions ('Medelec Solutions').
Eventually, the tender was awarded in favour of Medelec Solutions.
Upon sudden resignation of Senior Consultants of petitioner-
Company, the respondent No. 2 contacted the petitioner-Company
through email and offered their services. After negotiations, the
petitioner and the respondent No. 2 entered into a Consulting
Agreement on 10.02.2020, with a restricted term of six months,
agreeing that the respondent No. 2 would act as a consultant for
the petitioner-Company and handle such issues as per the terms
and conditions of the agreement, dated 10.02.2020. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent No.2 had raised various invoices, dated
11.02.2020, 11.04.2020 and 15.05.2020 claiming certain
amounts. Even though the respondent No. 2 is not eligible to
claim those amounts, the petitioner-Company, in good faith, paid
the excessive amount as raised in Invoice Nos. 1 and 4 on
05.05.2020 and 17.06.2020 respectively, as supply was being
maintained and LCs were being opened in a rush due to pandemic
crisis. Again, the respondent No. 2 raised Invoice No. 5 on
22.06.2020 for an amount of USD 7,11,845.00. As there was no
basis for raising of invoices, the petitioner through email dated
24.08.2020 informed the respondent No. 2 that the invoices will be
cleared in due course and asked the firm to perform its obligations
and to supply the equipments to meet the huge demand. The
Consulting Agreement dated 10.02.2020 expired on 10.08.2020.
However, as the petitioner-Company is in need of services of
respondent No. 2 to meet the demand, a fresh Consulting
Agreement was entered with the respondent No. 2 on 24.08.2020
for a period of six months. Subsequently, as there was no help
and assistance for the transportation, installations, demonstration
of ventilators from the respondent No. 2, the petitioner-Company
had to involve other companies to ensure smooth supply of
equipments. The respondent No. 2, thereafter, started to threaten
the petitioner-Company in order to extort money and started to
send warning emails to various members of the Board and the
Company of the petitioner, such as email dated 24.08.2020.
Further, a legal notice, dated 09.09.2020 was sent by the
respondent No. 2 calling upon the petitioner-Company to pay the
amounts covered by Invoice Nos. 5 and 6 within 30 days along
with damages of Rs.50.00 lakh. In the said notice, the respondent
No. 2 informed that it had registered itself under the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006 (for short, 'MSME Act').
Immediately, the petitioner-Company terminated the Consulting
Agreement, dated 24.08.2020 vide termination letter, dated
02.10.2020.
While so, the Chairman of Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises
Facilitation Council, Ranga Reddy, the respondent No. 1 herein
issued the impugned Intimation-cum-Notice, dated 22.10.2020,
whereby the petitioner was advised to pay an amount of
Rs.8,18,20,882/- to the respondent No. 2 being the dues of unpaid
Invoice Nos. 5, 6 and proforma Invoice, dated 21.10.2020 within
fifteen days. The petitioner-Company sent a reply, dated
26.10.2020 informing the respondent No. 1 that no amount is
payable to the respondent No. 2 and that the petitioner-Company
is not situated within India and therefore, the provisions of MSME
Act will not be applicable to the Company. Thereafter, the
petitioner-Company received an email, dated 18.11.2020 from the
official mail ID of respondent No. 1, containing therein a covering
letter of respondent No. 2, the Statement of Claim, dated
02.11.2020 along with attested affidavit being Reference No.
1581/MSEFC/2020 and impugned notice, dated 04.11.2020
issued thereon by the respondent No. 1 calling upon the petitioner-
Company to furnish their Statement of Defense to the Statement of
Claim filed by the respondent No. 2 within 30 days. In the same
mail, dated 18.11.2020, the petitioner had also received a copy of
the Supplementary Pleadings, dated 16.11.2020, to the Statement
of Claim.
Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, the Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner-Company, has vehemently contended that all the claims
before the respondent No. 1 are being filed through online and
since the portal of respondent No. 1 does not have the option for
filing of claims against a person/Company 'situated outside of
India', in order to get the claim filed, the respondent No. 2 wrongly
incorporated the address of the Company as "M-73 'M' Block Main
Market, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi-110048" and "Via Crush
87402 Bonaduz CH South Delhi", to give an impression that the
petitioner-Company is located in India. In its reply, dated
26.10.2020, the petitioner-Company had categorically informed the
respondent No. 1 that the Company is based in Switzerland and
operating/functioning from "Via Crush 8, CH-7402, Bonaduz,
Switzerland". Therefore, the very issuance of the impugned
notices by the respondent No. 1 is without proper application of
mind apart from lack of jurisdiction. The learned counsel has
drawn the attention of this Court to Rule 6(v) of the G.O.Ms. No.
39, dated 30.06.2017 and has contended that the respondent No.
1 has the power to examine the reference at preliminary stage to
check regarding the fee or competence of MSME Unit to file the
reference and is empowered to return the same if the reference or
particulars entered therein are not to the satisfaction of the
respondent No. 1. Further, as per Rule 9(1) of the G.O.Ms. No. 39,
dated 30.06.2017, the respondent No. 1 is under obligation to deal
with the aspect of jurisdiction to entertain the claim of respondent
No. 2. In the present case, inasmuch as the petitioner-Company,
by its reply dated 26.10.2020, raised the preliminary objection as
to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1 to entertain the claim of the
respondent No. 2 and the competence of to respondent No. 2 to file
the reference, the respondent No. 1 ought to have adjudicated and
given a finding on the objection by disposing of the representation
of the petitioner dated 26.10.2020 before proceeding to issue the
impugned notice, dated 04.11.2020. The respondent No. 1 has
lost the sight of the fact that the satisfaction regarding the
jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 and the competence of the
respondent No. 2 to file the statement of claim are prerequisites for
issuance of notice. Thus, the respondent No. 1 has issued the
impugned notice, dated 04.11.2020 with utter disregard to the
reply, dated 26.10.2020 submitted by the petitioner-Company and
therefore, the same is liable to be set aside being violative of
Section 18(4) of the MSME Act. It is contended that after issuing
the reply, dated 26.10.2020 raising the jurisdictional aspect, the
Supplementary Pleadings to the Statement of Claim is made by the
respondent No. 2 as an afterthought to wriggle out of the bar of
territorial jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1. Lastly, it is
submitted that the respondent No. 2 cannot be termed as the
supplier qua the petitioner under the MSME Act, 2006.
On the other hand, the learned counsel, Sri Hari Haran,
appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 contended inter alia that
the Consulting Agreement, dated 10.02.2020 was entered solely to
facilitate payments to the respondent No. 2 for the services already
rendered for securing the interests of the petitioner-Company
before the tender and for the services to be rendered to the
petitioner-Company for ensuring smooth execution of the tender by
the Company. That the initial agreement was executed in New
Delhi; the subsequent Consultant Agreement, dated 28.08.2020
was also executed at New Delhi; the cause of action arose in India;
the service rendered by respondent No. 2 is in India and no part of
cause of action took place in Switzerland. Therefore, the
respondent No. 1 has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim made
by the respondent No. 2. The petitioner has been carrying on its
business in India through its registered office/registered service
centre at New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Bangalore; employed 14
persons to carry on its operations; appointed a Special Power of
Attorney and Special Agent. Therefore, just because the
petitioner-Company's registered office is outside India, it cannot be
concluded that the petitioner is not located in India. Since the
petitioner is a buyer of services rendered by respondent No. 2 and
is located in India, irrespective of the place of its registered office, it
is amenable to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1.
The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has also raised
preliminary objection as to the maintainability of writ petition by
the petitioner-Company being a foreign registered entity. It is
contended that inasmuch as the action of respondent No. 1 in
issuing the impugned notices is a statutory mandate under the
Rules and MSME Act, 2006, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
Further, it is contended that the petitioner has an alternative,
efficacious remedy to approach the respondent No. 1 with regard to
the objections under the mechanism of MSME Act, 2006 and the
Rules framed thereunder under Section 16 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The disputed question of jurisdictional
fact whether the petitioner is located in India or not can only be
effectively adjudicated before the respondent No. 1 but not before
this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even the
claim of petitioner-Company about its non-liability to pay the
invoices and the alleged fraud by the respondent No. 2 are again
disputed questions of fact which can be adjudicated only by
respondent No. 1.
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
This Court, while ordering notice before admission on
30.11.2020, stayed all further proceedings before the respondent
No. 1.
In order to appreciate the contentions of both the parties and
the issues involved in the case, the relevant provisions are
extracted below. Rule 9(1) of the G.O.Ms. No. 39, dated
30.06.2017, published by the Industries & Commerce (FP&MSME)
Department, reads thus:-
"The Council shall if it is satisfied that, on the facts stated therein, it has jurisdiction to proceed with the reference, cause a copy of the statement of claim to be sent by registered post to the Respondent along with the copies of the attached documents and issue notice in Form (2) to the Respondent asking him to furnish within fifteen days a statement of Defense in Form (3) with such documents and facts in support of his Defense or having a bearing on the matter under reference together with his half share of deposit for costs in such manner as may be specified therein and within the time allowed to the Respondent for furnishing his statement of Defense".
As seen from the record, in response to the mail, dated
18.11.2020 sent by the respondent No. 1 enclosing the Statement
of Claim along with notice, dated 04.11.2020, the petitioner-
Company submitted a reply on 26.10.2020 questioning the
jurisdiction of respondent No. 1 to entertain the claim of
respondent No. 1. The relevant portion of the reply, dated
26.10.2020 reads thus:-
"Mr. Chiranjeevi has given a false address for our company as "M- 73 'M' Block Main Market, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi- 110048" and "Via Crush 8, 7402 Bonaduz CH South Delhi". We request to be allowed to clarify that we are a company based in Switzerland. We are a leading manufacturer and supplier of critical care ventilation solutions based in Switzerland and operating/functioning from "Via Crush 8, CH - 7402, Bonaduz, Switzerland" for over thirty years and are registered under the laws of Switzerland. All facts can be also verified from the website https://www.hamilton-medical.com/en_IN/About-us.html.
Our company has terminated Mr. Poluru Chiranjeevi's agreement vide letter dated 02/10/2020 and our letterhead can also be examined to see the address at Switzerland. The agreements and invoices that have been enclosed in the email as sent by your good office would also reflect that we are based in Switzerland. Xxx This letter is being sent merely to clarify our correct location and is without prejudice to our rights and recourse under applicable laws. A cursory investigation on our part suggests that the MSME Act applies to domestic companies (Section 18(4) of the Act)."
In both the Consulting Agreements, dated 10.02.2020 and
24.08.2020, entered by and between the petitioner-Company and
respondent No. 2, the address of the petitioner-Company is
mentioned as Via Crusch 8, 7402, Bonaduz, Switzerland. Similar
is the address mentioned in the legal notice, dated 09.09.2020 sent
by respondent No. 2. However, it is mentioned therein that the
company is being represented by its Special Power of Attorney in
India by one Mr. Amit Bhalla, M-73 (M Block Main Market),
Greater Kailash, Part-1, New Delhi-110048. As seen from the
record, the registered address of the petitioner-Company is in
Switzerland and not India. Therefore, mere residence of the SPA
holder cannot confer the jurisdiction on respondent No. 1 to
entertain the claim of respondent No. 2. When the respondent
No. 2 had raised various invoices showing the address of the
petitioner-Company in Switzerland, it is not understandable as to
how the respondent No. 2 could provide the petitioner-Company's
address as "M-73 'M' Block Main Market, Greater Kailash, Part-I,
New Delhi-110048" and "Via Crush 87402 Bonaduz CH South
Delhi". The obvious reason for showing the address in South Delhi
appears to be to wriggle out the bar of jurisdiction of respondent
No. 1 provided under Section 18(4) of the MSME Act, 2006.
Section 18(4) of the MSME Act reads as under:-
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro Small Medium Enterprise Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under the section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India".
(Emphasis added)
The provisions of the Act, more specifically Section 18(4) of
the MSME Act, 2006, as extracted above, confers jurisdiction on
respondent No.1 only with regard to any dispute between the
supplier located within its jurisdiction and the buyer located
anywhere in India. It is well accepted principle of law that the
powers or the jurisdiction that can be exercised by any
Court/Tribunal are conferred by the statute and the same have to
be exercised as per the specified provision contained in the statute.
The said provision dealing with the jurisdiction has to be complied
with, without any deviation and the Court/Tribunal cannot deviate
from this cardinal rule. Where the Courts lack the inherent
jurisdiction to try a particular case, they cannot act beyond the
said powers or at the behest of the party and have to necessarily
reject the application at the threshold. Even acquiescence or
waiver by the other party cannot confer any jurisdiction on the
said Court or Tribunal when the same is lacking. This Court as
well as the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments has time
and again held that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at
any point of time and absence of the defect of inherent jurisdiction
cannot be cured even by acquiescence or waiver. Where an
express power under the statute has been provided, the same has
to be read in the manner provided and the language employed
therein. A plain reading of Section 18(4) of the MSME Act makes it
manifestly clear that the respondent No.1 will have the jurisdiction
only to try the case "in a dispute between the supplier located
within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India" and
not otherwise. The petitioner in this case is having registered
Offices outside of India and merely because in the cause title, the
address of the petitioner is shown as "M-73 'M' Block Main Market,
Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi-110048" and "Via Crush 87402
Bonaduz CH South Delhi", the respondent No. 1 will not get any
jurisdiction to try the case. Once it is established that the
respondent No.1 lacks the inherent jurisdiction to try the case filed
by respondent No.2, the notices issued by the said authority do not
have any legal sanctity and have to be set aside. Therefore, the
argument of the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.2
that the petitioner can raise all questions with regard to
jurisdiction aspect before the respondent No.1 cannot be
countenanced. The documents filed by the parties reveal that the
respondent No.1 does not have the jurisdiction or the authority to
issue notices to the petitioner, which is located outside India and
respondent No. 1 apparently lacks the inherent jurisdiction to try
the case and therefore, on this ground alone, the impugned
proceedings are liable to be set aside and no proceedings are
maintainable against the petitioner-Company before the
respondent No. 1.
The writ petition is allowed accordingly setting aside all the
impugned proceedings on the file of the respondent No. 1. If the
respondent No. 2 is so advised, he is free to agitate his rights
before the proper forum having the jurisdiction to decide the lis
between the parties and the same shall be decided on its own
merits.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________ A. ABHISHEK REDDY, J Date: 20-04-2021 Tsr
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